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Abstract 
For the European Union (EU), the field of trade policy is a main field in which the EU 
can assert its actorness and build its identity as an international actor. This 
“superpower” potential arises out of the EU’s extensive resource equipment in trade 
policy and is driven forward by the EU’s significant economic interests. To what 
extent, however, the EU has been able to use its resources to shape the rules of the 
international trade regime according to its own preferences has remained 
questionable.  
This thesis investigates the question of the EU’s impact on and power utilisation in 
the international trade regime by analysing the EU’s changing involvement in World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations. Drawing from the theoretical concepts of the 
“international regime” and “power”, the thesis proposes an approach centred on the 
possession, mobilisation and impact of actors’ power in international regimes. In 
particular, the thesis proposes a framework centred on five key elements: 
specification of the regime, its qualities and focus; the resources or ‘underlying 
power’ that actors bring to the regime; the resources derived by actors from the 
operation of the regime itself, or ‘organisationally dependent capabilities’; the 
manifestation or deployment of resources and strategies by actors in negotiations; 
and outcomes defined in terms of actors’ power over the regime itself. After an 
examination of the broad context of the WTO’s development and the EU’s 
involvement in the international trade regime, this framework is then explored through 
a detailed study of the EU’s involvement in the negotiations over trade in services 
that took place in the WTO between 1995 and 2005, using evidence from a wide 
range of documentary sources and from interviews.  
On the basis of this exploration of trade in services, the thesis finds that despite the 
EU’s outstanding resources, the WTO negotiations have become too complex for the 
EU to decisively influence them due to a power shift in the international trade regime. 
The special nature of the trade in services negotiations makes these particularly un-
manageable and they do not seem to present the EU with a setting for achieving its 
preferences. A lack of cooperation among the WTO members in favour of the nego-
tiations has made progress in the negotiations very hard to realise for the EU. At the 
same time, the erosion of the EU’s resources by the shifting attitude in civil society 
towards trade policy, and an apparent lack of business support, has increased the 
challenge for the EU of managing the international trade regime. Questions are 
therefore raised about the extent to which the EU has responded to change, 
mobilised its resources effectively and had a consistent impact on the international 
trade regime since the mid-1990s. 
 
KEYWORDS: TRADE POLICY, EUROPEAN UNION, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION, TRADE IN SERVICES, GATS, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, DOHA ROUND 
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1 Introduction 
In October 2006, the European Commission launched what can be a called a new 
trade policy strategy. This strategy importantly contained plans for a range of new 
bilateral trade agreements that the European Union (EU)1 was planning to negotiate 
with several of its target markets. Compared to the enthusiasm and high expectations 
the EU displayed for the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the late 1990s and 
which it kept up even through the two failed Ministerial Conferences at Seattle in 
1999 and Cancún in 2003, this is a significant sea change. This sea change occurred 
on the back of the meagre result of the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial and the 
suspension of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations at the end of July 
2006. It shows that the EU, which since the end of the Uruguay Round had been the 
main proponent of a new trade round, is seeking a new forum to achieve its trade 
policy objectives. It indicates that the European Commission (here also referred to as 
“Commission”) seems to have started to doubt that the WTO can provide the most 
efficient framework for the pursuit of trade policy objectives by the EU.  
This sea change in the EU’s trade policy hence gives rise to a set of questions 
concerning the impact that the EU has had – or has thought it had – on the rules of 
the global trade regime on the multilateral level. In general, it is assumed that the EU 
has achieved significant actorness in the international trade regime. Although the EU 
might not be as influential in the realm of classical foreign policy as a nation state, it 
is thought to be a powerful actor in the global political economy (GPE) more 
generally. For the EU itself and specifically for its negotiators in the Commission, the 
field of trade policy is the main field in which the EU can assert its actorness and 
build its identity as an international actor. This renders the WTO into a “make-or-
break” arena; it is a key place in the GPE where the EU has “superpower” potential. 
This “superpower” potential arises out of the EU’s significant resource equipment in 
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trade policy and is driven forward by the EU’s massive economic interests in the 
attempt to shape the regime according to its own preferences. To what extent, 
however, the EU has been able to use its resources to shape the rules of the trade 
regime has remained questionable, as raised by Meunier and Nicolaidis: 
One of the most interesting questions about European trade policy 
today is how far the EU will be willing or able to transform its 
structural power into effective influence (and what will be its goals) in 
establishing itself as a global power through trade (2005: 266). 
This thesis investigates the question of the EU’s power utilization in and impact on 
the international trade regime by analysing the EU’s changing involvement in the 
WTO between 1995-2005, focusing especially on the EU’s impact on the trade in 
services negotiations (General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
negotiations). The investigation in this thesis is guided by two main assumptions: 
The first assumption is that power matters in international regimes and that a power-
based analysis is crucial in understanding the nature of negotiation outcomes under 
the WTO’s heading. Starting from an International Political Economy (IPE)2 
perspective, the research proposes a concept of actor power in regimes (drawing for 
example on the work of Krasner 1991 and Keohane and Nye 2001), which guides the 
empirical investigation. The focus of this thesis is hence on the EU’s power in the 
WTO, as suggested by the Meunier and Nicolaidis quotation above. The thesis also 
sheds light on the broader issues around power in multilateral trade negotiations, as 
raised by Wolfe: 
Power is still highly salient for understanding the institutional 
design of multilateral trade negotiations, but analysts need a subtle 
conception of its dimensions if we are to understand who has it, how 
it changes, and how much critical mass is needed for any aspect of 
the negotiating process (Wolfe 2006: 9). 
                                                                                                                                        
1 Although from a legal point of view, trade policy is a European Community (EC) policy, this 
dissertation follows the everyday use of the term “EU” as a general abbreviation for the European 
Union and its component parts. “EC” is only used to denote developments before the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union, or where directly used in a quote.  
2 In this dissertation, the term “IPE” refers to the body of literature which combines international 
relations and political economy research. In the literature, IPE is also called “global political 
economy (GPE)”. However, in this thesis, GPE denotes the globalising world economy and the 
complex relations between the economic and the political realms within it.  
1 Introduction 3 
 
The second assumption, which emerges out of the investigation, is that since its 
establishment in 1995, there has been a power shift in the WTO. This power shift has 
changed the “rules of the game” in the WTO, decreased the EU’s effectiveness in the 
WTO and challenged the EU’s strategy and conduct in the WTO. Whilst there has 
been debate about the nature and extent of this power shift, the thesis argues that it 
is a key feature of the international trade regime with which the EU has had to cope 
since the late 1990s, and thus a key conditioning factor in the EU’s deployment of 
power. 
The main part of this investigation is provided by a case study dealing with the overall 
framework setting negotiations in the WTO and the services negotiations between 
1995-2005.  
This time period was chosen for a variety of reasons: The WTO agreements entered 
into force on 1st January 1995 and the international trade regime started to function 
with a completely new institutional set-up, the WTO. At the same time, with the 
inception of the WTO in 1995, agenda-setting for a new round of trade negotiations 
immediately started. These pre-negotiations were crucial in determining the shape of 
the Doha Round of trade negotiations, which was launched in 2001. The importance 
of pre-negotiations in a negotiation process has been pointed out by Winham, who 
argued for the case of an earlier trade round: “it is clear that the pre-negotiation 
phase in the Uruguay Round generally resembled the process of negotiation that 
followed from it” (Winham 1989: 293). Despite the absence of a formal multilateral 
trade round, the groundwork for the new trade round was laid and the agenda 
shaped in the 1995-2001 period. These overall framework negotiations hence 
involved the EU’s attempt at building support for a new trade round after the 
inception of the WTO in 1995 and the EU’s participation in the trade round after the 
launch of the DDA in 2001. The cut-off date for the empirical study was chosen to be 
the end of 2005: In December 2005, the third Ministerial Conference in the 
framework of the Doha Round had taken place. By the time of the Hong Kong 
Ministerial, the agenda of the Doha Round had been importantly reshaped and the 
issues that would be included in a final outcome had become visible to a large extent 
(see for example Wilkinson 2006b: 138ff). Most importantly, crucial developments in 
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terms of the EU’s power impact on the WTO had become visible and had become 
institutionalised.  
Apart from the overall framework negotiations such as those central to the DDA, the 
WTO hosts specific agreements for several issue areas under its umbrella. The rules 
for these issue areas are not negotiated in the overall negotiations, but in specialised 
councils and working groups. To gain a more complete picture of the EU’s 
involvement in the WTO negotiations, the issue area of trade in services has been 
chosen for investigation. The trade in services negotiations have been selected as an 
example as the EU has identified further services liberalisation via the GATS 
framework as one of its core offensive interests and negotiation objectives, and one 
could hence expect to observe an active attempt of the EU at shaping the GATS 
negotiations. At the same time, the GATS framework provides an interesting example 
for observation, as services liberalisation was a “new trade issue” in the 1980s and 
the GATS framework is still evolving. This means that market access negotiations 
and rule setting negotiations are taking place in parallel. Due to the regulatory nature 
of the services negotiations, they also display different negotiation dynamics from the 
“traditional” GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) style tariff negotiations. 
This distinctive nature of the services negotiations, which implies a certain 
opaqueness to the outside observer, means that the services negotiations have often 
evaded the attention especially of IPE or International Relations researchers and 
therefore are of special interest for the investigation. In the 1995-2005 period chosen 
for this investigation, a set of services negotiations took place which were highly 
interesting for an analysis of the EU’s involvement in the WTO negotiations. These 
were on services liberalisation overall and on sectoral services issues (see below), 
and thus provided ample opportunity to assess the EU’s power exercise and its 
impact.  
The regime, issue area and time frame chosen for this dissertation thus provided rich 
material for investigation. The time frame under investigation in this thesis, 1995-
2005, allowed the comparison between successive time periods of the EU’s 
involvement in the negotiations. The combination of overall negotiations and issue 
area specific negotiations allowed the comparison between different types of 
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negotiations (highly politicised versus expert-driven) and the observation of issue 
linkages.  
The contribution of this thesis to the literature is fourfold: 
• From an IPE theory point of view, the thesis explores the interaction of the 
concept of “international regimes” and the concept of “actor power”. Regime 
theory has traditionally been dominated by interest-based approaches, 
whereas the thesis promotes a power-based regime analysis. 
• On the basis of the practical example of the EU’s involvement in the WTO 
negotiations, the thesis investigates the ways in which a powerful actor uses 
its resources in the trade regime and how successful its attempts at shaping 
the regime have been.  
• The thesis provides a detailed empirical analysis of the services negotiations 
and the particular negotiation dynamics in this area, specifically with reference 
to the EU but also touching on the activities of other actors.  
• The thesis evaluates the role of the EU in a recent set of trade negotiations, 
and raises questions about EU strategies in such negotiations more generally, 
in addition to those arising from its attempts to shape the negotiations over 
trade in services. 
Apart from the academic interest that the questions in this research raise, the 
practical relevance of this dissertation is hence to “shed light” on the “inner workings” 
of the international trade regime and to the question as to what influence the EU’s 
participation has on the WTO. 
1.1 Research questions and main arguments  
As noted above, the thesis is aimed at investigating the role of actor power in 
international regimes, and specifically the power of the EU in relation to the WTO. 
The first step in the investigation is thus to establish the framework for analysing 
actor power in international regimes. This is pursued through an evaluation of 
literature on the two key concepts, “international regimes” and “power”, which in turn 
gives rise to a framework based on five key elements: 
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1. Specification of the regime, its qualities and the issue-area(s) it relates to. 
2. Assessment of the resources and capacities that an actor brings to the regime, 
which can be seen as “underlying power”. 
3. Assessment of the actor’s “organisationally dependent capabilities” and thus of 
resources derived from the regime itself. 
4. A focus on formal negotiation and bargaining processes in which the actor is 
involved, so as to bring to light the exercise of power in those contexts, in particular 
through processes of agenda setting and coalition building. 
5. An assessment of outcomes, defined in terms of “power over” the regime and the 
achievement of stated preferences. 
The investigation in this thesis is guided by the following set of research questions, 
which derive directly from the five analytical elements outlined above: 
1. How has the EU recognised and adapted to the power shift in the WTO? 
2. What resources for action does the EU bring to the WTO? 
3. Which organisationally-dependent capabilities exist for the EU in the framework of 
the WTO? 
4. To what extent is the EU capable or not capable of influencing the processes 
leading to the WTO’s negotiation agendas? Are there differences between the 
different types of negotiations in the WTO? 
5. To what extent does the EU have the capacity to build and lead coalitions within 
the WTO (coalition-building) and in which ways does it acquire support for its 
positions (consensus-building)? 
6. Do outcomes of WTO negotiations reflect preferences of the EU? Why or why not? 
 An evaluation of the WTO and of the EU’s broad role within it suggests that the 
multilateral trade regime in general had become more attractive to the EU with the 
inception of the WTO. The expanding membership of the WTO provided the EU with 
a new channel of access to the newly joining, predominantly developing countries. 
The WTO as a regime promised greater returns for the EU than other regimes (for 
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example bilateral agreements) and thus the EU attempted to mould it according to its 
preferences. On the basis of its resources and its interests, the EU postulated a 
further trade round and services liberalisation as key objectives in the WTO and thus 
as ways of demonstrating EU power. This sets the scene for the more detailed 
examination of a case study – trade in services. 
The first part of the case study deals with the EU’s promotion of the new trade round. 
In parallel, preparations for the pre-scheduled “GATS 2000” negotiations were taking 
place. After the Uruguay Round, the GATS framework remained incomplete in a 
number of areas and negotiations on maritime services, telecom services, financial 
services and the movement of natural persons were scheduled to continue after the 
Uruguay Round. Additionally, negotiations needed to be conducted on a possible 
emergency safeguard measure (ESM),3 government procurement and rules on 
services subsidies (the so-called “rules negotiations”) as well as on disciplines on the 
regulation for service providers (i.e. the requirements foreign service providers have 
to meet in order to enter a foreign market). The second part of the case study follows 
the EU’s attempts to revive the new round idea after the failed Seattle Ministerial until 
the launch of the DDA in 2001 and through the parallel start of the GATS 2000 
negotiations. The third and fourth parts of the case study cover the time between the 
start of the DDA in 2001 through the failed Cancún Ministerial to the Hong Kong 2005 
Ministerial and the parallel GATS 2000 negotiations. 
The Conclusions to the thesis bring together the evidence from the empirical study, 
evaluate key themes and trends, and relate them both to the specific research 
questions and to the conceptual framework established at the outset. They also 
review the methodology deployed in the thesis and identify issues both for policy and 
for further research in the field. 
                                            
3 An ESM could be invoked by WTO members in case of an import surge and would allow them to 
temporarily suspend their liberalisation commitments under the GATS (South Centre 2005). 
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1.2 Research methods and sources 
This section discusses the research methods that were chosen for this dissertation 
and the sources upon which it relies. The nature of the research question suggested 
a longitudinal study which would enable the comparison between different time 
periods in order to assess whether the EU’s impact on the WTO negotiations has 
changed over time. Therefore, the case study method was chosen as the main 
research method.  
A “case” is an often employed term, so it warrants some initial definition for the 
purpose of this thesis. A “case” has been defined as  
A unit of human activity embedded in the real world; which can 
only be understood in context; which exists in the here and now; that 
merges in with its context so that precise boundaries are difficult to 
draw (Gillham 2000: 1).  
In this dissertation, the “case” is the negotiations in the context of the WTO. Though 
the human interaction which will be observed in a case is necessarily a one-off 
interaction, the longitudinal design of the case study in this thesis allows the 
observation of a range of interactions over various years and across different levels 
of negotiations (as discussed above), and by the combination of evidence from a 
range of source materials, which allowed a verification of the information gathered 
(see below). 
A case study is  
one which investigates the above [the case] to answer specific 
research questions […] and which seeks a range of different kinds of 
evidence which is there in a case setting, and which has to be 
abstracted and collated to get the best possible answers to the 
research questions (Gillham 2000: 1ff).  
It deals with a specific case which has been deemed particular enough to be 
subjected to further scrutiny (Stake 1995: xi). As discussed above, the WTO 
negotiations and the issue area of trade in services warrant more thorough 
investigation for a range of reasons. 
Within the case study, a process-tracing methodology is adopted. Process-tracing is 
a method to identify the causal chains between an independent variable (here: power 
input of the EU) and the outcomes of power usage (Checkel 2005: 5). The research 
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hence assumes an exploratory (what happened?) and evaluative approach (why did 
it happen and how well are procedures working?) (Denscombe 2002: 27), and relies 
on qualitative data typical for a process-tracing method (Checkel 2005: 6).  
Stake argued that “Case study research is not sampling research. […] Our first 
obligation is to understand this one case.” (1995: 4). While it is thus not always 
possible to generalise unconditionally from studying one case as in this dissertation, 
the thesis aims to produce a form of middle-range, actor-based power analysis in a 
regime, which can potentially be generalised to a range of regimes, actors and 
issues. The investigation will hence raise a number of important questions about the 
notion of actor power in regimes. The thesis might thus give guidance for the analysis 
of other cases involving a range of actors and of international regimes.  
The theoretical framework of the dissertation is developed from a review of the 
literature on international regimes, and power in political and IPE theory. A wide 
range of literature on the WTO in general and on EU trade policy has been consulted 
and used in order to develop the analytical framework, to derive the research 
questions and to set the broader context for the case study. 
For the case study, less secondary material was available and in large parts, the 
case study is based on newspaper reports (Financial Times (FT) and others), on 
material from the US specialist trade news service World Trade Online and its weekly 
newsletter IUST (“Inside US Trade”) and on the weekly trade newsletter “Bridges”, 
published by the ICTSD (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development),4 as well as on documents published both by the EU and the WTO. 
Documents from the EU came primarily from the European Commission and included 
speeches, strategy and position papers, press releases and communications to the 
WTO. From the WTO, documents analysed included the texts of the various relevant 
agreements and treaties, communications from various WTO members, WTO press 
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releases and other information material published by the WTO such as press briefing 
packs. The most important source of WTO documentation was, however, the minutes 
of CTS (Council for Trade in Services) and CTS-SS (Council for Trade in Services – 
special session) meetings, which have been analysed for the years 1995-2005. For 
the first part of the case study (chapters 5 and 6), CTS meeting reports have been 
consulted, as the GATS 2000 negotiations were prepared in this forum. For parts 3-5 
(chapters 7-9), CTS-SS documents were used as the GATS 2000 negotiations were 
shifted into this special formation of the CTS.5  
The thesis deals with an area which requires a high level of technical knowledge 
before a researcher can interact with practitioners, as the political dimension of the 
trade negotiations, and in particular the services negotiations, is often intermingled 
with very technical argumentations made on the expert level. To gain an 
understanding of the negotiation area and of the perceived impact of the EU on the 
negotiations, it was therefore important to network with experts both formally through 
interviews and informally in the margin of conferences and workshops. A main part of 
this networking was conducted during two three months stays in Brussels (04/05-
06/05 and 10/05-12/05). The relevant experts for this research were trade negotiators 
both on the expert or senior level, staff of Directorate General (DG) Trade, industry 
and representatives from non-governmental organisations (NGOs). At the same time, 
a lot of “inside information” and perceptions could only be captured by interviews. A 
total of 36 interviews have therefore been conducted. Interviewees included current 
and former EU negotiators from DG Trade with expertise in trade in services, two 
senior staff from DG Trade, services negotiators from several (non-EU) WTO 
                                                                                                                                        
4 The availability of information about trade policy making has greatly increased with the advent of the 
weekly Bridges Trade Newsletter in February 1997 (there is also a monthly edition which provides 
in-depth analysis and views of practitioners), the online publication of WTO meeting documents, and 
of other relevant WTO and EU documentation. The trade database IUST gave an often very detailed 
account of the negotiations, but obviously had a tendency to focus more on the US position than on 
the EU. Overall, EU trade policy making is hence still less publicised than US trade policy making 
and more difficult to track.  
5 In the text, sources from specialist press (Guardian, FT, Economist, Bridges Trade Newsletter, IUST) 
are referred to by the name of the source and the date of publication and can be accessed via the 
respective websites of the publishers. Official documentation from the WTO is referred to by its 
WTO document number and the date of its publication and can be accessed via the WTO 
Documents online webpage (Links are provided in the References). 
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members, a representative of an intergovernmental organisation, a member of the 
WTO Secretariat, business representatives and a NGO representative.6 Most of 
these interviews were not taped due to the strict confidentiality that interviewees 
required. The analysis of the interviews is hence based on the notes taken during the 
interviews. The semi-structured nature of the interviews meant that interviewees 
could speak freely and add their own concerns and information about the WTO 
negotiations, which contributed to the final evaluation in this thesis. The interviews 
hence allowed the researcher to gain both an enhanced understanding of the 
functioning of the negotiations, to cross-check material that was already available 
through other documentation, and they added information which could not have been 
derived from the primary materials used otherwise for this research.  
During the interview phase, it proved relatively easy to arrange interviews with 
various stakeholders in Brussels, but it was much more difficult to gain access to the 
trade negotiator and services experts community in Geneva. Experts at the different 
national delegations in Geneva were open to interviews to varying degrees, ranging 
from great openness to refusal of interviews or giving only very limited information. 
However, once a few initial contacts had been made, it was easy to get referrals to 
their colleagues from further delegations. As most negotiators were based in Geneva 
only for a certain time, the last two parts of the case study were covered most by 
interviewees. Five interviewees commented on the earlier parts of the case study and 
in this way complemented the material available for this period of the negotiations. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 explores the two concepts of “international regimes” and “power” in 
political and IPE theory. The concept of the international regime is introduced and 
discussed on the basis of its different theoretical strands. It is argued that a power-
based approach to regimes warrants further consideration and expansion, especially 
for the case at hand, the EU’s impact on the trade regime. Hence, the second part of 
the chapter reviews power concepts in political theory and in IPE and how they relate 
                                            
6 A list of interviews and sample interview schedules are provided in Annex 6 (Sect. 12.6) and Annex 7 
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to the regime concept. The third part of the chapter introduces the concept of actor 
power in international regimes that will guide the rest of the investigation. Five 
propositions (see above, section 2.3) are presented that inform the case study and 
the more focused research questions which are presented in chapter 3. 
In chapter 3, the WTO as the main institution in the international trade regime is 
introduced. The chapter gives first an introduction to the evolution of the international 
trade regime and the EU’s involvement in it. The second part discusses the WTO’s 
institutional structure, its decision-making procedures and its main principles, 
objectives and functions. The third part of the chapter explores the role of actor 
power, as identified in the theoretical framework, in the WTO and develops the five 
propositions set out in chapter 3 into a set of targeted research questions. The fourth 
part introduces the issue area “trade in services”.  
Subsequently, chapter 4 turns towards the EU as an actor in the international trade 
regime. The chapter analyses the EU’s resources for achieving actorness in the trade 
regime, which are first of all its competencies in the area of trade policy, its economic 
weight, its expertise and extensive manpower in the area of trade policy as well as 
the support (or lack of support) of EU civil society. The EU’s resource basis for the 
services negotiations is also introduced. Secondly, the chapter evaluates EU’s 
actorness as based on its vast network of relationships with its trading partners and 
the chapter hence focuses especially on the EU’s relationships with various country 
groupings in the WTO. In a third part, the chapter discusses the EU’s resources 
which emerge from its participation in the WTO (its “organisationally-dependent 
capabilities”).  
Chapters 5-9 are devoted to the analysis of the EU’s involvement in the WTO 
negotiations overall and the services negotiations specifically. Chapter 5 analyses 
the EU’s participation in the agenda-setting phase both for the overall negotiations 
and for the GATS 2000 negotiations 1995-1999. In parallel, a range of sectoral 
                                                                                                                                        
(Sect. 12.7).  
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services negotiations took place, which are dealt with in chapter 6.7 The years 
between the failed Seattle Ministerial Conference and the launch of the DDA in 2001 
are covered in chapter 7. While the EU here continued to promote the new trade 
round, it simultaneously participated in the newly started GATS 2000 negotiations, 
which are the focus of the second part of the chapter.  
Chapter 8 covers the DDA negotiations between their launch in 2001 and the Cancún 
Ministerial. The chapter follows the negotiations proceeding towards the Cancún 
Ministerial in 2003, the outcome of which constituted a second failure. In the second 
part, the chapter provides an insight into the services negotiations as becoming a 
place of ongoing “skirmishes” between developing and developed countries. In 
chapter 9, which treats the negotiations between the Cancún Ministerial and the 
Hong Kong Ministerial, it is established that the European Commission embarked on 
various initiatives to increase the prominence of the services negotiations in the 
overall DDA negotiations. The chapter hence follows the overall and services 
negotiations until the Hong Kong Ministerial. Finally, the Conclusion revisits the 
theoretical framework with its five propositions on actor power in regimes and the 
research questions. It then discusses them on the basis of the findings of the case 
study. On the basis of these findings, it explores future options for EU trade policy 
making. 
                                            
7 While between 1995-1999, sectoral, “issue-area specific” (see Sect. 3.3.4) negotiations on trade in 
services with distinct results took place in the WTO, after 1999 mainly framework negotiations were 
held. Some issue-area specific negotiation items were treated in these framework negotiations as 
well. The few issue-area specific negotiations that took place in working groups in the WTO were 
either not documented or remained without significant results. It was therefore decided that an 
additional chapter on issue-area specific negotiations after 1999 would not be of additional value to 
this thesis.  
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2 International regimes and actor power  
As noted in the Introduction, the focus of this thesis is on three key areas: first, the 
notion of international regimes, and particularly the international trade regime; 
second, the exercise of power within international regimes; and third, the ways in 
which the European Union can be seen to exercise power within the international 
trade regime. All three of these areas have been sites for conceptual contestation. 
The notion of international regimes has attracted attention from a wide range of 
supporters and critics, whilst the nature of power is one of the most keenly contested 
conceptual areas not just in International Relations but also more generally in 
Political Science and other social sciences. The international roles and 
characteristics of the EU have also given rise to long-standing debates and 
controversies.  
Within this broad intellectual context, this chapter and the two following chapters lay 
the theoretical groundwork and establish the broad empirical context for the 
subsequent investigation in this thesis. In the first part of this chapter, the concept of 
the international regime is introduced and discussed on the basis of its different 
theoretical strands. It is argued that a power-based approach to regimes warrants 
further consideration and expansion, especially for the case at hand, the EU’s impact 
on the trade regime. Hence, the second part of the chapter reviews power concepts 
in political theory and in IPE and how they relate to the regime concept. The third part 
of the chapter introduces the concept of actor power in international regimes that will 
guide the rest of the investigation. Five propositions are presented that inform the 
case study and the more focused research questions that are presented in chapter 3.  
2.1 International regimes 
[…] Relationships of interdependence often occur within, and may 
be affected by, networks of rules, norms, and procedures that 
regularize behaviour and control its effects. We refer to the sets of 
governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence 
as international regimes (Keohane and Nye 2001: 17). 
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Increasing economic interdependence in the global political economy has created a 
rising number of collective action problems on the supranational level; and a lack of 
governance has been identified for the international sphere by certain researchers 
(e.g. Haufler 2000). The increasing institutionalisation of international relations can 
be seen as one reaction to this lack of governance. The concept “international 
regime” is one approach to conceptualise the study of international interaction 
between states (“governance between governments”) and non-state actors, and to 
analyse the puzzle of institution-building in the international arena. Regime theory is 
a discourse field, incorporating a range of approaches. This section gives an 
introduction to regime theory: it introduces the debates surrounding the emergence of 
regime theory, definitions of an “international regime” and the theoretical approaches 
underlying it.  
The concept of the “international regime” emerged in the 1970s (see for example the 
work of Ruggie 1975, Young 1980). Regime theory emerged as the result of the 
perceived inappropriateness of the prevailing realist conception of the international 
order, which failed to accommodate the increasing interdependence in international 
relations observed especially since the end of World War II. Regime theory’s main 
concerns were with why cooperation between states occurred (e.g. Axelrod and 
Keohane 1986), how regimes (or more generally international institutions) affected 
the actors involved in them (e.g. Krasner 1983), and what made some regimes stable 
and others unstable, effective or ineffective (Underdal 1992; Young 1994; Powell 
1994; Lipson 1985). The debate about formal international organisations which had 
figured in the international relations community in the 1960s did not account for this 
international behaviour that did not necessarily follow formal rules. Regime theory 
therefore set out to define an object that was not “as broad as international structure, 
nor as narrow as the study of international organisation” (Haggard and Simmons 
1987: 491). One major advantage of regime theory is that it thus aims to describe a 
“functional whole” (Hasenclever et al. 1996: 191), but describing a “functional whole” 
has also brought regime theory the critique that it was imprecise (Strange 1983). 
Originating in North America in the late 1970s, substantial theoretical debate on 
regime theory took place in the early 1980s (see e.g. Krasner 1983). Regime theory 
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has subsequently been adapted mainly by German and Scandinavian political 
scientists to fit the needs of their different research agendas (Rittberger 1993a: xiii). 
At the time of its occurrence, regime theory encouraged hopes that it might be be the 
nucleus of a new and robust theory of international cooperation (Rittberger 1993b: 5). 
It seems that in the late 1990s the debate about regime theory abated. This could be 
interpreted as a decline of the theory, but Hasenclever et al. hold that the reduction in 
fierce academic discourse in the area of regime theory shows that the foundations of 
the theory now have been laid and form a reasonable basis for future work (2000: 
4ff). And indeed, the idea of the “regime” and regime theory continue to inform case 
studies in International Relations (IR) and IPE (for example Breckinridge 1997; Claes 
1999; von Moltke 2003; Hollifield 2004; Beeson 2006; Eid 2007; Harris 2007). 
Much of the wider application of regime theory has been qualitative and based on 
case study research. Regime theory has been applied to the area of security policy 
(e.g. Müller 1993a). Haas and others adapted it for cases arising in the realm of 
environmental cooperation (Haas 1993; Wolf 1989; Prittwitz 1989; Schrogl 1990). In 
the sphere of economic cooperation, a substantial body of literature has been 
established (Zacher 1987; Kreile 1989; Krasner 1991; Zacher/Sutton 1996). In 1989, 
Huettig analysed the early signs of a regime in trade in services (1989). Further work 
was on human rights regimes (Krasner 1993), the food aid regime (Hopkins 1992; 
Hasenclever et al. 1998) and satellite-based communication (Schrogl 1993). 
At the same time, regime theory has always attracted criticism on the grounds of its 
origins and its links to constellations of power in the world arena. Its North American 
origin led its critics to argue that it had been developed in order to assure Americans 
that the liberal international world order would survive after the decline of American 
hegemony. In this respect, regime theory has been seen as a response to the 
arguments of the theory of hegemonic stability (Gilpin 2001: 84ff). A strong and 
famous critical account of regime theory has been given by Strange who argued that 
the existing economic regimes were an outflow of US-American power and portrayed 
a built-in preference for American interests (Strange 1982; Strange 1996: 24).  
Despite this critique, Mayer et al. have identified three main and continuing tasks for 
regime theory (1993; 392): 
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• the analysis of regime formation, persistence, and demise (for the latter see 
Haas 1983);  
• the categorisation and explanation of regime properties; and 
• the analysis and conceptualisation of regime consequences and effects (see 
also Hasenclever et al. 2000: 4; 1993: 392). 
This dissertation will touch on all three of these areas by focusing on how an actor (in 
this case the EU) can or cannot induce change in a regime and how the regime 
influences this ability of an actor. Such a focus links to important questions about the 
general establishment and persistence of regimes and most particularly about how 
change takes place in regimes once they have been established. It also draws upon 
insights into the properties of regimes, which constitute a shaping force in the 
generation of actor behaviour and the exercise of influence. And finally, it focuses 
especially an interest in regime consequences and effects because of its concern 
with the ways in which actors shape and are shaped by the presence of an 
international regime. Chapters 3-4 will take further the analysis of the international 
trade regime, with a particular focus on its properties and its evolution, and will also 
set the stage for detailed analysis in chapters 5-9 of the EU’s activities within the 
services negotiations that took place in the WTO between 1995 and 2005. The 
remainder of this chapter will explore the implications of a focus on actor power in 
international regimes at the level of concepts and approaches. 
2.1.1 Definitions and classification of “regimes” 
In order to proceed with the investigation in this thesis, it is important to clarify what a 
“regime” is and how it relates to the case of the EU’s involvement in the WTO. 
Whereas proponents both of realism and of organisation theory have clearly defined 
“objects of study” – the state and the formal international organisation respectively -, 
scholars dealing with regime theory have spent huge efforts on defining theirs: the 
international regime or “international governance without supranational government” 
(Mayer et al. 1993: 406). The available definitions reach from a very broad one 
denoting any “patterned behaviour” between nation states to one that is only slightly 
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different from the definition of a formal international institution. A very broad definition 
such as 
A regime exists in every substantive issue-area in international 
relations where there is discernible patterned behaviour. Wherever 
there is regularity in behaviour some kinds of principles, norms or 
rules must exist to account for it. (Puchala and Hopkins 1983: 63) 
risks over-interpreting random “patterned” state behaviour and the extent to which 
states agree on the normative basis of their interaction. This definition has therefore 
not had many followers (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 493). A narrower definition 
sees regimes as multilateral agreements among states. These agreements formally 
regulate national action in one issue area (for example Young 1982: 20; Aggarwal 
1985). This narrower definition suffers from similar shortcomings to those of the 
formal international organisation or international law literature, which omit a vast 
range of state behaviour and other intervening factors (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 
493-496; Rittberger 1993b: 8-11). Krasner’s much-cited definition seeks a middle 
ground between a very broad and a very narrow definition, and it includes both 
formal and informal interaction between regime participants. He defines a regime as 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation 
and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of 
rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing 
practices for making and implementing collective choice (Krasner 
1983: 2).8 
A regime is hence constituted by principles, norms of behaviour and sets of rules and 
decision-making procedures. To Krasner, principles and norms constitute the 
fundamental structural elements of a regime. Thus, “changes in rules and decision-
making procedures are changes within regimes, provided that principles and norms 
are unaltered” (Krasner 1983: 3); and only “changes in principles and norms are 
changes of the regime itself” (ibid.: 4).  
                                            
8 As with a very broad definition, one of the major difficulties that occurs here is how to distinguish 
implicit principles in an actor’s behaviour from a behaviour that occurs arbitrarily. 
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Obviously, Krasner’s definition sacrifices simplicity to achieve more accuracy. The 
definition and differentiation of the various elements contained in the definition has 
thus caused a range of criticisms, because in practice it proved difficult to distinguish 
between principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures in a regime 
(Ruggie and Kratochwil 1986).9 Hence, Young criticised the definition as he regarded 
it as “really only a list of elements that are hard to differentiate conceptually and that 
often overlap in real world situations” (Young 1986: 106). An equally difficult issue is 
that of the inclusion of both explicit or implicit aspects of a regime: Focusing on 
implicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, and hence implicit 
regimes, helps to incorporate a vast range of state behaviour into the analysis, but 
might accidentally include state behaviour that is coincidental rather than rule-
governed. Furthermore, the inclusion of implicit regimes might produce inappropriate 
causal conclusions about the origin of actor’s behaviour, overemphasising the 
importance of (apparent) regimes over other factors (e.g. economic factors) 
(Haggard/Simmons 1987: 494ff). 
This ambiguousness of the Krasner definition has led some researchers to define 
regimes in a less comprehensive way: 
Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by 
governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international 
relations (Keohane 1989c: 4). 
Principles, norms and decision-making procedures are here summarised into “rules”, 
and implicit regimes are no longer considered as relevant. While this obviously 
simplifies regime analysis, it also subtracts from its richness and 
comprehensiveness. While Krasner usefully could distinguish between regime 
change and more superficial changes within a regime, this distinction is lost with 
Keohane’s definition (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 12ff). For these reasons, despite the 
criticisms described above, many researchers have chosen to follow Krasner’s 
definition to delineate their object of study (see for example Kohler-Koch 1989, 
Zacher 1987, Müller 1993b, Aggarwal 1985, Rittberger 1990), and this thesis will for 
                                            
9 Critics were Aggarwal 1985, Grieco 1995, Gupta et al. 1993, Kratochwil 1989, Kratochwil and Ruggie 
1986, Strange 1982, Humphreys 1994, Spector et al. 1994, Von Moltke 1995, Keohane 1989c. 
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these reasons also broadly adopt Krasner’s definition to guide its understanding of a 
regime.  
Further argument has evolved around Krasner’s notion of the regime as place 
“around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations”. Certain researchers argued that these converging expectations that 
characterised a regime are best identified by observing states’ behaviour and their 
compliance or non-compliance with a regime (for example Young 1989a; Wolf and 
Zürn 1986). Kratochwil and Ruggie direct our attention to cognitive factors, and the 
establishment of a regime through the establishing of shared understanding and 
meaning (1986). In a later piece, Keohane criticised both of these approaches: the 
first one for creating a “circular argument” (using state behaviour as proof that a 
regime existed and then using the regime to explain state behaviour), the second for 
creating an approach that does not allow us to determine whether a regime actually 
existed. Keohane hence advocates a regime approach that focuses on explicit 
regimes (as he had previously done, see above) (1993a), and as was mentioned 
above, this approach omits a range of state behaviour that might be informed by the 
regime, but not be formalised. In common with other approaches to regime theory, it 
can also be criticised for playing down the influence of domestic factors in preference 
formation and the shaping of state behaviour, in response to which ‘liberal 
intergovernmentalists’ such as Andrew Moravcsik have proposed a focus on 
preference formation and transmission (Moravcsik 1997) 
A further critical issue is how the concept of the “regime” relates to other concepts, 
such as “international cooperation” or “international institutions”. Regimes can be 
examples of international cooperation, but international cooperation can take place 
without a regime. Regimes are thus a subsection of international cooperation 
(Haggard and Simmons 1987: 495) and can be classified as one type of international 
institutions (Keohane 1989a: 3-5, Young 1986: 107). Keohane categorises 
international institutions into formal intergovernmental or cross-national 
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nongovernmental organisations, international regimes and conventions (Keohane 
1989a: 3-5).10 
Organisations are thus part of international regimes and they help to transform and 
adapt regimes, but they have often not been the main focus of regime theory. Some 
regimes will feature strong organisational structures, whilst others will function 
without these (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 496). In this context, organisations can 
be defined as  
purposive entities, […] capable of monitoring activity and of 
reacting to it and are deliberately set up and designed by states. They 
are bureaucratic organisations, with explicit rules and specific 
assignments of rules to individuals and groups (Keohane 1989a: 4, 
see also Young 1989a: 25-27). 
For Keohane, the evolution of international organisations results on the one hand 
from the interests of the participating parties, on the other hand from their own 
organisational interests. This in turn affects and changes the regime of which the 
organisation is part (Keohane 1989a: 5, see also Young 1989a: 25-27). At this 
instance the key point is to notice that Keohane attributes a certain “life of their own” 
to international organisations: international organisations themselves can develop an 
impact on the regime and play a role in its evolution.  
Regimes are also issue-specific and built to deal with problems that are considered 
as closely related by the governments establishing the regime: for example, the world 
trade regime, the world agriculture regime, the maritime affairs regime and many 
more. Issue areas11 are evolving and not static, depending on the state of 
international affairs and the actors’ perceptions and behaviour. They are  
                                            
10 Conventions, defined as “informal institutions, with implicit rules and understandings that shape the 
expectations of actors”, are a non-dispensable component of any international system. They are 
less institutionalised than regimes and when regimes are built on the basis of former conventions, 
this generally includes an extension and further specification of the rules in the issue area. However, 
Keohane points out later that the distinction between these three categories can be less clear-cut in 
practice than in theory (1989: 5). Keohane defines international institutions as “persistent and 
connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural rules, constrain activity and 
shape expectations” (1989: 3). 
11 It needs to be pointed out here that the delimitation of an issue area is contentious. For a discussion 
of this issue see for example Efinger and Zuern 1990; Efinger et al. 1988; Zuern et al. 1990. 
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sets of issues that are in fact dealt with in common negotiations 
and by the same, or closely coordinated, bureaucracies, as opposed 
to issues that are dealt with separately and in uncoordinated fashion 
(Keohane 1984: 61). 
As we will see later, the world trade regime can be considered as one issue area. At 
the same time, it comprises many different areas, such as agriculture trade, 
intellectual property rights and trade in services. These areas in themselves are issue 
areas. It is therefore more useful to consider the various sub-areas in the world trade 
regime (see chapter 2) as issue areas which are contained in the world trade regime 
with its central organisation, the WTO.  
Regimes are constructed for a specific purpose, namely to regulate the behaviour of 
states in a certain issue area from “self-help behaviour” into a cooperative mode 
(Hasenclever et al. 2000: 3). Obviously, this raises a set of questions as to why this 
cooperative behaviour occurs. Different theoretical strands influencing regime theory 
have developed different answers to this key question in international relations. 
2.1.2 Theoretical perspectives on regimes  
Regime theory emerged in the liberal rationalist tradition. However, the concept of 
the “regime” has then been discussed by scholars from a range of International 
Relations traditions, who have brought different analytical perspectives in to bear on 
it. This means that case studies have to be seen in the light of the analytical 
perspective used in them (Kohler-Koch 1989: 21). Hasenclever et al. separate the 
different regime theory approaches into the three classic strands of international 
relations theory: power-based realism, interest-based neo-liberalism, and knowledge-
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based cognitivism (Hasenclever et al. 1996).12 This distinction has commonly 
featured in the regime theory literature and the classification of approaches 
introduced by Hasenclever et. al. 1996 will be followed in this section.13  
To put it in very simple terms, realism focuses essentially on power relationships 
between states (albeit based on a rather limited definition of power), whereas 
liberalism takes the constellations of interests between international actors as the 
main variable. Cognitivist theories emphasise the impact of actor’s causal and social 
knowledge.14 As not only realist theories consider power as their main variable, as 
not only liberalism considers interests as its main variable and as not only cognitivism 
discusses the significance of the variable knowledge, the distinction here will be 
between the main variable that the different theories consider: interest-based 
theories, knowledge-based theories and power-based theories. We will consider the 
                                            
12 Apart from those analyses which can broadly be subsumed under the headings of the three main 
strands introduced above, some authors have incorporated additional factors into regime analysis: 
Zürn proposes that the domestic level as a source for the emergence of or change in international 
regimes can be integrated into the theoretical framework of regime theory without major conflicts 
(1993). This would eliminate the problem of an incomplete systemic analysis, which can be seen as 
a further short-coming of the mainstream regime theory. Arts links regime theory to the agent-
structure debate. He does so in order to overcome the dilemma between agent and structure, or in 
other words between voluntarism and determinism, in regime formation and implementation (Arts 
2000: 515). A major shortcoming of regime theory might also be its focus on the interaction between 
nation states. The state-centrism of regime theory is puzzling given that a range of authors 
demonstrate the significant impact of non–state actors on international policy-making (Arts 1998; 
Boulding 1988; Dawkins 1991; Ekins 1992; Ray 1993). According to these authours, these non-state 
actors possess resources which give them an effect – however extensive or limited – on 
international cooperation. They have for example knowledge and political support (see also Arts 
2000). 
13 Annex 1 (Sect. 12.1) gives an overview of the main propositions of the three strands on regime 
theory. For a slightly different distinction see Arts 2000. This differentiation has not remained 
uncontested: Steve Smith points out that though being useful due to its parsimony, the distinction 
needs further elaboration (Smith 1995: 13-21), since the three schools of thought are not necessarily 
coherent in themselves. Steve Smith’s description of the state of international relations gives a good 
overview of the benefits and limitations inherent in this distinction (1995). 
14 Some argue that debate between these three classical schools of thought has often been neglected, 
with each pursuing its own research agenda (e.g. Smith 1995: 20). Power-based and interest-based 
theories share common ground, as they both assume rational actors and constant preferences and 
they both rely on a positivist understanding of knowledge. The academic debate between them has, 
however, been fierce. Some authors have escaped the competitive and lengthy arguments and have 
argued that none of the three schools of thought is self-sufficient. There might thus be room for a 
synthesis. Whether this is in practice feasible, however, remains questionable. Hasenclever et al. 
assess this room for a synthesis in two main articles (1996 and 2000).  
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theories in this order in what follows, since the focus of this thesis is on the 
development and elaboration of a power-based approach to international regimes. 
The key differences between these three broad schools in regime theory lie in their 
different emphasis on why regimes are established, to what extent regimes matter 
and why some regimes survive and others fail – in other words, on answers to the 
questions posed by Mayer et al and quoted earlier in this chapter (Mayer et al 1993; 
see also Hasenclever et al. 1997: 2). The question of to what extent regimes matter 
raises in turn the question of regime effectiveness. This is indicated by the degree to 
which its members comply with a regime and whether a regime attains its objectives 
(e.g. Underdal 1992). Whether a regime survives or fails is dependent on its 
“robustness” or “resilience”, i.e. whether it survives in view of changes in its 
environment (Powell 1994).  
Interest-based theories of international regimes 
As mentioned above, regime theory emerged in the “liberal rationalist tradition” and 
most work on regimes has focused on the realisation of shared interests as their 
main variable and on the facilitating role of regimes in this process (Hasenclever et 
al. 1996: 183). This main paradigm in regime theory has been described under 
various headings, amongst others complex interdependence, liberalism, 
neo-liberalism, pluralism, globalism and institutionalism. The differences between 
these categories shall be neglected here and the main common features shall be 
described under the heading of interest-based theories. As we will see later on (see 
Sect. 2.2), this preoccupation with interests and consensual cooperation is reflected 
in the wider field of IR and IPE of the time. 
The main assumptions of this paradigm are: first, that states are rational actors; 
second, there is increasing interdependence between nation states; third, states are 
only one set of actors in the GPE (besides others such as international organisations, 
multinational corporations etc.); fourth, there is no hierarchy between issue areas; 
and fifth, the use of force is no alternative for governments in those areas where 
complex interdependence prevails (for example Keohane and Nye 2001). These 
aspects can be found to varying degrees in the different approaches that can be 
counted under the category “interest-based”. Importantly, these approaches focus on 
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“absolute gains” from international cooperation. Cooperation to them is a positive 
sum game in which all participants win (Hasenclever et al. 1996: 183). States 
cooperate in order to facilitate the achievement of common goals (Keohane 1984: 
78). The calculation of gains undertaken by states is based on their preferences, 
which are assumed to be fairly stable over time. This means that the interaction of 
states in itself does not change preferences; in other words that there are no learning 
processes (ibid.). This goes hand in hand with a certain disregard for the “losers” or 
losses from cooperation. 
Within this broad approach, a number of distinct theoretical strands can be identified. 
The first theory has been labelled “neoliberal institutionalism”. It originated from the 
work of Keohane. Mutual interests are at the centre of Keohane´s neoliberal 
institutionalism and are the root cause for international cooperation to occur. Without 
mutual interests, there are no potential gains, which means there is no incentive for 
states to cooperate (Keohane 1989a: 2, 1984: 6, 247f). Rational choice models such 
as the Prisoner’s dilemma, collective action theories and theories of market failure 
have been used in order to illuminate how and why states as rational egoists start to 
cooperate (e.g. Keohane 1984: 78; Snidal 1985; Martin 1992, Axelrod and Keohane 
1986).15 The Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrates a situation where the individualist 
rational interest leads both actors (in a two-person game) to sub-optimal (Pareto-
inefficient) outcomes. Had there been cooperation and hence information exchange 
between the two actors, they could have realized the Pareto optimal outcome. 
Axelrod shows that the incentive for the two players to cheat can be overcome if the 
game is iterated and if the uncertainty about the other actor’s behaviour is limited, 
and that in this way a Pareto optimal outcome can be achieved (Axelrod 1984).  
Consequently, neoliberal institutionalism attributes international cooperation and 
hence regimes an important facilitator function, which allows states to realize Pareto 
optimal solutions to collective action problems. For Keohane, opaqueness, 
                                            
15 In his seminal work “After hegemony”, Keohane seeks to show that an appropriate use of rational 
choice theory will predict the emergence of international cooperation. He thus reacts to the reproach 
that certain game theoretic approaches would predict non-cooperation rather than cooperation 
(Keohane 1984: 69ff). At the time, a special issue of the journal “World Politics” (Vol. 38, October 
1985, edited by Kenneth Oye) dealt with international cooperation and game theory.  
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communicational and informational restraints in the international system impede 
optimal outcomes. While interests are the central variable of liberal institutionalism, 
mutual interests alone do not determine the outcome of a negotiation process, but 
are mediated by the nature of the international system (Keohane 1984: 69). Regimes 
thus have the purpose of decreasing the level of uncertainty between cooperating 
states and of increasing transparency (e.g. Axelrod 1984).16 From this theoretical 
point of view, one reason for the establishment of regimes is that they can lower the 
costs of collective action, and thus increase the likelihood of the provision of public 
goods (Florini 2000: 18). Furthermore, they facilitate cooperation by providing 
information and by monitoring regime participants, and hence decrease the potential 
for conflicts among states (Keohane 1984: 97, 245). Because they institutionalise 
international cooperation, regimes also create opportunities for issue linkages and in 
the longer run make non-compliance or defection from the regime costly (Keohane 
1984: 89; Axelrod and Keohane 1986: 234). This already delivers one reason as to 
why regimes “survive”: defection can be costly for actors involved in the regime. 
Keohane finds further reasons. He argues that during the life span of a regime, states 
can develop an interest in maintaining current regimes even when the circumstances 
which encouraged their creation have changed. This can occur due to several 
reasons: for example transgovernmental networks might have evolved, a more viable 
policy-making tool is not available, or maintaining a regime is less difficult than 
creating one (Keohane 1984: 98-106).  
A simplification of the theory is that it assumes actors’ interests to be fairly stable 
(Snidal 1986: 43; Powell 1994: 318, Keohane 1989b: 40f), as opposed to knowledge-
based theories that would assume changes in interests during cooperation (see 
below). A challenge in using the theory is also that interests have to be defined and 
ranked according to their intensity (Haggards and Simmons 1987: 505, see also 
Jervis 1985). 
Keohane’s work shares key assumptions with realist accounts: the predominance of 
states as actors in IR (as opposed to other work in the area of interest-based 
                                            
16 The focus on transaction costs and the facilitation of information provision shows the theory’s 
2 International regimes and actor power 27 
 
approaches), the assumption of anarchy in the international system, a focus on the 
international system while neglecting possible domestic factors and holding state 
preferences constant. He also attributes a certain degree of importance to the 
distribution of power in regimes, but this is not the main focus of his analysis 
(Keohane 1984: 14, 27). Where the two accounts part company will be discussed 
below.  
Taking Keohane’s work on game-theoretical considerations on regimes as a basis, a 
number of researchers have introduced a differentiation between collaboration and 
coordination games (Stein 1983, Snidal 1985a, 1986, Oye 1986, Zürn 1992, Martin 
1993).17 Zürn coined the term “situation-structuralism” for this approach (Zürn 1992: 
151). A key assertion of these authors is that Keohane’s approach based on game 
theory is too limited, and that the situation in which states choose to cooperate 
influences the type of cooperation and thus the type of regime which emerges. Their 
explanation for the character of a regime can hence be found in the situation in which 
the regime was established. The reasoning is that there are not only situations of 
common interests (as in Keohane’s work), but also situations of common aversions. 
For the case of common aversions, while both/all actors agree on their least 
preferred outcome, they might hold different preferences for their desired outcome. 
The dilemma then is how to choose one of the desired outcomes. For the case of 
common interests, collaboration is required, and the resulting regimes will establish 
distinct rules in order to prevent cheating.18 For the case of common aversions, 
coordination is required. The purpose of regimes dealing with common aversion is to 
ensure that a certain outcome does not occur. Once this aim of avoiding a certain 
outcome has been reached, actors are either indifferent to the actual equilibrium 
outcome that is chosen or they have preferences for different outcomes. Stein 
describes this kind of regime as essentially self-enforcing: if actors defect, they will 
                                                                                                                                        
reliance on economic institutional theories (Hasenclever et al. 1996). 
17 Axelrod and Keohane also extended the simple game-theoretic model, incorporating structural and 
situational aspects (Axelrod and Keohane 1986). 
18 As an example for a collaboration regime, Stein refers to the SALT agreements on disarmament. 
Because the actors’ incentive to cheat is very high, disarmament regimes are highly institutionalised 
and have strong policing and monitoring mechanisms (Stein 1983: 128-129).  
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be left with their undesired situation and hurt themselves. The regime thus requires 
relatively low levels of institutionalisation, and does not need enforcement 
mechanisms19 (Stein 1983: 125-130).20  
A further group of researchers has focused on the impact of the issue area’s nature 
on outcomes. These researchers were trying to solve the question as to why states 
cooperated in one area but not in others, and they found different answers from 
those generated by the situation-structuralists above. They argued that there were 
cases where neither a focus on the actor nor a focus on international structure 
provided an answer for regime-emergence or non-emergence. Instead, they 
searched for the answer in the nature of the issue area (Efinger et al. 1988). Their 
contribution to the discussion was especially a clearer delineation of the issue area 
concept, which had underlain other analyses (Efinger and Zürn 1990). They follow 
the work of Czempiel (1981) in identifying different policy domains. The likelihood of 
cooperation according to these analysts is dependent on the policy domain and 
hence the nature of the issue area. They further refine their concept by differentiating 
between different types of conflicts that can occur within these issue areas (Efinger 
and Zürn 1990). Hasenclever et al. point out that at this point these researchers allow 
for states to be at times concerned with relative gains, which signifies a departure 
from the assumptions underlying other interest-based approaches (Hasenclever et al. 
1996: 190).  
Young as one of the founding fathers of regime theory has covered a wide array of 
aspects of the phenomenon, for example on the definition and conceptualization of 
regimes (1980). Later on, he developed a model of regime formation, which focused 
on “institutional bargaining”. This model focuses on the bargaining process that leads 
                                            
19 As an example for a coordination regime, Stein mentions traffic conventions, for example the rules 
of the International Civil Aviation Organization (1983:130-132). 
20 Two further, but less prominent regime types are identified by situation-structuralist: assurance and 
suasion regimes. The assurance situation is similar to a coordination game, but with the variation 
that distrust exists between the actors and defection occurs, which leads to a pareto sub-optimal 
outcome. Again, regimes are seen as possible facilitators in this situation. Suasion or “rambo 
games” mean that the only available outcome is suboptimal for actor A, while satisfying actor B. B 
then needs to convince A to cooperate. Cooperation in such a situation could for example occur of B 
is a hegemon (Zürn 1992, Martin 1993).  
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to regime establishment. Although his theories are rationalist and interest-based, the 
assumptions concerning the roles of institutions take a step towards 
cognitivist/knowledge-based theories (see below). This is reflected for example in the 
way he portrays states as role players rather than utility maximisers (Young 1989a). 
He incorporates into his analysis the fact that negotiators in international negotiations 
are working under the condition of imperfect information and factors in the effects of 
exogenous shocks and crises (Young 1989b). Furthermore, Young outlined the 
importance of effective leadership, which is based on negotiation skills (1989b). He 
described leadership based on resources or knowledge, i.e. on power, but his 
leadership concept is based on individual negotiators rather than states or other 
potential actors (Young 1991: 288).  
Not unexpectedly, interest-based approaches put interests at the centre of the 
establishment and the maintenance of regimes. Interests might give us an indication 
as to why states cooperate, and how. Thus Neoliberal approaches focus on interests 
and the facilitating function of regimes; situation-structuralist approaches focus on the 
kind of conflict, or of cooperation game, that is played; problem-structuralists focus 
on the issue area; Young’s institutional bargaining approach focuses on the 
negotiation process and mainly on cognitive elements (though indicating the routes to 
a power-based research agenda in his later work) (1991). The interest-based 
approaches do not, however, show why certain interests prevail in a regime and why 
others do not. Using interests as a variable does not answer the question as to why a 
regime has a certain shape or not. For the question of what impact an actor such as 
the EU has on the trade regime, and whether its interests prevail or not, and to what 
extent, an interest-based approach hence cannot deliver a viable answer.21  
This shortcoming of interest-based theories has been identified in the literature:  
                                            
21 A further point of critique on interest based approaches, going into a different direction, was made 
by Florini. She argues that interests have often been considered as economically rational. She 
emphasises that the role of ideas, social and moral ideas, should be taken into account. Using the 
example of the information revolution, where knowledge has been the main driver of change, she 
shows how these new ideas can create new collective action problems and how they alter the 
relative capabilities of different types of actors to solve these problems (Florin 2000: 18-20). This 
consideration leads on to the third main school of thought, the cognitivist or knowledge-based 
theories. 
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First, Keohane himself argues that in his view, weak actors in world politics do not 
have a free choice of entering cooperation or not; they are constrained by their weak 
economic situation and hence lack the power not to cooperate. The preferences 
(interests) of the weak actors can be pushed aside by a powerful actor, and the 
preferences of powerful actors will be attributed more importance in cooperation 
(Keohane 1984: 71, see also Krasner 1991: 364). Keohane hence sees the interest-
based approaches as an addition to rather than a replacement for the “traditional 
modes of political analysis”, i.e. power-based assessments (1990: 746). Similarly, 
Barnett and Duvall criticised interest-based approaches: “[…] the choice-theoretic 
perspective frequently masks relations of imposition, domination, structural 
determination, or cultural hegemony” (2005: 7). 
Second, there is no automatism between demand for a regime and its supply. Mutual 
interests alone do not suffice to explain why in certain cases where mutual interests 
exist, a regime is established, but in other cases of mutual interests no regime is 
established. Again, Keohane himself argues at one point that there are difficulties in 
“regime-creation in the absence of hegemony” (Keohane 1984: 100). A powerful 
actor might thus be necessary to create a stable regime. Third, Krasner criticised the 
preoccupation of interest-based regime theory with market failures, monitoring and 
information, which implies that “intelligence is more important than the underlying 
distribution of capabilities”. A basic assumption of regime theory is a Pareto 
suboptimal situation;22 and an interest-based regime theory, concerned with absolute 
rather than relative gains argues that moves towards the Pareto frontier can be made 
by cleverness rather than by power. This would mean increasing at least one actor’s 
utility without decreasing others; relative gains are the relevant gains in this case and 
not absolute gains (1991: 336). In Krasner’s opinion, however, the point on the 
Pareto frontier which will be chosen and thus the nature of the regime (or of the 
regime change) can be better explained by the distribution of power between actors 
(ibid: 337). The nature of an emerging regime is hence, according to Krasner, due to 
                                            
22 A Pareto optimal situation exists when no one actor can be made better off without making another 
actor worse off. In a Pareto suboptimal situation, an actor can be made better off without making 
another actor worse off. The concept derives from neo-classical economics. 
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the distribution of power between the participating actors rather than to their 
interests. Krasner argues that although research into power is not inconsistent with 
the study of regimes, the theory seems to assume that the analysis of power is of 
minor importance (1991: 361). 
Krasner’s arguments are very significant in relation to the central thrust of this thesis. 
They indicate that although interests can be key to the establishment and functioning 
of regimes, they do not appear to be a sufficient explanation either of their existence 
in the first place, or of what happens within them. The implications of a power-based 
approach will be fully explored later in this chapter, but first it is necessary to explore 
another important strand of regime thinking: cognitivist or knowledge-based 
approaches.  
Knowledge-based theories of international regimes 
A second broad strand of regime theories is knowledge-based theories. Researchers 
focusing on knowledge-based theories have raised a set of criticisms of interest- and 
power-based approaches on regimes. They argue first that states cannot be 
regarded as rational actors that exist prior to the international system; second, that 
the static approach to IR that interest- and power-based approaches assume is not 
an adequate model as it ignores learning and historic processes; and third that the 
“positivist methodology” that these approaches assume obscures the role and 
functioning of norms at work in IR. The focus of knowledge- based theories is hence 
on interest and preference formation, and interests as perceived by decision-makers 
play a central role in their analysis (Hasenclever et al. 1996: 205ff, see also Adler 
and Haas 1992: 371, Haas 1992, Joensson 1993).  
Hasenclever et al. distinguish between “weak” and “strong” cognitivism (1997: 136-
139; 154-157). Weak cognitivism emphasises the role “of causal beliefs in regime 
formation and change”. Knowledge is the initial ingredient for interest formation. 
Once interests have been identified, states can cooperate and decide to establish 
regimes (or not) (Adler and Haas 1992: 367; Haas 1992). Knowledge is also 
important in delineating the issue area that states are intending to deal with (Haas 
1992: 29). At the same time, policy-makers are today faced with high levels of 
uncertainty in many issue areas, which require technical knowledge, and are looking 
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for reliable, scientific information (Adler and Haas 1992: 369; Goldstein and Keohane 
1993a: 16). Uncertainty can be reduced by regime formation, and this is why 
international cooperation occurs (Young 1989b: 358ff). Keohane and Goldstein argue 
that rationalist accounts cannot in every case provide a convincing explanation, but 
that changes in knowledge should be taken into account (1993b; see also Ikenberry 
1993; R. Jackson 1993). At the same time, Goldstein and Keohane recognise 
limitations of a knowledge-based approach: for the activation of these new ideas 
Goldstein and Keohane state that the new ideas “become politically efficacious only 
in conjunction with other changes, either in material interests or in power 
constellations” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993a: 25). Goldstein and Keohane develop 
a typology of ideas that differentiates between principled beliefs and causal beliefs. 
Principled beliefs reflect the worldview of an actor and guide an actor’s choice of 
preference. Causal beliefs indicate an actor’s understanding of cause and effect and 
will direct its choice of means for achieving its preferences (ibid. 8-11). In the case of 
a battle game situation with multiple outcomes, Goldstein and Keohane argue that 
the outcome is importantly influenced by ideas. The nature of a regime is according 
to Goldstein and Keohane dependent on the ideas of the actors that form it (ibid.: 17-
19; see also Garrett and Weingast 1993). If ideas become enshrined in regimes, they 
will continue to influence policy and changing them becomes more difficult (Goldstein 
and Keohane 1993: 20-24).  
The process by which new ideas enter a state’s belief system is referred to as 
learning.23 Learning can change the range of possible outcomes that states 
recognise in conflict situations, and it can change a state’s interests (see for example 
Nye 1987, Smith 1987). With regimes locking in ideas, they start to change learning 
processes and hence actors’ interests and resource allocation (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993: 20-22).  
For ideas to spread in the international community, Haas points to the importance of 
“epistemic communities” which are seen as “channels through which new ideas 
circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country” (Haas 
                                            
23 For a differentiation between different types of learning see Nye 1987 and Haas 1993). 
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1992: 27). Epistemic communities are defined as “network(s) of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain (ibid. 1992; 1989: 384). These 
networks turn into a powerful source of information that governments rely on and 
they facilitate processes of international learning. Learning from epistemic 
communities will occur especially if uncertainty in the international community is high, 
when the experts have attained a degree of consensus among themselves and when 
the epistemic community has achieved a degree of political power and become part 
of the political system (Haas 1989, 1992, 1993). Having gained this kind of status, 
epistemic communities can have important influences on the emergence or demise 
of international regimes, and in shaping those regimes (Haas 1992, Drake and 
Nikolaidis 1992, Adler 1992, Peterson 1992).  
As “strong cognitivists” focus on the normative structures of the international society, 
their critique of interest- and power-based theories is more far-reaching than that of 
weak cognitivists. As the starting point for their analysis, they focus on the norms that 
constitute the international system (Ashley 1984; Wendt 1987; Dessler 1989). The 
existence of states is dependent on the existence of norms, for example the norm of 
“sovereignty”. States would not exist without norms, and could also not cooperate 
without these norms (Behnke 1993). Norms therefore can and have to be analysed in 
their own right; they are not only tools at the disposal of nation states, they are the 
necessary constitutive elements of the international society and of actors themselves. 
Regimes then not only function as constraining state’s behaviour by their norms, but 
they also constitute and shape the social world in which states are interacting, and 
hence their perception of reality (see e.g. Ashley 1984; Wendt 1987; Dessler 1989; 
March/Olsen 1989; Hurrell 1993). When norms exist, states feel compelled to comply 
with them, and their incentive for defection or cheating decreases (March/Olsen 
1989), because non-compliance with norm can create disorder in the international 
system that states themselves depend upon (Franck 1990; Hurrell 1993). Regimes 
as part of the international system have thus a significant life of their own and will 
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survive even if power capabilities or interests change (Kratochwill 1993, 1989; Müller 
1994).24 
The strong normative character of regime theory means that one danger in applying 
cognitivist arguments to regime theory is taking arguments originating in linguistics or 
psychology out of context and applying them potentially wrongly to new and very 
different contexts (Mayer et al. 1993: 410). Joensson thus underlines the 
complementary character of cognitivist theory (1993: 221).  
The cognitivist concept thus does not deliver a comprehensive answer to the 
question of actors’ impacts on international regimes. It has been criticised by those 
taking more rationalist or positivist approaches as marginalizing the most important 
shaping elements for regimes (specifically, pre-existing preferences and power 
relations), and thus exploring essentially second-order problems of a social nature 
(see for example Moravcsik 1997). In its complementary function, however, it seems 
to provide an interesting angle on the issue of power and preferences in regimes: 
knowledge seems to be an important part of power, and to play a significant role in 
shaping and re-shaping preferences, and this is a theme which will be revisited at 
various instances in later chapters.  
Power-based theories of international regimes25 
As noted earlier in the chapter, the longest-established power-based theory is 
realism – an approach which for long periods has occupied a dominant position in IR 
theory (Vasquez 1999; Morgenthau 2005[1948]). As noted earlier, Realism’s main 
assumptions are: first, that states are the main, most important and powerful actors in 
world politics; second, states are rational actors; third, that there is a hierarchy 
                                            
24 Certain “strong cognitivists” have regarded regimes as part of communicative discourse between 
states and hence as being constantly renegotiated (for example Neufeld 1993; Kratochwil 1989; 
Schimmelfennig 1995). Others have focused on that actor’s self conceptions and their conception of 
others are in a constant process of re-interpretation and reconstitution, and this is why states’ 
interests cannot be regarded as static, too. The establishment of a shared understanding in a 
regime will exert a stabilising function among regime members (Wendt 1994; Koslowski and 
Kratochwil 1994).  
25 The differences between realism and neo-realism lie mainly in the latter’s emphasis on the impact of 
structure and in its pursuit of a greater abstraction of the international system (Linklater 1995: 242-
245). 
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between issue areas with security having the highest priority; fourth, the use of force 
is an acceptable means of conflict resolution; fifth, international institutions are of 
minor or no importance; and sixth, preferences of national states are constant, which 
means they do not change by learning in the negotiations (Keohane and Nye 2001). 
Thus, classical realists such as Morgenthau see international institutions as reflecting 
the interplay of power and interests between states, with interest ultimately defined 
as power (Morgenthau 2005[1948]). 
Structural realists or neo-realists in the tradition of Waltz did not find that international 
institutions have an important effect on international politics (Waltz 1979, see also 
Mearsheimer 1994/1995).26 Although they accept that interdependence between 
states exists, it is of minor importance when compared to the interdependence that 
exists inside states (among individuals) (Linklater 1995: 245), and this means that the 
essentially state-centric nature of international politics is not only inevitable but will 
remain predominant. Of course, this thesis does not follow this approach, as it 
assumes that regimes do matter in the interaction between states. The WTO as an 
organisation includes a dispute settlement system and other monitoring mechanisms, 
and can be assumed to have an impact on the interaction between states (Haggard 
and Simmons 1987: 497). This means that it is important to explore power-based 
approaches without necessarily adopting a conventional realist approach, and to 
relate power to the establishment, nature and evolution of international regimes in the 
broadest sense. By doing so, we can extend some of the ideas put forward by 
Krasner and others, outlined earlier in this chapter. 
A first power-based theory that has relevance is the theory of hegemonic stability first 
propounded by Kindleberger (1973, 1981). While the theory only in few instances 
deals explicitly with the concept of “regimes” as such, it entails important ideas on the 
effectiveness and robustness of regimes, and on why regimes are established or 
                                            
26 This type of realists argues that regimes occur when states calculate that the absolute and relative 
gains of cooperation are positive. The prevailing operative principle of the international system is 
anarchy; a movement towards a hierarchical system or any other organising principle is not 
foreseeable (Linklater 1995: 245). Under anarchy, states are involved in a permanent power 
struggle for survival and protection of their sovereignty. Realists therefore conclude that cooperation 
is much harder to achieve than predicted by liberalists/neo-liberalists (Hasenclever et al. 2000: 9). 
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change (Kindleberger 1981; Hasenclever et al. 1997: 86). Kindleberger’s ideas were 
taken up by Keohane and Nye (1977) and Keohane (1980), who applied them to the 
regime concept. The argument is that the establishment of regimes depends on the 
existence of a hegemonic power, and the willingness of the hegemonic power to 
enter into international cooperation. Underlying these claims is an assumption of an 
unequal distribution of power in the issue areas where a regime is established. 
Keohane and Nye argued that the stronger state in an issue area will set the rules 
and dominate the weaker actors (1977: 50-51, Kindleberger 1973, 1981). The 
regime’s robustness depends on the hegemon as well, and consequently, regimes 
are expected to disappear when the hegemon loses power. Regime change occurs 
when the power of the hegemon changes (Kindleberger 1973, 1981, Keohane 1980). 
The regime is thus so dependent on the hegemon’s power that it cannot exist without 
it. In this way, the hegemonic stability approach differs from “real” or more 
institutionalist approaches to regimes, which attribute a certain “life of their own” to 
regimes (see above). The regime in this approach is not an independent variable, but 
essentially dependent on the hegemon’s resource power. With this view of regimes, 
the theory does not attribute a facilitator function to the regime as interest-based 
schools would suggest.27 Several studies also suggested that regimes could be 
established or could persist without the presence of a hegemon (Keohane 1980, 
1984, Young and Osherenko 1993, Rittberger and Zürn 1991).28  
Further work on regimes from a realist perspective was undertaken by “post-
classical” or “modified structural realists”,29 who incorporated international regimes 
into their analysis and tried to explain the puzzle of international cooperation. They 
emphasise that it is crucial to understand the influence of power in international 
cooperation (for example Gilpin 1981; Krasner 1991). Grieco’s work, for example, 
has focused attention back on the international structure. To him, neoliberal 
                                            
27 For an extensive critique of the theory of hegemonic stability see Snidal 1985b and Young 1989a. 
28 The process or means by which hegemonic power is exercised were not a main focus of the work 
on hegemonic power, although Gilpin promoted the idea of leadership by coercion and through 
positive and negative sanctions (1981). The work of Kindleberger and others has a more “benign” 
view of the hegemon, who unilaterally supports the regime and hence provides public goods to other 
states (see also e.g. Kindleberger 1986).  
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institutionalist accounts of international cooperation fail to understand the anarchic 
nature of the international system. They underestimate the fear of being cheated 
(and hence of relative losses), which states experience in an anarchic international 
system and hence overestimate the likelihood of international cooperation occurring 
(Grieco 1988a, 1988b). Even in the absence of immediate conflict and threat to the 
state’s survival, states want to avoid situations in which fellow states can turn relative 
capabilities into bargaining power and hence into outcomes further disadvantaging 
the disadvantaged states (Grieco 1990, 1993a). Grieco incorporates calculations of 
absolute and relative gains into his work; states might choose to cooperate to realize 
absolute gains depending on their sensitivity (1990, 1988a). Grieco then suggests 
several conditions under which cooperation can take place; for example cooperation 
might occur if states have a common adversary, if the issue area is not related to 
security or if capabilities gained from the issue area are not likely to be transformed 
into general capabilities and the balance of capabilities will remain the same (i.e. 
gains of cooperation are distributed equally), (ibid., 1988b, Lipson 1984). Side-
payments can also be used to maintain the balance of capabilities between states 
(Grieco 1990: 47). Grieco sees institutions as of minor importance for the emergence 
of international cooperation (Grieco 1988a: 488, 494), but attributes institutions a 
major role in maintaining cooperation: regimes can provide information that will lower 
the fear of being cheated, can help mitigate fears about relative concerns (for 
example by introducing a notion of “reciprocity), can facilitate side-payments so that 
gains from cooperation are distributed equally (and exit options from regimes can 
provide a further re-assurance; if gains are distributed too unequally, states can opt 
out) (Grieco 1990: 233-234, 1988b).  
As was mentioned earlier in the chapter, Krasner criticised interest-based 
approaches for their neglect of which Pareto-optimal outcome would be chosen: “The 
basic issue in the politics of regime formation is where states will end up on the 
Pareto frontier, not how to reach the frontier in the first place” (Krasner 1993: 140). 
Krasner sets out to explain cooperation in regimes with the two variables interest and 
                                                                                                                                        
29 For this distinction see Brooks 1997 and Schweller and Priess 1997. 
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power, but his emphasis is clearly on power, or to be more precise on “relative power 
capabilities” (1991: 336). For the case of a coordination problem (common aversion), 
Krasner observes that a regime is established if the power distribution is symmetrical. 
If the power distribution between actors is asymmetrical, powerful states will 
unilaterally pursue their preferred policy. The point that Krasner makes focuses on 
the case of a symmetrical power distribution and a common aversion problem: What 
would happen if there is not only one, but several Pareto efficient outcomes and 
actors disagree about their preferred outcome? What would determine who would 
win this distributional conflict? Krasner argues that the answer to this question is to 
be found in the distribution of power capabilities (1991: 337). To illustrate his point, 
Krasner refers to the game “Battle of the Sexes”, illustrated by a couple wanting to go 
on holiday together: the two actors agree on what they want to avoid (not to go on 
holiday together), but they differ on their preferred location (mountains or seaside).  
To Krasner, the employment of power in a distributional conflict can have the 
following outcomes (among others) (1991: 340): 
• Inclusion or exclusion of actors: Powerful actors can determine who is 
admitted to the “game” in the first place. 
• Setting the rules of the game: Powerful actors can set the rules of the 
game, for example, which actor gets the chance to move first. 
• Changing the rewards of the game: Powerful actors can change the “payoff 
matrix” of a game. They can use issue linkages to threaten other actors 
into compliant behaviour.  
Consequently, power to Krasner “[…] can be understood as the ability to determine 
who plays the game, or to define the rules, or to change the values within the payoff 
matrix” (1991: 342). His focus is hence on power outcomes and how power can be 
used in the bargaining process, but he also makes statements on the sources of 
power for his case study on communication regimes: 
“Power has been determined by three considerations: technology 
and market size, which have influenced the relative opportunity costs 
of change and therefore the ability to make credible threats; 
membership in universal international organisations, which has given 
states the presumptive right to influence policies that are affected by 
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one-nation-one-vote decision-making procedures; and control over 
territorial access provided by juridical sovereignty.” (Krasner 1991: 
363; see also Krasner 1985).  
However, Krasner’s power argument does not stop here. Power changes to him are 
also responsible for the emergence of conflict between states (in his example of the 
global communication regime new power was conferred by new technologies which 
then raised collective action problems) (1991: 337), and regimes change when the 
power distribution changes (1991: 363). Krasner parts company with “traditional” 
realists: to him, the regime assumes a stabilizing function and helps to resolve 
coordination problems. It is the nature of the regime that Krasner tries to explain.  
In an earlier work on regimes, Krasner had elaborated on the relationship between 
regimes and actor power. He argued that changes in the power distribution between 
regime participants did not immediately transmit into the regime. Whereas a regime 
initially reflected the power distribution between the participants, this power 
distribution proved to be much more dynamic than the static properties of the regime. 
This time lag in the transmission of power changes means that the regime (and 
hence its norms, rules, principles) can have an influence on an actor’s power and the 
resulting outcomes of power exercise, or - to phrase this differently – the regime is 
partially independent of the underlying power distribution (between the regime 
participants). It may empower or constrain certain actors and potentially run counter 
to the interests of states, which, if we only looked at the distribution of resources, 
would be considered the most powerful. Regimes hence have a certain “life of their 
own” (Krasner 1983: 357). In this way, Krasner departs from scholars such as Gilpin, 
whose understanding of the international system is that relations of states are 
immediately changed when power distributions change (1981: 9), and comes close to 
the positions adopted by some interest-based approaches.  
If this is accepted, regimes can then produce the following effects on actors:  
“First, regimes can alter actors’ calculations of how to maximize 
their interests. Second, regimes may alter interests themselves. 
Third, regimes may become a source of power to which actors can 
appeal. Fourth, regimes may alter the power capabilities of different 
actors, including states.” (Krasner 1983: 361). 
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The first effect emerges from the changes in the incentive structure for actors that the 
regime causes. Actors develop an interest in maintaining the regime. Increased 
information between regime participants also changes interests themselves. The 
principles, norms and decision-making procedures of regimes also might advantage 
certain actors over others, and hence regimes become a source of power. This might 
ultimately feed back into the resource basis of actors, strengthening the resource 
basis of certain actors and weakening others (ibid. 361-367).30 
Although Keohane has put forward the most extensive interest-based approach on 
regimes, which led to significant later work by other researchers, his own work also 
contains elements concerning the variable “power” in a regime context. Power to him 
is essential in the establishment of regimes (see Sect. 2.1.2; Keohane 1984). 
Keohane and Nye’s famous work on complex interdependence also contains notions 
of a power concept, albeit a limited one (see Sect. 2.3). Likewise, Gilpin concludes 
that regimes might well be biased towards the most powerful participant and points to 
a research agenda in regard to “the history of compliance by affected states, 
particularly in situations when a regime is perceived as being counter to a state’s 
interests” (2001: 86). If regimes are reflective of the power distribution among their 
participants, the question can be raised as to what happens when this power 
distribution changes (see below). 
Arts identifies a further power-based stream in IR, which he terms political economy 
(2000). Proponents of political economy focus on structural power in Strange’s sense 
as control over production, finance, ideas and knowledge (1994; see below) or, if one 
assumes a less extensive notion of power, in Cox’s sense of control over the 
production system (1981). While Krasner’s understanding of power also entails 
notions of structural power, the main emphasis in political economy is on structural 
power. Political economy also incorporates a broader range of actors; not just states, 
but all those actors who could be the holders of power are taken as units of analysis. 
Power and hegemony can thus result from domination of politics, economics and 
                                            
30 Schrogl confirms this empowering aspect of regimes in his study on international cooperation in the 
area of satellite-based communications (1993). For a study on “battle games” with multiple 
outcomes see Garrett’s account on the completion of the EC’s internal market (1993).  
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knowledge in a certain area, but also from the possession of certain ideas and values 
(Strange 1994; Guzzini 1993; Lipschutz and Conca 1993). Political economists have 
partially criticised regime theory as being preoccupied with surface phenomena, as 
the important changes to them are changes in the distribution of power in the 
structure of the international system (Lipschutz and Conca 1993). This power 
definition and explanation of regime change is too far-reaching for the purpose of the 
actor-based power analysis in this thesis, which will focus on power exercise in one 
specific regime. However, it helps to remember that changes observed in one 
specific regime might be part of broader, structural changes. 
There is thus a strong basis for incorporating arguments about power into a 
consideration of how regimes arise, evolve and produce effects. Although this thesis 
will take up the basic realist demand for a consideration of power in regime analysis, 
it will follow the work of for example Krasner in assuming that regimes matter, and 
that power in regimes matters. It will hence adopt a power definition broader than the 
realist one, which is based mainly on military power. A broader and redefined power 
concept needs to be found in order to proceed with the analysis (as will be discussed 
in Sect. 2.2 and 2.3). Not only this, but power in the context of this thesis needs to be 
considered in relation to specific actors or groups of actors operating within a specific 
issue area. So the need is for an actor-based conception of power that can be 
applied within the context of international regimes. This is the focus of the remainder 
of this chapter. 
2.2 Power in political theory and IPE 
As discussed above, regime theory and with it the broad gist of IR theory of the 
1980s and 1990s have not focused on power as their main variable, but on interest-
based approaches. The question about the influence of power in regimes has not 
received as much attention in IR and IPE (Guzzini 2000: 53; Gehring 2004). One 
reason for this, as noted above, is that the interest-based school assumed symmetry 
between actors and hence eliminated power considerations from its research 
agenda. Another reason is that the empirical assessment of power can be a 
challenge. Guzzini argues that an assessment of power always includes 
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“counterfactual reasoning”; the researcher “compares” the state of affairs with an 
imagined situation where power is non-existent (1993: 446).  
Nonetheless, questions concerning the choice of the regulatory model in the GPE 
(“who governs”), the distribution of gains in cooperation (“who wins and how much”) 
and whether regimes are tools of the most powerful countries to preserve their 
interests are crucial in the discussion surrounding the expansion of international 
regimes (and in the context of this thesis, of the trade regime). “Power” of actors in 
the solution of distributional conflicts is hence a significant variable for understanding 
the functioning of the GPE. Florini, for example, argued on the basis of collective 
action theories that 
“with a little translation into the appropriate theoretical terms, the 
debate over the form of the emergent world order boils down to 
disagreements over which collectivities will provide which collective 
goods to whom” (2000: 15). 
Similarly, Barnett and Duvall extensively criticise the pre-occupation of IR with 
interests and norms, and argue for a power-based analysis of global governance: 
“By using the optics of power, we transform the image of global 
governance. No longer is it solely concerned with the creation and 
maintenance of institutional arrangements through consensual 
relations and voluntary choice. It now becomes a question of how 
global life is organized, structured, and regulated.” (Barnett and 
Duvall 2005). 
To understand the power of actors in international regimes, we need to understand 
what the notion of power entails, what the sources of power are, what factors shape 
power and what effects power has. How have political theory and IPE analysts up to 
now dealt with power? What power concepts have they employed? How do these 
concepts relate to the concept of “regimes”?  
2.2.1 Power in political theory 
While power might be a contentious concept, it nonetheless is a key concept in 
political sciences (Lukes 1974, 2005; Connolly 1983), and power theories in political 
theory are a far-reaching field. The issue of “power” has also attracted the attention 
of many different sub-disciplines of political science (for example postmodernism, 
international relations, feminist approaches) (Morriss 2002: xii), and the literature 
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dealing with power is respectively wide.31 Core aspects of the understanding of 
power in political theory will be briefly discussed here to give an impression of the 
debate in political sciences and to provide basic considerations for the power concept 
in this thesis. To illustrate the different power concepts, I will talk about two actors, 
the powerful actor A and the less powerful actor B. 
The relational power concept 
Part of the power research community defines power in terms of its outcome and in a 
relational way. Weber described power as the opportunity to enforce one’s own 
interest in a social relationship even if the other party has different interests 
(1956/1980). The outcome of power exercise is here an enforcement of one’s 
interests in the setting of a social relationship. Power is power over someone. A 
similar concept of power was put forward by Dahl, who defined power in this way: “A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do.” (1957: pp. 202-203). In line with his definition, Dahl assessed power in 
analysing which party succeeded in the decision-making process in an American city. 
His results were published in the famous study Who governs? The City of New 
Haven (1961). Another supporter of this view of power was Polsby (1970). The 
common feature of these power definitions is their focus on actual negotiation 
processes, power outcomes and the relationship between the two actors A and B. 
Additionally, this power definition assumes “intentionality” between the two actors, 
and it presupposes a conflict of interest (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 13). 
These basic definitions of power, often referred to as the “pluralist” definition of 
power, lead to an extensive debate (Lukes 2005). There are two key critiques that 
shall be mentioned here: first, the critique of researchers emphasising systemic, 
structural aspects of power and second, the critique of researchers defining power as 
a capacity (power-to) rather than in terms of process and outcomes.  
                                            
31 As this thesis deals with actor power in an international regime, it does not survey all the different 
strands of power theory. The interested reader is referred to Lukes 2005, Section “Guide to Further 
Reading” for further literature on the power debate.  
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Structural power 
Important critics of Dahl’s definition of power were Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and 
Lukes (1974). Bachrach and Baratz added a second dimension of power to the 
definition advanced by Dahl, describing a sort of power that A was exerting indirectly 
by setting the structures and agendas in a way that certain interests of B would never 
actually enter the agenda and be dealt with (1962; 1970). This dimension of power 
hence focuses on ‘non-decision making’. The problem for Bachrach and Baratz then 
was how to investigate this invisible power dimension: How could the researcher 
know that there was a hidden conflict behind the apparent agreement between the 
different parties? How could the researchers know that B had interests that he could 
not bring to the agenda because A was preventing him from doing so? Finally, this 
problem made Bachrach and Baratz acknowledge that their second dimension of 
power was only observable if an overt conflict occurred (Lukes 2005: 7). It is 
important to keep in mind though that power can be expressed in non-decision 
making and when issues are dropped from agendas.  
While Lukes considered the two-dimensional view as a substantive advance over the 
one-dimensional view of power, Lukes took the idea of Bachrach and Baratz further 
and added a third dimension to the power debate. This third dimension not only 
assumed that issues would be prevented from being brought to the agenda in the 
first place, but it assumed that certain issues, certain interests would be prevented 
from even being recognised as relevant by the weaker actor (Lukes 1974: 23). This 
power dimension describes a structural power, which shapes the system, and hence 
the ideas and the knowledge, in which the actors interact.32 
Power from resources 
In the following years, Lukes´ concept was criticised by several authors (see for 
example Barry 1975; Clegg 1975; Layder 1985; Digeser 1992; Hay 1999, 2002). 
Lukes then revised his three-dimensional power concept, and in 2005, identified the 
following problems of his 1970s concept:  
                                            
32 Similarly, Barry asked for a differentiation between the outcomes of power exercise and “luck” in 
negotiations, where structures are such that actors win their desired outcome without having to act 
(1989). 
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“The definition of the ‘underlying concept of power’ offered in PRV 
[...] is entirely unsatisfactory in several respects: Following others in 
the ´power debate´, it focuses on the exercise of power. Power is a 
dispositional concept, identifying an ability or capacity, which may or 
may not be exercised. Secondly, it focuses entirely on the exercise of 
‘power over’ […]. Thirdly, it equates such dependency-inducing power 
with domination, assuming that ‘A affects B in a manner contrary to 
B’s interests’, thereby neglecting what we have seen to be the 
manifold ways in which power over others can be productive, 
transformative, authoritative and compatible with dignity. Fourthly, 
assuming that power, thus defined, affects the interests of those 
subject to it adversely, it offers no more than the most perfunctory 
and questionable account of what such interests are, and […], it 
treats an actor’s interests as unitary, failing to consider differences, 
interactions and conflicts among one’s interests. […] it operates with 
a reductive and simplistic picture of binary power relations between A 
and B (2005: 109). 
Important from Lukes´ critique of the three dimensional power concept is especially 
that power is not only visible when it is exercised and when it visibly becomes a 
“power over” somebody, but that power is also a capacity.33 In his 2005 book, Lukes 
thus describes power as “a potentiality, not an actuality – indeed a potentiality that 
might never be actualized.” (2005: 69). This is an important turn from his initial 
understanding of power as a process and as expressed in outcomes. A different 
strand of power researchers had argued this point earlier, following the power 
definition offered by Hobbes that power is a “present means, to obtain some future 
apparent good” (1985[1641]; see also Pitkin 1972, Morris 2002). Similarly, Arendt 
argued that power resulted from the cooperation of individuals (1970). Pitkin points to 
the relationship of the word “power” to the Latin word “potere” – to be able to. She 
goes on to argue  
“That suggests, in turn, that power is a something — anything — 
which makes or renders somebody able to do, capable of doing 
something. Power is capacity, potential, ability, or wherewithal” (1972: 
276). 
                                            
33 A second key point from Lukes’ critique of his 1970s concept is that he rejects a normative 
interpretation of power as domination and suppression. Again, this point can already be found in 
Arendt´s work of 1970, in which she argued for a distinction between power, strength, force, 
authority, and violence. Power to her could not be equated to force or violence or imposition (as in 
the “power over” understanding), and hence should not be seen as negative or as producing 
negative outcomes as such (Arendt 1970). 
2 International regimes and actor power 46 
 
In the literature, these two different understandings of power (power over versus 
power to) have been reflected to different degrees. Some authors discuss both, but 
come to differing conclusions about them: Although Connolly argues that both power 
concepts are important, he then goes on to establish a concept focusing on “power-
over” (1993). Morriss, on the other hand, considers both aspects, but focuses on 
“power-to” (2002). For the further analysis in this thesis, it is important to keep in 
mind the differentiation between power over (process, outcomes, relationship 
between actors), power to (capacity) and structural power.  
2.2.2 Power in IPE 
Having considered key aspects of power concepts in political theory, this section 
moves a step further to consider power approaches in IR and IPE. As mentioned 
above, the focus of IR theory on interests and norms has led to a neglect and one-
sided criticism of power-based approaches. However, before the turn to interest-
based and cognitive approaches, power had been the focus of realist works on IR 
from the beginnings of the discipline (see for example Donnelly 2000, Vasquez 
1998). 
Hans Morgenthau, as one of the founding fathers of International Relations, made 
power the central variable of relations between states:  
“The main signpost that helps political realism find its way through 
the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest 
defined in terms of power.” (2005[1948]: 5).  
Morgenthau argued that “moral ideas” did not lead to an adequate understanding of 
international relations. At the same time, he held that international institutions and the 
equal status they attribute to their members did not reflect the “reality” of international 
relations, which was dominated by unequal power distribution between different 
actors (2005[1948]: 5ff). Morgenthau´s power concept takes into account a relational 
aspect of power and differentiates between military and political power (2005[1948]: 
28-29). One can thus say that Morgenthau´s power concept included “power over” 
and “power to” aspects. 
Other than the process oriented “power-over”, and similar to the idea of the “power-
to”, approaches discussed above, realists have emphasised the importance of 
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resources to establish which actor is powerful (e.g. Waltz 1979: 191). Mearsheimer 
gives central importance to material capabilities, as he thinks outcomes are 
unreliable indicators of the power distribution between actors (Mearsheimer 2001: 
57-61). For Mearsheimer, the most important resource for power is military power, 
while other forms of power, such as economic power and size of the population, are 
of secondary importance (2001: 56). In another example, Gilpin defines power as 
military, economic and technical capabilities, consciously leaving aside other power 
aspects which he regards as “immeasurable” (1981: 13). Realist theory also makes a 
strong connection between power and interests: in other words, as noted above, 
power for Realists has meaning not only in relation to the power of others within the 
international arena, but also in relation to the range and scope of interests pursued 
by states and other actors. For Realists, one of the central problems of international 
relations is the balancing of power resources not only in light of the distribution of 
power in the international arena, but also in light of the demands posed by different – 
sometimes conflicting – interests. 
This basic realist concept of power has been criticised by many researchers. Two 
main critiques were first that the realist understanding of the resource basis for power 
was too limited and second that the realist concept of power itself was too limited.  
Keohane and Nye extensively argue that the resource basis considered as relevant 
by “traditionalists” is too narrow, and that under the conditions of “complex 
interdependence” different resources are relevant: “The conventional notion of power 
lacks definition. In particular, different power resources may be needed to deal with 
different issues.” (2001: 7). Keohane and Nye name political, economic and military 
resources (2001: 10).  
Apart from the hard, material aspect of power, Nye´s concept of soft power describes 
a power that an actor disposes of because of the attraction its culture, ideas and 
economic power: “the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other 
countries develop preferences or define their interest in ways consistent with its own” 
(Nye 1990: 153). Nye hence points our attention to resources such as economic and 
ideational factors, and to a passive kind of power that an actor is exerting simply by 
“being there”, in other words by its presence. In his 2002 book on the limitations of 
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US power, Nye uses the argument that the resource base for world power has shifted 
and expanded (including to NGOs), and is hence distributed unevenly among nations 
and other actors, to argue in turn for a multilateral engagement of the US (Nye 2002). 
There has also been strong criticism of the focus by structural realists or Neo-
Realists on the prevailing distribution of power in the international arena, and on the 
ways in which this seems to reduce agency among states who are assumed all to 
respond in essentially the same ways to shifts in power structures. Guzzini suggests 
a “dyad of concepts” to assess power structures: “power” to Guzzini is “an agent 
concept”. The structural aspects of power are in his concept described by the word 
“governance”. His “dyad of concepts” includes both power and governance, and 
hence attempts to combine agent power and structural power (1993; see also 
Guzzini 2000).34 Such an approach is clearly relevant to the concerns of this thesis 
with actor power in international regimes. 
Baldwin also points attention to the structure in which the exercise of power takes 
place. He argues that an assessment of an actor’s power requires an initial 
assessment of the (economic, political and social) structure of the issue area. He 
holds that power does not have fungibility – if an actor has power in issue area A he 
cannot necessarily be sure this power can be transferred into issue area B. The lack 
of fungibility leads Baldwin to describe power as multidimensional and to underline 
the importance of an issue-area specific situational analysis (Baldwin 1989, 1992). 
This demand for an issue-area specific consideration (as opposed to the 
consideration of the overall power balance found in traditional realists writings) was 
also made by Keohane and Nye (1977, 2001). Baldwin also describes the 
dependence of power on the value system the actors that are interacting. Power only 
exists if the negotiation partner accepts the respective “currency” of power and 
values possession of it (Baldwin 1989, 1992).35 In the context of international 
regimes, the relevance of these propositions is readily apparent. 
                                            
34 An extensive discussion about various concepts of structural power can be found in Guzzini 1993. 
35 Baldwin demonstrated this with the example of a person threatening another one with a gun and 
shouting “your money or your life”. The threat is only powerful if the threatened person values his life 
(i.e. the “currency” of this exchange) 
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A focus on the structural aspects of power can also be found in Strange’s work.36 To 
Strange, structural power37 is a far-reaching force: 
Structural power […] is the power to shape and determine the 
structures of the global political economy within which other states, 
their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) 
their scientists and other professional people have to operate 
(Strange 1994: 24ff). 
Strange defines this type of power as more substantial than agenda-setting or rule-
designing power (i.e. Dahl’s and Bachrach/Baratz’ power concepts), as it includes the 
power to set the framework in which agendas and rules would be determined (ibid: 
25). In her seminal work “States and Markets”, four sources of structural power38 are 
identified by Strange: control over the security structure, the production structure, the 
financial structure and the knowledge structure (Strange 1994).39 Structural power 
may hence give an actor disproportional power as the system is shaped beneficially 
for him. Guzzini argues accordingly that one meaning of structural power is “indirect 
institutional power” – controlling outcomes not by “direct confrontation” but changing 
the institutional circumstances (1993: 451-456). This insight will be taken further in 
later parts of the chapter. 
2.2.3 Reviewing Power Concepts 
The discussion above gives ground for a wide-ranging reappraisal of power concepts 
in IR and the IPE, in order to reflect the development of more complex notions of the 
relationship between actor power, interests and international structures. One way of 
developing such a reappraisal can be found in a comprehensive and recent work on 
power in international relations edited by Duvall and Barnett (2005). While Duvall and 
Barnett argue for a power-based research agenda in IR, they aim to expand the 
                                            
36 Strange’s model can be seen as an extension or even an opposition to a Marxist/Neo-Marxist or 
Gramscian view of structural power as deriving before all from control over the production structure 
(ibid: 26, Cox 1987). 
37 An extensive discussion about various concepts of structural power can be found in Guzzini 1993. 
38 This means that in Strange’s model also non-state actors (international organisations, multinational 
companies, non-governmental organisations, epistemic communities) can have structural power. 
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traditional definition of power in their work: They argue that “much of the discipline 
has tended to treat power as the ability of one state to use material resources to get 
another state to do what it otherwise would not do” (2005: 2). Apart from the 
reference to material resources, this definition reflects the first dimension of power 
introduced above – ‘power over’. Not surprisingly, Duvall and Barnett then go on to 
critique this direct, relational concept along lines that very much resemble the work of 
Bachratz and Baratz (1962), and Lukes (1974). Although Duvall and Barnett are not 
the first ones to attempt such an extension of the power definition (see above; 
especially Guzzini 1993), their categorisation will be introduced here to bring together 
the discussion in this chapter.  
Barnett and Duvall establish four different categories of power, which are helpful in 
order to understand the character of power in IR. Their first category is compulsory 
power, defined as direct control over another (2005: 13). This first power dimension 
follows the definitions of Weber and Dahl identified above, but it does not presuppose 
intentionality of actor A. It includes unintended power effects that A might be 
producing by simply being there. The use of compulsory power is apparent, it is 
visible in the interaction of states (but not only states) and it is based on material 
resources (see also Gilpin 2002). Barnett and Duvall’s concept of compulsory power 
is not only based on material, but also on symbolic and normative resources (2005: 
15). Barnett and Duvall’s second category of power is institutional power, defined as 
actors´ control over socially distant others. This second power dimension describes 
control between A and B in an indirect way. The emphasis of this dimension is on the  
“formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as 
A, working through the rules and procedures that define those 
institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions (or non-
actions” and conditions of existence of others, sometimes even 
unknowingly.” (Barnett/Duvall 2005: 15). 
Barnett and Duvall compare compulsory and institutional power: compulsory power is 
based on an actor´s resources, while institutional power is indirect and it works to A´s 
                                                                                                                                        
39 Strange’s model can be seen as an extension or even an opposition to a Marxist/Neo-Marxist or 
Gramscian view of structural power as deriving before all from control over the production structure 
(ibid: 26, Cox 1987). 
2 International regimes and actor power 51 
 
favour because of the institutional arrangements (decision making rules, norms, etc.). 
Barnett and Duvall assume that institutions are biased towards certain actors; that is 
to say, institutions further the interests of certain actors more than of other actors. 
These considerations obviously link to the work of Krasner and Keohane and Nye on 
the impact of regimes on the relations between countries. They also touch on the 
systematically built-in bias brought up by Bachrach and Baratz in their second 
dimension of power.  
Duvall and Barnett’s third category is that of structural power, defined in terms of 
direct and mutual constitution of the capacities of actors. Barnett and Duvall’s 
concept of structural power defines it as “the structures […] that define what kind of 
social beings actors are” (2005: 18). While in the concept of institutional power, 
institutions and structures are regarded as fixed and unchanging, the structural 
power concept focuses on structures and how they produce the very actors that 
interact in their realm:  
“The kind of social beings that are mutually constituted are directly 
or internally related; that is, the social relational capacities, 
subjectivities, and interests of actors are directly shaped by the social 
positions that they occupy.” (ibid.).  
Structures hence shape resources, capacities and ideology of actors (Gill and Law 
189). This concept is related to Luke’s third dimension of power (see above),40 and 
also to the ideas of cognitivist theorists on the mutual constitution of actors and 
interests.  
Barnett and Duvall’s final power category is that of productive power, defined as the 
production of subjects through diffuse social relations (2005: 20). This concept is 
closely related to the concept of structural power. The key difference between 
structural and productive power is that the latter is more diffuse: 
“Productive power, by contrast, is the constitution of all social 
subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge 
and discursive practices of broad and general social scope.” (2005: 
20). 
                                            
40 Other scholars that have focused structural power in their analysis are Rupert and Smith 2002, 
Murphy 1994, Cox 1992, Latham 1999. 
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The focus of productive power is hence on discourse, the social processes and the 
systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced (Macdonnell 1986).  
The four-fold categorisation of power advanced by Barnett and Duvall brings together 
many of the arguments dealt with in earlier parts of the chapter. In particular, it 
provides important ways of relating actor power to institutions and structures, and 
thus of potentially providing a strong basis for the study of actor power in 
international regimes. This is the subject of the final part of this chapter. 
2.3 A concept of actor power in international regimes 
The previous section has reviewed a range of different power approaches. They 
differed in terms of where they located power: Is it visible in the resources of an 
actor, in the process or in the outcomes of negotiation processes? Should it be 
observed with regard to an individual actor or rather in terms of structure? While all of 
the approaches highlight different aspects of the phenomenon “power”, which one is 
the most suitable for the case at hand? The proposal here is to establish a framework 
and propositions based specifically on the direct, observable exercise of power by 
actors within international regimes, and drawing specifically on the categories of 
compulsory power and institutional power proposed by Barnett and Duvall (2005).41 
This approach and framework should be especially suited to cases fulfilling the 
following criteria, similarly suggested by Barnett and Duvall (2005: 13-21). First, the 
approach is suited to interactions such as negotiations within international regimes 
where the contributions of specific actors are observable, where their interests can 
be discerned (and are often openly professed) and thus where we should be able to 
observe interest-seeking behaviour. Second, the approach can accommodate open 
conflicts of interests between actors within a regime, over such issues as agendas, 
negotiation processes and outcomes. Third, regimes provide evidence for the 
exertion of control over negotiations by specific parties and of the effects of 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. Fourth, a focus on 
                                            
41 In a short paper, Wolfe uses these two types of power to analyse change in the WTO agriculture 
negotiations (2006; see also Wolfe 2007b). 
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negotiation processes avoids an over-concentration on background structures and on 
broader processes of social construction, and directs our attention towards the 
application of resources by actors in a specified context. Finally, such a focus 
enables analysis to capture the extent to which actors might attempt to use the 
regime in which they are involved for their own benefit 
As discussed above, compulsory power follows the basic definitions of power by 
Dahl. The focus of this relational power concept is on processes and power 
outcomes. Other authors have pointed to the importance of power as a capacity or 
the importance of resources. These different elements have been integrated in the 
definition of power by sociologist Philip Habeeb, who regards power as  
the way in which actor A uses its resources in a process with actor 
B so as to bring about changes that cause preferred outcomes in its 
relationship with B (Habeeb 1988: 15) 
Keohane and Nye´s concept of power in their seminal work “Power and 
Interdependence” (1977, 2001) takes a similar view on power as based on resources 
and visible in process and outcomes. While they argue that an assessment of an 
actor’s resources is crucial in an assessment of actor power, they emphasise that 
there is no direct link between resources and outcomes, but that resources are 
“translated” through the bargaining process into outcomes (2001: 16ff; 196ff). To 
assess power comprehensively in this thesis, we hence need to take the following 
elements into account: resources, processes and outcomes.  
In the definitions of power by Keohane and Nye and Habeeb, power is dynamic and 
observable. Power is part of a process in which various actors interact on the basis of 
resources. In the case that will be investigated in this thesis, this interaction and 
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negotiation takes place within the trade regime. Keohane and Nye hence enrich their 
power concept by considerations on how regimes affect power exercise (2001):42  
Figure 2.1 The Keohane and Nye model of regime change in an international organisation 
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interdependence 
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Other  
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Source: Keohane and Nye 2001: 49 
Keohane and Nye’s model applies to situations characterised by what they define as 
“complex interdependence”. The key assumptions of complex interdependence (and 
                                            
42 Prior to introducing their model of regime change under complex interdependence, Keohane and 
Nye discuss three other models which can explain regime change based on power changes. They 
discuss (1) an economic process model of regime change, which attributes change to shifts in 
economic interdependence and technology, but fails to grasp political factors (e.g. military, security 
or autonomy); (2) the traditional realist explanation, which states that changes in the distribution of 
politico-military power between states (and, in an extended model, changes in the perception of the 
threat of military aggression, in relative economic strength of the actors and in hierarchical patterns) 
are the trigger for regime change, but fails to take into account the implications of different power 
patterns in different issue areas, the implications of increasing interdependence and the domestic 
dimension; and (3) the issue structure model, which assumes that power cannot be transferred from 
one issue area into another and that the strongest state in one issue area is responsible for regime 
change, but fails to asses that sometimes power can be transferred (Keohane/Nye 2001: 33-47). In 
their work, Keohane and Nye find that all models can explain regime change under certain 
circumstances. Their analysis is hence marked by significant complexity. For the case of the EU´s 
involvement in the WTO, it suffices to use the model of regime change in an international 
organisation, because the conditions set out by Keohane and Nye are met in this case, and because 
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related approaches) have been introduced earlier (see Sect. 2.1.2). As we will see 
later, multiple channels of interaction exist between members of many international 
regimes (see chapter 3, 4). The agenda for any given regime (and especially those 
where formal negotiations are a central feature) is likely to contain a multitude of 
interrelated issues and very different distributions of interest are likely to exist in 
those different issue areas. Military force is not used on the issues under negotiation 
between the members of international regimes. We can hence say that the situation 
within which the members of many regimes negotiate is characterised by “complex 
interdependence”.  
In Keohane and Nye’s framework, what has been called “regime” in this chapter so 
far is represented by “existing norms and networks” (see also the Keohane and Nye 
definition of regimes in Sect. 2.1). An actor’s resources are referred to as “underlying 
capabilities” in the model. However, these are not the only capabilities that an actor 
can dispose of: Keohane and Nye call the resources that emerge from the interplay 
of a specific actor’s resources with the regime “organisationally dependent 
capabilities”. This second aspect of power relates to the “institutional power” category 
of Barnett and Duvall. To identify an actors’ power in a specific regime, an 
assessment of the regime is hence necessary. The actor’s resources are then 
translated in the bargaining process to produce an outcome (which in the Keohane 
and Nye model then causes changes in the regime, which then changes the 
organisationally dependent capabilities of actors, the bargaining process and 
outcomes etc.).  
In the work of Baldwin introduced above, he argued that resources were not 
completely “fungible”, i.e. transferable between different issue areas (Baldwin 1989, 
1992). This understanding of power was taken up by Keohane and Nye (2001). Apart 
from an assessment of the regime and the actor’s position in it, attention therefore 
needs to be given to the characteristics of the issue area and the actor’s status in it.  
                                                                                                                                        
our main focus is not only on resources and distribution of capabilities in general, but also on actual 
negotiation processes.  
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This section has identified the key aspects that need to be dealt with in the analysis 
of actor’s power within international regimes, and has related it to Barnett and 
Duvall’s categories of ‘compulsory’ and ‘institutional’ power. It has also used 
Keohane and Nye’s analysis of change in international regimes to develop a more 
nuanced appreciation of what ‘actor power’ might mean. An assessment of power 
following the model of Keohane and Nye hence needs to start with an assessment of 
the regime and the issue area under consideration. We then need to look at the 
actor’s resources (underlying capabilities in the issue area and overall), the actor’s 
organisationally dependent capabilities, the negotiation process (bargaining) and 
outcomes. The following sections deal with these in more detail.  
2.3.1 Resources: an actor’s “underlying capabilities” 
Both Habeeb’s and Keohane and Nye’s definitions (see above) take resources as the 
initial “ingredients” for power. As mentioned in Sect. 2.1.2, whereas the realist 
tradition in International Relations considered military resources, population and 
territory as the most relevant resources (although not the only relevant ones!) (e.g. 
Gulick 1967), IPE proponents have extensively argued that in an increasingly 
interdependent world the power base has extended. Keohane and Nye name the 
increasing importance of political and economic resources (for example Keohane and 
Nye 2001: 10/196-197).  
Though Strange is making a structural argument, she still identifies “power bases” – 
resources which are the origin of power. To Strange, an actor is empowered by 
control over the security structure, the production structure, the financial structure 
and the knowledge structure (Strange 1994).43 In her work, Strange hence identifies 
not only material, but also immaterial resources: knowledge (1994: 19), ideas and 
moral authority (1994: 23), social cohesion and a strong civil society (1994: 38). 
Knowledge and ideas can be used to constrain actors and can hence be regarded as 
resources (Adler and Bernstein 2005); knowledgeable actors can promote ideas that 
further their own interests (e.g. Sell and Prakash 2004 ). Related to the resource 
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“knowledge” are factors named by Hurrell, such as the ability to adapt to changes in 
the GPE and influence over norms (Hurrell 2005: 50). Moral authority and rhetorics 
have been used by civil society to “convince” states of certain norms (Keck/Sikkink 
1998; Price 1998). Similarly, Nye’s work on “soft power” points our attention to non-
material power factors such as the attractiveness of an actor’s governance system 
(Nye 1990).  
Resources for power can also be found in the relationships between actors. Keohane 
and Nye introduce a measurement of dependence between countries. They 
differentiate between “sensitivity”, which measures the rate at which a country is 
affected by changes in a second country, and how great and costly the effects are, 
and “vulnerability”, which measures the availability and costs of policy alternatives. 
We can assume that a country that is less “sensitive” to changes in other countries 
has greater independence for action and is hence more powerful in the relationship. 
Alternatively, if a country is relatively sensitive to changes in other countries, but has 
viable alternative policy options, it again disposes of greater power in the relationship 
than if it was sensitive and vulnerable (Keohane and Nye 2001: 10ff; on policy 
alternatives see also Hurrell 2005, Steinberg 2002 and the “go-it-alone” power 
concept by Gruber 2000). The degree of dependence between countries can hence 
be a resource for an actor.  
Similarly, as Baldwin has argued, resources are only viable in the exercise of power if 
the respective actor recognises the “currency” of power and values possession of it 
(Baldwin 1985, 1989). Relationships to other actors in a given regime hence can 
constitute further potential resource for an actor.  
Summing up, resource power consists of 
• Those material and immaterial power resources directly attributable to an 
actor (economic resources; political resources; security resources; control over 
production, financial and security structures; strong civil society (e.g. support 
                                                                                                                                        
43 Strange’s model can be seen as an extension or even an opposition to a Marxist/Neo-Marxist or 
Gramscian view of structural power as deriving before all from control over the production structure 
(ibid: 26, Cox 1987). 
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by business or civil society); legitimacy for action in the GPE; domestic 
support (for example by business or civil society), status in the GPE, control 
over ideas and knowledge; experience.  
• Those power resources resulting from the actor’s relationships of dependence 
or independence with other actors in the system (including policy 
alternatives44). 
As discussed above, we need to distinguish between overall and issue area power 
when analysing power, and hence also when analysing resources.  
2.3.2 The regime as power resource: an actor’s “organisationally-dependent 
capabilities” 
In Keohane and Nye’s model, the interplay between the regime’s characteristics (i.e. 
its implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures) and 
an actors’ resources give rise to a third type of resource for an actor: 
organisationally-dependent capabilities. In order to assess how an actor’s power 
works within a regime, it is hence necessary to consider how regimes affect the 
power of actors in them. 
Similarly, Krasner argued in one of his early essays on regimes that changes in the 
power distribution between regime participants did not immediately transmit into the 
regime (see Sect. 2.1.2). The time lag in the transmission of power changes means 
that the regime (and hence its norms, rules, principles) can have an influence on an 
actor’s power and the resulting outcomes of a power exercise. The regime is partially 
independent of the underlying power distribution, and hence may empower or 
constrain certain actors As we have noted already, therefore, regimes can thus have 
                                            
44 An actor who has at its disposal viable exit options (alternative forums for achieving its goals) will be 
more powerful than an actor who is relying entirely on the regime. 
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a certain “life of their own” (Krasner 1983: 357,45 see also Abbot and Snidal 1998, 
Barnett and Finnemore 2004). It is important, however, to note that although regimes 
might formally attribute equal status to each participating country, actors in the 
regime will not have equal status in practice – the difference results from the 
difference in resource equipment between the different actors and from the 
empowerment or the loss of power resulting from the regime itself (for example 
Gruber 2000; Murphy 1984), and from the bias (or constraints to the agenda) built 
into the regime by its founding fathers, who in Gruber’s view are the dominant 
powers of the time (Gruber 2005). For Krasner, the regime is a static background, on 
the basis of which power relations are played out. Regimes are not seen as “being 
continually reshaped by the historically constituted and intersubjectively reproduced 
societal biases” (Guzzini 1993: 475). This simplification allows us to regard regimes 
as a resource for power. As this thesis focuses on actor power, it follows this static 
interpretation of regime; in consequence, for the purposes of analysis, regimes will 
be taken as static background on the basis of which bargaining is conducted.  
Regimes can hence be seen as a source of power in themselves, as they can 
change the balance of power between actors (Krasner 1983: 358-361, 364ff; Guzzini 
1993: 451).46 Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between an actor’s power and the 
regime within which it is exercised: 
                                            
45 In his later work on power in regimes, Krasner starts earlier though, with the establishment of a 
regime (see above). He bases his hypothesis on cases of international regulation/rule-establishment 
in various sub-sectors of global communications. The existence of a collective action problem was 
the obvious starting point for cooperation. In his case studies, if power was distributed very 
asymmetrically and interests diverged, the most powerful states would pursue their preferred 
policies unilaterally. This could either mean that the predominant power chooses to provide the 
collective good by itself or that the predominant power refuses to cooperate if non-cooperation is its 
favourite outcome. If the distribution of power was rather symmetrical and there was a mutual 
interest, regimes tended to be established. The nature of the regime depended on the distribution of 
power between actors. Changes in established regimes followed from changes in the underlying 
capabilities of actors, for example from technological development (Krasner 1991: 336ff). The 
question could thus be why a certain point on the Pareto frontier, and thus a specific regime, has 
been reached. The relevant variable to explain this variation in outcome is power (ibid: 361). 
46 Additionally, regimes can shape the preferences of actors. Anticipations about the status of an actor 
hence influences its actual power in the regime 
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Figure 2.2 Relationship between an actor’s power and the regime 
 
Source: Author  
Figure 2.2 integrates the considerations of resource power and of organisationally 
dependent capabilities. An actor’s power emerges from its resources and can be 
used by that actor to establish or change a regime. Power is here postulated as the 
central, independent variable. In a regime, power can be used to change the existing 
rules, expand the regime or demolish it. Importantly, in turn the regime shapes and 
constrains an actors’ power. As has been discussed above, this shows again that 
there is not necessarily a causal link between an actor’s resource endowment and 
control over outcomes and governance.  
The regime as a resource for power differs from the resources above in that it is not a 
“possession” of the actor (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 16). Thus as we shall see later, 
the EU does not own the world trade regime, and might not even significantly 
dominate it, but the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures of the 
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2.3.3 Power exercise in the negotiation process: an actor’s contribution to 
bargaining 
The next step in Keohane and Nye’s model is bargaining – or the negotiation 
process. An actor with resource power and in the right institutional setting has the 
potential to exert power. These possibilities for action can be operationalised during 
the negotiation process – depending on the actor’s strategic priorities and interests. 
The actor also might choose not to fully use its possibilities due to tactical reasons or 
normative considerations. An actor’s preferences might thus influence its “exerted 
power” in different issue areas. At the same time, the “activation” of resources does 
not automatically lead to analogous outcomes, as Keohane and Nye describe in 
several instances (2001). For example, an actor’s behaviour in a negotiation is 
importantly shaped by the perception of the opponent’s preferences (e.g. Odell 2003: 
9, 2000). This means that the way an actor exerts its power in a negotiation is 
influenced by imperfect information, and thus a certain speculation and anticipation.47 
In view of these “hindrances” that can occur at the bargaining stage, observing the 
bargaining process can thus deliver answers as to why a powerful actor might or 
might not succeed to translate its resources into its desired outcomes.  
At the bargaining stage, actors will first of all attempt to shape agendas according to 
their own interests (Keohane and Nye 2001: 27-29). This means promoting certain 
issues, but also trying to prevent other issues from being added to the agenda 
(Bachrach/Baratz 1962). Successful agenda-setting depends on adequate timing, 
influencing the discourse in networks and it can also be influenced by external 
events, which can create “windows of opportunities” for new issues. Agenda-setting 
in regimes will follow certain formal rules, but as we will see in subsequent chapters, 
the WTO heavily relies on informal agenda-setting (e.g. Mansbach and Vasquez 
1981, Kingdon 1984, Pollack 1997).  
Second, actors will attempt to generate support for their ideas and interests. This can 
be via rhetorical tools, publication and/or floating of research and hence the shaping 
                                            
47 Such an admission calls for the incorporation of cognitivist factors in the analysis, as it can be 
assumed that actors’ perception of the negotiation changes with iterated negotiations; this means 
the actors undergo processes of learning. However, this is not the focus of this dissertation.  
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of ideas (see above). Actors also choose to establish formal or informal coalitions to 
promote certain issues. As we will see later, coalitions in the WTO can be issue-
specific or dealing with multiple issues (e.g. Narlikar 2003, 2005).48 However, if we 
take into account the aspect of non-decision making, an actor might also try to 
prevent a coalition from being established or from pursuing its interests. Support for 
interests can also be attained by issue linkages. Issue linkages can hence be an 
important tool in this bargaining process. These linkages can occur between issue 
areas or even between different regimes (Keohane and Nye 2001: 26ff, Odell 2000, 
Axelrod and Keohane 1986) 
As was evident from Krasner’s definition of regimes, the interaction in regimes and 
hence the bargaining in regimes does not only occur formally, but also informally. 
Bargaining in many regimes takes place not only in the actual, formal negotiations, 
but also informally or in other fora - for example through bilateral negotiations. 
Bargaining can thus be understood to not only include formal negotiations, but to 
have an informal component (Keohane and Nye 2001: 26).  
As argued by Keohane and Nye, the bargaining process entails an operationalisation 
of power. This operationalisation can occur in the setting or breaking of agendas, in 
the generation or destruction of support for an actor’s interests, for example by 
building or destroying coalitions, and by the strategic use of issue linkages. 
Observing the bargaining process can thus provide clues as to why a powerful actor 
might or might not succeed to translate its resources into its desired outcomes.  
2.3.4 Actors, Power and Outcomes 
The final part of the analysis focuses on the outcomes of power exercise. In Keohane 
and Nye’s framework, this outcome is “regime change”. We should, however, keep in 
mind that for actors a desirable outcome of a negotiation process can also be non-
agreement or impasse (Odell 2000: 39). In Dahl’s early work on power exercise, the 
main focus was on the analysis of outcomes of bargaining processes (1962). 
                                            
48 Coalition theory has dealt with questions such as “How were allies chosen?”, “What strategies do 
the coalitions adopt?” or “How are gains from cooperation divided among participants?”. For an 
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Keohane and Nye criticised this one-sided focus on outcomes, because of the 
intervening factors such as the regime and the bargaining process as above, and 
hence outcomes are here only one element in a comprehensive assessment of 
power. Still, to assess an actor’s impact on a given regime, it is crucial to also 
analyse how far the actor manages to translate its resources into actual outcomes.  
It is important to differentiate between different power outcomes: First, there are the 
effects of “structural power”, which as noted above are not the focus of this thesis. 
These effects would include the setting of frameworks, and establishing and 
moulding the regime and the interests and capacities of the actors within them 
(Barnett and Duvall 2005: 18). Second, there are the power outcomes which result 
from the exercise of compulsory and institutional power. Outcomes of compulsory 
power include changes in the behaviour of B, or to put it in different words, control 
over B’s behaviour. Institutional power achieves this control, as discussed above, in 
an indirect way (Barnett and Duvall 15-17). The results of power exercise in the 
bargaining process can be regarded as “interim outcomes” in which we can 
determine the impact of an actor: agenda-setting or –breaking, generation or 
destruction of support (including coalition-building or destruction, issue-linkages). 
Finally, there are formal outcomes and decisions or impasse and failure of the 
negotiations. However, even if we look at formal outcomes, and formal agreements, 
we need to differentiate as to how far the interests of an actor are represented in an 
apparent negotiation success. The prevalence of an actor’s preferences in the 
agreement is an important indicator of its success in power exercise (Odell 2000: 38).  
2.3.5 Actor-Centred Power Analysis: Five Propositions 
The argument put forward in this section, based on the review of power approaches 
both generally and in the more specific context of international regimes, can be 
summed up in five propositions: 
                                                                                                                                        
introduction to coalition theory see for example Browne 1973, Gamson 1964, Riker 1962, Sandler 
and Tschirhart 1980, Schweller 1994, de Swan 1973, Laver and Shepsle 1990. 
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• First, that analysis of actor power in international regimes depends initially on 
specification of the international regimes, its qualities and the issue-area(s) it 
relates to. 
• Second, that analysis of actor power in international regimes depends on an 
assessment of the resources and capacities that the actor brings to the regime 
(in other words, of ‘power to’ existing independent of the regime – in Keohane 
and Nye’s terms, ‘underlying power’). 
• Third, that analysis of actor power in international regimes must take account 
of the actor’s ‘organisationally dependent capabilities’ and thus of resources 
derived from involvement in the regime itself (what might be defined as ‘power 
from’ the regime – in Barnett and Duvall’s terms, ‘institutional power’) 
• Fourth, that analysis of actor power in international regimes can profit from a 
focus on formal negotiation and bargaining processes in which the actor is 
involved (and thus on what might be termed ‘power in’ negotiations as 
analysed by Keohane and Nye) 
• Finally, that analysis of actor power in international regimes must include an 
assessment of outcomes (and thus what can be seen as ‘power over’ in the 
regime setting – in Barnett and Duvall’s terms ‘compulsory power’) 
It must be emphasized that this is not a comprehensive framework, in the sense that 
– as argued earlier – it sees issues of structural power and global power distribution 
as relatively secondary to the exercise of power in a specific regime, at a specific 
time and in relation to specific issues. The aim is thus to produce a form of middle-
range analysis, which can potentially be generalised to a range of regimes, actors 
and issues, not to produce a general theory of power in regimes or in the 
international arena more generally. Despite these limitations, the investigation raises 
a number of important questions about how the notion of actor power is to be 
operationalised or measured, and in particular estimating the way things would have 
been without the exercise of power; as Guzzini notes, ‘the judgement of significance 
of a given set of abilities (power) presupposes an implicit statement about the 
unaffected state of affairs’ (1993: 446). It is argued in the context of this thesis that an 
evaluation of actor power incorporating both actor-specific and regime-dependent 
capabilities (Ward 1987), and relating this to specific negotiation processes, can 
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minimise the problems emerging from this problem of operationalisation. In the same 
way, holding the broad characteristics of the regime as a constant, so that attention is 
focused on what is going on within the regime framework, is intended to reduce the 
problems that might emerge from broader global processes of change or crisis. 
2.4 Interim Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the reasons for the emergence of new governance 
systems on the international level, and specifically the role of international regimes as 
reflecting processes of ‘governance without government’ through international 
cooperation. It has conceptualised cooperation on the international level on the basis 
of regime theory and argued for the relevance of an approach focused on actor 
power in regimes. It then turned to consider different aspects of power, and to 
develop a set of propositions relating to actor power in regimes as the basis for 
further analysis. 
The previous discussion has shown that a comprehensive analysis of power requires 
the incorporation of a range of variables. Some have only briefly been touched upon. 
For example, to define and analyse resources (or “resource power”) comprehensively 
is a major undertaking. The choice of any power analysis is thus between parsimony 
and clarity on the one hand and complexity and analytical depth on the other hand.  
Overall, the chapter has shown that the power debate features a range of dimensions 
along which the researcher can proceed. On one side, there is the broad macro level 
understanding of power as it figures in the Realist power analysis, and similarly if one 
speaks about “structural power” in Strange’s sense. On the other side of the 
spectrum there is a micro level understanding of power, which involves analysis of 
specific negotiation situations with two or more actors. As indicated above, the 
middle-range analysis of power in relation to regimes has not received much 
attention.  
The power analysis which will be attempted in this thesis will be broadly based on the 
regime change model of Keohane and Nye as outlined above, in combination with 
the various aspects of power discussed in this chapter, and in particular the five 
propositions about actor power in international regimes advanced in section 2.3. 
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These five propositions will be the background against which more specific research 
questions about the EU and the international trade regime will be developed. As 
discussed above, to proceed with this analysis, a first step will be to assess the 
regime, in this case the world trade regime as reflected in the WTO and its norms, 
principles and rules. The second step will be to analyse the EU’s resource power in 
relation to its engagement with the WTO, including its issue-area dependent 
capabilities and power from its relations with its negotiation partners, and its 
organisationally-dependent capabilities. The third step – and the most detailed in the 
context of the empirical investigation - will be to analyse the negotiation process and 
outcomes with specific reference to trade in services, which will give indications of 
how effectively the EU has used its power in the WTO.  
The subsequent Chapter 3 will attempt the first step in assessing the world trade 
regime and specifically the WTO. Together with the theoretical groundwork laid out in 
this chapter, the chapter will also develop a set of more specific research questions 
about the impact of the EU in the world trade regime. 
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3 The WTO in the Global Trading System  
The discussion in chapter 2 has established that the first step in the analysis of an 
actor’s power in a regime needs to be the analysis of the regime itself. As argued 
earlier a given regime will give rise to a “filter process” through which a single actor’s 
power is transformed as the result of the structure, focuses and operating practices 
of the regime. In this thesis, the regime under investigation is the international trade 
regime. The WTO is the major international organisation in this regime, incorporating 
a host of norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures. This chapter 
describes first the evolution of the international trade regime with its organisation 
GATT until the establishment of the WTO in 1995, paying particular attention to the 
EU’s (or its predecessor’s) contribution to this evolution. The second part of the 
chapter assesses the institutional structure of the WTO. Based on the findings of 
these two first sections and the theoretical propositions set out in Ch. 2, the third 
section assesses power in the WTO and develops a set of specific research 
questions that will guide the further investigation in this thesis. In the wider GPE, the 
international trade regime is not the only regime though. It borders and at times 
overlaps with other regimes, some of which are nascent, for example the world 
environmental regime. The international trade regime itself covers a variety of issues 
areas, such as agriculture, trade in services and intellectual property rights, which in 
themselves display specific characteristics (see Figure 3.1). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, an issue area might give rise to different power relations than can 
be found overall in the regime. This is why one specific issue area is introduced in 
the fourth part of this chapter: trade in services.  
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Figure 3.1 The WTO in the global trading system 
Source: Author  
3.1 The international trade regime and the WTO  
3.1.1 Evolution 
Since the Second World War the international trade regime, was importantly shaped 
by the GATT. The history of the GATT can be traced back to the Atlantic Charter of 
1941, with which the Allies sought to set up the economic and political order of the 
post-World War II area. After the negative experiences of the inter-war period, where 
the closed international economy could be identified as a reason for the extent of the 
Depression and as a cause for the increasing inclination to start another war, the 
Allies intended to delimit protectionist tendencies from their roots and to lock liberal 
principles into an institutionalist framework. Special responsibility for the construction 
of this system was assumed by the USA, but the UK also contributed to the shape of 
the new trading system (Curzon 1965: 20-31; Gardner 1956: 101-104, 348-380; Dam 
1970: 10-16; Kock 1969; Ikenberry 1992).49 This system was intended to balance the 
aim of liberal trade and the social aims of the “New Deal”. In 1944, the two “Bretton-
Woods Sisters”, the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank, were 
thus set up. The “Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO)” of 
                                            
49 Ikenberry emphasises the role of ideas (resulting from Keynesianism and evolving in an 
international community of British and American experts) in the shaping and establishment of the 
GATT regime, which legitimised the exercise of US power and made consensual agreement 
between the early GATT signatories possible (1992).  
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194850 was supposed to create a third complementary institution (Hauser and 
Schanz 1995: 7-9; Wolfe 1999: 208). The Charter not only dealt with the reduction of 
tariff barriers to trade, but also with competition policy and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (Hauser and Schanz 1995: 7-9; Senti 2000: 14ff), hence already envisaging an 
institution more comprehensive than today’s WTO. The ITO also sought to balance 
the two objectives of free trade and full employment. Negotiations on the ITO charter 
took place from October 1946 to August 1947. At an early stage, conflict arose 
between different positions as to how these at times contending objectives should be 
attained. The resulting compromise, the ITO charter, was never ratified. This was due 
especially to conflicts between the USA and the UK, and the US failure to ratify the 
charter (Curzon 1965: 30; Senti 2000: 20; Diebold 1952; Gardner 1956: 104-109, 
348-380; Kock 1969: 35-61).  
However, part of the Havana Charter had been negotiated separately after the 
Conference of London in 1946. While the US had initially intended to conclude a 
range of bilateral treaties, it quickly realized the advantage of multilateralising its 
model of commercial treaties and it proposed the “GATT”. In the end, the GATT 
became the only part of the ITO charter that survived and entered into force. With 23 
signatory parties, it entered into force on 1 January 1948 and contained regulations 
regarding tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. Compared to the initial ITO concept, 
the GATT51 was much less institutionalised and formal. It consisted of three parts: 
Part 1 obliged contracting parties to grant “most-favoured nation” (MFN) treatment to 
each other and it installed the principle of non-discrimination (exceptions from this 
principle were granted for existing preferential trade systems). Part 2 contained trade 
rules, which dealt for example with transit trade, antidumping duties, customs 
valuation and quantitative restrictions (and it identified the exceptions under which 
quantitative restrictions were allowed to be used, such as balance of payment 
                                            
50 The GATT was founded by Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
China, Lebanon and Syria withdrew from the agreement afterwards (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 
38). 
51 A detailed discussion of the GATT agreement can be found in Curzon 1965. 
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difficulties). Part 3 contained provisions for future trade negotiations (Senti 2000: 20; 
Curzon 1965: 31-32; Gardner 1956: 379-385; Gorter 1954; Curzon and Curzon 1974; 
Kock 1969: 62-65).52 In her comparison of the GATT and the ITO charter, Kock 
concludes that “those parts of the Havana Charter which in American opinion had 
been most debatable or which would have required approval by the Congress, were 
not included in the General Agreement” (1969: 69). As the ITO could not be 
established, the GATT became the framework in which multilateral trade policy 
questions were dealt with for the following nearly 50 years.  
In the following decades, the GATT was shaped on the one hand by the expansion of 
membership, including the integration of numerous emerging and developing 
economies. On the other hand, structural changes in the world economy and in 
national trade policies (such as the increasing use of non-tariff barriers) demanded 
adaptation and extension of the treaty (Senti 2000: 24ff). Changes and amendments 
to the GATT treaty were negotiated during eight trade rounds (Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1 The eight trade rounds 
Name (Place), 
Time 
Number of 
participating 
countries  
Key results 
1. Geneva 
(ibid), 1947 
23 Average tariff reduction 19% 
2. Annecy, 
France (ibid), 
1949 
23 Average tariff reduction 2%, 10 new GATT signatories 
3. Torquay, UK 
(ibid), 1950-51 
38 Average tariff reduction 3 %, UK defends trade preferences 
for the Commonwealth countries 
4. Geneva 
(ibid), 1955-56 
26 Average tariff reduction 2%, Japan joins GATT, European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as observer  
5. Dillon 
(Geneva), 
1961-62 
26 Average tariff reduction 7%, Negotiation seen as direct 
consequence of the emergence of the European Economic 
Community (EEC)  
6. Kennedy 
(Geneva), 
1964-67 
62 Average tariff reduction 35%, Part IV GATT on development, 
first anti-dumping codex 
                                            
52 Senti (2000), Curzon (1965) and Gardner (1956) describe extensively the negotiations surrounding 
the Havana Charter and the evolution of the GATT. For a detailed discussion of the content of the 
GATT agreement see Dam 1970 and Hoda 2001.  
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7. Tokyo, 
(Geneva), 
1973-79 
102 Average tariff reduction 34%, first agreements on the reduc-
tion of non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs), “enabling clause“ to 
exempt preferences for developing countries from MFN 
8. Uruguay 
(Geneva), 
1986-93 
123 Average tariff reduction 40%, significant extension and 
deepening of the GATT, addition of new areas: trade in ser-
vices, TRIPs, TRIMs, establishment of the WTO  
Sources: Hauser and Schanz (1995: 42); Senti (1994: 15-17) 
The first two rounds, in Geneva and Annecy, were still part of the establishment 
process of the GATT. The 1950-1951 Round in Torquay was the first litmus test of 
whether the GATT would work as a tool for reducing tariffs. The negotiation 
technique in these early rounds was essentially bilateral: negotiators exchanged 
“request lists” and then “offer lists”. While the Geneva Round still produced rather 
substantial results, the subsequent negotiation rounds fell short of expectations 
(Curzon 1965: 87-88; Evans 1971: 10ff). The GATT started to encounter new 
problems. These had to do with the bilateral negotiation technique employed in the 
early GATT tariff negotiations, which limited the reach of concessions, and with 
negotiation principles. The principle of reciprocity (see Sect. 3.1.3) was already part 
of GATT; and European countries with low tariffs (Belgium, Netherlands, 
Scandinavian countries) recognized a first drawback of the system in the early 
1950s: With their low rate tariff regimes, they had little left to offer to their negotiation 
partners to encourage these to lower their high tariffs. They hence asked for GATT to 
aim for more equal tariff levels (“tariff harmonisation”), especially in Europe (Curzon 
1965: 87-88; Evans 1971: 22; Kock 1969: 72).  
Already at this stage, the predominance of the European-American “axis” in GATT is 
visible, as for example developing countries could not support such an idea due to 
their vulnerable economic situation. However, disputes arose between those who 
wanted to deal with European tariff issues within the OEEC (Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation) and those which thought that this issue should be 
dealt with in the GATT. The latter proposition was supported for example by the UK 
(Curzon 1965: 87-88). These attempts at an early GATT “reform” failed, and the 
Geneva Round of 1955-1956 started in a climate of heightened tensions and 
uncertainty among GATT members. The US, though held back by domestic 
pressures, made substantial commitments in the negotiations, but the overall 
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negotiation result was unsatisfactory for most parties, especially for continental 
European countries (the UK still prioritised Commonwealth trade over trade with 
continental Europe). This was the final incentive for continental European countries 
to envisage trade policy coordination among themselves. Ideas on European trade 
policy discussed for several years within the GATT framework now directly fed into 
the establishment of the EEC trade policy. GATT thus had a major impact on the 
evolution of EEC trade policy, and GATT conformity was an aim of EEC trade policy 
from its inception (Curzon 1965: 94-97; Evans 1971: 13).  
At the same time, the US and the UK were clearly opposed to these plans for a new 
preference zone (although the US supported European integration for political 
reasons), and fears were abundant that GATT would not survive. However, the 
creation of the European regionalist projects gave an incentive to the rest of GATT 
signatories to increase their efforts of cooperation so that they would not be 
disadvantaged by the European solo attempt. The UK reverted to its EFTA project, 
but the US had to rely on GATT to achieve its trade policy goals with regard to the 
new European economic “bloc”, and it used the GATT framework to achieve 
substantial tariff reduction by the EEC for GATT signatories. The Dillon Round hence 
had the purpose of dealing with the establishment of the European common customs 
tariff and lowering its impact for GATT signatories, and the GATT proved a useful 
framework in which even the strong EEC countries could be encouraged to conform 
(Curzon 1965: 97-99; Curzon and Curzon 1976: 168-171; Evans 1971: 13). 
The other objective of the Dillon Round was reciprocal reduction of tariffs among all 
negotiating parties. However, the Dillon Round was still plagued by the negotiation 
methods of the early GATT years, which already in the 1950s had been regarded as 
not sufficiently taking into account disparities in tariffs levels. Additionally, the US was 
limited by a narrow negotiation mandate. Again, negotiation results thus were not 
satisfactory to GATT signatories (Curzon 1965: 99-100; Curzon and Curzon 1976: 
171-175; Evans 1971: 14, 16). 
With the European Common Market taking shape at an unexpected speed and the 
US economy going through a slack period, fears of a European rivalry and of a 
challenge to the US’ predominant status in the world economy quickly emerged in the 
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US after the Dillon Round. The new US government launched a campaign for a new 
trade policy negotiation mandate, whose primary aim was to provide the US with 
improved market access to the EEC. The passage of the “Trade Expansion Act of 
1962” created the domestic legal basis for a new approach to GATT negotiations. 
The approach foresaw linear tariff reductions based on a formula approach (rather 
than only reciprocal tariff reduction on a product-by-product basis) and gave key 
importance to cooperation with the EEC (Curzon 1965: 102-104; Curzon and Curzon 
1976: 178-81; Evans 1971: 134-159; Preeg 1970: 39-56). 
The US then started to promote its idea of a new trade round, including its new 
approach to GATT negotiations, internationally. Certain industrialised and certain 
less developed countries were unsure that fair burden sharing could be achieved with 
a linear approach to tariff reduction. During this US campaign, the EEC position was 
marked by hesitation and influenced by its internal project of establishing its Common 
Agricultural Policy. The US’ idea of a partnership with the EEC on trade issues was 
furthermore complicated by a range of transatlantic disputes and disagreements, 
such as the rejection of a British EEC accession by France (Curzon 1965: 102-104; 
Evans 1971: 160-180).53 Further conflicts arose when it came to translating the basic 
US idea of linear, formula-based tariff reductions into actual operational negotiation 
rules, and sectoral solutions had to be found. On industrial tariffs, for example, there 
was not only to be a linear approach at tariff reduction but also an elimination of tariff 
peaks, but how this was supposed to work was in the end left to the actual 
negotiations as no solution could be found in the preparatory committee (Evans 
1971:183-202; Preeg 1970: 39-56). Major disagreement also existed on the issue of 
agriculture policy: major agricultural exporters such as the US, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand promoted an ambitious proposal for agricultural liberalisation. Others, 
such as the EEC, the UK and Japan, did not want to see agriculture included in linear 
tariff reductions. The EEC’s position additionally was plagued by internal 
disagreement, and it remained uncertain whether France would agree to any tariff 
                                            
53 The US’ support for a British accession to the EEC in the early 1960s can be explained by the US’ 
hope that the British would promote a more liberal approach to trade policy within the EEC (Evans 
1971: 137). 
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cuts on agricultural products. A range of unresolved issues in conjunction with the 
establishment of the CAP and other political disagreements between France and 
Germany about the future of the EEC in general provided a shaky ground for the 
negotiations on agriculture and even resulted in a short period in which the 
negotiations proceeded without the EEC. In agriculture as well, the establishment of 
negotiation rules was finally integrated into the actual negotiations (Evans 1971: 201- 
215; Preeg 1970: 72-77; Warley 1976: 377-395). As no general negotiation rules had 
been agreed upon, negotiations on tariff reductions proceeded with the help of lists 
which established possible concessions between trading partners on a bilateral 
basis, with the later addition of a process of multilateral “appraisal” (comparison and 
consolidation) of offers (Evans 1971: 221-236; Preeg 1970: 81-95). Apart from these 
two big issues at stake in the Kennedy Round, several side issues were discussed. 
These included the issue of the participation of developing countries (whose role was 
rather minor in the negotiations and in terms of commitments), countries searching 
special treatment because of their economic and trade structures, and non-tariff 
barriers (Evans 1971: 243-264; Preeg 1970: 70-72).  
During the whole of the prenegotiation stage and the Kennedy Round, the EEC 
played a very active role and hence re-affirmed its commitment to the multilateral 
trade regime. The Commission’s position as the agent of the EEC members meant it 
tried to broker compromises between its members and the GATT negotiators (see 
e.g. Evans 1971: 208). At the same time, the Commission was dependent on 
unanimous approval by the Council of Ministers on all the negotiation items. This 
caused problems and delays at several instances (see above). The EEC’s position 
was also rather defensive in key areas of the negotiations, with the US shaping the 
agenda much more proactively (Evans 1971: 265, 278; Preeg 1970: 111-121).  
While the negotiations lingered on till 1967, the looming expiry of the US 
government’s negotiation mandate exerted considerable force on the negotiations 
and the negotiations were concluded in June 1967. The main results of the Kennedy 
Round were tariff reductions on a more substantial level and on a wider range of 
products and than in previous rounds. Exemptions were granted to countries with a 
“special trade structure”. Other achievements were several sectoral arrangements 
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and the establishment of an Antidumping Code to frame national dumping legislation. 
The result of the agriculture negotiations was rather meagre though, reflecting the 
irreconcilable differences between GATT signatories. While a step to a 
multilateralisation of the GATT negotiations had been undertaken with new 
negotiation techniques and the attempt to achieve a linear tariff reduction formula, 
this step was not yet complete and had been severely compromised over the course 
of the negotiations (Evans 1971: 295, 280-296; Preeg 159-177, 204-255). 
Quickly after the end of the Kennedy Round, its results were challenged. A sharp rise 
in world trade and instability in the international financial system created insecurity in 
the international trade regime. Protectionist tendencies in the US led to the call for 
counter-measures against increasing imports; the British economy experienced 
serious pressure; and French domestic economic problems meant the introduction of 
protectionist measures. Countermeasures taken by the UK and France against their 
balance of payment problems (and similar issues) led to a belief in the US that since 
the Kennedy Round the use of NTBs had been massively expanded outside the USA 
(Evans 1971: 299-300; Winham 1986: 70-71). Additionally, the US’ own economic 
problems led to the collapse of the post-war Bretton Wood monetary regime. This 
exacerbated the fear of increased protectionism in the international trade regime, and 
governments decided to conduct a further round of multilateral trade negotiations to 
contravene this perceived rise in protectionism (Winham 1986: 71).  
However, the relative decline in economic hegemony of the US in the 1970s also 
made the US more sensitive to the restrictive trading practices of its negotiation 
partners and to seeking its own advantage from trade liberalisation (Krasner 1979). 
Curzon and Curzon state in their analysis of the early post-war trading system:  
That postwar trade liberalization has been a beneficial exercise for 
America’s trade partners, and that if any country could be said to 
have ‘lost’ within our given time-horizon it was the United States itself” 
(1976: 200). 
This gave the US an incentive to be more insistent on its own position in trade 
negotiations (Winham 1986: 95). Hence, although the US’ hegemonic power might 
have declined in the early 1970s, the USA still assumed a pivotal role in agenda-
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setting for the new trade round (Krasner 1979, see also for example Winham 1986: 
101-104). Krasner goes as far as to state that  
“Basically the United States, which wanted to change nontariff 
practices that were impeding its trade, and the LDCs, which wanted 
special and differential treatment, were the demandeurs in the 
negotiations.” (1979: 509) 
As before, the progress in EEC integration in various areas gave the US a strong 
incentive to actively shape the GATT negotiations, for example on standards (e.g. 
Winham 1986: 101-104), although the EEC also pursued active interests in certain 
sub areas of the negotiations, for example on standards and customs valuation 
(Winham 1986: 101-109).  
Compared to the Kennedy Round, the EEC’s position had changed because the UK 
had acceded to the EEC. This meant that the Tokyo Round negotiations were even 
more dominated by just two actors, the US and the EEC, than the Kennedy Round 
(Winham 1986: 76; 84). However, the positions of these two key actors often were 
diametrically opposed to each other and the Tokyo Round clearly was a US project. 
When the US was already promoting its idea of a multilateral trade round, the EEC 
was still taken up by internal projects, such as further agreements on the CAP, 
monetary cooperation between its member states, accession negotiations with the 
UK, Norway, Denmark and Ireland54 and the establishment of preferential trade 
agreements with various former colonies of its members (see Ch. 3). The EEC 
agreed to the Tokyo Round idea because of US pressure and the rising pressures in 
the world economy in the early 1970s (Winham 1986: 78). The EEC officially 
emphasised its commitment to liberal trade, but its position was clearly protectionist 
and sought to defend the EEC against a range of US proposals (such as the linear 
reduction of tariffs, elimination of tariffs, and liberalisation of agricultural trade). At the 
same time, the EEC thought to appease the US and hence to maintain stability in the 
international trade regime (Krasner 1979: 509; Winham 1986: 80-84, 95). 
The conflicting positions of the negotiating parties, especially of the EEC and the US, 
were incorporated into the Tokyo Declaration of 1973 and would shape the 
                                            
54 The UK, Denmark and Ireland joined the EEC in 1973. Norway decided against accession. 
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negotiations for the following six years (Winham 1986: 92-100). At a first stage of the 
negotiations, GATT signatories were mostly occupied with collecting and analysing 
data, especially on NTBs. This stage started shortly after the end of the Kennedy 
Round and lasted till after the Tokyo Round had officially been started with the Tokyo 
Declaration (Winham 1986: 59-60, 84-90, 100-127). However, negotiations then 
hardly proceeded in the three years from 1974-1977. One reason for this was the US’ 
domestic position. The US’ negotiation mandate was not agreed upon and ratified 
until January 1975. Further delays were caused by the US 1976 election, so that the 
US was only fully equipped for the negotiations in 1977 (Winham 1986: 129-137). At 
the same time, a dispute between the EEC and the US about the agriculture 
negotiations prevented movement until 1977 (Winham 1986: 146-158). Two new 
issues entered the agenda at that time: government procurement, which provided for 
further disagreement between the US and the EEC (Winham 1986: 138-141), and 
the proposal to change the GATT framework to take into account the special situation 
of developing countries (Winham 1986: 141-146) 
As in the Kennedy Round, the central issue of concern in the tariff negotiations was 
the formula with which tariffs should be reduced. The US presented an ambitious 
proposal based on a linear formula. The EEC’s proposal again aimed at tariff 
harmonisation (elimination of tariff peaks), which would have especially hurt the US 
(the EEC’s tariff structure had already been harmonised when the common external 
tariff was established) (Krasner 1979: 510; Winham 1986: 156-164). In the end, a 
Swiss proposal was accepted, which combined both linear tariff reduction and a 
degree of tariff harmonisation. However, because disagreements between the 
negotiating parties were so significant that they could not agree on the details of the 
Swiss formula, actual tariff reduction in the end differed from country to country 
(Krasner 1979: 510).  
The agriculture negotiations were particularly contentious in the Tokyo Round, with 
the US as main demandeur for increased market access, especially from the EEC 
and Japan. However, by now the EEC’s CAP had developed into a powerful 
domestic instrument of subsidising agricultural production, and domestic interest in 
maintaining the status quo of the CAP was respectively high and manifested. With 
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the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal scheduled, which each had distinct 
interests in maintaining the CAP, the EEC’s position did not allow much space for 
concessions. After the agriculture question had been one of the factors that blocked 
progress in the Tokyo Round in the 1974-1977 period, the US in July 1977 hence 
dropped its request that agriculture should be negotiated alongside industrial tariffs. 
This decoupling of agriculture and industrial tariffs made progress in the Tokyo 
Round possible. As could be expected from this point onward, the result of the 
agriculture negotiations was rather minor and limited to certain product groups 
(Krasner 1979: 518-521, Winham 1986: 146-154, 164-167, 247-255).  
A highly intensive period of negotiations followed the 1977 US concession in the 
agriculture negotiations. Most negotiation areas made important progress, except for 
agriculture (Winham 1986: 168-211). The Tokyo Round entered its final decision-
making stage, in which a disagreement between the EEC and the USA on a sub-
issue in the negotiations, subsidies and countervailing duties, nearly lead the 
negotiations to break down. It was overcome by fine manouvering by both the EEC 
and the USA, and the negotiations were concluded by 1979 (Winham 1986: 212-
305). Overall, the Tokyo Round constituted a qualitative expansion of the GATT, and 
its results were at the time regarded as the most far-reaching since the establishment 
of the GATT. The results of the Tokyo Round were tariff reductions and revisions of 
the GATT with regard to dispute settlement, differential treatment for LDCs, and trade 
restrictions for balance of payment reasons. The Tokyo Round expanded the GATT 
significantly into regulatory, rule-making areas that before were regarded as domestic 
policies: Six sectoral codes on NTBs were also agreed upon. These were dealing for 
example with the reduction of technical barriers to trade (TBTs), antidumping, 
subsidies and countervailing measures and government procurement. The Tokyo 
Round was hence the first round to systematically treat NTBs. Despite these steps in 
the direction of further trade liberalisation, sectoral exemptions and other exceptions 
were further institutionalised in the international trade regime. Special and differential 
treatment (S&D) for developing economies was introduced and the separate 
treatment of agriculture was further institutionalised (Krasner 1979: 492, 508, 510-
525; Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 104; Winham 1986: 256-305). Krasner hence 
argues that the Tokyo Round agreements hence showed increasing fragmentation 
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and differential treatment in the international trade regime (Krasner 1979: 492, 499-
508), but at the same time, the Tokyo Round also brought with it an increased 
legalisation of the GATT system with its entry into the area of rule-making (Ostry 
1997: 99). 
Following on from the Tokyo Round, protectionist pressures on GATT members 
resurged in the wake of the 2nd oil crises, decreasing exports and imports and 
growing trade and budget deficits. The US continued to suffer from an 
unprecedented trade deficit, which made US congress increasingly inclined to pursue 
protectionist measures (Croome 1995: 7; Senti 2000: 64-66; Winham 1989: 285; 
Finger 1991; Bhagwati 1991: 14-22).55 The significant structural changes in the world 
economy in the 1980s with the sharp increase in the volume of international trade in 
goods and trade in services, the emerging wave of FDI as well as the progress in 
technology and information technology, coupled with the possible protectionist shift in 
US congress led the Reagan administration in the USA to consider a new multilateral 
trade round and a broadening of the GATT’s agenda. The Uruguay Round was 
hence, as had been the rounds before, a US initiative. Preparatory work for the new 
round started in 1981. The US proposed a broad trade round that would include trade 
in goods, trade in agriculture and as new areas trade in services, trade-related 
intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and trade-related investment measures (TRIMs). 
The special position of developing countries should receive particular attention. The 
US’ idea for a trade in services agreement was refuted by developing countries and 
the EC (European Community). Alledgedly, this lack of enthusiasm on the side of the 
EC and the developing countries led the USA to subsequently conclude a range of 
far-reaching bilateral agreements (Baldwin 1993; Senti 2000: 68; Croome 1995: 11, 
12-20; Winham 1989; Bhagwati 1991: 16-22, 71-74).56 However, the USA continued 
to lobby heavily for its idea of the extended trade round and gradually convinced the 
EC and other GATT signatories. A group of developing countries, led by Brazil and 
                                            
55 Bhagwati discusses the role of Japanese trade policy in the rising persuasiveness of a trading 
system based on “managed trade” rather than free trade (1991).  
56 The 1980s also saw a rise in US unilateral action in trade policy (see for example Bhagwati 1991 
and Ostry 1997). 
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India, strongly resisted the move towards new negotiations, but gradually lost support 
over the course of four years, so that in 1985 preparations for the Uruguay Round 
entered their decisive phase. Subsequently, the Uruguay Round was launched in 
1986 with the Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este (Croome 1995: 28-36; Senti 
2000: 71-72; Winham 1989).57 It became the longest and most arduous negotiation 
round so far, with a range of negotiation deadlocks and near break-downs.58 
As the USA had intended, the Uruguay Round’s agenda was an expanded one. It 
consisted of 15 working groups which dealt with market access, measures to 
strengthen the GATT as an institution, reform of GATT rules and new issues. The 
new issues were trade-related intellectual property, trade-related investment 
measures and services (Winham 1990: 800-801). The US’ interests were hence 
rather wide in this new trade round. As core interests of the US in the Uruguay 
Round can count “agricultural reforms, new disciplines on subsidies and antidumping 
policies, and more-open [sic] public procurement practices. In the new issues, 
agreements on services, intellectual property, and investments […].” (Schott 1990: 
39ff). The EC’s demands were less extensive. Despite its initial hesitation with regard 
to an agreement on trade in services, it started to support the negotiations, but 
promoted an agreement less extensive than the US’ approach would have foreseen. 
Other than that, the EC’s main interests lay in the areas of  
new rules on […] intellectual property rights; acceptance of the 
principle of selective application of safeguards measures; progress on 
institutional issues, including dispute settlement reforms […]. The EC 
objectives focus mainly on rulemaking rather than liberalization, and 
suggest a willingness to weaken the rules as necessary to encourage 
broad-based support for agreements in new areas (Schott 1990: 40).  
The EC’s position in the Uruguay Round was hence, as in previous rounds, a more 
cautious and hesitant one than the US’. And as in the previous rounds of 
negotiations, agriculture emerged as the most contentious area in the market access 
negotiations. The EC’s unchanged preoccupation with protecting its CAP again was 
at odds with the demands of the USA and other agricultural exporters united in the 
                                            
57 For a detailed discussion of the Punta del Este meeting in September 1986 see Winham 1989. 
58 For an extensive discussion of the Uruguay Round negotiations see Croome 1995. 
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“Cairns Group”. A further area of distinct conflict was that of textile trade, where the 
interests of developed countries as main importers of textiles were at odds with those 
of developing countries that exported textiles (Winham 1990: 800-801). Particularly 
contentious were also the new areas, which in general were opposed by developing 
countries. Due to the special nature of services (see Sect. 3.3), services proved 
especially difficult to negotiate (Winham 1990: 802).  
The first two years of the negotiations were mainly devoted to the organisation of the 
negotiations and the analysis of the issues at hand. A mid-term review of the 
negotiations was held at Montreal in 1988, but despite of heightened expectations, a 
majority of the contentious issues in the agriculture and textile negotiations remained 
undecided. Agriculture had once again become a major stumbling block in the 
negotiations. Further contentious areas were textiles and intellectual property rights, 
where developed countries opposed developing countries (Winham 1990: 807; Senti 
2000: 79; Rayner et al. 1993: 1517). However, the Montreal meeting brought 
progress in the services area, despite of a highly convoluted text that had been 
prepared for the meeting, and on the revision of the GATT dispute settlement. A 
solution to the other questions, and particularly on the agriculture disputes dominated 
by the EC and the USA, was further postponed (Winham 1990: 807; Senti 2000: 81).  
A short while after the Montreal meeting, interim agreements on intellectual property 
rights and on textile trade were reached, and it became evident that despite the 
clearly divergent interests of developed and developing countries, these two areas 
would be integrated into the GATT system (Winham 1990: 807; Senti 2000: 81). 
However, a wide variety of areas still needed to be tackled and the Trade 
Negotiations Committee set a deadline to conclude the round by the end of 1990.59 
The US’ proposal on tariff reductions on goods prevailed over that of the EC and 
others, and a proposal on tariff reduction was ready by the end of 1990 (Senti 2000: 
83). However, other areas had not moved fast enough. The agriculture negotiations 
                                            
59 Discussions continued, among others, in the areas of tariff reductions, NTBs, tropical products, raw 
materials, textile trade, agriculture, GATT provisions, subsidies and countervailing duties, dispute 
settlement, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, trade-related investment measures, 
functioning of the GATT system and services. These will not be discussed in detail here.  
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experienced a renewed crises only a few months after the Montreal meeting. The EC 
was accused of defending the status quo only. Various different proposals on the 
future of agriculture debate were debated, ranging from proposals to incorporate 
more strongly the criteria of self-sufficiency to proposals on special treatment for 
developing countries. None of the proposals constituted a substantial basis for further 
negotiations and negotiations grinded to a halt (Croome 1995: 233-235, 238-241; 
Senti 2000: 86-89). Similarly, the negotiation groups on services and TRIPs could 
only submit a draft with many open questions to the next interim conference in 
Brussels in December 1990 (Croome 1995: 242-251, 251-256; Senti 2000: 98-100).  
Faced with a wide variety of half-finished work, Ministers at the Brussels Conference 
had to postpone the conclusion of the Round and temporarily suspend the 
negotiations (Croome 1995: 276-286). After a further year of consultation, Arthur 
Dunkel, the GATT General Director, presented interim results in a “Draft Final Act”. 
The draft was welcomed by many GATT members, but not by the USA and the EC. 
The USA demanded more far-reaching commitments on agriculture, but the EC 
regarded even the Draft Final Act as too compromising for its CAP (Senti 2000: 101; 
Rayner et al. 1993). The 1992 CAP reform and further beneficial circumstances in 
EC-USA relations made the Blair-House-Agreement of 1992 possible, which opened 
the way to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (Senti 2000: 102-103; Rayner et al. 
1993: 1520). That a CAP reform made the Blair-House-Agreement possible showed 
the ambivalence in the EC’s position on agriculture: while it tried to maintain the 
status quo of its CAP, it also seems to have recognised that it could not isolate itself 
in agriculture trade forever (see e.g. Rayner et al. 1993: 1518).  
With the Uruguay Round agenda, a further broadening of the GATT system was 
intended. At the same time, the GATT system suffered from a range of shortcomings. 
It had evolved into a complex system of over 200 treaties and its Secretariat worked 
on a “shaky” basis as the GATT 1947 had not even foreseen the establishment of a 
Secretariat. Its membership had expanded significantly and negotiations had become 
increasingly complex. At the time, Jackson wrote that the provisional nature of the 
GATT was still confusing both members of the public and of governments as to the 
status of the GATT treaty. Other deficiencies lay in “the problem of amendments, the 
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relationship of the GATT to domestic law, the dispute settlement procedure, 
questions of membership and problems of rulemaking and the powers of the 
contracting parties” (Jackson 1990a: 18-35, 45-47; Jackson 1990b: 207, 207-209, 
218-222; see also Winham 1989: 285; Finger 1991; Jackson 1993). Jackson hence 
put forward the proposal for a new “World Trade Organisation”. This new institution 
would function as an institutional head for the GATT and the new agreements 
negotiated in the Uruguay Round; it would clarify the institutional and administrative 
shape of the trade regime and incorporate a strengthened dispute settlement system 
(Jackson 1990a: 91-103; for an alternative proposal see Bhagwati 1991). Discussion 
on GATT reform and strengthening had been taken place in the so-called FOGS 
(Function of the GATT System) negotiation group, which was dominated by middle 
powers as the issue was of lesser importance to the EC and the USA. So far, FOGS 
had pursued a much more modest agenda than establishing a new organisation, and 
hence the discussion on the possibility of establishing a “World Trade Organisation” 
only took shape in 1990 (Ostry 1997: 193; Jackson 1990b: 205). Whether Jackson’s 
idea directly influenced the debate in FOGS is contentious in the literature (Schott 
1990: 37; Bhagwati 1991: 97; Croome 1995: 273), but subsequently a Canadian and 
then an EC proposal for the establishment of a WTO were submitted to FOGS, and 
FOGS began to work around these ideas. The EC had by now realised that the WTO 
idea could be a useful tool to constrain US unilateralism (Ostry 1997: 193). With the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1993, GATT members hence also agreed to set 
up the WTO. 
The Uruguay Round hence led to an unprecedented deepening and widening of the 
GATT and to an important reform of the international trade regime. The agreements 
concluded at the end of the Uruguay Round significantly altered the shape of the 
international trade regime, and were therefore sometimes referred to as the “New 
World Trade Order”. The WTO Agreement institutionalised the GATT and created a 
formal international organisation (Hauser and Schanz 1995: 56; Klein et al. 1998; 
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Martin and Winters 1995).60 In contrast to the GATT, the WTO is thus a legal person 
according to international law (e.g. Blackhurst 1998). Furthermore, the renewed 
GATT, the so-called GATT 1994, provided for a further facilitation of market access 
through the reduction of barriers to trade, both tariff barriers and NTBs. For the first 
time, the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) submitted the contentious issue of 
agricultural trade to the disciplines of the multilateral system. The integration of textile 
trade was the second particularly crucial area which previously had been excluded 
from the multilateral negotiations and was assessed seriously for the first time, 
leading to the conclusion of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). A range 
of further “side” agreements such as the Trade-Related Investment-Agreement and 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures complemented the GATT 
1994. The GATS was added to the GATT as the second major agreement, aiming for 
the first time at the liberalisation of service trade. The TRIPs Agreement functioned 
as the third “pillar” of the WTO (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 226-231; Frenkel and 
Radeck 1996: 15; see also Kuyper 1995; McKinney 1994). A new dispute settlement 
system was installed in order to improve implementation and adherence to the rules 
of the world trade regime (for example Meng 1998: 59-65).  
The trade regime had thus undergone a significant deepening and broadening. 
Decision-making structures had to adapt and keep up to this quantitative and 
qualitative expansion of the regime. Importantly, the key principles or features of the 
regime as developed in the 1940s and afterwards are still present in the regime 
today. Together with the subsequent additions to and changes in the regime, they 
shape the current negotiations under the heading of the WTO (Narlikar and Wilkinson 
2004; Wilkinson 2000). One can also assume that the regime, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, initially reflected the power distribution among its founders. This is 
reflected in the fact that during GATT times the major trade powers not only 
dominated the agenda, but also struck the major deals with the developing countries’ 
participation being rather marginal. Clearly though, many changes in this power 
                                            
60 For a quantitative analysis of the potential effects on world trade of the Uruguay Round agreements 
see for example Will and Martins 1995. For a discussion of the results of the Uruguay Round see for 
example Klein et al. 1998 and Ostry 1997. 
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distribution have occurred over the last decades and might influence the way actors 
can today impact on the trade regime. First of all, though, the next section describes 
the current institutional structure of the WTO system. 
3.1.2 Current institutional structure 
It is important to note that the WTO is an organisation with a rather meagre 
“organisational head”: the WTO Secretariat. The other “organs” of the WTO are 
membership-driven, reflecting the WTO’s function as negotiation forum and as 
intergovernmental institution (Drahos 2003). The WTO is headed by the Ministerial 
Conference, which convenes at least every two years. Compared to the GATT, the 
frequency of ministerial meetings has been increased. This was done in order to 
improve the political leadership of the WTO (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 50). It has 
been argued that this modus operandi caused the Ministerial Conferences to develop 
a certain momentum of their own: as Ministers convene, there is an underlying urge 
to come to an agreement and thus to have a “successful” meeting, even if 
preparatory negotiations in the various committees and councils (see below) have 
not yet produced an agreement (interview 10; see also Wolfe 2004b). This can then 
mean that reaching an agreement rather than considerations regarding contents or 
efficiency become the driving forces during the Ministerial Conferences, especially as 
since the inception of the WTO in 1995 public attention to the Ministerial Conferences 
has increased significantly (e.g. Narlikar 2004). The Ministerial Declarations, which 
usually constitute the result of the Ministerial Conferences, are the centrepieces for 
the negotiations during the Ministerial Conferences. These texts can be the result of 
preparatory work of the various WTO committees and councils. At times, they have 
been prepared completely or in part by the WTO Director General (WTO DG) or by 
parts of or coalitions of the WTO membership, which shows that while the 
negotiations in the WTO are organised multilaterally overall, influence on outcomes is 
importantly dependent on providing input to the negotiation process and on 
influencing and building coalitions (see Ch. 5-9; see also for example Winham 1986: 
205-206; Odell 2007).  
In the times between Ministerial Meetings, the General Council guides the 
organisation. The General Council is attended by Ambassadors (or representatives 
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of equal status) of WTO members. Three further councils are directly subordinated to 
the General Council: the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the CTS. These would be attended by 
expert negotiators. Below the Council level, a range of expert committees and 
working groups work on the vast range of issues on the WTO’s agenda. This expert 
level with its specialised Councils and sub-ordinated working groups is the most 
technical and least politicised in the WTO system. Although a lot of public and 
research attention is generally given to those negotiations taking place during the 
Ministerial Conferences, to assess the ways an actor influences the decisions (and 
non-decisions) taken in the regime the expert level of negotiation needs to be 
analysed as well. For example, it is generally accepted that there is a large inequality 
in the extent of participation of different WTO members especially on this expert 
level. In general, every WTO member can send representatives to any meeting, but 
in practice only the major trade powers have the manpower to send delegates to all 
the meetings (Blackhurst 1998: 33-35; Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 53). As the 
diverse working groups prepare the input for the Ministerial Conferences (on the 
basis of mandates attributed to them beforehand), influence at this stage of the 
process is crucial in shaping the regime. 
Negotiations in the WTO hence take place on different levels and pursue different 
purposes.61 We can identify three broad types of negotiations in the WTO:  
Overall framework-setting: “negotiations about negotiations”  
This is the level of Ministerial meetings and the General Council, who discuss the 
broad direction or even the construction and reconstruction of the regime. The 
decisions taken at this level change the norms, rules and principles of the regime or 
significantly alter its scope (such as adding the GATS to the WTO system). The 
decisions hence affect the functions and functioning of the regime as a whole. As 
mentioned above, this level is the most politicised, and has gained in predominance 
over the last years in the WTO (Wolfe 2004a). It shapes the issue-area negotiations 
taking place within the WTO and hence constitutes “negotiations about negotiations”. 
                                            
61 For a classification and discussion of decision-making in the GATT see Curzon and Curzon 1974. 
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Issue-area framework setting: negotiations about negotiations in specific issue 
areas 
This level includes all those decisions aiming to shape the negotiations in a specific 
issue area (for example services, intellectual property rights, agriculture). Decisions 
can be taken by a Ministerial meeting or the General Council (if an issue has got 
politicised), but most of the decisions on this level are made by the specialist 
Councils (for example Council for Trade in Services) involving expert negotiators 
(see for example Narlikar 2004). The politicisation of this type of negotiation is 
dependent on the issue area.  
Issue-area specific negotiations: negotiations about substance  
This is the level of the expert committees and working groups. This type of 
negotiation deals with the substance of the negotiations, often in great detail. 
Decisions of this kind are taken in the specialist Councils, specific working groups 
and other sub-committees. Politicisation is again dependent on the issue area.  
Coalitions, such as the Quad and the Cairns Group, have an important influence in 
the WTO. According to Winham, coalitions started to be of importance in the Tokyo 
Round (Winham 1990: 815),62 but one can argue that the EEC emerged as a 
negotiation coalition already in the Kennedy Round, and that even prior to this, 
cooperation between countries was important, for example between the UK and the 
USA in the early GATT times. During the later GATT times, the Quad with its 
members EU, USA, Canada and Japan had an important influence (Wolfe 2004a). 
Often, decisions were prepared bilaterally between the EU and the US and then 
promoted to the wider membership. In the Uruguay Round for example, once the EU 
and the USA had agreed upon an extension of the GATT regime to include 
intellectual property rights and services, and then had gained support from Japan 
and Canada, other countries could no longer stop the initiative, although they 
opposed the idea (Winham 1986: 169-189; Drahos 2003, Braithwaite and Drahos 
                                            
62 Arguably, this is due to the increasing number of WTO members. The early GATT negotiations 
provided a nearly “private” atmosphere in which signatories could negotiate (Finger 1991). With the 
expansion of the WTO membership (and greater public attention), the nature of decision-making has 
inevitably changed, and coalitions have gained in importance as mechanisms for informal decision-
making (see e.g. Hoekman 1993). 
3 The WTO in the Global Trading System 88 
 
2000). Only after agreement among the Quad had been reached, developing 
countries were included in the discussion. Developing countries were either not 
signatories of the GATT or lacked the resources to substantially contribute to the 
negotiations. Hoekman and Kostecki therefore comment that these Ministerials often 
were a futile exercise for developing countries representatives (Hoekman and 
Kostecki 2001: 50ff; Winham 1986: 169-189, 210-211). In the Doha Round and with 
the increasing number of members, the number of coalitions grew strongly (Wolfe 
2007a). For example, in 2003 the G20 emerged.63 The coalitions are informal or 
formal groups, and they pursue one or several issues. Some coalitions exist for a 
long time, others form on an ad hoc basis and disappear quickly afterwards. They 
have a range of functions:  
Clubs provide their members with an opportunity to learn about 
issues with like-minded colleagues; to co-ordinate positions for WTO 
meetings; and to debrief on past meetings. Clubs often speak as a 
group, allowing members to expand support for each other’s 
preferred issues. Clubs also engage in analytic burden-sharing in the 
preparation of common proposals (Wolfe 2007a).  
Narlikar suggests that the new developing country coalitions have a different quality 
from older developing country coalitions (2003), which will be taken up in the case 
study.  
Decision-making in the WTO is importantly shaped by the informal consensus rule 
and by the mechanism of the “single undertaking” introduced in the Uruguay Round, 
by which all agreements automatically apply to all WTO members (except for 
agreements explicitly exempted from this rule) (Wolfe 2007b). Decision-making in the 
WTO involves the three stages bargaining, consultation and consensus.64 Large 
parts of this process are informal. These informal processes of consensus-building 
are why for example coalitions play such a great role in consensus-building.  
                                            
63 The G20 is a group of developing countries, mainly active in the agriculture negotiations (see 
chapter 9). The question of developing country coalitions in the GATT and WTO since 1982 has 
been extensively discussed by Narlikar (2003). For an overview of coalitions in the WTO see Wolfe 
2007. 
64 Hoekman and Kostecki point to the fact that consensus does not mean unanimity. It rather means 
that “no delegation physically present in the Council has a fundamental objection on an issue. Those 
that are not present or abstain do not count.” (2001: 57). 
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Inside the WTO, informal meetings of Heads of Delegations, Ambassadors, Ministers 
or expert negotiators are part of the consensus-building process. The “Green Room” 
is one such meeting which has become well-known. It emerged in the GATT as a 
consultation between the Director General and representatives of selected GATT 
members, and continued to figure in the WTO. Political meetings held within the 
WTO system, referred to as “Mini-Ministerials”,65 have also been used for information 
exchange and consensus-building among Ministers from sub-sets of the WTO 
membership. Meetings of representatives of WTO member states in other 
organisations, such as the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) or APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation), have been 
instrumentalised for the same purposes, although their main objectives were different 
ones (Wolfe 2004a). Committees and councils on the expert level meet formally, but 
also for them most work is done in “informal mode” (Wolfe 2006: 3). In a recent work, 
Odell points to the significance of the chairs of this multitude of meetings, who can 
play a role in facilitating the consensus-building process (2007).  
Votes in the WTO can theoretically be held if unanimity cannot be reached and in a 
range of issues a two-thirds majority or three-quarters majority is required. The WTO 
voting system does not rely on weighted voting, but attributes one vote to each of its 
members (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 56ff).  
Table 3.2 Decision-making in the WTO 
Decision-making 
rule 
Type of issue 
Unanimity Amendments concerning general principles such as non-discrimination 
Three-quarters 
majority 
Interpretations of the provisions of the WTO and waivers of WTO disciplines 
for members 
Two-thirds majority Amendments to the WTO relating to issues other than general principles; 
accession 
Consensus Where not otherwise specified 
Source: Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 57 
The fact that the WTO voting system attributes one vote to every single country in 
practice means that, in theory, the USA, Brazil or China have the same voting power 
                                            
65 For an analysis of the role of Mini-Ministerial in the evolution of the WTO see Wolfe 2004a. 
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as Honduras or Trinidad and Tobago. Although some might argue that this system is 
“more democratic” than a representation by economic weight (but certainly not more 
democratic than a representation by population), it has the (questionable) effect of 
potentially empowering countries in issue areas where they are neither interested nor 
dispose of expertise. This of course was perceived as a threat to the big trading 
powers already in GATT times and it thus comes as no surprise that formal votes 
were not taken in the GATT. In GATT times, abstention of smaller countries was 
accepted – what counted were the voices of the major trading powers, and GATT 
rules applied only to those countries that accepted the specific agreements and 
amendments anyway. This tradition of avoiding formal votes has persisted in the 
WTO (Evans 1968: 96ff; Curzon and Curzon 1974; Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 57, 
see also Narlikar 2004). In the WTO, despite the formal option of majority voting, in 
practice votes still rarely occur: consensus decisions have remained the usual 
practice. Clearly, the consensus practice is preferred by the economically powerful 
states (the EU, USA, Japan and others), as they otherwise fear they might be 
outvoted by the many economically weaker members of the WTO. And as the WTO 
agreements through the “single undertaking” now automatically apply to all WTO 
members, the consensus practice is also of interest to economically weaker states 
(Senti 2001: 19; Wolfe 2005: 638, 2007b). Others have argued though that the 
GATT’s veto power for the EU and the USA has remained in place: though 
negotiations can progress if one of the smaller powers objects, they will stall if one of 
the major trading powers disagrees. In any case, an agreement that would be 
concluded without the consent of one of the major powers would hardly be 
implemented by the latter and would thus risk being a void agreement. The 
consensus rule in the WTO is hence not an actual one, but one that benefits 
importantly those countries that are powerful actors in the system (Hoekman and 
Kostecki 2001: 58ff; Jackson 1990a: 23).66  
                                            
66 Jackson’s proposal had foreseen a steering committee for the WTO to provide for greater flexibility 
and ease in the decision-making process (1990a). However, FOGS failed to agree upon this (Ostry 
1997: 195). For a recent discussion on the decision-making process and possible ways of reform 
see Wolfe 2005. 
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The General Council convenes not only in its original formation, but also in two 
further forms: as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) and the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB). The TPRM regularly assesses the trade policies of all the 
Member countries in order to increase transparency and to subordinate them to 
multilateral scrutiny (Hauser and Schanz 1995: 234). As it reviews the OECD 
countries more frequently than the developing countries, Francois has argued that it 
“shifts the balance of power in this game, ever so slightly, in favour of the developing 
countries” (Francois 1999: 6). It can be questioned, however, to what extent this 
impact is relevant, as the TPRM does not have an enforcement mechanism.67 
Apparently, the impact of the TPRM lies more in the exposure to other WTO 
members. 
The DSB has been a significant innovation compared to the GATT, unifying the 
fragmented dispute settlement processes of the GATT.68 Members who find another 
member in breach of a WTO agreement can submit a case to the DSB, under the 
condition that they have attempted to resolve their dispute bilaterally. A panel with 
three to five experts, chosen according to their expertise and independence, will be 
set up to deal with the case. Within six months, they have to submit their judgement, 
which is voted upon by the DSB. The two parties can raise objections within 60 days. 
The objections are also subject to the approval of the DSB (Meng 1998; Ostry 1997: 
196-200; Senti 2000: 138-152). If the plaintiff wins his case, the DSB can then grant 
him the right to retaliate. This means that the WTO system is backed up by a 
multilaterally legitimised enforcement system, which should substantially strengthen 
the regime (Jackson 1998). However, in the “right to retaliate” lies a power problem. 
The DSB itself has no authority to impose a penalty; it can only attribute the right for 
retaliation to the plaintiff. These unilaterally imposed retaliatory measures are an 
effective instrument for the powerful trade nations. Sanctions by smaller states might 
often have a negligible effect and the DSB might be inefficient for economically 
                                            
67 The TPRM is only one of a range of transparency-enhancing regulations in the WTO. For a more 
extensive discussion of these regulations see Hoekman and Kostecki (2001: 61-65). 
68 However, some of the side agreements (for example those concerning anti-dumping and the textile 
sector) still have separate provisions concerning dispute settlement. 
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weaker and/or economically less diversified WTO members.69 Additionally, Shaffer 
argues extensively that the case law in the WTO is importantly shaped by those 
actors that use it the most and provide most of the expertise – the EU and the US 
(Shaffer 2005). Power in the dispute settlement system can thus be assumed to be 
unequally distributed in favour of economically powerful WTO members.70 
The main administrative unit of the WTO is the Secretariat. The tasks of the 
Secretariat are of an organisational and technical nature in support of the various 
committees, the dispute settlement body as well as in part for developing country 
members. Trade analysis is a further task (WTO 2004a). As the GATT Secretariat, 
the WTO Secretariat, and hence the WTO as an international organisation, is rather 
“slim”: as of 2006,71 the Secretariat had 594 employees. Compared to other 
international organisations, its budget was also rather limited (Curzon and Curzon 
1974: 302ff; Blackhurst 1998; WTO 2006). This reflects that the Secretariat, the 
supranational head of the WTO, does not have any direct power. The only way the 
Secretariat can influence decisions is through the expertise and experience of its 
employees. Official decision- and proposal-making power resides with the member 
states of the WTO. The WTO can thus be considered as a mostly intergovernmental 
organisation. Hoekman and Kostecki call it a “network organisation”, referring to the 
tight cooperation between the WTO Secretariat, national delegates and ministries in 
the WTO member countries (2001: 54ff; see also Blackhurst 1998). The WTO 
Secretariat is led by the Director General (WTO DG). In the history of the GATT, the 
personality of the WTO DG has been vital for the evolution of the organisation. Since 
the end of the Uruguay Round a politicisation of the post of WTO DG has taken 
place, proportionally to the organisation’s growing public importance (Hoekman and 
Kostecki 2001: 55), but the competencies given to the WTO DG by the WTO treaties 
                                            
69 In recent years, it was discussed that additionally to the right to retaliate there should be a 
compensation mechanism to alleviate this problem (see for example Davies 2006). For a further 
discussion of the effects of the DSB for the balance between WTO members see Smith 2004. 
70 Further improvements in the DSB compared to the GATT are the time limitation for settlements and 
the fact that it permits cross-sector retaliation (ibid). Overall, the impact of the DSB is still a field of 
research. 
71 As a contrast, the World Bank has a staff of roughly 10,000 and the IMF 2,716 (World Bank and IMF 
websites). 
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is rather limited. Still, it can be argued that the Secretariat and the WTO DG can 
exert influence on the negotiation process by for example publications, research on 
negotiation topics and public speeches (Blackhurst 1998).  
The WTO agreement itself mainly deals with institutional issues, but the following 
agreements are also administered by the WTO: 
• the GATT with twelve further side agreements which are compulsory for all 
WTO members (see Box 3.1) 
• the GATS 
• the TRIPs Agreement 
• the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
• the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
• two plurilateral agreements: the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and the 
Agreement on Government Procurement72 
• the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) 
Box 3.1 GATT side agreements 
Agreement on Agriculture  
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing  
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade  
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures  
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI (Anti-dumping)  
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII (Customs Valuation)  
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection  
Agreement on Rules of Origin  
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures  
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  
Agreement on Safeguards 
                                            
72 Two further plurilateral agreements, the International Dairy Agreement and the International Bovine 
Meat Agreement, were abolished in 1997 and the respective sectors are now dealt with under the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPS). 
3 The WTO in the Global Trading System 94 
 
In general, the agreements start with broad principles, setting out the objectives to be 
attained. They then outline extra agreements and annexes concerning specific 
sectoral issues. As a third part, the agreements (except for the TRIPs Agreement) 
contain schedules or lists of commitments which have been undertaken by the WTO 
members (WTO 2004b; Wolfe 1999: 212). Actors can thus try to influence the shape 
of the regime at very different levels: for example, they can influence the broad 
principles, but also create exceptions for specific sectors or modify their individual 
commitments. The vastness of the issue areas covered under the WTO heading 
creates opportunities for issue-linkages, but the very different nature of the issue 
areas also adds to the complexity of the negotiations.  
3.1.3 Principles, objectives and functions 
A unifying feature with regard to all these different agreements is that the WTO 
system is based on a set of principles and objectives that have been – to various 
degrees and with certain adaptations – incorporated into all the WTO agreements: 
The formal objectives of the WTO are expressed in the preamble of the Marrakech 
Agreement:  
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large 
and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, 
and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, 
while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking 
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective 
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development. 
It is commonly argued that the philosophy underlying the WTO system is that of free 
trade, inspired by the American influence on the GATT system in its beginnings. 
Mearsheimer identifies as the dominant idea in Western policy-making the spreading 
of democracy and capitalism, as the prevailing hypothesis states that prosperous 
nations do not have an inclination to go to war (Mearsheimer 1994/1995: 5). 
However, with the many exceptions incorporated into the WTO system today, “free 
trade” is certainly more of a “paper objective” than a reality. For free traders, these 
exceptions certainly were severe concessions to the “reality of political life” (Rode 
1999/2000: 49). Wolfe describes the WTO system as a “continuing compromise 
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between the open international markets and the development of the domestic welfare 
state, a compromise that reflected the differing visions of how to organize a capitalist 
economy” (Wolfe 1999: 209; see also Moon 1999). Rather than liberalising trade, the 
WTO can thus be regarded as reconciling diverging national interests and policies. 
This indicates that analysing the WTO means analysing a political, rather than an 
economic process and that rather than causing economic change, the WTO serves 
as a facilitator to accommodate economic change in domestic policies (Wolfe 1999: 
210). 
The WTO’s agreements are built upon a set of principles.73 The most important 
ones are introduced here. 
The principle of non-discrimination has two components. The first is MFN. MFN 
means that any concession that a WTO member makes to another WTO member will 
be extended “immediately and unconditionally” to every other WTO member. 
“Unconditionally” means that the conceding country cannot expect anything in return; 
“immediately” denotes that all WTO members have to obtain the concessions at the 
same point of time. MFN is not only applied to tariffs, but also to other rules in 
conjunction with imports and exports, or more generally NTBs (Senti 1994: 42ff; 
Evans 1971: 36-39; Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 566ff).  
The MFN norm has been abandoned on a number of occasions: for example, there 
are exceptions for regional trade agreements or free trade areas (for example the EU 
or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)), for certain products 
(“waivers”) and for developing countries (the so-called “enabling clause”). Specific 
exceptions can also be found in the GATS and the TRIPs Agreement (Senti 2000: 
168; Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 566ff).  
The second component of the non-discrimination norm is “national treatment (NT)”. It 
forbids discrimination between domestic and foreign producers, products or services. 
Discrimination in the sense of the “national treatment” principle can occur for 
                                            
73 Apart from the principles discussed here, in the respective literature, various other norms are listed 
and/or grouped differently (see for example Senti 1994: 40-66; 145; Hauser and Schanz 1995: 41; 
Frenkel and Radeck 1996: 17; Finlayson and Zacher 1981). However, a more extensive analysis of 
these basic principles does not seem necessary for the purpose of this dissertation. 
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example in the form of national product standards, discriminatory taxes or 
subsidisation of national producers. The “national treatment” principle thus initially 
aims at NTBs (Hauser and Schanz 1995: 14-17). Originally, the principle in the GATT 
only referred to so-called “like products”, but in practice this caused a vast number of 
definitional problems (for example should roasted and unroasted coffee be regarded 
as “like products”?). The “national treatment” principle has hence subsequently been 
extended to include substitutes (Senti 1994: 48ff). Exceptions can be found 
especially in the area of trade in services and public procurement. 
The principle of reciprocity aims to equalise the concessions between different WTO 
members: on the one hand, concessions should not mean a higher burden on one 
country than on a second; on the other hand, free-riding should be minimised. 
Emerging out of the American trade policy tradition, the original GATT of 1947 took 
this norm very serious and did not differentiate between for example the different 
economic state of its members. Exceptions were introduced later on at the demand 
of developing countries (Evans 1968; Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 574-578). The 
GATT, and now the WTO agreements, do not contain exact definition of what 
reciprocity means and this has caused ample discussion, but it also gives negotiators 
in the WTO important flexibility to classify concessions as “reciprocal” (Senti 1994: 
51-54; Evans 1971: 21-33): 
When a negotiator invokes his right to reciprocity, he is speaking a 
language that both he and his fellow negotiator understand. Yet his 
meaning cannot be expressed with mathematical precision (Evans 
1971: 23). 
The effect of the principle of reciprocity is that it gives special power to those 
countries that are economically powerful and in a position to offer important 
concessions. It can also mean that countries withhold a potential unilateral 
liberalisation measure in order to have bargaining chips in a later negotiation 
(Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 576ff).  
In order to enforce the commitments made in the multilateral trading system, WTO 
members are obliged to adhere to the principle of transparency and for example 
publish any legislation relevant to their trade regime.  
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Continuous liberalisation of trade has always been the main principle of the GATT 
and WTO system (Senti 1994: 59-61; Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 570-574). Over 
the history of the GATT and the WTO, this principle has been applied in different 
ways: for example, via the reduction of tariff barriers to trade (these include tariff and 
tariff-like charges) and non-tariff barriers to trade. As seen above (see Sect. 3.1.1), 
this principle has often been contravened by other national interests and has hence 
been applied unequally throughout the different GATT negotiations (see for example 
Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 570-574). 
Exception from the MFN and NT principle are made for preferential trade agreements 
(Art XXIV GATT) and for developing countries (VIII GATT).74 The fact that these 
contradictory principles (such as the MFN or the “national treatment” principles on the 
one hand, and S&D for developing countries and the allowance for the creation of 
regional trade agreements on the other hand) coexist in the framework of the WTO 
illustrates the compromise between diverging philosophies and ideas that is sought 
under the roof of the WTO (as pointed out on p. 95). Further exceptions from the 
general WTO rules are foreseen for the case of economic hardship: WTO members 
can fall back on a range of safeguard provisions, for example in the case of balance 
of payments difficulties or dumping. Finlayson and Zacher in their analysis of the 
GATT go so far as to speak of a “safeguard norm” to characterise the trade regime’s 
in-built exceptions, which constitute a right not to comply (1981: 580ff; see also 
Finger 1995).75 Apart from these rules at times potentially being economically 
sensible, these institutionalised exceptions have allowed for the WTO system (and 
prior to it the GATT) and for trade liberalisation through it to be widely acceptable 
(Finger 1995), although naturally these exceptions create potential coherence 
problems and were obviously not the intention of the founding fathers of the GATT.  
The functions of the WTO are summarised in Art. III of the Marrakech Agreement, 
namely to administer the agreements under its heading, to provide a forum for 
                                            
74 For a discussion of the exception for regional integration projects see Evans 1971: 39-60. Kock 
points to the fact that the original ITO dealt with developmental issues in a separate section, 
whereas the GATT 1947 did not pay special attention to it (1969: 67) 
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negotiations under its member countries, to administer the DSB and the TPRM and 
to achieve increasing coherence in relation to the IMF and the World Bank.76  
For the countries participating in the WTO, market access to other countries is an 
important function of the WTO. This was already a motivation of the early GATT 
signatories (Gorter 1954:2-3). It has also been assumed from the insertion of GATT 
that a multilateral system would circumvent the creation of further bilateral 
agreements, which were regarded as detrimental to world trade, and that GATT 
would function as a negotiation forum to lower trade barriers, set the rules to govern 
world trade and mediate differences between its signatories (Gorter 1954: 5-11; 
Gardner 1964).  
The functions of the WTO have also been discussed from various theoretical 
perspectives: the WTO has been described as “a […] forum for the management of 
the global trading system” and it is “a structure of rules and […] a container for a set 
of commitments that reflect the specific application of these rules.” (Wolfe 1999: 208, 
210). Wolfe from a cognitivist’s point of view points to the shared knowledge that is 
inherent in the WTO and the expectations of countries that have shaped it. He 
furthermore enumerates that the WTO functions as a forum for the legitimisation of 
norms and principles, a source of information and a place to negotiate rules, make 
decisions and settle disputes (Wolfe 1999: 210). Later on, he argued that the WTO’s 
function was the solution of collective action problems: “Multilateral trade reform 
requires the supply of two collective goods, new rules and more open markets. No 
state can supply either of these goods alone […] (2006: 6). 
From a neo-liberalist point of view, other authors have argued that the WTO 
facilitates the management of increasing interdependence and facilitates cooperation 
(Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 34ff ; see also Haggard and Simmons 1987: 495; 
Finlayson and Zacher 1981). It does so by reducing uncertainty and providing 
information for the regime participants. Furthermore, it increases transparency 
                                                                                                                                        
75 For a discussion of these exceptions in the GATT see Dam 1970: 99-107; and for a brief discussion 
of agreements on the safeguard provisions in the Uruguay Round see Finger 1995. 
76 Compared to the GATT, only the last two functions are new (Blackhurst 1998: 46). 
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(Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 34ff, see also Gorter 1954, Finlayson and Zacher 
1981). The WTO was seen by them as an essential facilitator in the global trade 
regime. 
However, with the many loopholes in the WTO framework (see above), it is certainly 
questionable to what extent this theoretical function of the WTO is relevant in 
practice. Additionally, the facilitating and information provision function of the WTO 
have been challenged by the significant increases in WTO membership (Odell 2007). 
Of course, one should not forget that the WTO functions not only as a forum for 
communication, but also for the exchange of trade liberalisation commitments. The 
rationale for this is that far-reaching commitments are best undertaken in a 
multilateral and reciprocal way, as this maximises the gains. In turn, this renders 
trade liberalisation politically more acceptable at the domestic level. From an agent-
structure point of view, the WTO also facilitates domestic policy-making, providing a 
way to circumvent pressure groups seeking protective policies (Hoekman and 
Kostecki 2001: 25-27).  
The assessment of the evolution and current organisational structure of the 
international trade regime have already indicated that different GATT signatories, and 
now WTO members, have varying degrees of influence in the various negotiation 
processes occurring in the trade regime. We will hence now investigate the question 
of actor power in the WTO closer.   
3.2 Power in the WTO 
The first proposition set out in Ch. 2 for an actor-based power analysis in a regime 
was that “analysis of actor power in international regimes depends initially on 
specification of the international regimes, its qualities and the issue-area(s) it relates 
to”. Actor power is indeed central to the functioning of the WTO negotiations: “It 
would, however, be naïve to argue that all countries exert the same power in WTO 
negotiations” (Sampson 2000: 1100; see also Wilkinson 2000: 6). As discussed in ch. 
2, from the perspective of hegemonic leadership international regimes are an 
essential tool of the hegemon to preserve its power. The GATT has thus frequently 
been seen as a power tool of the USA. As we have seen in section 3.1, the GATT 
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was initially indeed dominated by the US, with the UK initially wielding some power 
as well. The emergence of the EEC then meant that a second key actor had to be 
taken into account (Curzon and Curzon 1974: 322ff). Winham and Ostry describe the 
Tokyo Round as the point in time when the international trade regime developed from 
a unilateral US-led system into a bilateral EU-US led system (Winham 1986; Ostry 
1997: 94). Curzon and Curzon see this transition in the 1960s already (1974: 328), 
and speak of a “senior and junior school” in the GATT:  
The seniors at the end of the sixties were the developed countries 
of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. The juniors were the 
less-developed countries. There were also some intermediates […] in 
the process of moving from the junior to the senior school. Influence 
in GATT is clearly situated in the senior school, where there are two 
heads and a number of prefects (1974: 325). 
The predominance and power of developed countries was such that the developing 
country majority for example accepted that no formal votes were ever held. Evans 
argued already in 1968 that the developing countries realised that the big trade 
powers would not implement decisions that they had not freely agreed to (Evans 
1968: 96-97). If it was not to achieve own interests, the appeal to participate in the 
GATT for countries other than the USA might have been the prospect of US market 
opening (Gorter 1954: 2-3). In the early 1970s, Curzon and Curzon describe the 
EEC-US leadership and dominance of the GATT, and see only a defensive kind of 
influence of the developing countries at this stage:  
[D]eveloping countries in GATT enjoy a certain amount of strength 
through weakness, and their demands for waivers and other 
derogations from the general agreement are always treated with 
indulgence (1974: 323). 
Proponents of dependency theories have hence for their part stressed the 
importance of the WTO as a tool of the industrialised countries in general, who use 
the WTO in order to impose their standards and values on the developing world and 
to increase the dependency of the latter on the industrialised countries (Keohane 
1993: 29; see also Wade 2003). Wade argued this in particular for the cases of the 
TRIPs, TRIMs and GATS (2003).  
However, the WTO is not just a given tool of the developed countries, but as 
discussed above a negotiation forum which is shaped by negotiation among its 
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members and which incorporates a host of inherently contradictory objectives and 
principles. In fact, the term “negotiation forum” might be a rather “tame” description of 
the conflicts that we observed in the GATT (Sect. 3.1.1) and that can be observed 
within the WTO today. In the GATT, conflicts could on the one hand be observed 
between the EC and the USA (with many prominent cases), but since the Uruguay 
Round key conflicts have been observed to occur between what can broadly be 
categorised as the “developed” and the “developing” countries.77 This today 
prominent line of conflict is hence not new to the trade regime (Drahos 2003), and 
has become increasingly prevalent within the last 25-30 years. After following import 
substitution strategies rather than integration into the world economic system and 
failing to achieve a “New International Economic Order (NIEO)” in the 1970s, the 
1980s and 1990s witnessed not only a sea-change in development theories but also 
in policy approaches in developing countries.78 Consequently, an increasing number 
of developing countries acceded to the GATT, making its membership more 
numerous and diverse (Bergsten 2005; Hurrell and Narlikar 2006; Evans 1968).79 At 
the same time, changes in the wider GPE such as shifts in the distribution of 
economic gains and economic growth, trade patterns and the increasing economic 
preponderance of “new” or “newer” players such as Brazil, India and China shifted 
the power distribution underlying the international trade regime. Some spoke about 
the emergence of a “multipolar” order in the GPE (for example Ostry 1997). As we 
would have expected from the discussion of the impact of power changes in regimes 
in chapter 2, these power shifts in the GPE started to affect the GATT as well. Inside 
the GATT, disillusionment of the developing countries with the GATT negotiation 
process was visible already in the 1960s and 1970s (for example Winham 1986: 
210ff; Evans 1968), and in the Uruguay Round a range of issues were tabled that did 
                                            
77 The conflict between the “developed” and the “developing” countries most of the times includes 
subgroups of these two broad categories. Although the lines between these two groups are blurred 
in many ways and the term “developing” is contentious in itself, this simplification shall be employed 
here as it grasps a wide range of the relevant issues in this case. 
78 Whether this latter change was imposed or due to verifiable scientific evidence and who gained or 
lost from this change shall here be left open for discussion. 
79 For an account of the developing countries’ impact on the original GATT text and in the early GATT 
years see Evans 1968. 
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not feature the EU-US line of conflict, but a developed-developing country line of 
conflict (Winham 1990: 813-815; Minhorst 1998; see also Watal 2000; Wolfe 2007).80 
Additionally, the Uruguay (and Doha Round’s) way of bundling all negotiation areas 
together into a “single undertaking” further increased the bargaining power of 
developing countries (Mattoo and Subramanian 2004). 
However, the Uruguay Round has not seen the full effects of this rise of the group of 
developing countries. Mattoo and Subramanian argue that the Uruguay Round 
managed the initial incorporation of some newly emerging powers into the trading 
regime, but that the large group of developing countries sought their place in the 
WTO post-1995 (2004). The WTO membership has grown further since the inception 
of the WTO, and it became even more diverse (Wilkinson 2000: 58).81 The shifts in 
the GPE and the subsequent integration of developing countries into the GATT and 
the WTO have hence started to pose a challenge to established power patterns in 
the international trade regime.82 Several commentators hence diagnose a shift of 
power between industrialised and developing countries after the 1995 inception of 
the WTO, because “developing countries now demand to be heard during trade 
negotiations” (Van den Hoven 2004: 260; see also Mattoo and Subramanian 2004). 
A similar point of view can be found in the work of Narlikar (2003), Narlikar and 
Tussie (2004), Bello (2002), Odell (2006) and Wolfe (2006), and although not all 
commentators have followed this line of argument in interpreting the changes in the 
WTO (see the different explanations for the course of the Ministerial Conferences 
presented in Chapters 5-9), this thesis follows the above named authours in 
assuming that a power change has taken place in the WTO.  
                                            
80 In fact even prior to this, the developing countries tried to install their own alternative to the GATT: 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was set up in 1964 and was meant to 
especially take account of the needs of developing countries (Gardner 1964). 
81 At the end of 1994, GATT membership had risen to 128 countries. By 1999, the WTO had 135 
members (Wilkinson 2000: 58), and by 2007, it had 151 members (WTO 2008).  
82 However, distributional conflicts and power struggles have not only been visible in the international 
trading regime since the 1980s, but before this. Odell and Eichengreen argue in an article that the 
failure of the ITO in the 1940s/1950s was, among other reasons, due to the “stronger” position of the 
USA or, to be more precise, due to its stronger “exit options” (Odell and Eichengreen 1998).  
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The power shift has arguably had a number of different effects. A key effect is that it 
started to change the role of the EU and the US in the trade regime:  
It is also now a part of the new reality that the EU and the US are 
no more able to dominate the WTO than they are able to dominate 
the global economy. They are essential players, but they cannot set 
the rules alone. They must involve other large economic powers, now 
including China, India, and Brazil as well as Japan. (Wolfe 2004a: 
59ff) 
Similarly, Odell argued that in a multilateral organization, the provision of the public 
good of institutional change in a multilateral regime is still dependent on the powerful 
actors (i.e. the EU and the USA), but that at the same time  
[t]oday poor small traders such as those in the African Group are 
better organized and prepared than earlier, and many are drawing 
support from non-governmental organizations. Developing countries 
are showing greater willingness to stand firm and block the whole in 
order to defend against losses and claim greater gains. (2007: 428) 
Similarly, Hurrell and Narlikar have argued that the power shift emerged from 
learning by the developing countries, which enabled them to assume a more effective 
role in the WTO negotiations (2006). Apart from the rising economic power of the 
newly powerful actors in the WTO, knowledge as a resource hence plays a role in the 
power shift.  
Additional to the changing role of the EU and the USA, the power shift has had 
effects on the functioning of the regime:  
The WTO during its formative first decade experienced an 
unanticipated clash of two diplomatic cultures. Trade diplomats with 
experience in the GATT naturally expected to continue the special 
informal decision-making practices of their experience. But the 
membership expanded dramatically, by the formal accession of non-
members and also effectively, as developing and transition GATT 
Members that had been largely passive became much more active in 
negotiations. (Odell 2007: 446) 
Wolfe argued that informal consensus-building in the WTO would proliferate even 
further:  
I conclude for now that the emergence of new players and more 
complex issues means that the proliferation of informal ministerial 
conversations is likely to continue in some form (2004a: 29) 
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The power shift was also perceived by policy-makers: Former WTO Director 
Ruggiero wrote in 1999 about the challenge that the empowered developing pose to 
established decision-making procedures in the WTO and about the need for a 
broader international leadership (1999). In 2005, former GATT and WTO Director 
General Sutherland argued that while international economic power had shifted, the 
EU-US alliance was still called upon. He hence also perceived that the old bipolar 
system as such had come under challenge and thus welcomed the emergence of the 
G4 (2005). Importantly, the EU itself perceived a power shift in the WTO, which will 
become evident in the empirical chapters 5-9, and the EU hence started to react and 
adapt to the new power distribution.  
This suggests that the period of observation chosen for this dissertation is one of a 
change of the power distribution in the regime. A key defining feature of the regime 
during the period of observation is hence a power shift. The power distribution 
underlying the regime, as suggested by Krasner, has not been static, but dynamic 
(see Ch. 2). This raises the question as to how actors, and more specifically in our 
case the EU, has recognised and reacted to the power shift in the WTO. Therefore, 
the first research question to be pursued is how the EU has recognised and 
reacted to the power shift in the WTO. 
The second proposition put forward in Ch. 2 was that “that analysis of actor power in 
international regimes depends on an assessment of the resources and capacities 
that the actor brings to the regime”. In the discussion of the WTO structure we have 
seen that the WTO consists of different levels of negotiations: Ministerial 
Conferences, General Council, specialised councils and committees. Power can 
hence be exercised in different levels, or to express it differently, within the WTO 
there are negotiations of a different nature which provide different opportunities and 
challenges for the power exercise of actors and which require different kinds of 
resources. It is therefore important here to outline the potential implications of this 
structural variety: 
The types of resource power an actor needs to influence decisions in these different 
types of negotiations have already been briefly mentioned in chapter 2. Hoekman 
and Kostecki point out that a country’s share in world trade, its trade dependence or 
3 The WTO in the Global Trading System 105 
 
openness (ratio of exports and imports to GDP) and the absolute size of its market 
(GDP) are important indicators of its influence in the WTO. In the WTO negotiations, 
these countries dispose of far greater bargaining chips than economically weaker or 
less diversified WTO members (2001: 58; Sampson 2000). While economic and 
political resources are evident conditions, the impact of institutional resources should 
not be underestimated: Jawara and Kwa demonstrate in their account of the 
preparations for the Doha Ministerial Conference the importance of having sufficient 
numbers of highly skilled staff. As the WTO system consists of a high number of 
working groups and committees, simply to attend all of these meetings requires 
significant staff numbers - and an active participation would require even more staff 
and specialised expertise. In long and arduous negotiations it is crucial to have 
enough support and backup staff, as “wearing down the adversary” can be an 
important negotiation technique. To maintain informal channels to build coalitions (for 
example by setting up informal “mini ministerials”) requires financial and personnel 
resources as much as functioning networks (Jawara and Kwa 2004: 65, 107; 
Blackhurst 1998: 36ff; Wolfe 2004a, 2004b).83 Information and expertise are further 
crucial resources for exerting power in the WTO, especially in the expert level of the 
negotiations (Sampson 2000: 1100). 
Part of these power resources in the WTO are an actor’s level of dependence from 
other WTO members and its “exit options” – those WTO members which have viable 
exit options out of the multilateral system will be more powerful in negotiations than 
others (see also Odell 2000 on the issue of an actor’s “best alternative to negotiated 
agreement” (BATNA) point). In the case of the trade regime, actors which have the 
capacity to sustain a bilateral network might choose to circumvent the multilateral 
system if it does not deliver the public goods they are seeking. These actors can use 
their “exit options” as tools to threaten other actors into compliance with their 
                                            
83 Jawara and Kwa go so far as to mention the issue of language resources: the lack of negotiators 
that speak English well can be a significant obstacle, especially for some developing countries 
(Jawara and Kwa 2004: 65, 107). Narlikar mentions that resource-poor delegations have greater 
problems in maintaining links between their Geneva delegation and domestic institutions (2004: 
424). 
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proposals. They might choose to use their exit option and revert to regional or 
bilateral initiatives – either openly or tacitly.  
In the specific issue areas, the overall status of a country in the WTO does matter. 
However, as we have seen in Ch. 2, overall power can only account for part of the 
power analysis. An actor’s power in a specific issue area will hence depend on its 
resources in that specific issue area. Relevant factors are hence the country’s share 
in trade, market size, relative openness to trade, political resources, institutional 
resources, information, expertise and relevant exit options in the specific issue area. 
Overall, the second proposition leads us to a second research question, 
namely what resources for action the EU has in the WTO overall and in the 
specific issue area chosen for this investigation. 
The third proposition set out in Ch. 2 was that “analysis of actor power in international 
regimes must take account of the actor’s ‘organisationally dependent capabilities’ 
and thus of resources derived from involvement in the regime itself”. The WTO’s 
institutional framework influences the capabilities member actors have, and thus their 
opportunities for action. In consequence, the WTO alters both the power distribution 
between its members (for example Keohane 1993: 29). As discussed above, the 
WTO has been regarded as tilted towards those countries that initiated the regime, 
who shaped its norms and principles and hence the kind of liberalisation that took 
place inside the WTO. Wilkinson argued that these asymmetries are an essential part 
of the trade regime and cannot easily be overcome as  
meaningful alterations to the asymmetries in the WTO’s legal 
framework have not been forthcoming precisely because they require 
the giving of concessions for those received. […] As the balance of 
the exchange has always resided with the institution’s most dominant 
members, this has, in turn, contributed at least to the perpetuation of 
asymmetry, and at most to its amplification (Wilkinson 2006b: 4).  
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However, we have also seen that in certain instances the regime empowers less 
powerful actors.84 Even informal rules, such as the consensus rule combined with the 
single undertaking, have given even economically weak states a certain bargaining 
power in WTO negotiations, which they would not have outside the WTO (Wolfe 
2007b; Gehring 2004). Features of the regime that stand out as having an enabling 
or disabling function for actors in the WTO are 
- the decision-making procedures, including the consensus rule and the single 
undertaking, which allows for issue-linkages across issue areas and 
negotiation levels (see Sect. 3.1.2);  
- the institutional set up of the WTO, including the TPRM, the DSB and the 
influence of the Secretariat and the WTO DG (see 3.1.2); 
- the norms and principles of the regime, including the principle of reciprocity 
and the “safeguard norm” (see Sect. 3.1.3). 
The third proposition thus leads us to ask as a third research question which 
organisationally-dependent capabilities exist for the EU in the framework of the 
WTO. 
The fourth proposition put forward in Ch. 2 was “that analysis of actor power in 
international regimes can profitably focus on formal negotiation and bargaining 
processes in which the actor is involved”. It was argued that agenda setting, coalition 
and support building are preparations for decisions and analysing them will help to 
understand whose preferences the decisions reflect (see also Gering 2004: 2). 
Agenda-setting or –breaking is an important way of exerting power in the bargaining 
                                            
84 Nonetheless, in much of the literature (esp. publications by NGOs, newspapers) an underlying 
assumption is that the WTO should comply with “democratic principles” (often leaving open how 
these should look like) and an ideal model of “democratic equality” and that it should redistribute 
wealth. The questions one needs to consider in these cases are whether those with an 
underproportionate share in trade should be powerful in the WTO and what should be the crucial 
power resource in the WTO, if it was not the share in world trade. Should one expect those to shape 
the rules who do not “use” them (i.e. do not trade that much)? In terms of organisationally-
dependent capabilities, diffuse factors might have an influence on outcomes in the WTO as well: if 
actors place their agents in strategic positions in the organisation (for example chairmen), one might 
expect an increase in their influence on decisions. Jawara and Kwa even claim that the nationality 
and ideology of the WTO Secretariat has an influence on the proposals made and thus decisions 
taken (Jawara and Kwa 2004). It is, however, hard to determine the influence of these diffuse factors 
on outcomes.  
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process. The WTO’s agenda is only partially set in a formal way (for example after 
the Uruguay Round certain revisions of WTO agreements were incorporated in the 
texts of the agreements), but mostly in an informal process involving the different 
negotiation levels in the WTO. Ministerial Conferences often function as road marks 
in this process. To assess the way the EU exercises power in the WTO 
negotiation process, we hence need to ask as a fourth research question to 
what extent the EU is capable or not capable of influencing the processes 
leading to the WTO’s negotiation agendas, and whether there are differences 
between the different types of negotiations.  
As discussed above, consensus-building in the WTO functions via a multitude of 
formal and informal meetings. Coalitions have assumed a key part in this process. 
Actors involve in coalition-building and maintenance processes as part of the 
consensus-building process. In this way they attempt to build support for their 
position. The informal part of decision-making might also involve “buying support” 
(“carrot”) by issue-linkages (or even forcing compliance (“stick”)) (Sect. 2.3; see also 
Wolfe 2004a; Narlikar 2005). The following tools have, according to Jawara and Kwa, 
been used by the EU and the USA prior to the Doha and Cancún Ministerials85 to 
convince developing countries of their agendas: 
• issue-linkages: influence on other international agencies (IMF, World Bank, 
and other agencies which provide funding and financial aid, debt relief, 
technical assistance) (2004: 149), granting preferential market access or 
threatening to withdraw preferences (2004: 152-155) and granting financial 
aid, debt relief, technical assistance or threatening to withdraw it;86 
                                            
85 The Jawara and Kwa text does not satisfy academic criteria. It is formulated as a narrative with 
sources not being made explicit in many cases and claims left without verifiable evidence. However, 
it is one of the few texts which deals with the informal side of the current negotiations in the WTO. 
The material used here can give indications of potential power instruments in the WTO – the usage 
of these would have to be confirmed separately for each case. 
86 Van den Hoven points out that the EU in fact funds some of the poorest African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries for their participation in the trade negotiations (2004: 262). 
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• lobbying: influencing national governments87 and influencing the media (2004: 
112). 
Narlikar discusses similar informal ways of building consensus, which to her are 
detrimental for developing countries (2004: 422). A further technique is to introduce 
research and other informational material into the consensus-building process. As a 
fifth research question, it can therefore be asked to what extent the EU has the 
capacity to build and lead coalitions within the WTO and in which ways it 
acquires support for its positions. 
The fifth proposition set out in Ch. 2 was “that analysis of actor power in international 
regimes must include an assessment of outcomes”. It is important to remember here 
that decisions in the WTO are not only the formal decisions taken, but also decisions 
to drop issues that have been used as bargaining chips or which run counter to an 
actor’s preferences. As set out in Sect. 2.2, informal decisions are hence important to 
be considered. It can hence be asked as a sixth and final research question 
whether outcomes reflect the EU’s preferences, and why or why not. 
3.2.1 Research questions 
The previous section revisited the five propositions set out in Ch. 2 and discussed 
them in relation to actor power in the WTO. The discussion led to the establishment 
of six research questions. It is evident that these can be divided into three groups. 
The first question follows the work of Krasner on shifts of power in regime change, as 
presented in chapter 2:  
1. How has the EU recognised and reacted to the power shift in the WTO? 
This question arose from the discussion of the changes in the WTO regime in the last 
years. It concerns the overall, structural evolution of the trade regime and will be 
taken up again in the end of the thesis. 
The second group of questions concerns the resource power of the actor EU within 
the regime. This follows the two first steps in the Keohane and Nye model: 
                                            
87 Jawara and Kwa find several cases where oppositional developing country staff had allegedly even 
been removed due to US pressure (2004: 151).  
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2. What resources for action does the EU have in the WTO? 
3. Which organisationally-dependent capabilities exist for the EU in the framework of 
the WTO? 
The next chapter will take up these two questions and discuss them in relation to the 
EU’s participation in the WTO. 
The third group of questions concerns the effects of power in negotiations or the way 
power is used in order to achieve certain outcomes: 
4. To what extent is the EU capable or not capable of influencing the processes 
leading to the WTO’s negotiation agendas? Are there differences between the 
different negotiation levels? 
5. To what extent does the EU have the capacity to build and lead coalitions within 
the WTO and in which ways do they acquire support for their positions? 
6. Do outcomes reflect the EU’s preferences? Why or why not? 
These questions will be studied in the case study on the basis of the EU’s 
involvement in the WTO between 1995-2005 and in relation to the negotiations in a 
specific issue area. As has been mentioned several times, specific issue areas under 
the heading of the WTO might display distinct characteristics. The negotiations in 
major sectors also take place outside of the Ministerial/General council level, which 
will add to the richness of the observations. The issue area chosen for this case 
study is trade in services.  
3.3 The issue area: trade in services  
As has been mentioned above, the GATS was added to the WTO system as an 
agreement separate from the GATT. Trade in services is in its nature different from 
trade in goods, and services have a different character than goods. Hence, first of all, 
a definition for services has to be found. 
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3.3.1 Definition of services and services statistics 
Box 3.2 A definition of services 
UN System of National Accounts’ (SNA) classification of services 
6.8.  
Services are not separate entities over which ownership rights can be established. They cannot be 
traded separately from their production. Services are heterogeneous outputs produced to order and 
typically consist of changes in the conditions of the consuming units realized by the activities of 
producers at the demand of the consumers. By the time their production is completed they must have 
been provided to the consumers. 
6.9. 
The production of services must be confined to activities that are capable of being carried out by one 
unit for the benefit of another. Otherwise, service industries could not develop and there could be no 
markets for services. It is also possible for a unit to produce a service for its own consumption 
provided that the type of activity is such that it could have been carried out by another unit. 
6.13  
There is a group of industries generally classified as service industries that produce outputs that have 
many of the characteristics of goods, i.e., those industries concerned with the provision, storage, 
communication and dissemination of information, advice and entertainment in the broadest sense of 
those terms - the production of general or specialized information, news, consultancy reports, 
computer programs, movies, music, etc. The outputs of these industries, over which ownership rights 
may be established, are often stored on physical objects - paper, tapes, disks, etc. - that can be traded 
like ordinary goods. Whether characterized as goods or services, these products possess the 
essential common characteristic that they can be produced by one unit and supplied to another, thus 
making possible division of labour and the emergence of markets. 
UN 2001: Services Industries 
Examples of service activities are wholesale, retail, certain kinds of repair, hotel, catering, transport, 
postal, telecommunication, financial, insurance, real estate, property rental, computer-related, 
research, professional, marketing and other business support, government, education, health, social, 
sanitation, community, audiovisual, recreational, cultural, personal, and domestic services. 
Source: UN SNA 1993, Sect. 6, B.1.6., UN et al. 2001 
Any negotiation on services trade is first and foremost challenged to define what its 
object of negotiation is. The definition outlined in Box 3.2 shows why: services are 
immaterial, production and consumption occur mostly simultaneously and the 
classification and definition of services can be contentious due to diverging interests 
of the negotiating parties (see also Hindley 1990a: 131ff; Hoekman and Stern 1993; 
Snape 1990).  
In national accounting, services are classified according to the IMF Balance of 
Payments Manual. An initiative of the United Nations, the European Commission, the 
IMF, OECD, UNCTAD and the WTO in 1994 started to push forward the 
development of internationally coherent concepts, definitions and classification and to 
improve the availability of internationally comparable trade in services data (UN 
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2001: vii). The resulting manual provides countries with a framework to classify 
service trade, incorporating attempts to gather the services provided locally by 
foreign affiliates. It seems, however, that this comprehensive manual has so far only 
been implemented by a few OECD countries.  
While estimates assume that services constitute about one fifth of world trade in 
balance of payments terms (UN 2001: 9), the actual impact of services in world trade 
can be assumed to be much larger than that, because data on trade in services is 
still only incompletely available.88 This is, amongst other reasons, due to the fact that 
a large part of services trade is dependent on FDI (see for example Sauvant 1990).89 
This means that after an initial investment there are no reported flows of services 
across the border; production by the foreign supplier and consumption by the 
domestic consumer take place domestically. While data on foreign affiliates’ trade in 
services is not internationally available, the manual by the UN et al. states that for the 
US 
in 1998, services delivered to foreign markets by foreign affiliates 
of United States companies, and to United States markets by United 
States affiliates of foreign companies, exceeded the respective values 
of the exports and imports of services recorded in the United States 
balance of payments (UN 2001: 9). 
For service provision by people moving across borders (classified as “GATS Mode 4” 
(Movement of natural persons)), statistics are also hardly existent; there is a 
multitude of classification and definitional issues which remain to be determined. A 
further aspect leading to trade in services statistics only being incompletely available 
is that a large part of service trade is subsumed under trade in goods as they 
concern transport services, distribution services and export financing. 
Crucially, to render statistics on trade in services more comprehensive and reliable 
does involve major costs (as it involves much more than a numerical compilation on 
the border). It also depends on cooperation of services companies, and on their 
                                            
88 For an earlier account of this problem see for example Hoekman and Stern 1993. 
89 “The Manual reflects the emerging international consensus that statistics on such services should 
be developed for firms in which a foreign investor has a majority interest. They should be classified as 
a first priority on an activity basis (i.e., by industry of the producer rather than by type of service 
produced).” (UN 2001: 4) 
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willingness to reveal their internal company statistics (as services trade often involves 
intra-company transactions).  
Overall, and while taking into account the statistical difficulties experienced in 
measuring trade in services, figures on trade in services show a general increase in 
trade in services – while according to a 2004 WTO report the share of services in 
world trade overall has not changed significantly in the 1990s (WTO 2004c; see also 
Hoekman and Stern 1993). In the public debate, there is a general assumption that 
trade in services has increased and that its impact has become more important. 
Given the technological change experienced in the 1990s and technological 
innovation such as the arrival of the internet, trade in services can be expected to 
gain further in importance. 
3.3.2 The political economy of service trade 
Service trade is subject to “domestically legally defined non-price barriers” 
(Langhammer 2005: 313). The quantification of these barriers is virtually impossible 
(ibid). This has important implications for attempts to liberalise services trade via 
multilateral negotiations: liberalisation of service trade does not mean reducing or 
abolishing barriers “at the border”; but it means transforming national legislation and 
regulation (Hindley 1990a: 133; Eiteljörge 1998; Snape 1990). This means that in the 
WTO, negotiations of a very different kind, tariff reduction and regulatory, are held in 
conjunction, which can obviously cause frictions, especially when these very different 
negotiations are supposed to comply with similar deadlines.90 Regulatory 
negotiations require negotiating parties to have in-depth knowledge of the legal and 
governance systems of their own and of negotiation partners to identify what 
constitute barriers to trade (see for example Jackson 1993; Eiteljörge 1998). This can 
be assumed to be a further challenge, in particular to the resource-poor developing 
countries.  
                                            
90 Lawrence and Litan distinguish between “shallow” (at the border measures to reduce discrimination 
among trading partners) and “deep” integration (beyond the border measures to harmonise 
regulation) (1990). Of course, this problem has been encountered in the GATT negotiations when 
NTBs were negotiated. However, due to the special nature of services the barriers to services are 
even harder to define than in the case of NTBs for goods (Hindley 1990: 133). 
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Multilateral liberalisation in service trade can entail reducing the policy scope for 
national rule-setters. At the same time, services industries can be private, public or 
mixed private and public industries. Public industries can have non-profit objectives 
(for example the Belgian post employs workforce which would not be competitive in 
the private labour market), which can make them uncompetitive on an international 
level. Which industries are public depends on national characteristics and history, 
and these are a major factor impacting on the negotiation process and shaping the 
interests of the WTO members. Domestic regulatory agencies therefore also have an 
interest in the negotiations. Services are not only subject to trade ministries, but are 
dealt with in various ministries under various responsibilities, which can create 
coordination problems on the national level and hence impact on the multilateral 
negotiations (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 246-248; Hindley 1990a; Jackson 
1993).91  
“Reciprocity” in services negotiations is even less quantifiable than it is in trade in 
goods due to the non-numerical nature of barriers to trade in services (see for 
example Wolfe 2005: 636).92 Still, one can find in the respective publications that an 
“equal level of liberalisation” is aspired to by the negotiators in the WTO. 
Interviewees explained that negotiators act with a “spirit of reciprocity” (interview 3, 
30). However, for the respective government agents their gains from the negotiations 
are less visible and therefore less easy to exploit for their personal benefit and more 
difficult to “sell” to the domestic public. 
The effects from services liberalisation are either unknown or far from clear-cut, 
which means that in the public (in the EU), an extensive debate about the effects of 
services liberalisation has taken place over recent years. This debate has taken 
place both publicly in the media, between the different levels of negotiations at the 
WTO and inside of the actual services negotiations, which take place between 
technocrats in special working groups. The debate concerns the effects of services 
                                            
91 As in other areas, international agreements on services might be useful for governments to enforce 
reform despite domestic resistance (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 246-248). 
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liberalisation. Those that argue that services liberalisation has overwhelmingly 
positive effects, hold that countries which liberalise first might have an advantage and 
incentives for further reform – hence every country should strive to liberalise as much 
as possible. With the actual effects of services liberalisation not being evident, control 
of knowledge about service trade (this includes the interpretation of the available 
data and control about the prevailing academic theories) might therefore be an 
important factor in the services negotiations  
While the GATS was the first multilateral agreement to liberalise trade in services, 
services liberalisation is now covered by most regional and bilateral agreements (to 
varying degrees) and by the OECD. Thus while the GATS remains at the core of the 
international regime for trade in services, the regime itself has spread and become 
more diverse. 
3.3.3 Services in the Uruguay Round93 
Services entered the GATT negotiation agenda at the end of the Tokyo Round as an 
initiative of the USA, and met the strong opposition of developing countries which 
feared a detrimental effect of services liberalisation for the development of their 
economies.94  
Developing countries were hesitant to include service trade in the negotiation agenda 
for the Uruguay Round (and maintained this position during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations). They argued that they were not sufficiently equipped to negotiate an 
area as complex as services and feared that developed countries might lose interest 
in the trade in goods negotiations. Additionally, they were weary that the GATS might 
provide a “back door” for developed countries to introduce investment liberalisation. 
                                                                                                                                        
92 This does not imply that “perfect reciprocity” can be achieved in trade in goods negotiations. Various 
loopholes exist here, for example the difference between bound and unbound tariffs and the 
(systematic) use of NTBs. 
93 For a more extensive discussion of the services negotiations in the Uruguay Round see Messerlin 
and Sauvant 1990, Eiteljörge 1998 and Hoekman 1993. 
94 It argued that the substantial market access concessions it had made in trade in goods had led to 
the economic rise of its trading partners, especially in South East Asia. However, the USA claimed it 
had suffered competitive disadvantages from this liberalisation and hence wanted to gain market 
access in areas where it had competitive advantage (Eiteljörge 1998). 
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After they failed to exclude services from the agenda, the “G10”, consisting of the 
most influential developing countries together and led by India and Brazil,95 tried to 
limit the negotiations on services as much as possible (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 
249; Winham 1990: 803; Winham 1989: 286; Eiteljörge 1998: 153; Sauvé 2000). A 
concern of several GATT signatories was also the potential loss of sovereignty 
through a services agreement (Eiteljörge 1998). In view of this resistance against the 
GATS, one can regard it already as a success of the USA and the EC that an 
agreement was concluded at all (interview 30). 
At Punta del Este, the interim solution to these concerns was to negotiate the GATS 
separately from GATT. The Punta del Este declaration left great scope for the 
negotiators to determine the shape of the GATS. GATT procedures and principles 
were to apply, but it was not specified how (Eiteljörge 1998: 154; Marconini 1990: 
20). It is hence often mentioned that after the inclusion of services in the Uruguay 
Round agenda the understanding of what service liberalisation would have to include 
and the understanding of service trade continued to evolve.96 Thinking about the 
trade in services liberalisation thus evolved significantly during the Uruguay Round, 
which led to a delimiting of the initially ambitious liberalisation approaches of the 
industrialised countries (Barth 1999: 9; Marconini 1990; Sauvé 2000). The GATS was 
thus importantly shaped by the evolution of ideas while under negotiation. 
The negotiations were dominated by rule-making. Liberalisation negotiations and 
commitments were of secondary importance in the Uruguay Round (WTO 
2000/2001: 103; European Commission 2005b; Winham 1990: 803-804). In the 
GATS, countries therefore bound current levels of openness or even levels below the 
current market access (Hoekman 1995: 327; see also Martins and Will 1995). The 
reluctance of the negotiating parties to make far-reaching commitments under GATS 
in the Uruguay Round was also reflected in their choice of negotiation method. They 
chose to exchange concession via a “positive list” approach, in which only those 
                                            
95 The G10 included for example Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Nigeria and Yugoslavia. 
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sectors are listed in which a liberalisation commitment is offered. This is opposed to a 
“negative list” approach, where all sectors are liberalised except for those specifically 
listed. The “positive list” approach employed in the GATS negotiations meant that not 
only the commitments were rather limited, but also that the negotiation process 
suffered from intransparency. In particular, no information about those sectors not 
committed to liberalisation was provided (Hoekman 1995).  
In an analysis of the draft GATS, Hoekman found that while the draft GATS 
contained elements of the different proposals which had been tabled at the 
beginnings of the negotiations in 1987/1988, the influence of the OECD countries on 
the shape and content of the agreement was predominant (1993: 2). Still, interests of 
developing countries were reflected: for example a group of very sceptical developing 
countries argued initially that there should not have been any agreement on services. 
Although they did not manage to achieve this goal, they did manage to de-link the 
services negotiations from the trade in goods negotiations and the GATS was 
established as a separate agreement. They also managed to have “economic 
development and growth” inserted as one objective of the negotiations (Hoekman 
1993: 3).  
As mentioned above, the EC was initially hesitant to include services in the Uruguay 
Ruond, but changed its positions when it realised that services liberalisation could 
further the EC’s competitive advantage in world trade and could delimit the US’ 
tendency for unilateral measures. The EC‘s then demanded an agreement that 
granted “effective market access” to a wide membership and for a wide-ranging array 
of sectors. The EC supported the idea of a “regulation committee”, which would 
supervise whether regulations in service trade are “appropriate”. The goal of the 
agreement was to create “comparable” market access for all participating countries, 
although the EC wanted commitments to apply on a sector-specific level and not to 
be binding overall. The US asked for “national treatment” and MFN to be applied to 
                                                                                                                                        
96 Issues under discussion included the definition of services, statistics, concepts for the new 
agreement and sectoral coverage, relation to other international or sectoral agreements and 
institutions, measures and practices contributing to or limiting the expansion of trade in services 
(Marconini 1990).  
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all members of the agreement without exception. The US proposal also included 
provisions on FDI and other similarly far-reaching demands, which altogether meant 
that many developing countries considered the US proposal as going beyond the 
negotiation mandate (Hoekman 1993: 4; Hindley 1990: 136-143; Sauvé 2000). The 
EC’s proposal of a “softer” GATS, which was supported by a range of developing 
countries, prevailed, for example with regard to the extent that the “national 
treatment” principle is applied, although the US achieved MFN to be a general 
obligation (Hoekman 1993: 11ff). 
Chadha et al. point out that systematic asymmetries were visible on the GATS 
negotiations as “very little, if anything, was done to enhance developing country 
service export opportunities (e.g., through the movement of natural persons)” (2000). 
Similarly, Mattoo questions that there was a balanced outcome in the services 
negotiations of the Uruguay Round: “The much-troubled trade off between modes of 
delivery simply did not take place”, which he attributed not only to the unwillingness 
of the industrialised countries to commit under Mode 4 (see below), but also to the 
unwillingness of developing countries to open their domestic markets (Mattoo 2000). 
These conflicts visible in the Uruguay Round are the background for the current 
negotiations on services in the WTO. 
3.3.4 The GATS 
Despite the difficulties encountered during the negotiations, the GATS was denoted 
as a remarkable achievement after the Uruguay Round, as it constitutes the first 
legally binding international agreement on trade in services (UN 2001: 10; Hoekman 
1995). However, as discussed above, the liberalisation actually achieved after the 
Uruguay Round was not very far-reaching and in many cases countries bound 
themselves below their current levels of openness. The GATS hence rather sets a 
framework to undertake future liberalisation than already incorporating it (Barth 1999: 
40; WTO 1994; Hoekman 1995; Eiteljörge 1998).  
The GATS does not define “services” as such, but it includes all tradable services 
with the exception of air transport services and services supplied under government 
authority (Barth 1999: 40; WTO 1994). However, due to the positive list approach 
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that has been chosen, this does not mean that these sectors have actually been 
liberalised. 
The WTO Secretariat’s list of services sectoral classifications covers the following 
sectors. The list is not exhaustive and legally binding, but used by most WTO 
countries: 
Box 3.3 Sectors dealt with under the GATS 
Business services 
Communication services 
Construction and related engineering services 
Distribution services 
Educational services 
Environmental services 
Financial services 
Health and related services 
Tourism and travel related services 
Recreational, cultural and sporting services 
Transport services 
Other services 
Source: WTO MTN.GNS/W/120 10.07.1991 
Liberalisation in the GATS is scheduled according to sectors and mode of supply. 
The GATS identifies four modes of supply: 
Box 3.4 Modes of supply under GATS 
For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of a service: 
• from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member (Mode 1); 
• in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member (Mode 2); 
• by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any 
other Member (Mode 3); 
• by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the 
territory of any other Member (Mode 4). 
Source: WTO 1994 
While trade in services under Mode 1 and Mode 2 resembles trade in goods, as the 
services actually cross a physical border, Mode 3 and 4 involve the movement of the 
service provider across the border. Mode 3 hence raises a host of issues related to 
foreign direct investments, such as the right of establishment. Mode 4 raises issues 
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of work permissions and migration (Hindley 1990b). Evidently, these issues have 
proven rather contentious and complex in the GATS negotiations.97  
The GATS contains a number of general rules and obligations, and specific 
commitments (which can be found in country-specific schedules). This positive list 
approach indicates the compromise that had to be reached in the Uruguay Round 
between those arguing for a far-reaching liberalisation and those who did not want to 
place a limitation on their national sovereignty (Barth 1999: 41). The following are the 
core principles of the GATS: 
While MFN is a general obligation under the GATS, the GATS also lists a set of 
exceptions to the principle: these are general exceptions such as those for regional 
integration agreements (such as the EU), or for preferences for trade in border 
regions. The second type of exceptions is country-specific and can be asked for by 
every WTO member for up to 10 years. They are reviewed every five years. Still, 
exemptions other than those notified initially can only be granted via requesting a 
waiver from the Ministerial Conference. Developed countries were the main users of 
these exemptions and sectors most widely exempted from MFN were sensitive 
sectors such as audiovisual services, financial services and transportation services. 
Overall, MFN is less encompassing in GATS than in GATT (Hoekman and Kostecki 
2001: 252; Barth 1999: 41ff; Hoekman 1995: 333-336).  
“National treatment” under the GATS is granted via a positive list approach, which as 
explained above means that only those sectors that are listed are committed to 
liberalisation. This makes liberalisation more prudent, but probably also slows down 
the liberalisation process (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 253; Hoekman 1995: 334). 
The GATS furthermore contains a new principle: a market access obligation. If a 
country has liberalised a sector under GATS, six specific market access restrictions 
are clearly prohibited by GATS (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 253; Hoekman: 334). 
Additionally, the GATS provides for the establishment of mutual recognition of 
qualifications between members (GATS Art. VII) and acknowledges the need to 
                                            
97 Some have argued that an exclusion of Mode 3 and Mode 4 from the GATS would make the 
agreement more efficient and it would be easier to achieve further liberalisation (for example Snape 
1998). 
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ensure non-competitive practices and monopolies are regulated (Hoekman and 
Kostecki 2001: 253). The GATS also includes obligations for transparency of service 
regulations and for the continued liberalisation of service trade. In fact, negotiations 
are scheduled for every five years and entail the bilateral exchange of concessions 
between negotiation parties. A new round of negotiations was thus scheduled for 
2000. The GATS requires governments to ensure that regulations in services sectors 
are administered in “a reasonable, objective and impartial manner”. To do so the 
Council for Trade in Services was mandated to establish disciplines, where deemed 
necessary (GATS Art. VI). Liberalisation commitments are scheduled in national 
schedules and are of a highly individualistic character. 
Exceptions from the GATS principles exist for a number of reasons similar to those in 
GATT, for example for balance-of-payment reasons (GATS Art. XII).  
A main problem of the GATS principles is that they only apply to those sectors 
actually committed, and hence their reach is rather restricted (Hoekman 1995; 
Eiteljörge 1998). Hence, Hoekman criticises the GATS for being intransparent; for the 
individualistic and incoherent style with which commitment have been listed by WTO 
members; for the mostly sectoral approach which does not further coherent 
application of MFN and coherent liberalisation and which makes governments more 
prone to lobbying by interests group; for the scheduling commitments by mode of 
supply, which creates an incentive for countries to focus only on particular modes of 
supply; and for combining specific commitments and the positive list approach, so 
that countries could be incited to create restrictive policies only to have bargaining 
chips in the next negotiations (Hoekman 1995: 346-348). The GATS thus remains a 
flexible but complex and incomplete agreement, where actual liberalisation levels are 
hard to determine.  
As mentioned before, each issue area under the WTO displays different interest and 
power constellations, and this is clearly the case for the trade in services issue with 
its very specific nature. This is a further reason why the services negotiations have 
been chosen for study in this dissertation.  
After the Uruguay Round, the GATS framework remained incomplete in a number of 
issue areas. Negotiations on maritime services, telecom services, financial services, 
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on disciplines for domestic regulation and the movement of natural persons (Mode 4) 
were scheduled to continue directly after the Uruguay Round. Apart from this, the so-
called “rules negotiations” (negotiations on an ESM, services subsidies and 
government procurement) were to be held.  
Furthermore, the GATS agreement itself mandates a range of negotiations and 
review processes, which are summarised in Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3 Issues mandated for negotiation in GATS 
Art GATS Issue Treated in 
this thesis? 
Art. IV 
 
Increasing participation of developing countries: negotiation of 
specific commitments to enhance their capacity for services trade, 
their participation in networks, liberalisation of sectors of interest to 
developing countries 
Yes. 
Art. VI Disciplines on domestic regulation: “With a view to ensuring that 
measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, 
technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Council for Trade in 
Services shall, through appropriate bodies it may establish, de-
velop any necessary disciplines.” 
Yes. 
Art. X Multilateral negotiations on the question of an ESM: result is to 
enter into force three years after coming into force of WTO 
agreement 
Yes. 
Art. XIII Government procurement: negotiations on government procure-
ment in services within two years from the date of entry into force 
of the WTO Agreement 
Yes. 
Art. XV Subsidies: developing the necessary multilateral disciplines to 
avoid trade-distortive effects of subsidies.  
Yes.  
Art XIX-XXI Progressive liberalisation  
Art. XIX Negotiation of Specific Commitments: “Members shall enter into 
successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later than five 
years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement and 
periodically thereafter, with a view to achieving a progressively 
higher level of liberalization”. “For each round, negotiating guide-
lines and procedures shall be established. For the purposes of 
establishing such guidelines, the Council for Trade in Services 
shall carry out an assessment of trade in services in overall terms 
and on a sectoral basis with reference to the objectives of this 
Agreement, including those set out in paragraph 1 of Article IV. 
Negotiating guidelines shall establish modalities for the treatment 
of liberalization undertaken autonomously by Members since pre-
vious negotiations, as well as for the special treatment for least-
developed country Members under the provisions of paragraph 3 
of Article IV”. 
Yes.  
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Annex on 
Article II 
Exemptions 
Review of MFN exemptions: “Review all exemptions granted for a 
period of more than 5 years. The first such review shall take place 
no more than 5 years after the entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement.” 
No (as it was 
not part of the 
overall 
services deal). 
Annex on Air 
Transport 
Services  
Periodic review, at least every five years, of developments in the 
air transport services sector 
No. 
Source: GATS agreement 
This so-called “built-in” agenda of the GATS scheduled negotiations to increase the 
current levels of liberalisation to start 5 years after the entry of force of the WTO 
agreement (i.e. in 2000) (Art. XIX GATS). For these negotiations to proceed, 
negotiation guidelines and procedures would have to be established, and an overall 
and sectoral assessment of trade in services would have to be conducted. 
Autonomous liberalisation (liberalisation undertaken unilaterally) and the special 
situation of the least-developed countries (LDC) would have to be taken into account. 
These negotiations scheduled in the WTO to start after the Uruguay Round will be 
observed in the next chapters. 
In Sect. 3.2, it was explained that different types of negotiations take place in the 
WTO. To structure the case study in the next chapters, this general outline of the 
negotiations shall here be specified for the case of the trade in services negotiations. 
“Overall framework-setting” concerns the broad strategic direction of the WTO and 
treats services as one issue at par with agriculture, NAMA and others. For services, 
issue-area framework setting takes place mostly in the CTS (and in informal 
meetings), which also has to decide on the negotiation modalities required in the 
GATS agreement. Issue-area specific negotiations can take place in the CTS as well, 
or in various sub-committees and working groups. The different types of negotiations, 
where they take place, coalitions (presumably) at work in them and how they are 
documented are set out in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4 Types of negotiations in trade in services 
Type of 
negotiation 
Issues Places of 
negotiation  
Coalitions 
(see Ch. 5-9) 
Documentation 
Overall 
framework-
setting 
“Negotiations about 
negotiations”. 
Services here at 
par with other issue 
areas such as 
agriculture etc. 
General Council 
Ministerial level 
meetings (formal 
and informal) 
Quad, new 
Quad, G6, ACP 
(African, 
Caribbean and 
Pacific 
countries) 
EU press releases, 
strategic papers 
General Council 
Documents 
Press coverage: 
IUST, Bridges, FT  
Issue-area 
framework 
setting 
“Negotiations about 
how to negotiate 
an issue.” 
Services: strategic 
direction within the 
issue area e.g. 
where should 
certain issues be 
dealt with, how are 
negotiations 
structured etc.  
autonomous 
liberalisation, 
modalities for LDC; 
assessment of 
services trade, 
modalities  
CTS 
Informal meetings 
(plurilat., bilateral) 
Quad, very 
good Friends of 
services, ACP, 
US-India 
chaired 
informal group 
(inactive?)  
EU service-specific 
papers and press 
releases.  
CTS documentation 
Press coverage: 
IUST, Bridges  
Issue-area 
specific 
negotiations 
“Negotiations about 
substance”. 
Sub-units of the 
services 
negotiations  
All sectors: 
financial, telecoms, 
transport, postal, 
energy, 
environment, 
audiovisual, 
tourism, 
professional 
services etc. 
All horizontal 
issues:  
Mode 4, ESM, 
procurement, rules 
on service 
subsidies 
Various working 
groups on specific 
services sub-issues, 
specialised 
committees. 
Informal and formal 
bilateral 
negotiations. Since 
March 2006: 
plurilateral 
negotiations.  
Depending on 
sector/issue 
area: Friends 
groups in 
nearly all 
sectors, 
Quad??, 
ACP?? 
EU specific papers 
mostly not available. 
Documentations from 
working groups. But 
not from informal 
meetings or from 
bilaterals.  
Press coverage: for 
some of the issues 
available.  
Source: Author 
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3.4 Interim Conclusion 
Chapter 2 established that the first step in the analysis of an actor’s power in a 
regime needs to be the analysis of the regime itself. This chapter analysed the global 
trade regime in three parts: first of all, the WTO and its norms, principles and rules as 
the main organisation in the international trade regime was introduced. Second, a link 
was set up between considerations regarding the WTO and an actor’s power. Third, 
the issue area chosen for the case study was introduced.  
Importantly, the way the regime has evolved during the last 60 years still impacts on 
the negotiations today. The WTO is mostly a membership-driven organisation and 
functions as negotiation forum, and thus its institutional head might only have a minor 
influence on negotiation outcomes. The WTO’s principles are partially contradictory, 
reflecting the diverging national interests that need to be accommodated in the WTO. 
They provide scope for actors to use them according to their own preferences. The 
plurality of issues under the roof of the WTO creates opportunities for issue-linkage, 
but they also make the negotiations rather complex. There is hence ample scope to 
use resources as power tools in the regime.  
It can also be assumed that the regime initially reflected the power distribution among 
its initial members, which is in line with Krasner’s work. It was evident that 
economically powerful actors with institutional resources would have advantages in 
the international trade regime, and that influence on the regime can be exerted at 
different stages of the negotiation process.  
However, it also seems that for the time period under consideration in this 
dissertation, a power shift has occurred. As Krasner suggested, the power 
distribution underlying the regime seems to have proved more dynamic than the 
regime itself.  
The chapter also introduced the issue area that will be researched in the case study. 
The services negotiations are of a regulatory nature and hence very different from 
the traditional tariff reduction negotiations under the GATT. Therefore, they entail a 
specific set of issues, for example with regard to national sovereignty, and interests, 
which means they require specific resource power. After the Uruguay Round, the 
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GATS framework remained incomplete in a number of issue areas and these 
negotiations will be followed in the next chapters.  
On the basis of the considerations of the WTO in combination with the five 
propositions set out in Ch. 2, six research questions have been drawn up, which will 
guide the investigation in the thesis: 
1. How has the EU recognised and reacted to the power shift in the WTO? 
2. What resources for action does the EU have in the WTO? 
3. Which organisationally-dependent capabilities exist for the EU in the framework of 
the WTO? 
4. To what extent is the EU capable or not capable of influencing the processes 
leading to the WTO’s negotiation agendas? Are there differences between the 
different negotiation levels? 
5. To what extent does the EU have the capacity to build and lead coalitions within 
the WTO and in which ways does it acquire support for its positions? 
6. Do outcomes reflect preferences of the EU? Why or why not? 
The next chapter will take up the second and the third research questions and 
discuss the EU’s resources in the international trade regime and which 
organisationally-dependent capabilities it has at its disposal within the WTO and 
within the issue area services. 
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4 The EU in the international trade regime  
“Whatever the EU’s deficiencies in political coherence, cultural 
identity, and military organization may be, it does not lack economic 
power.” (Cameron 1998: 21) 
This chapter conceptualises the EU as an actor in the international trade regime. 
Cameron’s statement indicates a common assessment of the EU’s actorness in the 
GPE: Although the EU might not be influential in the realm of classical foreign policy 
and although it is not a state, it is presumed to be a powerful actor in the GPE, and in 
particular in the international trade regime.  
In the first part of the chapter, it will be argued that for the EU itself and specifically its 
negotiators in the Commission, the field of trade policy is the main field in which the 
EU can assert its actorness and build its identity as an international actor.98 The EU 
can do so on the basis of a set of resources that it has at its disposal, which will be 
introduced in this chapter. These are the EU’s economic and institutional resources 
and its relationships with the “rest of the world”. A special emphasis is on the EU’s 
resources in the area of trade in services. 
The second section of the chapter looks at those organisationally-dependent 
capabilities in the WTO which (potentially) enable the EU to play an active role in the 
regime.  
4.1 The resource basis I – trade policy, institutions, policy-making, 
trade in services  
The focus in this section is on what has enabled the European Union to establish a 
presence in the GPE. More specifically, it describes those resources which condition 
the EU’s impact in the WTO. 
                                            
98 It here has the most distinguishable identity and actorness. Arguably, the EU is the most powerful in 
this area. As van den Hoven put it “The WTO is probably the only international organisation in which 
the EU acts like a superpower and shares equal status with the United States.” (van den Hoven 
2004: 258).  
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Economic weight  
The most significant resource of the EU for action in the GPE is its economic clout. 
As we have seen in chapter 3, since the emergence of the EEC in the 1950s, the EU 
has firmly established itself as a partner and rival of the once unchallenged 
hegemon, the USA (Meunier 2005). Looking at it from a purely quantitative point of 
view, the EU is the dominant trade block in the world both in trade in goods and in 
trade in services:99  
Figure 4.1 The EU’s and the US’ share (in %) in world merchandise and service exports and 
imports (excl. Intra-EU trade) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Merchandise exports Merchandise imports Service exports Service imports
EU
USA
 
Source: WTO 2005a 
The EU’s position regarding FDI is equally strong: in recent years, it has been both 
the strongest source economy and recipient of FDI, with the 2004 enlargement 
expanding the EU’s advance. The UNCTAD’s (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development) 2006 ranking of the 25 biggest Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
shows that 15 originate from EU member states (ranked by foreign assets).100 Of the 
100 biggest MNCs, a total of 85 are from the TRIAD (EU, US, Japan) (UNCTAD 
2006).  
                                            
99 The EU and the US shared the first or second place in all the statistics used for Figure 4.1. 
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Looking at it from a qualitative point of view, the single market programme, the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the various round of enlargements have 
not only been milestones for the European integration process, but they also 
significantly altered the EU’s resource basis for action in the GPE and accordingly 
shifted its influence in the WTO. The effects of these changes inside the EU are too 
diverse to simply say that they in all cases increased the EU’s capacity for action in 
the GPE, but they increased the attractiveness of the single market to foreign 
exporters and investors. This makes the EU an indispensable trading partner for 
most countries. Many countries hence seek access to the EU market via trade 
agreements and try to adapt to EU standards (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006). This 
economic clout and attractiveness is the source of the EU’s power in the GPE. 
Trade policy  
As has been outlined in the previous chapters, institutional resources form a further 
crucial basis for the EU’s power in the WTO. Compared to other EU policy areas, the 
EU’s competencies in the realm of external economic policies can certainly be 
regarded as the most far-reaching.101 The EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 
gives the EU extensive competencies in trade in goods. This well established policy 
area has contributed a crucial part to the EU’s emergence as a recognised 
international actor (Tsoukalis 1997: 231).  
                                                                                                                                        
100 MNCs are parent companies and their foreign subsidiaries, which are subject to the control of the 
parent company (UNCTAD 2000: 267). The number counted here excludes Daimler-Chrysler, which 
is listed as originating in the US and Germany. 
101 The EU’s competencies in external economic policies are based on the Common Custom’s Tariff 
(Art. 23,26 and 27 Treaty of Amsterdam (TOA)), the CCP (Art. 131-134 TOA) and the EU’s com-
petencies to conclude international treaties (Art. 300, 301 and 308 TOA). For the main provisions on 
the CCP see Art. 133 TOA in Annex 2 (Sect. 12.2). 
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The EU’s actual trade-policy emerges in a complex process of negotiation between 
the Commission DGs,102 the Council and its various sub-committees, national 
ministries and various extra-EU influences. The stages of trade policy-making are 
• design of a negotiation mandate,  
• representation of the parties during the negotiations,  
• ratification of the agreement once negotiated,  
• implementation and enforcement of the agreement once it is brought into 
force.103  
However, the EU treaties do not give the European Commission a “blank cheque” for 
trade policy, especially not in areas going beyond trade in goods. Although with the 
expansion of the international trading agenda into the field of new trade issues in the 
1980s and 1990s, the CCP has in part been extended (for example in the field of 
trade in services), in a range of areas where the EU member states were reluctant to 
extend the EU’s and thus the European Commission’s competencies. The 
competence struggles during the Uruguay Round led the member states and the 
European Commission to seek the clarifying opinion of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). In Opinion 1/94, the European Court of Justice laid out that the EU only had 
                                            
102 Services negotiations are dealt with by the DG Trade’s Services Unit, with 15-20 people. 2005 the 
services unit has merged with the smaller investment unit. In practical terms, the services unit’s staff 
deals with one or more sectors and one or more countries per person (interview 3). In the Council, 
services is discussed between the Commission and a specialised formation of the 133 Committee 
called the “Ad hoc Article 133 Committee (Services)”, which due to its specialised nature can deal 
with technical issues (rather than the more political discussions taking place in the higher level 
formations of the 133 Committee). The Committee consists of services experts from EU member 
states’ Ministries. The Commission meets the Committee for 1-2 days every 2 weeks, as opinion 
1/94 and the Nice treaty established mixed competencies in the services area. With this frequency 
of meetings, the Council is monitoring the Commission very closely and is keeping the 
Commission’s hands tied on sensitive issues such as audiovisual, water, education, Mode 4. For 
example, the Commission was under pressure by its trading partners and EU industry to move 
forward with regard to mutual recognition agreements. The Council blocked the Commission’s 
attempts and only gave it agreement to move forward on one sector (architects) as a pilot. An 
interviewee described the way that services knowledge is spread as a “web”: starting from the 
experts in the national permanent representations, then there are experts in national ministries of 
trade/economy and in other ministries, depending on the sector (transport, telecommunication, 
industry, finance, tourism, etc.) (interview 31). 
103 The details of the trade policy-making process in the EU is described in more detail in Meunier and 
Nicolaidis 2006. 
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competence in trade in goods, but that there were shared competencies in other new 
areas. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the EU member states decided that 
community competence could be extended to certain new issues (trade in services 
and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) on a case-by-case basis by 
unanimous voting (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005: 5). This formal possibility to extend 
community competence had not been used until the re-negotiation of the CCP 
leading to the Nice Treaty (Krenzler and Pitschas 2001: 443).  
The Nice Treaty further institutionalised the outcome of Opinion 1/94 and its mixed 
competence provisions. Though exclusive community competence was extended to 
trade in services, a ‘positive list approach’ provided for the remaining national 
sensitivities. In the other contentious area, intellectual property rights, a complex 
division was created between those intellectual property issues which related to the 
commercial aspects of intellectual property rights and which thus fell under 
community competence as opposed to those unrelated to commercial aspects, which 
were kept as mixed competencies. The latter could be subsumed under Community 
competence by a unanimous decision of the Council. According to Smith, this leads 
to a set of potential difficulties for the EU: the ability to “speak with one voice” in 
foreign economic policy has been regarded as the main advantage and resource of 
the EU in the past. If this ability increasingly depends on a political decision (by the 
Council), this raises questions about authority and legitimacy in EU trade policy-
making and it also raises questions about the impact of the EU on the multilateral 
system (Smith 2001: 792). It certainly denotes a shift from a technocratic 
understanding of trade policy to an increasing politicisation.104  
                                            
104 This politicisation has been observed for the WTO as a whole and should be seen in conjunction 
with the increasing public attention to issues related to trade policy. With trade policy extending into 
further new and sensitive areas, the competence issue re-emerged in the European Convention on 
the Future of Europe. The Constitution extended the “legislative procedure” (formerly: co-decision 
procedure) to the CCP, notably strengthening the role of the European Parliament in the CCP. If the 
Convention (or versions of it) did enter into force, it would bring about remarkable changes to the 
division of competencies between the EU and the member states: trade in services (albeit with a 
safeguard mechanism for cultural and audiovisual services), intellectual property rights and FDI 
would fall under exclusive EC competence (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005: 6ff; European Commission 
2004n). 
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For those areas where mixed competencies existed in the past, this has resulted in 
tensions between the EU and the EU member states, between the Commission and 
the Council. Nonetheless, if the EU member states have a common interest, the 
European Commission often negotiates on behalf of them even without formal legal 
competencies105 on the ground of a common position agreed by the EU member 
states. This has happened quite successfully in various areas, as shown by Young 
who refers to this new mode of co-operation as “soft institutions” (2002).106 In a more 
recent work, Young identifies “pragmatism” as a major principle of the EU 
participation in the WTO’s dispute settlement system: on the one hand, the member 
states cooperate outside the areas foreseen in the treaties. On the other hand, they 
tend to challenge each other’s positions only if they have strongly diverging interests 
(Young 2006: 189).  
Nonetheless, one can identify rifts and competition around the EU’s trade policy 
position in various arenas: first of all, there are the domestic arenas in each EU 
member state, which in themselves have to combine a variety of different positions 
prevalent in the respective domestic economy. The differing and at times opposing 
positions of the EU member states (ideological, material preferences) remain key 
variables in the determination of the trade policy positions of the EU. Second, there is 
the inter-institutional arena in the EU, and more specifically the European 
Commission and the Council of Ministers and, to a lesser degree, the European 
Parliament. Third, there is the intra-Commission arena, in which rifts are especially 
visible between DG Trade and DG Agriculture (but one should expect rifts also 
between DG Trade and DG Environment/DG Development). Fourth, there is the 
European level, in which various stakeholders such as industry and NGOs interact 
with the EU institutions.  
                                            
105 It could be argued that it is a resource of the EU for action in the WTO that its nearly complete 
external trade policy is not part of a coherent foreign policy. The EU can in the WTO concentrate on 
purely economic considerations without having to give too much attention to issues such as human 
rights (Eglin 1997: 497). 
106 In one of his speeches, EU Trade Commissioner Lamy actually identified a trend towards more 
unity in trade issues inside the EU, which in his eyes made possible a more active stance and pur-
suit of the EU’s goals regarding a new trade round (2002). 
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What does this mean for the EU’s power in the GPE? Both legal competencies and 
the institutions – here especially the European Commission – can be regarded as 
important resources of the EU in the GPE. The EU is unique in that the EU member 
states have pooled sovereignty on the European level in the CCP, and that the 
Council of Ministers formally or informally delegates most trade policy negotiations to 
the European Commission (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006).  
Furthermore, the EU’s institutions have special experience and expertise: one 
argument is that the EU’s institutions are more adjusted than national institutions to 
cope with a multi-level-governance environment and with large scale negotiations 
trying to accommodate diverging national preferences. This has been seen as giving 
them a competitive advantage in the WTO (for example Lamy 2002), but it also 
indicates a further research agenda. The fact that the EU does have a highly trained 
and experienced trade policy workforce (and can potentially additionally draw on the 
expertise of national trade ministries in the EU member states) can increase its 
potential for successful action in the GPE and in the WTO.  
This point was supported by interviewees, who identified the EU’s economic weight 
and its technical expertise as the EU’s crucial resources, because they allow the EU 
to provide substantial technical input into the negotiation process (for example 
interview 32). An EU official explained that trade policy expertise was located mostly 
in DG Trade and in the USTR (United States Trade Representative), and to a much 
lesser extent in the Japanese and Canadian trade ministries (interview 1).107 Non-EU 
services negotiators appreciated in particular the EU’s skilled negotiators (interview 
14, 16, 21, 23).  
“[The EU’s resources] show itself in the way the EU delegates 
interact with other delegations, the studies they produce to back up 
their argumentation, the contribution they make to discussions.” 
(interview 23). 
                                            
107 According to the interviewee, DG Trade seems to even have an advantage over the USTR, as the 
USTR is more thinly staffed; people there had to work excessive hours and were much less well 
paid, so that there was a greater fluctuation of staff. In DG Trade, staff specialised on trade policy for 
their whole career. This means that a large part of the worldwide trade policy memory is located in 
DG Trade (and also in the WTO Secretariat) (interview 1). The EU also seemed to be investing 
more heavily into the negotiations than for example the US; for example it installed seminars to 
promote ideas about competition policy (interview 14). 
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According to interviewees, the EU also stands out because of its institutional 
memory. An interviewee commented that due to its resources, the EU could 
importantly shape discussions (interview 24).108  
The scale of the asymmetry between the EU and its WTO counterparts is also 
evident if one compares the EU’s staff numbers with that of the majority of its 
negotiation partners: an EU business representative explained that the EU had much 
more staff than the USTR (800 in DG Trade versus 200 in the USTR), which gives it 
a large base of expertise (interview 30). Additionally, the EU allegedly has an 
advantage of distance – it can fly in experts easier and quicker to Geneva than most 
WTO members (interview 17).109 
As a trade “superpower”, the EU automatically receives special treatment in the 
negotiations: the EU will get attention and if it disagrees, special allowances are 
made (for example these would not be made even if China disagreed) (interview 16). 
The EU also seems to be the only counterbalancing force for the US in the services 
negotiations (interview 16). However, this special attention also means that when the 
EU negotiators make mistakes or unpopular moves, this is noticed throughout the 
WTO.110  
                                            
108 He explained that this ability is used when an actor has offensive interests, but that defensive 
actors would let others “do the work”. The EU stood out because “They can refer to documents from 
five years ago”. EU negotiators do not depend on written statements, but can speak freely in 
meetings, as they know their sectors so well (interview 24).  
109 A NGO representative indicated that an important resource of the EU was its handling of the media, 
which was not only directed at the domestic level but also towards the wider WTO system (interview 
35). 
110 Other WTO members also seem to pay particular attention to who is sent to meetings, whether it is 
higher ranking officials or sectoral experts (interview 21). In bilaterals, the resourcefulness of the 
Commission can create a situation which is perceived as “awkward” by some interviewees. They 
described their experience in bilaterals with the Commission: the Commission would usually come 
with around 5 representatives plus the EU member states’ representatives. An interviewee 
described how a while ago the Commission had started to send 20 Commission representatives 
plus EU member state representatives, which the interviewee then faced on his own as the domestic 
ministry had not sent any experts for the meeting (interview 15, similarly in 17). Negotiators from 
some countries seem to feel intimidated by this kind of EU tactic (interview 19). However, some 
seem to use the “manpower”-game tactically: an interviewee described that his country would send 
only one negotiator at those times when the EU refused to move forward in agriculture (interview 
19). It also seems that the bigger players, as for example Brazil, are well able to counter the EU in a 
bilateral. 
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The EU’s internal arrangements as described above pose a challenge to coherence 
and consistency of the EU’s trade policy approach. Meunier and Nicolaidis call it a 
“conflicted trade power”, because it has to accommodate not only one level of 
interests (as in a nation state), but both the EU member states and the European 
level (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006). Tsoukalis argued similarly that in areas where 
the interests (protectionist versus liberal/”North-South divide”/small versus big) of the 
EU member states diverge, the EU’s economic policies and the EU member states’ 
(for example development) policies towards third countries have not always been 
coherent and complementary. In his view, the EU’s political system with its only 
partial transfer of foreign policy competencies to the EU level and its unclear division 
of competencies predetermines a foreign economic policy approach that can never 
be as aggressive as that of the USA: it can never use all the instruments that are 
available to an actor which pursues a “full-blown” foreign policy (Tsoukalis 1997: 
234).111 The institutional set-up of the EU hence constitutes an ambiguous basis for 
its representation to the outside world. According to the respective issue-area and 
due to its changing membership, the EU can be regarded as a constantly changing 
actor. The question is therefore what type of action the EU produces on the basis of 
its changing resources. A first indication of this is presented in Box 4.1, which 
describes how interviewees view this issue: 
Box 4.1 The EU and its member states: perceived impact on trade policy in the WTO 
To what extent does the EU’s special internal structure impact on the use of its power in the WTO? 
Several interviewees assumed that the EU would be restrained in the negotiations due to its internal 
coordination mechanisms. EU officials observe the same kind of “frictions” that occur in other negotia-
tion areas. An EU official indicated that the EU’s internal negotiation machinery takes up energy of the 
negotiators and makes the EU a slower moving actor, who sometimes misses opportunities at the 
international level. This is the case for example during Ministerial Conferences, when EU negotiators 
are bound up in meeting the EU member states rather than other country representatives (interview 
10). According to a former EU official, other WTO members also at times use the EU’s inability to 
move its position for their own benefit (interview 11).  
                                            
111 This would lead on research asking whether the usage of the EU’s power in the WTO is thus 
predetermined by its internal structure and whether the EU’s policies are thus by default “different” 
from the USA’s. This will, however, not be discussed here. 
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On services, an EU official reported about a large degree of consensus and harmony between the 
Commission and the 133 Committee (other than for example in agriculture). However, the EU member 
states would point out to the Commission where there is member state competence or where Com-
mission proposals could not be implemented, as they conflicted with EU member state legislation (in-
terview 3). A 133 Committee member saw this differently and reported a continuous “battle” between 
the Commission and the EU member states for information (interview 13). He also criticised the top-
down approach that was prevalent in the relation between the Commission and the EU member 
states, with the 133 Committee not being involved in discussion about the Commission’s future strat-
egy and with discussion on policy ideas being limited (interview 13).  
The Commission perceives that the EU member states have a clear idea of their own interests 
(interview 3). According to their interests, in the different sectors, different EU member states take the 
leadership role: financial services: UK; telecoms: for example Germany, France, Spain, Italy; maritime 
services: Denmark, Greece, Germany, sometimes UK. Conflicts can arise when offensive interests 
differ between EU member states (interview 3). At times, the Commission tries to circumvent the EU 
member states, which they then sometimes noticed and it would create a crisis (interview 11). 
For (non-EU) WTO members, the EU displays a rather harmonious picture when it comes to its posi-
tion in the services negotiations (interview 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 25). This seems to be based on all EU 
member states being generally interested in the services negotiations, and the differences lying mostly 
in the intensity of their interest. Divergences are visible in the areas where some EU member states 
have defensive interests, for example in audiovisual/cultural services (interview 20). An interviewee 
named, however, the fact that the non-harmonised single market resulted in a 400 page services 
schedule of the EU (interview 15). This undermined the EU’s otherwise well-coordinated approach in 
the negotiations (interview 16). However, the EU does not use EU member state delegations in other 
WTO member states for lobbying purposes (interview 16). A 133 committee member speculated that 
the Commission did not use this resource because its message could be transposed incoherently 
(interview 13). On the other hand, several interviewees from (non-EU) WTO members reported that 
they had personal connections with services representatives from EU member states, who contacted 
them for updates on the negotiations, especially during the benchmark discussion. Though there are 
no formal contacts between (non-EU) WTO members and EU member states, informal contacts are 
frequent (interview 13, 17, 19, 21, 26). It seems that especially the bigger EU member states, for ex-
ample the UK, France, Germany, feel a need to “triangulate” the information the Commission passes 
on to them, whereas smaller EU member states rely on the Commission’s briefings (interview 13). 
Hence, an interviewee from a (non-EU) WTO member suggested that there was a lack of transpar-
ency and confidence between the EU and the EU member states (interview 26). Another interviewee 
told the anecdote of an EU country calling him to make sure that the position of the respective EU 
member state was taken into consideration. The interviewee suggested, however: 
“I would do the same. If my [capital] colleagues asked me to do something really stupid, then I couldn’t 
do anything, I would have to stick to my instructions […], but I would talk to my colleagues at WTO 
informally and ask them to pursue what I really think is right.” (interview 21).112 
Source: Interviews 
Whether this potential lack in coherence and consistency necessarily translates into 
a loss of power for the EU has been contested by others. As the EU’s nearly 
complete external trade policy is not part of a “complete” foreign policy, it permits the 
EU to mainly concentrate on economic considerations – advantageous for example 
when dealing with China (Eglin 1997: 497). In the 1990s, the EU with its action 
                                            
112 Especially the representatives from the new EU member states seemed to be concerned with 
leaving the European Commission conduct the negotiations for them (interview 21, 23). 
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entirely (or nearly entirely) in the sphere of “soft power” was assumed to hold the key 
to a privileged role in the international sphere due to this unique resource equipment 
(for example Smith 2000: 337). On the one hand, it has been argued that the EU’s 
internal constraints might actually empower the EU in the negotiations: European 
Commission negotiators can refer to the difficulties of having to renegotiate a 
negotiation stance internally and hence have more leverage to make their negotiation 
partners agree to a compromise (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006).113 On the other hand, 
Meunier points out that the EU’s institutional set-up can only be an advantage when 
the EU is on the defensive (Meunier 1998). Does it also provide an advantage when 
the EU is in the offensive (as in the case study in this dissertation)? The EU’s specific 
structure hence creates both opportunities and constraints for action for the EU. 
At the same time, the increasing EU membership is a double-edged sword:114 while it 
increased the EU’s economic weight in the GPE and might increase its attractiveness 
as a market, it might increase the EU’s immobility as well as aggravate existing 
conflicts in the WTO, for example in agricultural policy (if the EU’s position becomes 
more protectionist) (van den Hoven 2002). Hence, the latest EU enlargements in 
2004 and in 2007 raise questions as to how the nature of the EU’s trade policy will 
change with the arrival of 12 new cultures and interests and should give new impetus 
to the debate between the “free-traders” and “protectionists”. It also encourages the 
emergence of a new balance of power between the various EU institutions (Meunier 
and Nicolaidis 2005: 12, van den Hoven 2002). 
                                            
113 An EU official confirmed this: he indicated that the EU “felt” internally it had a more refined position 
due to its former internal bargaining (interview 10). 
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Business and civil society as stakeholder in EU trade policy  
An arena that might warrant further consideration in the case of the EU’s involvement 
in the WTO negotiations, and in particular in the trade in services negotiations, is the 
EU’s relationship with EU business and civil society in general. DG Trade has 
established various frameworks within which it takes in the point of view of EU 
business and civil society (for example the “Civil Society Dialogue”). European 
businesses and civil society influence EU trade policy-making via formal channels 
such as industry associations, but a lot of channels of influence are of an informal 
character for example in the form of epistemic communities.  
In comparison to American business, the influence of European business on trade-
policy making seems to be less institutionalised and pronounced. Furthermore, the 
influence of European business can be found at different levels: interest 
representation takes place not only towards the EU, but has traditionally been 
focused towards national capitals. EU industries also display a high level of 
heterogeneity (compared to US industries) with diverging interests and preferences. 
Taube therefore suggests that European industries have difficulties in achieving an 
equally powerful stance. He goes so far as to suggest that free-riding on the position 
of influential US industries might at times be the only option for European industries 
(2002: 34). For the EU, support of European business can importantly increase the 
leverage of the EU in the WTO. However, the effects of business support or 
opposition for the EU’s trade policy are not clear-cut: during the Doha negotiations on 
the medicines required for health crises, the EU has on the contrary been more able 
                                                                                                                                        
114 In the services negotiations, the enlargement of the EU created a special problem: after the 1995 
and 2004 enlargements, the EU had to unify its schedule with those of the acceding countries. At 
times, countries had to renounce commitments, as they were more liberal as those of the EU. The 
way the EU handled this meant that it is now unclear to non-EU countries which part of the 
apparently new concessions in the EU schedule are genuinely new or which ones are due to the 
enlargement. This has created lots of confusion and decreased the EU’s credibility. A few countries, 
normally allies of the EU, have since then “been less eager to be allies”. Apparently 17 countries 
negotiate with the EU because of the recent enlargement, but of course this issue is known across 
the WTO membership (interview 19, 21). At times, the Commission made the meetings with other 
WTO members “exploratory” so that it did not have to bring the EU member states along (interview 
23). A similar situation had occurred already after the 1995 enlargement. It was expected that the 
EU would withdraw commitments in audiovisual services for example. WTO members had the 
opportunity to negotiate a compensation. The EU was criticised especially because it did not clearly 
indicate in which areas commitments were withdrawn (IUST 18.07.2003, 10.10.2003). 
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to offer concessions as business interests have not been as pronounced as in the US 
(van den Hoven 2002: 265).  
Representatives from diverse NGOs as (albeit self-appointed) agents of civil society 
have in general complained about not having comparable access to the EU 
institutions as European industries. Their expertise and opinion constitute a further 
resource for the EU, but their opposition can have negative consequences for the 
EU’s participation in the WTO negotiations.  
The EU’s services market 
For 2005, Eurostat figures place the share of services in EU-25115 gross value added 
at 71.9%, and at 67.6% of employment. This makes the services industry the most 
important employer in the EU-25, ahead of both industry and construction. At the 
same time, the importance of services in the EU economy has increased steadily 
over the last decades (Eurostat 2007a, b), while the EU’s industrial sector has felt the 
pressures of a more globalised competition. This growing importance and strength of 
EU services industries can be seen as one cause for an increased political and 
economic interest in services trade (Eurostat 2006a). 
As has been mentioned above, the EU is the biggest player in services trade extra-
EU: “In 2005, the EU-25´s international trade in services recorded a surplus of €56.9 
billion, compared to 47.6bn in 2004 and 38.5bn in 2003.” (Eurostat 2007a). It is also 
important to note by what large margin the EU’s and the US’ external services trade 
dominate the world economy: 
In 2005, the European Union remained the world's largest exporter 
and importer of services. The EU-25 accounted for 28.3% of global 
exports and 24.7% of imports. It was followed by the USA (19.0%) 
and, at some considerable distance, by Japan (6.7%), China (4.4%) 
and Canada (3.3%) (Eurostat 2007a). 
Overall, the EU has a definite surplus in trade in services. It increased from EUR 
47.6bn in 2004 to EUR 56.9bn in 2005. Eurostat names the USA, Switzerland, 
Turkey and Norway as other countries with persistent surpluses, whereas Japan, 
                                            
115 EU-25 refers to the EU’s 25 member states after the 2004 EU enlargement. 
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Russia, South Korea, Canada, China, Thailand and Mexico recorded significant 
deficits (Eurostat 2007a). 
Annex 3 (Sect. 12.3) shows clearly the importance of the USA as a trading partner of 
the EU in trade in services. Eurostat calculates that 30.2% of EU total exports and 
33.2% of EU total imports were with the USA. Annex 3 is ranked according the size 
of the balance between exports and imports. Other trading partners that were 
important for the EU in terms of volume were Switzerland, Japan and Norway. China 
also showed a growing volume of services trade with the EU. The highest deficits 
were with Morocco, Thailand, Croatia, Egypt and Turkey. Eurostat attributes this to 
travel services (Eurostat 2007a).  
Not all EU member states contribute equally to the EU’s share in international 
services trade. According to Eurostat, in 2005 the UK exported most services outside 
the EU, followed by Germany and France. In terms of imports, Germany came first, 
followed by the UK and France (Eurostat 2007a). As can be seen from Figure 4.2, 
the UK had the biggest trade in services surplus in 2005, while Ireland and Germany 
had the biggest deficits.  
Figure 4.2 EU member states’ share in total extra-EU International Trade in Services transactions 
(in %), net (in bn Euro), 2005 
 
Source: Eurostat 2007a 
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Figure 4.3 Shares in EU-25 International Trade in Services transactions with the rest of the world 
(in %) per services sector 
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Figure 4.3 gives an impression of the sectoral distribution of EU trade in services. 
Evidently, most of the EU’s services exports and imports concentrate in 
transportation services, travel services and other business services, followed by 
financial services and royalties and license fees.  
As has been discussed in the section on trade policy competencies, trade in services 
competencies have not been entirely conferred to the Community level. This reflects 
the state of the internal market on services, which, although aimed for in the EU 
treaties, still remains incomplete. This is particularly striking giving that most of the 
services trade overall (incl. intra-EU services trade) occurs between EU member 
states (Eurostat 2007a). The OECD identifies the following obstacles as impediments 
to trade in services in the EU: monopolies, quantitative restrictions, territorial 
restrictions, residence requirements, rules designed to ensure independence and 
autonomy, regulations governing professional qualifications, different company tax 
regimes, price regulations, difficulties in opening a bank account in a different EU 
member state, differing accounting rules, payment and reimbursement of VAT, 
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favourable tax treatment for local providers, difficulties in the context of debt 
collection, difficulties with the reimbursement of medical costs (OECD 2005b: 15). 
As the EU had identified a less obstructed services market as a key to achieving the 
goals of the Lisbon agenda in 2000, the Commission drafted a first strategy paper 
(“An Internal Market Strategy for Services"116) at the end of 2000. This strategy paper 
was the first in a range of communications,117 which reaffirmed the EU’s commitment 
to advancing – somehow – the integration of trade in services on the EU level. This 
finally led to the Commission’s presentation of the draft “Directive on Services in the 
Internal Market” (popularly known as the “Services Directive” or “Bolkestein 
Directive”) (COM(2004) 2 final/3) on 13 January 2004.  
The services directive followed from the rights established in EC Treaty Articles 43, 
48 and 49 (concerning “freedom of establishment” and “freedom to provide services 
within the Community”). It sought to establish legislation which would provide a more 
global solution to the challenges faced by EU service providers than the case law 
building up through the European Court of Justice was able to provide. 
The services directive did not cover financial services, transport, and 
telecommunications, which fall under different EU instruments. In the area of financial 
services, EU activity is guided by the “Financial Services Action Plan”. On transport, 
the Commission published a White Paper in 2001: “European transport policy for 
2010: Time to decide”. On telecommunications, the Commission developed a new 
regulatory framework, which came into force in 2003. The service directive also 
sought to exclude what could be classified as non-profit public services, because of 
concerns in the EU public with regard to the privatisation of public services. The 
                                            
116 "An Internal Market Strategy for Services" Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament. COM(2000) 888 final, 29.12.2000. 
117 See for example: “Conclusion on obstacles to the provision of services in the internal market 
at the 2462nd Council meeting on Competitiveness” (Internal Market, Industry, Research), Brussels, 
14.11.2002, 13839/02; European Parliament Resolution of 13 February 2003 on the Communication 
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions: “2002 Review of the Internal Market Strategy – Delivering the 
promise” (COM(2002) 171 - C5-0283/2002 - 2002/2143(COS)); "Internal Market Strategy - Priorities 
2003-2006" Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2003) 238, 
07.05.2003. 
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OECD reckoned that the services directive would have covered around 50% of 
economic activity in the EU (OECD 2005b: 16, 21-24). In 2004 and 2005, the 
services directive gained significant attention in the public debate in the EU, which 
led to a set of revisions. The directive was finally adopted in December 2006 and EU 
member states have three years to implement it.  
For the EU’s participation in the services negotiations in the WTO, this means that on 
the one hand, the EU is the gatekeeper of an attractive and growing market for 
services. On the other hand, in terms of legislation, this market is fragmented, which 
creates uncertainties about the EU’s actual negotiation position (as it is hard to know 
which legislation applies in which case). These uncertainties could have both a 
positive or a negative effect on the EU’s bargaining power in the WTO negotiations. 
The attempts at further integration of the services market, visible since the early 
2000s, might be enhanced by a participation of the EU in the WTO services 
negotiations. Langhammer argues that the WTO negotiations could bring about 
further harmonisation of the internal services market, as had happened for the goods 
markets in the course of the Dillon and Kennedy rounds (Langhammer 2005: 323). In 
this way, the WTO might provide the legitimacy for further EU internal integration. 
The EU’s distinct position as services exporter in world trade in services, with a 
distinct trade surplus, underlines the strength of the offensive interests one can 
expect the EU to have in the services negotiations. The EU should be very interested 
in market access and market conditions favourable to its services exporters (incl. 
service provision through FDI). Services constitute a key offensive interest for the EU 
– and have been postulated as such in official documentation (speeches, press 
releases). This led to the EU’s active participation in the Uruguay Round and also to 
its proactive attitude in the sectoral negotiations in the 1990s. At the same time, the 
EU postulated services as the area where it could outweigh “losses” in the 
agricultural negotiations.  
The EU as a (or the) major source of FDI and the GATS with its Mode 3 provides an 
interesting tool for the liberalisation of FDI in the services area – there are provisions 
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here that the EU could not achieve in the separate framework of the MAI (multilateral 
agreement on investment) and the MFI (multilateral framework for investment).118 
This gives the EU a strong incentive to push for greater market access and more 
transparency. 
The EU’s main offensive interests are usually identified as the financial services 
negotiations and telecommunication services, but also encompass environmental 
services, construction services, distribution services and others. The EU has 
defensive interests with respect to audiovisual services and with respect to Mode 4. 
That it has such broad interests is a double-edged sword for the EU: on the one hand 
it gives it an important role, on the other hand it means that it has stakes in every 
area (interview 33). Overall, this means that the EU (like the USA and others) has a 
definite interest in opening up the markets of other countries for their highly 
successful service industries. Services should hence be an area where the EU could 
be expected to actively use its power to shape the negotiations in the WTO. 
4.2 The resource basis II - key relations of the EU with the external 
world  
This second section of this chapter looks at a second key area constituting power 
resources for the EU’s action in the WTO. It has already been mentioned above that 
the attractiveness of the EU’s internal market renders the EU into an indispensable 
trading partner for most countries. The EU has often been described as the centre of 
a network of relationships and preferential trade relationships exist between the EU 
and wider parts of the WTO membership. These relationships exist at different levels: 
the EU is engaged in multilateral negotiations in various regimes and frameworks. At 
the same time, the EU has established and is establishing relationships towards a 
range of regional groupings (for example with Mercosur,119 the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)). Bilateral cooperation 
                                            
118 In the 1990s, there were attempts to establish a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the 
OECD. These attempts failed. Subsequently, the EU promoted the inclusion of a Multilateral 
Framework of Investment (MFI) in the WTO, which the EU also had to abandon (see case study). 
119 Mercosur is a common market agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
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forms the third level of cooperation the EU is involved in. In all these areas, the EU is 
dealing both with market access and regulatory issues as much as dispute 
settlement (Smith 2001).  
A common way of conceptualising the EU’s relationships with the external world is to 
speak about the EU’s “pyramid of preferences” (for example Bretherton and Vogler 
1999: 62), resulting from the level of preferences that the EU grants its respective 
trading partners. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries with their 
tight relationship with the EU can be placed at the top of this pyramid, followed by EU 
candidate countries. The African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP) occupy a 
higher place in the pyramid than those countries falling under the EU’s “General 
System of Preferences (GSP)” system. The relationship the EU has with its trading 
partners and the preferences the EU grants can be regarded as a further potential 
resource for the EU’s action in the WTO, because the EU can achieve support for its 
proposals in the WTO via its extra-WTO relationships. As the action of other WTO 
members constitute intervening factors, coalition building or achieving of support by 
deals across regimes and issue areas could be a way for the EU to build consensus 
in the trade regime. 
As we have seen in Ch. 3, the EU’s position in the WTO is shaped importantly by its 
relationship with the USA. This is not only due to their economic strength, but also 
due to the fact that the two are both economically and politically highly 
interdependent –they share about 40% of world trade between them. As discussed in 
chapter 3, since its inception in the 1950s, the EC has arguably acted on increasingly 
equal footing with the USA in the GATT and the WTO on the basis of its far-reaching 
competencies in the CCP (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005). Cooperation of the EU and 
the US was hence a key shaping factor of the trade regime (Dahos 2003; McDonald 
2000). However, in the realm of the WTO, one cannot only find cooperation, but also 
competition and overt confrontation between the EU and the USA. These occur both 
in actual trade negotiations and in the day-to-day working of the world trading regime. 
Cooperation emerges on the basis of shared interests and the strongly 
institutionalised transatlantic relationship (epistemic communities etc.). Competition 
exists between different regulatory models, which both the EU and the USA try to 
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export into the WTO system. This often attributes the role of counter-model to the 
EU. Having co-existed in the GATT for nearly four decades, competition between the 
EU and the USA has in recent years included and includes competition for a 
leadership and an agenda setter position in the WTO, as we will see later (Van den 
Hoven 2002, 2004). Confrontation takes place in the realm of the DSB, where the EU 
and the USA have been key adversaries (roughly 20% of all DSB cases take place 
between the EU and the USA) (WTO 2005a).  
Among the other OECD members, the accession countries who acceded in 2004 and 
2007 constituted a de-facto extension of the EU’s sphere of influence, as in the 
expectation of EU accession they aligned their WTO policy to the EU’s position.120 
Among the remaining OECD members (Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Republic 
of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey), a range of them 
(Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey) can be identified as EU policy-takers, as their 
economies and economic policies are closely intertwined with the EU’s.  
Within the WTO, the Quad (EU, US, Canada, Japan) has played a central role in the 
coordination of negotiations. One would hence expect the EU-Canada and the EU-
Japan relationship to be further crucial relationships in the WTO.121 The European 
Commission already established a dialogue on WTO issues with Japan in 1998 
(European Commission 2007a). Together with Canada, the EU “commit[ed] […] to 
working towards an ambitious outcome to the Doha Development Agenda” 
(European Commission 2004o). However, the importance of the Quad might be 
decreasing in line with the growing importance of various developing countries in the 
WTO (see chapter 3 and Annex 4 (Sect. 12.4).  
This should come as no surprise, given that developing countries now represent 
around 80% of the membership of the WTO. Their support or disapproval is hence 
crucial to the outcome of the EU’s policies in the WTO. The EU’s relationships with 
developing countries are shaped by power, interests, historical ties, and arguably 
                                            
120 Currently not all EU member states are OECD members. Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic 
states Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have not acceded to the OECD (OECD 2005a). 
121 There is hardly any literature available on these relationships, especially within the context of WTO 
negotiations. 
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geographic proximity.122 Although the distribution of power is apparently tilted 
towards the EU in these relationships, a range of shifts can increase or decrease the 
bargaining power of the respective countries towards the EU (for example shifts in 
the EU’s economic, security or political interests).  
The centrality of economic interests for the EU’s relationships in the trade regime is 
obvious. For example, the EU has been a key promoter of the Chinese entry to the 
WTO with a range of economic, political and institutional reasons behind this. It 
seems that the EU acted as China’s patron rather than as driven by moral 
considerations, putting aside political concerns such as human rights, presumably in 
order not to interfere with its economic interests (see for example Algieri 2002).  
The EU’s relationships with developing countries have both a formal and an informal 
dimension. On the formal side, there are a multitude of trade and cooperation 
agreements that the EU has entered into and which institutionalise the EU’s 
relationships with its trading partners.123 These agreements cover a vast range of 
issue areas, similar to what the WTO agreements are covering and partially going 
beyond the scope of the WTO agreements. The EU has concluded agreements with, 
for example, the Mediterranean countries (various agreements since 1995), Mexico 
(1997) and Chile (2002). Since the 1990s, the EU has also established interregional 
relations with ASEAN through the framework of various partnership initiatives. The 
EU is currently, among others, negotiating with Mercosur (since 1999) and has in 
October 2006 announced a new generation of bilateral trade agreements (European 
Commission 2006b). This new generation of trade agreements will focus especially 
on emerging economies, with some of which free trade agreements (FTAs) had not 
yet been established. The announcement of a possible EU-India FTA fits into the 
picture (European Commission 2006c). 
With regard to services, all the trade agreements the EU concluded after 1995 
contain provisions on service trade and are all based on the provisions set out in the 
                                            
122 The prime example for this is the Mediterranean region. In the future, the Caucasus region might 
receive increasing attention as well. 
123 For an overview, see for example for example European Commission 2006a. 
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GATS. In this way, the EU’s approach differs from that of the US, which with the 
1994 NAFTA and other agreements had followed an approach to services trade 
liberalisation different from the GATS (see for example Stephenson 2000).124  
One set of agreements the EU negotiated since 1995 were the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements. They are limited in scope with regard to both liberalisation of services 
and co-operation in matters related to services trade.125 The exceptions here are the 
agreements with Jordan and Algeria, which contain commitments going further than 
the other Euro-Mediterranean agreements. All the agreements are based on GATS 
provisions. It is significant here that Algeria is not yet a WTO member, and thus in 
fact is implementing WTO legislation even prior to its accession.126 While the ECDPM 
assesses the services provisions in the Euro-Mediterranean agreements as 
“relatively shallow”, it also points to the space for further liberalisation, which is 
incorporated in the agreements, and their focus on far-reaching co-operation in the 
services sector.  
Compared to the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, the EU and South Africa “Trade, 
Development and Co-operation Agreement”127 is less ambitious with regard to 
services trade, but it also leaves scope for far-reaching future liberalisation in all four 
modes of supply. The agreement also explicitly refers to the area of maritime 
services, which due to domestic concerns in the US has so far not been integrated 
into the WTO. Emphasis in this agreement is on economic co-operation.  
In contrast to this, the “Economic Partnership, Political Co-ordination and Co-
operation Agreement” (signed 8 December 1997 and entered into force on 1 October 
                                            
124 The following considerations and observations are based on an “InBrief” by the ECDPM (European 
Centre for Development Policy Management), which compared the services sections of ten free 
trade agreements concluded by the EU. For a more detailed discussion of the services provisions in 
the EU free trade agreements, the reader is referred to this analysis (ECDPM 2004/2005). 
125 These agreements were with Tunisia (1995), Israel (1995), Morocco (1996), Jordan (1997), the 
Palestinian Authority (1997), Algeria (2001) and Lebanon (2002). 
126 Algeria has been an observer to the GATT and the WTO since 1987. The “Working Party for the 
accession of Algeria” met for the first time in 1998. Algeria submitted revised offers on trade in 
goods and services in January 2005 (WTO 2005b).  
127 The agreement between the EU and South Africa has been signed on 11 October 1999 and has 
been in force, provisionally and partially, since January 2000. 
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2000) between the EU and Mexico makes much further reaching provision for a later 
liberalisation of service trade: it includes a “standstill” provision in force since 2001 
and provides for a second phase of negotiations which are supposed to take part 
after the end of the services negotiations in the WTO.  
The last FTA the EU has concluded is the EU-Chile Association Agreement (signed 
in November 2002, provisionally in effect since 1 February 2003). It is the most 
extensive agreement with regard to its provisions in services trade. It contains a 
commitment to the liberalisation of the movement of natural persons, which might 
become interesting in the future (although the language remains vague). The 
ECDPM brief concludes its analysis of the EU-Chile Agreement as following: 
While building on many elements of previous agreements, the 
Association Agreement between the EU and Chile is the most 
complex of the FTAs examined in this brief. […] [I]t differs from the 
earlier FTAs in that [a review to facilitate progress toward further 
liberalisation] is an ongoing process within the Association 
Committee. 
The ECDPM brief finds a trend towards greater institutionalisation of the services 
provisions and a move from potential to actual liberalisation, especially in the 
agreements with Mexico and Chile.  
For the argument in this thesis it is important to see that while all these agreements 
contain more or less far-reaching options for further liberalisation of service trade 
between the parties, the agreements are based on GATS provisions and rely on 
GATS levels of liberalisation. Progress with regard to liberalisation thus remains 
dependent on the results of the WTO negotiations, although the agreements do open 
the door for further, independent approaches. If one assumes that the EU has a 
distinct interest in deepening liberalisation in several areas in services trade, a 
liberalisation strategy distinct from the GATS (although not independent and not yet 
yielding results) is only visible in the last two agreements with Mexico and Chile – 
and there only partially. This seems to indicate that the EU has given a clear 
preference to the multilateral agreement to pursue services negotiations.  
However, relying on a multilateral framework, which is unfinished in many respects, 
also creates the possibility for an actor to pursue policies bilaterally that it cannot 
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pursue multilaterally. This was referred to as an actor’s “exit options” earlier 
(Sect.3.2). GATS provisions have shaped the regional/bilateral agreements and have 
even shaped the agreement with non-WTO member Algeria. Is there evidence for the 
EU’s regional/bilateral strategy shaping the multilateral regime? Abugattas argues 
that issues which have been left open for interpretation in the GATS framework are 
being defined by the main users of the provisions in regional agreements (Abugattas 
Majluf 2004: 17-20).128 At the same time, and this is visible across all the agreements 
analysed by the ECDPM, the EU’s “exceptions” (for example audiovisual services) 
are replicated on a regional/bilateral level as much as special attention is given to 
those areas where the EU has special interests (financial services, 
telecommunications).129 
Historical ties are the key factor in the EU’s relationship with the ACP.130 The ACP 
group consists of 78 developing countries, 41 of which can actually be classified as 
LDC. The relationship of the EU with the ACP can be seen as a direct result of British 
and French colonialism. Institutionalised subsequently with the Yaoundé, the Lomé 
and today the Cotonou Convention, the EU-ACP relationship has undergone 
significant transformations in the last three decades, reflecting shifts in economic and 
development ideologies. Though being classified as developing or least developed 
countries, the ACP is a very diverse group of countries with widely diverging levels of 
economic development, economic structure and interests. A small group of countries 
                                            
128 (1) GATS Art. V requires Regional Trade Agreements to comply with a set of provisions. Several 
regional trade agreements have attempted to define these provisions clearer – the EC Association 
Agreement with Jordan being one of them. (2) One of the main, complex provisions of Art. V is the 
requirement for “substantial sectoral coverage”. With no commonly agreed classification system for 
service sectors in place and multilateral interpretation of what constitutes “substantial coverage”, this 
has been interpreted differently by WTO members: most Regional Trade Agreements have in 
practice come into force excluding whole sectors (and not just parts of sectors) or modes of supply – 
for example Mode 4 in agreements modelled after NAFTA. Abugattas explicitly refers to the problem 
that countries participating in regional integration agreements start to interpret the rules set out on 
the multilateral level: “The problem is that, instead of being determined on the basis of GATS Art. V, 
sectoral coverage is being defined pragmatically on the basis of the specific interests of the parties.” 
(2004: 19). This includes the EU. 
129 Similarly, when Latvia negotiated the conditions for its WTO entry with the US, the EU managed to 
prevent Latvia from committing in the area of audiovisual services, as this would have been 
problematic when Latvia eventually would enter the EU and its trade policy would be integrated into 
the EU’s. 
130 Other developing countries fall under the EU’s General System of Preferences (GSP). 
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(mainly South Africa) dominates the EU-ACP trade relationship. Overall, the EU-ACP 
relationship reflects a high degree of asymmetry: while the ACP heavily depend on 
the EU as their export market, their importance for the EU has declined as the EU 
has increasingly focused on its near abroad. This has increased the EU’s leverage in 
the relationship.  
While the EU has created this variety of formal, institutionalised relationships with its 
trading partners, these formal channels of interaction also have an informal side. On 
the basis of the formal interaction between the EU and its trading partners, informal 
relationships could form. International epistemic communities of experts can evolve, 
which can influence the evolution of ideas in international governance issues (see 
Sect. 2.1.2). In the case of the EU, one should also not forget that the formal and 
informal relationships that EU member states have with other countries potentially 
provide a further access channel for the EU. 
The bilateral and interregional relationships the EU has with its trading partners thus 
provide it with a place for policy experiments: bilateral and interregional agreements 
can be more far-reaching than multilateral agreements, because signing a bilateral 
agreements is less of a commitment than signing one at the WTO level. On the 
bilateral/interregional level of governance, the EU can aim to shape the ideas its 
trading partners have about the issues on today’s trade agenda; and it can potentially 
promote or even insert the EU’s own regulatory model in its bilateral trade 
agreements. This level of governance can function as a preparatory level for further 
multilateral policies. Furthermore, the bilateral and interregional relationships can be 
a place for consensus-building and trade-offs. The EU could offer concessions on the 
bilateral level in order to achieve a consensus on the multilateral level. In this sense, 
the EU’s relationships with its trading partners constitute resources for the EU, which 
might in principle be deployed in the WTO.  
4.3 The resource basis III: regime dependent capabilities or “the fit 
between the EU and the WTO”  
In chapter 2 it has been elaborated that an actor’s power is shaped by the regime. In 
chapter 3, it was then discussed what characteristics or resources would enable an 
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actor to be powerful in the WTO. In this section, these considerations will be brought 
together with the discussion of the EU as a trade policy actor: what are the 
organisationally-dependent capabilities that the EU has for action in the WTO, which 
render the WTO into an important forum for EU trade policy-making?  
Its economic clout alone renders the EU into a major power in the WTO, and the 
WTO regime is essentially dependent on the contributions of the major economic 
powers (Rode 1999/2000: 50, 62). As discussed before, the EU’s power and impact 
is dependent on its power in the respective issue area, as influence on the WTO’s 
provisions is also dependent on how important the stance of the member is in the 
respective issue area.131 For the EU, the multitude of issue areas dealt with under the 
heading of the WTO combined with the “single undertaking” carries the significant 
advantage of issue linkages: the EU might for example ask for concessions in the 
field of telecommunications in exchange for a slight opening of its agricultural 
markets. It can thus use issue linkage to achieve reciprocity (Hoekman and Kostecki 
2001: 115).  
Besides its influence resulting from its economic resources, the EU enjoys a special 
status in the WTO. When the European Economic Community was founded in 1957 
with the Treaties of Rome, it was constructed according to Art. 24 of the GATT 
agreement which allowed for the establishment of free trade areas and customs 
unions132 between the GATT signatories. Whether the EC and later the EU and its 
network of preferential agreements with third countries actually complied with the 
GATT rules as it has been and is claimed by the EC/EU, is questionable (Woolcock 
1993: 543; Preeg 1970: 26-30). An examination has never been undertaken as it 
could have meant that the EC members could have withdrawn from the GATT, which 
would have rendered the latter into a void agreement (Rode 1999/2000: 49). The 
existence and legitimacy of the WTO is therefore inextricably linked to the 
                                            
131 This means that for example Argentina has a substantial influence on WTO agricultural issues as it 
is a main grain exporter (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 58). 
132 These preferential trade areas were and are interpreted as intermediate stages for a world-wide 
trade liberalisation. Several criteria have to be fulfilled by the founding countries to make the pref-
erential trade areas “GATT/WTO-compatible”. 
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membership of the EU.133 In many ways, the EU is thus an indispensable factor in 
the regime, without which the regime would lose its significance.  
Whereas the EC represented its member states during the GATT years without being 
a formal member and thus on a legally uncertain basis, the WTO agreements 
explicitly foresee its membership. Membership for other regional trade blocks does 
not seem to be intended (Mauderer 2001: 67). This is why Bretherton and Vogler can 
conclude that: 
 „... EC agency was constructed in terms of the disciplines and 
institutional setting of the GATT regime, but equally the regime itself 
was moulded to the requirements of one of its most powerful 
participants.“ (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 55).  
Other than in international organisations such as the United Nations, where the EU 
only has observer status, and the IMF, where it is represented only via its member 
states, the WTO is one of the few organisations where it has the same rights and 
responsibilities as other members, and hence taking on the same role as other nation 
states in the WTO (MacLeod et al. 1996: 170, 179ff, 189ff).134 This means that on the 
basis of its long-term involvement in the regime the EU has acquired both a 
formalisation of its involvement in the regime and it has acquired legitimacy for 
action. It has constructed its image and is thus shaping expectations.  
However, although the EU is a member of the WTO, the EU member states are 
equally members of the WTO. This is due to the unclear division of competence 
between the EU and its member states and the extension of the WTO’s agenda into 
areas which are not subject to community competence. From a legal point of view, 
this creates uncertainties: regardless of the internal division of competence, the EU is 
bound under international law to implement and comply with all WTO agreements 
                                            
133 Some authors even argue that the WTO would not have come into being without the EU’s initiative 
(for example Tsoukalis 1997: 240; Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 78). 
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(Mauderer 2001: 67; Langhammer 1999/2000: 82; Petersmann 1999/2000: 84ff). 
Arguably, these legal uncertainties and “double” memberships render the EU into 
such a particular actor in the WTO and pose a particular challenge to the other WTO 
members.135 However, some have argued that exactly this opaqueness and the 
“difficult” institutional structure of the EU increases its bargaining power in the WTO: 
as the position of the EU is the result of an often lengthy and complicated bargaining 
process, negotiators of the adversary party know they cannot demand too many 
concessions from the EU. If they did, they would risk that the European Commission 
would have to consult with its member states again, which would delay the 
conclusion of the agreement. The EU can thus use its internal divisions strategically 
in the WTO (for example Meunier 1998). 
The EU also has a disproportionate influence on decision-making in the WTO, both 
on a formal level and informally. In terms of the formal decision-making in the WTO, 
as both the EU and each of its member states are members of the WTO, the EU can 
cast 15 (since 01.05.2004: 25; since 01.01.2007: 27) voices in a vote. If both the EU 
and the member states voted in a decision, their votes would be restricted to a 
maximum of 15/25/27 (Denza 1999: 14). As discussed in Sect. 3.1.2, the consensus-
rule of the GATT has de facto stayed in place in the WTO and the positions of the 
major trade powers are always taken into special consideration in decision-making in 
the WTO. The EU alone thus already has more influence on decisions in the WTO 
than a single nation state,136 and it can enhance its influence by using its influence on 
its neighbours (the “policy-takers” mentioned earlier) and by using its network of 
                                                                                                                                        
134 A thorough analysis of the legal implications deriving from the EU’s participation in international 
organisations or in international relations in general has been undertaken by MacLeod et al. 1996 
and Emiliou and O’Keefe 1996. MacLeod et al. describe membership and observer status of the 
EC/EU in international organisations: “[T]he status of member allows participation of the fullest kind, 
placing the Community on the same footing as States which are members of the organization in 
question, with the right to vote, to propose motions in its own right, to speak as of right, and so on. 
Observer status usually implies a more limited right to participate, usually without a right to vote.” 
(1996: 170). 
135 The legal uncertainties surrounding the EU CCP and the specific structure of the EU can be used 
by other WTO members to play out the various EU entities against each other. For example, Algieri 
demonstrates how China has known well during the last years to play out single EU member states 
against each other and against the EU in total (Algieri 2002: 67ff). 
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preferential trading arrangements (Farrell 1999: 7ff). The EU thus disposes of special 
capabilities to influence the WTO regulations due to the particularities of the decision-
making system of the WTO.  
A similar point can be made regarding the DSB. As has been noted in Sect. 3.1.2, 
the DSB is a step into a more rule-oriented approach to the solution of trade 
disputes. However, the EU clearly has an advantage when its comes to the 
implementation of DSB decisions. It can on the one hand afford not to implement 
decisions, at least for a certain time. On the other hand, its economic power gives it 
the potential for massive retaliations and thus power in the DSB (though these can of 
course hurt the EU economy as well) (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 83, 96-98). The 
DSB does not rely on an established body of law, but builds up a certain “case law” 
during the course of its existence. This means that those litigants that use the system 
extensively shape the emerging body of law – and the EU with its massive economic 
resources and its expertise is one of the most frequent users of the DSB (Farrell 
1999: 11). 
From this section it is hence obvious that there are many ways in which the 
international trading regime with its institution WTO provides the EU with 
organisationally-dependent capabilities. The key issue for further analysis is the ways 
in which these resources are deployed and translated into power over both the 
negotiation process and outcomes. 
4.4 Interim Conclusion 
This chapter has given special consideration to the second and the third research 
questions outlined in chapter 3, namely which resources and which organisationally-
dependent capabilities the EU has at its disposal for action in the international trade 
regime. It has argued that in the context of the international trade regime, the EU’s 
position as a key actor can be assumed on the basis of its resources and other 
power components which were identified. Overall, as expected, the EU’s resource 
                                                                                                                                        
136 Other WTO members can and do also form groupings to promote their position, but the EU is the 
only firmly institutionalised one. 
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equipment is unique and extensive. Its power in the WTO is founded on its economic 
resources and the attractiveness of its internal market. Its political power relies on 
extensive and extending competencies of the EU in trade policy. However, the 
distribution of competencies between the EU and the EU member states is not clear-
cut in the area of the “new trade issues”, which carries the potential of frictional 
losses. In practice the effect of this division of competencies is neither a clear 
advantage nor a disadvantage, but carries the potential for both. It is also not clear 
what role EU business and civil society could play in the EU’s impact on the WTO. 
This will have to be considered specifically for each issue area and will therefore be a 
question to be carried forward into the case study. 
The EU’s vast network of formal and informal relations with its trading partners 
provides the EU with further resources for its impact on WTO negotiations. Within the 
WTO itself, the EU benefits from its long established actorness and from a special 
legal status. Its structure enables it to have a disproportionate influence on decision-
making and on the DSB. These organisationally-conferred capabilities make the 
WTO an advantageous place for power exercise for the EU. The WTO hence 
provides the EU with unique opportunities to build up an independent identity and to 
prove and assert its actorness in the GPE. It is the regime where the EU not only has 
long established actorness, but also has achieved formal status. Theoretically, the 
EU should be able to establish leadership and live up to its “superpower image”. 
Given the leading role of the EU in services trade, it might thus be assumed that it 
would have a predominant influence in the WTO negotiation process, and over the 
outcomes produced in this sector. 
This begs the question, however: to what extent is the EU’s potential weight 
transposed into tangible influence over the negotiation process and over policy 
outcomes, specifically with reference to services? The next step is therefore to 
consider the way the EU has exerted power in the WTO negotiations overall and 
specifically in the services negotiations, and what the outcomes of this power usage 
were. These questions, following research questions 4-6 set out in chapter 3, will be 
considered in the subsequent case study chapters. 
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5 WTO negotiations 1995-1999: agenda-setting  
The case study starts at the end of the Uruguay Round. The WTO agreement, 
including the GATS, had just come into force. The institutional framework of the WTO 
foresaw no stop to the negotiations though: Ministerial Conferences were pre-
scheduled to be held every 18 months and they needed to be filled with content by 
WTO members. Various negotiations, including those on services and agriculture, 
were scheduled by the regime to continue in 2000. Within the frame of these basic 
institutional cornerstones, the WTO agenda was ready to be shaped further. This 
framing of the WTO agenda took place both overall and in the services issue area. 
This chapter traces the progress of these negotiations over the first four years of the 
existence of the WTO and looks at how the EU tried to impact on the regime in these 
two different areas: how would the EU use its power in the newly created WTO?  
In parallel to the framework negotiations, a set of issue-area specific negotiations on 
trade in services, which had been prescheduled by the Uruguay Round, took place in 
the WTO. These will be dealt with in detail in chapter 6. There were linkages between 
the different levels of negotiation, which are indicated throughout the two chapters.  
5.1 Overall framework negotiations: the new round idea 
As early as in 1995, only shortly after the coming into force of the Uruguay 
Agreements and the establishment of the WTO, EU Trade Commissioner Brittan 
started to promote his idea of a broadened WTO agenda (see for example European 
Commission 1995b). In the European Commission, there had been a tiredness after 
the protracted Uruguay Round negotiations, and plurilateral and bilateral negotiations 
were seen as the way forward. Soon, however, Brittan realised that these kind of 
negotiations would always put the EU into a defensive situation due to the position of 
the EU on agricultural liberalisation. He hence started to promote the idea of a 
renewed comprehensive trade round, following the model of the Uruguay Round. 
Personal reasons have also been named as the reason for this move by Brittan, an 
attempt to create a legacy (interview I). In early 1996, the Commission launched a 
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new strategy for its trade policy (European Commission 1996d). In a speech to 
French business representatives, Brittan in early 1996 outlined this strategy and 
called for a “less defensive approach to trade”. This move by Brittan can be seen as 
one in a chain of events, starting in the 1980s, which led to an overall less hesitant 
and more offensive position of the EU on trade policy (Woolcock 2005). In a speech 
in 1996, Brittan mentions the importance of EU resources in trade policy: 
We will use our considerable powers to the maximum in order to 
ensure that our trading partners respect their WTO and other market-
opening commitments (European Commission 1996f). 
Equally, Brittan is quoted in the accompanying press release: 
It is time for Europe to abandon its defensiveness about 
liberalisation and focus fully on opening those markets that remain 
closed to our products and investment (European Commission 
1996d). 
The Commission proposed a new market access strategy, and wanted to establish a 
market access database. The EU also set out to push for a completion of the ongoing 
services negotiations.  
In April 1996, Brittan noted that the phase of consultation and gathering of new ideas 
on EU trade policy had not yet been completed. He described bilateral approaches 
as of secondary relevance for Europe and emphasised the central role of the WTO. 
As the Marrakesh agreements contained commitments to further trade liberalisation, 
Brittan used this to argue that the regime compelled WTO members to launch new 
negotiations before the end of the century. He mentioned as negotiation issues 
agriculture, NAMA and government procurement, but not services. Importantly, a 
range of new issues were proposed to be added to the WTO: investment, 
competition, labour and environment (European Commission 1996g). In this very first 
phase, we can hence see first of all a definition of the potential new WTO agenda on 
the EU level and the initial promotion of this agenda among WTO members. The EU 
wanted to substantially broaden the scope of the WTO agreements, arguably on the 
basis on its resources which Brittan had considered as substantial. 
On the EU level, discussion continued in the run up to the Singapore Ministerial, 
which was scheduled for December 1996. For example, shortly before the Singapore 
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Ministerial, Brittan tried to win the support of Dutch business representatives: 
“Europe is increasingly in tune with your needs, but needs your continuing support.” 
(European Commission 1996h). At this early stage already, he assessed his 
approach at “selling” the now so-called “Millennium Round” idea as successful: 
I am nonetheless very pleased that the working hypothesis in 
everyone's mind now seems clearly to be that what could properly be 
called a Millennium Round will be needed (ibid). 
This suggests that Brittan (and with him the European Commission) was at this stage 
building consensus both on the domestic and on the international level, which to 
them seemed to have been proceeding smoothly. Additionally, the talks on financial 
and telecommunication services were used as a litmus test for the ability of the WTO 
to move forward and hence for the EU’s ability to achieve its long-term goals in the 
WTO: “If we fail on these short-term objectives, the longer term strategy will be blown 
off course” (ibid). 
5.1.1 The Singapore and Geneva WTO Ministerial Conferences  
Wilkinson interprets the First WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in December 
1996 as different from a GATT Ministerial, in that it evoked considerable discussions 
and negotiations in and around the conference, rather than a simple stock-taking 
which seemed to have been prevalent in GATT Ministerials. Wilkinson also notes a 
changed public awareness, which he attributes to a growing expectation and 
attention to the WTO procedures (for example Wilkinson 2001: 413). This changed 
awareness certainly also had to do with the fact that already in this first Ministerial 
after the end of the Uruguay Round, discussion centred around the question whether 
a new trade round should be launched at the end of the century. The Ministerial was 
hence much more than a pure stock-taking exercise, but involved active agenda-
setting discussions.  
During the Singapore Ministerial, Brittan (re-)introduced his vision of the new 
Millennium Round, which would incorporate a range of new negotiation areas into the 
WTO framework. He mentioned competition and investment, the attempted new deal 
on telecommunication services and information technology. To calm the existing 
opposition, he explained that a work programme did not mean a decision on further 
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negotiations (European Commission 1996e), although it is clear that the 
establishment of a work programme is an act of agenda setting, which makes a later 
turning away from it much more difficult. In a position paper targeted at journalists, 
the European Commission set out its vision for the future of the WTO. While the 
paper acknowledged the prescheduled negotiations in agriculture, services and 
various other areas, due to start in 2000 for the two earlier issues and later for some 
of the others, the paper also presented the vision of the Millennium Round and 
included the trade and labour issue as well as a section on trade and environment 
(European Commission 1996a). It is clear that for the EU the greatest target and 
challenge was at this stage to convince other WTO members of the necessity of a 
bigger trade round and that the WTO agenda for the future negotiations should be 
extended beyond services and agriculture.  
During the Singapore Ministerial, discussion centred on what the WTO’s future 
should be. The developed countries’ requests for discussions regarding the new 
issue areas were refused by many developing countries, which insisted that before 
further issue areas could be added to the WTO, all of the Uruguay Round 
agreements would have to be fully implemented, especially in the area of textiles and 
agriculture. The question of Uruguay Round implementation was to become one of 
the constantly disputed issues between developed and developing countries. Equally 
disputed was the move to include labour rights into the WTO (Wilkinson 2006b).137 In 
Langhammer’s view, the hesitant attitude and the lack of implementation in sensitive 
sectors by the developed countries created already at the Singapore Ministerial a 
“disillusioning” for the developing countries after the success of the Uruguay-Round. 
Apparently, the Ministerial Declaration was mainly negotiated between the major 
trade powers, as it had often happened in GATT negotiations. This led to frustration 
among developing countries. ICTSD quotes a developing country member who 
described the meeting as “expanded bilateral”. However, this criticism and frustration 
did not lead to a disruption of the Ministerial process and all WTO members agreed 
                                            
137 Apparently the strongest proponents of this were the US and Norway (ICTSD 1996); Hoekman and 
Kostecki report it was the US, France and Canada (2001: 452). 
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to the compromise.138 The compromise that emerged was hence celebrated as a 
success by politicians, but many negotiators and trade experts felt that the 
disagreements had only been postponed to future negotiations in the Councils and 
Committees in Geneva (ICTSD 1996; Langhammer 2000: 2; Pedersen 2006).  
The Ministerial had the following key results: the draft proposal for the Information 
Technology Agreement, put forward by APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation) 
countries and the EU, was adopted. A range of new working groups was established 
and mandated by the conference in order to discuss government procurement, trade 
and investment as well as trade and competition. The Committee on Trade and 
Environment was created as another permanent institution inside the WTO and the 
WTO’s relations to the IMF were institutionalised by a new cooperation agreement 
(ICTSD 1996; Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 105; Langhammer 2000: 2). The 
Singapore Ministerial Declaration also included commitments to implementation and 
the WTO as an institution, the latter of which can usually be found in all WTO 
Ministerial Declarations. On services, the Singapore Ministerial reconfirmed the 
commitment of WTO members to the various negotiations that were still taking place 
and set a range of deadlines for them (see Box 5.1). The declaration outlined the 
broad aims of these negotiations: improved market access and flexibility for 
developing countries. It provided a framework for subsequent negotiations in Geneva 
by setting and reaffirming deadlines. Remarkably, in the professional services area, 
WTO members envisaged a further extension of disciplines beyond the accountancy 
sector. 
Box 5.1 The section on services in the Singapore Ministerial Declaration 
Services Negotiations  
17. The fulfilment of the objectives agreed at Marrakesh for negotiations on the improvement of 
market access in services - in financial services, movement of natural persons, maritime transport 
services and basic telecommunications - has proved to be difficult. The results have been below 
expectations. In three areas, it has been necessary to prolong negotiations beyond the original 
deadlines. We are determined to obtain a progressively higher level of liberalization in services on a 
mutually advantageous basis with appropriate flexibility for individual developing country Members, as 
envisaged in the Agreement, in the continuing negotiations and those scheduled to begin no later than 
                                            
138 Pedersen explained this agreement despite the underlying procedural critique with a lack of 
resources and expertise: many developing countries representatives had never participated in a 
GATT/WTO meeting, or were ill-prepared (2006).  
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1 January 2000. In this context, we look forward to full MFN agreements based on improved market 
access commitments and national treatment. Accordingly, we will: 
? achieve a successful conclusion to the negotiations on basic telecommunications in February 1997; 
and 
? resume financial services negotiations in April 1997 with the aim of achieving significantly improved 
market access commitments with a broader level of participation in the agreed time frame. 
With the same broad objectives in mind, we also look forward to a successful conclusion of the 
negotiations on Maritime Transport Services in the next round of negotiations on services 
liberalization. 
In professional services, we shall aim at completing the work on the accountancy sector by the end of 
1997, and will continue to develop multilateral disciplines and guidelines. In this connection, we 
encourage the successful completion of international standards in the accountancy sector by IFAC 
[International Federation of Accountants], IASC [Inter-agency standard committee], and IOSCO 
[International Organisation of Securities Commissions]. With respect to GATS rules, we shall 
undertake the necessary work with a view to completing the negotiations on safeguards by the end of 
1997. We also note that more analytical work will be needed on emergency safeguards measures, 
government procurement in services and subsidies.  
Source: WTO 1996b139 
Brittan evaluated the Singapore Ministerial as a success for the EU’s strategy:  
The Commission's call to chart a course towards a Millennium 
Round has received wide support from developed and developing 
countries. […] A clear objective for WTO has been set this week. We 
have a well-defined road map for continuing liberalisation of trade and 
a broadening work programme to keep the WTO up to date with a 
fast-changing world economy (European Commission 1996b). 
The Commissioner also pointed out that Ministers had confirmed their support for 
agreements on financial services, accountancy services and that an additional group 
of countries would submit offers to the telecommunication services negotiations 
(Barbados, Egypt, Jamaica, South Africa, Indonesia, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong 
(China), Korea, Poland, Switzerland, Singapore and the Slovak Republic) (European 
Commission 1996b). This obviously played into the hands of the EU. 
Eighteen months later (May 1998), Ministers reconvened for the Geneva Ministerial. 
This conference remained without major results due to the continuously divergent 
position of the WTO members (Wilkinson 2006b), but foresaw the launch of a work 
programme for future trade negotiations to provide input for the next Ministerial 
                                            
139 Document S/C/3 (Report from the CTS to the General Council of November 1996) additionally 
mandated the CTS to conduct an “information exchange” between WTO members in preparation of 
the GATS 2000 negotiations and to start work on negotiation guidelines and modalities as required 
by Art. XIX GATS. 
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Cofnerence. Brittan, allegedly the one who had first called for the round, seems to 
have succeeded in establishing the idea for the new trade round (Rode 1999/2000: 
60). Accordingly, Brittan welcomed the move of the US towards supporting a 
comprehensive trade round:  
Even the US, who had previously favoured continued sectoral 
negotiations, appeared more open at the Geneva Ministerial to 
considering a Round as one option for further liberalisation (European 
Commission 1998a). 
This implies that the EU assumed at this stage that it had been able to at least 
partially warm the US to its idea for the Millennium Round. It appears that at this 
stage, the EU had considerable influence and capacity to shape discussions in the 
WTO, as it was leading and pushing forward its agenda, regardless of the rather 
hesitant position of the US. 
This was well recognised by Brittan and arguably the European Commission, who 
were additionally reassured by the progress in the issue-area specific negotiations on 
trade in services (see chapter 6). Brittan emphasised this new position of the EU in 
speeches in 1997 and 1998: 
Looking at our record in the Uruguay Round, in working for the ITA 
[Information Technology Agreement], in reaching an international 
agreement on liberalizing telecoms and now in working for a similar 
agreement to liberalize financial services, I have no hesitation in 
claiming that the EU is now at the forefront of the process of 
liberalizing world trade (Brittan 1997). 
I do not think I can be accused of hubris when I say that the 
European Union has emerged as a guiding, if not leading, force in the 
international trading system (European Commission 1998a). 
The EU was hence definitely turning from a rather defensive position in the 1980s to 
one of leadership and a more offensive position in the 1990s. At the same time, it can 
be argued that the EU perceived increased opportunities for power usage of the EU 
in the WTO, which led it to position itself as a new leader in the WTO.  
The idea that the EU was now a leader (or the decisive leader) in the WTO can be 
attributed directly to Brittan. It might have served more than just to frame the 
discussion in the international forum WTO though: a former EU official explained that 
it was regarded as a good way to convince the EU’s domestic constituency of the 
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need for a broad negotiation round, especially in order to overcome the French 
resistance towards further movement on agriculture (interview 1). Apparently there 
was an awareness in the European Commission that pinning agriculture against 
services alone would not overcome the defensive stance the EU had in agriculture, 
although for example Brittan tried to play up and emphasise the French interest in 
services liberalisation (European Commission 1996f).  
5.1.2 The Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference 
In July 1999, the European Commission presented its proposed agenda for the 
Seattle talks, which included the extension of WTO talks beyond agriculture and 
services to include competition policy, investment, consumer health, development, 
environment, government procurement and industrial tariffs. On agriculture, it was 
obvious that the paper outlined a defensive position (FT 09.07.1999; European 
Commission 1999a; see also Paemen 2000), but the appointment of the French 
Pascal Lamy seemed to have been a good strategic move to get the French on 
board (for example FT 13.07.1999). It can be interpreted as a move to enhance the 
EU’s capacity to act.  
However, while the EU might have managed to increase domestic support for its 
proposals by this move, the circumstances in the WTO developed for the worse for 
the EU. Several months were taken up by a battle around the question as to who 
should be the next WTO DG: Michael Moore (New Zealand) or Supachai 
Panitchpakdi (for example FT 03.05.1999). Once this conflict was resolved with a 
compromise to divide the term in office between Moore and Supachai, only little time 
remained for the preparation of the Ministerial Conference and among the leading 
countries, let alone the broader WTO community, there was still no agreement as to 
which negotiation issues should be included in the Seattle agenda.  
In October 1999, a first draft for the Seattle Ministerial was hence rejected by the US. 
It had been a text which had left a vast range of options open and was thus no real 
step forward to an agreement (Odell 2007). A second draft of the text included 
weakened versions regarding anti-dumping (AD) regulations, and the proposed 
investment rules and competition policy. Developing country flexibility was cut out. 
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These changes were seen as a direct result of US opposition to the first draft, and 
the EU, Japan and other countries accused the US of “obstructionism” (FT 
11.10.1999). This means there was a clear lack of cooperation between the EU and 
the US which made the WTO process lurch. The EU criticised the weak US support 
for the new trade round launch (FT 18.10.1999). Closer to the Ministerial, high level 
meetings took place between US President Clinton and European Commission 
President Prodi to coordinate between the EU and the US positions (FT 28.10.1999). 
This open criticism and the high level meetings can be seen as attempts by the EU to 
make the US move ahead, but it might have come too late for the Seattle Ministerial. 
To a certain extent, the EU’s negotiation position was weakened by the re-
appearance of divisions among EU member states in the direct run-up to the Seattle 
Ministerial. While the EU had presented a common agenda for the WTO talks in the 
summer, in fact internal rifts had remained and became clearly visible in the run up to 
the Seattle Ministerial. The first contentious area was the one on trade and labour. 
EU member states were divided on these questions (FT 17.10.1999).140 The second 
was the French demand for an exemption of audiovisual services from the 
negotiations (FT 14.10.1999). The EU’s internal difficulties in regard to a reform of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform further limited the EU’s negotiation 
margin in this crucial area (Langhammer 2000: 3). 
The trade and labour issue proved highly contentious in the WTO itself: four weeks 
before the Seattle Ministerial, a renewed push by the EU for the inclusion of labour 
issues onto the WTO agenda seems to have only deepened the rift between WTO 
members (FT 09.11.1999). Similarly, agriculture turned into another major stumbling 
block (or maybe the key stumbling block) in the run-up to the Ministerial (FT 
26.10.1999). A third revised version of the draft text for the Ministerial consequently 
showed the extent of disagreement between the different groups in the WTO, 
displaying large parts of bracketed text throughout (FT 22.10.1999).  
                                            
140 Denmark, Sweden and Austria supported a working group on labour rights at the WTO. Other EU 
member states were only for a looser commitment. 
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At the same time, there seems to have been a sense that negotiation dynamics in the 
WTO had started to change. In October 1999, Pascal Lamy in Washington 
commented on changes in the way the WTO functions:  
In the old days, getting a new Round launched and indeed agreed 
was simply a question of aligning EU and US objectives, sidestepping 
the odd row about agriculture, signing up the rest of the world, and 
catching the next plane home. Those days are gone. Developing 
countries must become, and are becoming, key players within the 
WTO in order for it to function as a truly global institution (European 
Commission 1999b). 
This would indicate that in the European Commission there was a recognition that a 
change in the power structure in the WTO was taking place. A similar analysis of the 
changing situation at the WTO is visible in Lamy’s speech at the opening of the 
Seattle Conference (European Commission 1999d).  
This development inside the WTO was, however, not the only change in the 
international trade regime that the European Commission observed. Lamy 
commented also on a newly emerging presence of NGOs (European Commission 
1999d, 1999c). These two changes, mentioned by Lamy at this stage prior to the 
Seattle conference, culminated in the Seattle Ministerial, where the newly emerging 
presence of NGOs made itself felt: the conference was accompanied by an 
unprecedented level of protests by anti-globalisation demonstrators, managing to 
disrupt the conference progress at times (see for example Bleyer 2000), and ended 
in a debacle for the EU: while the European Commission had for a long time 
envisaged the Seattle Ministerial as the starting point of the new trade round, the 
conference failed.  
What did this mean for the WTO? The failure of Seattle gave rise to a substantial 
discussion both among practitioners and academics. An analyst ascribed special 
importance to this failure: 
The failure of the Seattle ministerial to launch a new round was 
unique in the history of the postwar global trading system. Never 
before had countries come together to start a negotiation and failed to 
do so. Prior rounds were replete with instances of missed deadlines 
and “time-outs” before talks were completed […], but ministers had 
never before failed to agree to start talking about trade problems and 
their possible remedies when they had all convened to do so (Schott 
2000: 5). 
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Although the protesters on the streets of Seattle celebrated the conference failure as 
their victory (see for example Clarke 2000; Bleyer 2000; Gould 2000), 141 most of the 
literature identified other reasons and found different explanations: 
A first set of explanations for the failure of Seattle points to the substance of the 
agenda, which had led to irreconcilable differences between WTO members. As 
discussed, before the conference differences between industrialised and developing 
countries increased rather than diminished. The positions of the EU, the USA and 
Japan were polarised as well (for example Das 2000: 186; WTA 01.03.1999; Schott 
2000).142 Following this line of argument, Bergsten hence recommends that what is 
needed to launch the new trade round (which he saw as being of key interest to the 
US) is mainly US iniative. The US needed to overcome its internal stalemate and to 
also build a common agenda with other WTO members (Bergsten 2000).  
A second set of explanations for the failure relates to conference management. 
Preparation and negotiations in the run up to the conference started too late. This 
was in part due to the fight over the next WTO DG, which could only be ended in July 
1999 (Odell 2003: 13-14; Das 2000: 193ff; Narlikar 2004).143 Mediation between the 
different interests was weaker than in the two previous conferences and several 
severe faux-pas happened in the political management of the conference (Odell 
2003: 13ff, 18-21; see also Odell 2007).  
A third set of explanations relates to the relation the WTO has with civil society. The 
protests at the side of the Seattle Ministerial hence were taken to indicate the 
                                            
141 See for example the interview with a representative of the group “Global Citizen” in Foreign Policy, 
No. 118, Spring 2000, pp. 29-55. 
142 This polarization had various reasons: The US still suffered from its now “chronic” trade deficit 
(Langhammer 2000: 2) and US congress was hence reluctant to grant the Clinton administration 
trade negotiation authority. Or, the contending views of the EU and the USA on the future of the 
global trade order might have contributed to their failure to reconcile their views (for example Wahl 
2000; Schott 2000). The EU and the US had failed to develop a common vision of the agenda; and 
even during the conference the US still circulated its own proposal for the narrow round on 
agriculture, services and labour standards (Guardian 01.12.1999; Das 2000: 193). 
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changing attitude in civil society to the WTO (McMichael 2000 Esty 2002; see also 
Sampson 2000; Wade 2003; Clarke 2000; Graz 2000; Gould 2000).144 Importantly, in 
this way the options for using policy tools to encourage development were said to 
become increasingly limited (Wade 2003). This set of explanations for the failure of 
Seattle gave rise to a wider debate on the legitimacy and accountability of the WTO 
(Esty 2002; Henderson 2002).145  
A fourth set of explanations relates to the ideas inspiring trade-policy making. Similar 
to his analysis of the trade system in the early 1990s (Bhagwati 1991), Bhagwati 
interpreted the failure of Seattle as a result of the rise of the protectionist idea of “fair 
                                                                                                                                        
143 The organisational changes due to the arrival of the new WTO DG meant that pre-conference 
negotiations only got under way eight weeks before the conference. The draft Ministerial 
Declaration, which had to be taken as the basis for negotiation during the Ministerial, was a 
contended and very extensive text with an endless amount of bracketed text options and had not 
been brought to a manageable format and length when the conference started (Odell 2003: 13-14; 
Das 2000: 193ff; Narlikar 2004). 
144 The new attention to the WTO that had been observed at the Singapore Ministerial already was 
seen as part of a new criticism brought forward towards the WTO, namely that it was not 
representative of civil society or denied access to it. As part of the broad debate on globalization 
taking part in the late 1990s, it was also feared that the WTO could severely overwrite and delimit 
the political space of national states in favour of a global “rule of the market”, or even as part of a 
kind of world government for trade: “The notion of a global, collective state managing capital’s affairs 
is foreshadowed in the organizational structure and operation of the WTO” (McMichael 2000: 467; 
Esty 2002). 
145 The debate is exemplified by two articles by Esty (2002) and Henderson (2002). Esty argued that 
the WTO suffered from a legitimacy crises, which was indicated by the continuing protests by civil 
society accompanying the meetings of international economic institutions and which was due to the 
WTO being out of pace with “modern norms” (2002; see also Sutherland et al. 2001). He 
recommended to the WTO that it re-built its legitimacy by increasing its links to civil society and by 
proving its efficacy in not just serving economic objectives, but by furthering broader societal 
objectives such as human rights issues, poverty alleviation and environmental protection. 
Additionally, the WTO needed to introduce more direct accountability and transparency (Esty 2001). 
Esty’s idea of a shaping of the international trade regime was refuted by Henderson (2002), who 
argued that an international organisation’s legitimacy, and hence the WTO’s legitimacy, derived from 
its member governments. He argued that national states remained the main actors in the GPE and 
in the WTO. They also incorporated wider societal concerns in their negotiations in the WTO 
already, and there was hence no need nor use in expanding the WTO beyond trade issues. Hence, 
Henderson did not see a necessity to involve NGOs in the WTO decision-making process, nor did 
he think that these organisations would have legitimacy to become involved. With this he does not 
mean the increased provision of information, which as we have seen, had been introduced with 
relatively little controversy in the WTO. Henderson refuted an involvement that gives NGOs a 
function beyond observer status (2002). While Henderson acknowledges there has been change in 
the role of the WTO, he locates the change inside the organisation (new rules, new issues, new 
members), while Esty locates it outside in the changing international system.  
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trade” (or “managed trade”)146 in developed countries, which led to demands for the 
inclusion of a wide range of standards (among others on environmental protection 
and on labour rights) in the WTO. This in turn alienated the developing countries, 
who regarded these measures as detrimental for their economic development and as 
tools of the developed countries.147 Bhagwati hence proposed to refocus the WTO on 
trade liberalisation (Bhagwati 2001). Contrary to Bhagwati, others argued that the 
WTO system was influenced too much by the idea of “free trade”, and hence were 
adamant that policy space of national states needed to be maintained and economic 
development should be achieved through managed protectionism. The international 
trade regime was to be reconstructed to further these objectives (Wade 2003; 
McMichael 2003; Clarke 2000). 
A fifth set of explanations places the Seattle failure in the wider development of the 
post-war trade regime, which meant that certain interests (labour, developing 
countries’ interests) had been systematically sidelined and where now causing 
disruptions in the negotiation process (Wilkinson 2001; see also Wilkinson 2000).148  
                                            
146 In his 1991 analysis, he referred to “managed trade” rather than to fair trade, but the concepts are 
similar. 
147 Although he describes the idea of managed trade as on the decline in the academic sphere 
(Bhagwati 2001: 18ff), it had been taken on board by a range of civil society actors. The rise of this 
idea hence had inspired the civil society opposition against the WTO, and civil society now feared 
that trade threatened national cultures, human and labour rights. According to Bhagwati, this had led 
to demands for the inclusion of a wide range of standards, for example on trade and environment 
and trade and labour. Bhagwati hence recommended “lightening up” the WTO by turning back to the 
original purposes of the GATT/WTO, namely trade liberalisation, increasing fairness in the DSB and 
attempting to reshape ideas in civil society, for example by institutionalising dialogue between the 
WTO and civil society (Bhagwati 2001). 
148 Arguing from a historic institutionalist point of view, Wilkinson argues that because the broader 
institution ITO failed, trade regulation and hence labour and social interests had been systematically 
side-lined in the international trade regime. The same had happened to developing countries’ 
interests; and the later addition of special and differential treatment to the GATT was not sufficient to 
redress this imbalance of interests, which in the Uruguay Round was even acerbated by the addition 
of further areas to the GATT contrary to developing countries. Wilkinson argued that these 
systematically sidelined interests led to the collapse of Seattle. Wilkinson hence argued for a 
departure from these “traditions” in the world trade regime. He argued that developing countries 
interests had to be addressed before new areas would be incorporated into the WTO. Similarly, the 
relationship between the WTO and civil society as well as organised labour needed to be taken into 
account (Wilkinson 2001; see also Wilkinson 2000). In later work, Wilkinson dealt with the fact that 
despite of the systematically sidelined interests, change in the trade regime had not been 
forthcoming and he attributes this to the shared belief in the superior benefits deriving from 
multilateral trade liberalisation through the WTO and a nearly unchanged global power distribution 
(Wilkinson 2006b). 
5 WTO negotiations 1995-1999: agenda-setting 170 
 
Finally, a sixth set of explanations attributes the failure of Seattle to the new role 
developing countries played in the run up and during the Seattle conference. 
Developing countries for the first time endeavoured to participate actively in a WTO 
Ministerial, with preparatory sessions set up to train their officials (Odell 2003: 8) and 
an active participation of developing countries in the pre-Ministerial negotiation 
process (Watal 2000; see also Mattoo and Subramanian 2004; Pedersen 2006). 
Obviously, the broad group of developing countries pursued a range of different 
issues, but they also managed to coordinate among themselves to a certain extent. 
(Watal 2000; Pedersen 2006).149 This meant that additional voices had to be 
incorporated into the negotiation process, while at the same time new coalitions and 
thus new divisions were building up (Langhammer 2000).150 Pressure developed 
inside the organisation challenging the way it had functioned up to now. The failure of 
the Seattle Conference thus brought to the light of the day a whole host of systemic 
issues which had “smouldered” under the surface for a while. An interviewee put it in 
this way: “Seattle was a “wake-up” call for the EU: the game had started to change” 
(interview 32).151  
                                            
149 For example, the new coalition of the like-minded group (LMG) emerged prior to Doha. The like-
minded group were Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Jamaica. Watal criticises 
developing countries though for their focus on special and differential treatment and other defensive 
ideas and recommends to them to focus on their offensive interests in trade liberalisation (2000). 
150 The expansion of membership and the fact that due to the Single Undertaking free-riding on 
negotiated agreements had been minimised explain this new interest of developing countries in the 
negotiations (Schott and Watal 2000). Hence, the “green room process”, a legacy of the GATT, 
failed to work this time, as it was apparently employed to keep out many developing countries (Das 
2000: 191, 194ff; Schott 2000; see also Ricupero 2000). Pedersen reports active denouncement of 
the “green room process” by the developing countries, which they had not dared (or did not manage 
to) at the Singapore Ministerial (2006). 
151 A proposal after the conference was hence to set up steering committee that would replace the 
“green room process” and transform consensus building into a much more transparent and inclusive 
procedure in the WTO (Schott 2000; see also Schott and Watal 2000). The Secretary General of 
UNCTAD, Rubens Ricupero, went further than Schott: He called for a general redressing of the 
substantial imbalances and biases in trade rules detrimental to the developing countries, which had 
been institutionalised and legitimised by the GATT and then the WTO. He identified a set of “double 
standards” and exceptions, that to developing countries gave the trade regime little trustworthiness 
(2000). For further proposals on WTO reform post-Seattle see Schott 2000. 
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Negotiations after Seattle 
The year after the Seattle breakdown seemed to be marked by standstill rather than 
by a search for a new compromise; several initiatives did not provide significant new 
momentum as mistrust between the negotiators prevailed. Meanwhile, negotiators 
were awaiting results from the US elections in 2000. Although preparations for 
negotiations on agriculture and services trade had moved forward as foreseen in the 
so-called “built-in agenda” of the Uruguay Round, they were not incorporated in a 
broader framework now, which hindered progress. The business community 
expressed impatience with the sluggish process towards a new trade round (Das 
2000: 199ff). 
Clearly, in this phase services as an issue area played a completely subordinate role 
in the negotiations on the general framework of the WTO. Agriculture, 
implementation issues and the proposed extensive expansion of the WTO agenda 
were taking up the attention of WTO members. Several reasons can be suggested 
for this low-key role of services: 
• Agenda-setting had already taken place for services and the review 
institutionalised in the regime.  
• The services issue was not considered as a contentious area. This was 
argued by a former EU official who stated that in the 1990s, the services 
negotiations were considered as a “clean” area or a “clean” industry. Services 
liberalisation was an uncontested issue (interview 11). 
• There could have been a lack of understanding in these more general 
negotiations about what the services negotiations would entail.  
• After the successes of the telecommunication and financial services 
negotiations, there might have been an expectation that the services 
negotiations might go ahead without high level, politicised fights. 
• There might also have been a lack of interest in the services negotiations. 
However, while services played a low key role in these negotiations on the general 
framework of the WTO, discussions about the GATS 2000 negotiations took place in 
the CTS. The next section deals with these discussions. 
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5.2 Issue-area framework negotiations: preparing GATS 2000152 
The CTS’ agenda was preformed by the provisions for future negotiations as 
foreseen in the GATS agreement (see Sect. 3.3.4). Art. XIX GATS required WTO 
members to prepare for the next round of negotiations by conducting an assessment 
of services trade. Obviously, the GATS agreement left open how such an 
assessment would be conducted.  
A first milestone for WTO members in the preparation of the GATS 2000 negotiations 
and an opportunity to refine the broad provisions of the GATS was the Singapore 
Ministerial. Prior to the Singapore Ministerial, the CTS hence discussed expectations 
for the Singapore Ministerial. One of the key points was whether an information 
exchange as part of the requested wider assessment of service trade and 
liberalisation would be desirable and when it should take place. Discussion was 
based on papers by Australia and Chile (s. discussion in documents S/C/M/13; 
S/C/M/12; S/C/3; S/C/M/14). This information exchange was set up by a document to 
the General Council as a preparation for the GATS 2000 negotiations (WTO S/C/3 
06.11.1996).153 
In 1998, the information exchange scheduled by the Singapore Ministerial started. 
The discussion about the approach towards the GATS 2000 negotiations gained 
pace. Members engaged in the exchange, guided by initially four, then five questions: 
What are the regulatory authorities, governmental and/or non-
governmental?;  
Are there any special or common problems encountered as 
regards transparency or the application of the most favoured national 
principle?;  
 What are the most prevalent types of restriction on market access 
or national treatment?;  
                                            
152 The CTS in 1995 also dealt with the enlargement of the EU, establishment of working groups, 
observer status for other international organisations, NAFTA etc.. This will not be dealt with here as 
this section only deals with the prenegotiations for the GATS 2000 negotiations. 
153 The results of the Singapore Ministerial with respect to services liberalisation were already 
discussed above (see Sect. 5.1.1). 
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Are there other types of regulation - for example in the areas of 
licensing, technical standards or qualification requirements - which 
commonly restrict trade in the sector? 
What are the main barriers exports face in the market of other 
Members? (WTO S/C/M/29 24.08.1998) 
The exchange on the basis of these questions was intended to “facilitate the access 
of all Members, in particular developing country Members, to information regarding 
laws, regulations and administrative guidelines and policies affecting trade in 
services.” (WTO S/C/M/28 20.07.1998) The CTS met and consulted on a multitude of 
sectors in June 1998 and the Secretariat published a set of “background notes” on 
the following sectors: distribution, courier, audio/visual, construction and engineering, 
and postal services. In July 1998, members discussed legal, advertising services, 
architecture and engineering services, computer and related services, environmental 
services (WTO S/C/M/29 24.08.1998). By August, several delegations had submitted 
discussion papers to the CTS, but not the EU. In October, WTO members dealt with 
energy services, health and social services, education, air transportation and tourism 
related services (WTO S/C/M/30 12.11.1998). The Chairman framed the discussions 
as open-ended and encouraged “spontaneous exchange”. Meetings were supposed 
to be held mostly in informal mode to facilitate this (WTO S/C/M/28 20.07.1998). This 
first phase of the prenegotiations to GATS 2000 was hence mostly a phase of 
information gathering and exchange among the negotiators. 
Due to the informal character of the negotiations, the reports from the CTS only 
provide summaries and the contributions of single countries cannot be determined. 
Most papers submitted to the CTS were also informal. However, if one takes the 
submissions of informal and formal papers as an indication of who shaped the 
discussions in the CTS (Table 5.1), it is interesting to mark first of all the complete 
absence of discussion papers by developing countries. In a paper on agriculture and 
services, Egypt attributes this absence to the lack of capacity and resources by 
developing countries (WTO WT/GC/W/135 26.01.1999). If developing countries did 
not manage to provide input at this stage of the discussion, the build-up of knowledge 
can be seen as mainly developed country led and discussion would focus on 
developed country issues. The lack of input from developing countries was 
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intensified, for example, by the fact that the Secretariat’s “background notes”, 
although not intending to be a comprehensive sectoral analysis due to the pure 
scope and diversity of the service sectors in different countries, were mainly based 
on OECD country examples and statistics. A reason for this is that statistics from 
other countries were simply not available. 
A second observation is that the EU only submitted one formal and one informal 
paper, although the other Quad members were very active. In a contribution to the 
discussion, Australia expressed its disappointment with a lack of contribution by a 
range of members to the information exchange programme (WTO WT/GC/W/116 
20.11.1998); this could mean that the information exchange exercise was at this 
stage a rather one-sided discussion in terms of participation, potentially even without 
significant contribution of the EU.  
Table 5.1 Formal and informal papers submitted to the CTS for the sectoral information exchange 
programme in 1998 
Transport services (a) Transport Services (general): Japan, and Poland; (b) Air Transport 
Services: Australia, New Zealand and Turkey; (c) Land Transport Services: 
Australia and New Zealand; (d) Maritime Transport Services: Australia, New 
Zealand, Norway and Turkey. The United States submitted a formal paper 
on Transportation Services (S/C/W/71), EU (informal paper) 
Legal services Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States (plus paper from 
International Bar Association) 
Advertising services Australia, Japan and the United States 
Architectural 
services 
Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States 
Engineering services Canada 
Computer and related 
services 
Australia, Canada and the United States 
Environmental 
services 
Australia, Canada, and Japan (United States also circulated a submission 
made to the Committee on Trade and Environment on Liberalization of 
Trade in Services and the Environment, WT/CTE/W/70) 
Courier and postal 
services 
Canada, Poland, Norway, EU 
Construction Canada 
Education services Australia, Hong Kong (China), Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and Poland, 
US (formal paper S/C/W/55) 
Health and social 
services 
Australia, Japan, and Norway, US (formal paper S/C/W/56), Czech 
Republic, Poland  
Tourism services Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Norway, US (formal paper 
S/C/W/57) 
Energy services Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Norway, US (formal paper S/C/W/58) 
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Audiovisual services  Norway 
Accountancy 
services 
Australia and Japan, US (formal paper S/C/W/90) 
Financial services Australia, Japan and Turkey, US (formal paper S/C/W/89) 
Telecommunication 
services 
Australia and Japan, US (S/C/W/91) 
Presence of Natural 
Persons 
Australia, EU (informal paper) 
Sources: WTO S/C/M/31 09.12.1998, WTO S/C/M/29 24.08.1998, WTO S/C/M/30 12.11.1998 
In late 1998, discussion in the CTS turned towards how to continue the preparatory 
work. The Chairman argued that he sensed the information exchange exercise had 
nearly been completed. The next step for WTO Members was to conduct an 
assessment of the state of service trade and the regulatory developments that had 
taken place since the coming into force of the GATS. (Some) Members initially 
thought that this task could be accomplished in the next two CTS meetings. While the 
Council seemed to have agreed that they needed background information for the 
assessment exercise from the WTO Secretariat, the US questioned whether a further 
assessment exercise was needed after the information exchange of 1998, while 
Egypt asked for an assessment of the effects of services liberalisation on developing 
countries (WTO S/C/M/32 14.01.1999). Whether an assessment still had to be 
conducted or not was to become one of the central disputes between developed and 
developing countries.  
Following the argumentation of the US, Switzerland in May 1999 submitted a 
proposal suggesting that the CTS should move from the information exchange and 
assessment stage to establishing negotiation guidelines and modalities, which was 
the next step in the preparation for the GATS 2000 negotiations as mandated in Art. 
XIX GATS. Switzerland called for negotiations on the modalities and guidelines “as 
concretely as possible”, and offered a definition of what would have to be included in 
these negotiations: 
(a) issues/topics for the negotiation; (b) the objectives of the 
negotiation; (c) a method or principles for the negotiation; (d) an 
approximate time-frame; (e) and practical arrangements regarding the 
organisation of work  
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However, not all delegations shared the Swiss vision of the services negotiations. 
The Indians, in a submission to the General Council, expressed dismay that the 
review provisions in several WTO agreements were interpreted by some delegations 
as intended to lead to new commitments for services liberalisation. The Indian 
delegation saw them as provisions to ensure an assessment of the effects of the 
existing agreements and rejected the approach put forward by “some delegations” to 
use the review process for further commitments. They also rejected the idea of “one 
major delegation” (presumably referring to the EU or USA), who was eager to get 
agreement for a new trade round and hence wanted to decide upon all the reviews at 
the Seattle Ministerial (WTO WT/GC/W/151 08.03.1999). The conflict between those 
wanting to move forward to market access negotiations and those that were not 
really interested in market access was hence evolving even before the GATS 2000 
negotiations started. 
5.2.1 Assessment exercise 
The assessment exercise could thus not be dismissed from the agenda as quickly as 
some developed countries had intended. The difficulties the WTO members were 
facing in the assessment exercise were, however, not only of a tactical and political 
nature. The assessment exercise suffered from various technical difficulties, which 
were summarised by the Chairman in the subsequent CTS meeting on 26.04.1999 
(WTO S/C/M/35 17.05.1999): 
However, such an assessment is rendered difficult by the paucity 
of statistics, particularly acute for developing countries, by the lack of 
information on whether GATS commitments had actually improved on 
trade regimes, and by the fact that various liberalization initiatives, as 
in basic telecommunications and financial services, had been 
negotiated too recently for any economic consequences to be 
observable (WTO S/C/M/35 17.05.1999). 
Discussion about how to proceed with the assessment exercise hence continued to 
take up room in the CTS meetings. Subsequently, a set of WTO members, including 
Uruguay, Egypt, Switzerland, Hong Kong (China), Brazil, India and Cuba, 
encouraged the WTO Secretariat to continue its cooperation on the assessment of 
service trade with UNCTAD. The EU representative disagreed with this, because like 
the US and Switzerland, the EU considered the assessment undertaken so far (with 
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the information exchange and the 1998 WTO Secretariat papers) as sufficient and 
wanted to move on to discuss negotiation guidelines and modalities. A new idea was 
floated by the EU, Hong Kong (China) and Switzerland - that the assessment of 
service trade should be conducted continuously in parallel to the negotiations (WTO 
S/C/M/35 17.05.1999).  
Interestingly, an informal paper by the Secretariat suggested that developing 
countries would gain especially from liberalisation in tourism, health, construction, 
maritime, software development and implementation and Mode 4. This in a sense 
delivered the right arguments for those WTO members promoting a move towards 
greater market access. The Secretariat had therefore provided support for a certain 
group of WTO members. 
In the next meeting, the supporters of contact with UNCTAD had expanded (now 
Uruguay, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Indonesia (speaking on 
behalf of ASEAN), Mexico, and Egypt spoke out in support), but Switzerland changed 
position and now supported the adversaries of a constant UNCTAD involvement (EU, 
Switzerland, the United States and Japan). Developing countries emphasised that an 
involvement of UNCTAD could add a developing country perspective to the 
discussion in the CTS. It could help their preparation for the GATS 2000 negotiations, 
given their lack of capacity for assessment of service trade. However, developed 
countries encouraged them to undertake their own national assessment of services 
liberalisation. This would have taken the pressure of conducting the assessment 
exercise off the CTS. In their opinion, UNCTAD’s work had sufficiently been 
considered already in previous Secretariat’s studies (WTO S/C/M/36 15.06.1999). 
Again, the arguments brought forward by the developed countries were not only 
political or strategical. There were also technical arguments, for example the diversity 
of services sectors, which would have justified a national assessment. Technical and 
political/strategic motivations were hence constantly intermingled. 
In the subsequent CTS meeting, UNCTAD gave a presentation on the assessment of 
services trade in developing countries (WTO S/C/M/38 13.09.1999). The EU 
delegate commented that the problems faced by developing countries were the same 
as in developed countries, and that the differences between them were merely a 
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question of “degrees”. This raises the question whether there was really an 
understanding in the European Commission of the difference between the service 
sectors in developed versus developing countries. At this stage, the EU delegate 
therefore emphasised the importance of capacity-building and technical assistance, 
because he considered it crucial to increase the participation of developing countries 
in service trade. The developing countries did not agree with this point of view: the 
Indian and other developing country delegates pointed to various developing country 
specific issues. Contrary to what had been suggested by WTO Secretariat studies 
(see for example above) and the statements of developed countries in the CTS, 
some developing countries outlined that the case for service liberalisation was for 
them more negative than positive. Towards the end of 1999, consensus was now 
widespread in the CTS that the assessment exercise should be an ongoing process 
(WTO S/C/M/39 15.10.1999). The assessment exercise hence became an 
institutionalised part of the negotiations. 
5.2.2 Negotiation guidelines and modalities 
While the discussion on the assessment continued in the CTS, in parallel a 
discussion started on the possible content of the negotiation guidelines and 
modalities (both will here be referred to as “guidelines”). This discussion was 
intermingled with the development of positions by various delegations (at times 
preliminary positions were represented informally) and a first discussion about what 
the aims of the various groups would be in the future GATS negotiations. The EU’s 
objective for the modalities and guidelines was for them to be general and open-
ended. The US representative explained that for the US, the guidelines and 
modalities were only a means to an end (towards greater market access in services) 
and that the US would like to discuss alternatives to the request-offer approach, for 
example using a different scheduling method (WTO S/C/M/35 17.05.1999).  
In the first meeting that considered the guidelines, WTO members started to argue 
whether the CTS was in fact mandated to determine the negotiation guidelines, given 
the preparatory work under way in the General Council. Uruguay, Brazil, Hungary 
and Mexico argued that instead of the CTS, the General Council should be 
responsible. This could have been a delaying tactic, because movement in the 
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General Council would inevitably be slower, or because links to other negotiation 
areas might have been easier in the General Council. Canada, Egypt, Hong Kong 
(China), Switzerland and the US emphasised that the CTS was mandated to 
establish the modalities and guidelines. The subsequent discussion dealt with the 
content of possible future negotiations on services. Despite this thematic move of the 
discussion, the Dominican Republic indicated that they did not yet consider the 
information exchange to be finished (WTO S/C/M/35 17.05.1999; WTO 
S/C/M/35/Corr.1 03.06.1999). The way to a discussion about the substance of the 
guidelines was hence “thorny” and interrupted by those WTO members, who did not 
support the way in which the discussion was evolving.  
The EU submitted an informal paper in the next CTS meeting, Norway a formal one 
(S/C/W/109). The EU’s delegate presented the EU’s position on the guidelines, which 
indicated that the EU did not want to see a change in the structure and principles of 
the GATS and that the preparation for the round should be open-ended. The EU 
wanted to see “comprehensive coverage of sectors and modes of supply”. It asked 
for the guidelines to include the revision of the Annex on Air Transport, MFN 
exemptions, domestic regulation, GATS rules, and should take into account the 
needs of developing countries (see also Table 5.2 and Sect. 5.2.3). However, Brazil, 
Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay, Hungary and India again contested the assumption that the 
CTS should deal with the development of the guidelines or that it was appropriate to 
start the discussion on this at that point. The US argued that the work of the General 
Council and the CTS were complementary. An idea was also to ask the Secretariat to 
compile a draft list with issues for the modalities, but no agreement was reached on 
this (WTO S/C/M/36 15.06.1999). 
At the same time, the Indians submitted a further paper to the General Council, which 
set out the Indian position for the GATS 2000 negotiations (for details see Table 5.2). 
The Indians felt that a thorough assessment of service trade and the effects of 
services liberalisation was an indispensable requisite for them before further 
negotiations could take place. For the later negotiations, they emphasised the 
importance of ensuring implementation of current commitments, including 
operationalisation of Art. IV, significantly higher commitments under Mode 4 and the 
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establishment of autonomous liberalisation modalities (WTO WT/GC/W/224 
02.07.1999). This position was supported by other developing countries, for example 
Venezuela. In subsequent CTS meetings, the discussion shifted to the actual content 
of the potential modalities/guidelines, and there was a certain convergence around a 
set of topics:  
first, objectives, scope and principles of the negotiations, including 
the concerns of developing countries; second, liberalization of 
commitments, including Members' schedules and MFN exemptions; 
third, rule-making activities, on domestic regulation, subsidies, 
government procurement and safeguards, and including also the 
clarification of certain GATS provisions (WTO S/C/M/38 13.09.1999). 
Switzerland subsequently submitted draft modalities (WTO S/C/W/123 17.09.1999). 
Norway, Korea and Hong Kong (China) submitted a detailed proposal for the 
modalities as well, which outlined their position as proponents of the services 
negotiations. However, not every delegation was content with the items on the 
agenda so far: for example, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Honduras 
proposed a tourism annex for the GATS, so that the special nature of the sector 
would be accounted for more appropriately (WTO S/C/W/127 14.10.1999). The 
discussion in the CTS in 1999 ended at this stage.  
Table 5.2 presents the positions of a set of delegations as they were presented in 
position papers and in the CTS in 1999.154 For the issue of market access, the table 
shows the different importance attributed by the proponents of the services 
negotiations, often also called the “demandeurs”, on the one hand and the rather 
defensive countries: the EU, US, Japan, Switzerland and Australia prioritise market 
access and transparency, whereas Egypt and India prioritise the implementation of 
existing agreements and the operationalisation of Art. IV (incl. S&D). The 
demandeurs seem ready to expand or experiment with the negotiation approaches in 
GATS, whereas Egypt and India ask for assessment and implementation prior to 
5 WTO negotiations 1995-1999: agenda-setting 181 
 
market access negotiations. In terms of modes of services trade, Mode 4 is 
mentioned by Egypt and India as a priority, whereas the other countries do not 
prioritise any mode (except for Australia). It seems that all delegations are more or 
less interested in continuing the rules negotiations. Government procurement is 
named only by the EU, US and Australia. “Development” as a negotiation principle 
and objective has become a central point for all delegations (although one might 
suspect some might be interested more out of strategy consideration than substantial 
ones). Domestic regulation seems important to the demandeurs, but not to the 
defensive countries.  
. 
                                                                                                                                        
154 Not all delegations submitted position papers or presented their position in the CTS. Due to space 
constraints, it would also not have been possible to present more positions in this thesis. For more 
information on the positions of different delegations in the GATS 2000 prenegotiations see: 
WT/GC/W/115 (USA), WT/GC/W/116 (Australia); S/C/W/109 (Norway); WT/GC/W/272 (Turkey); 
WT/GC/W/281 (Venezuela); S/C/W/125 (Hong Kong (China); Korea and Norway); S/C/W/127 
(Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Honduras); S/C/W/120 (Indonesia and Singapore); 
WT/GC/W/379 (Cuba).  
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Table 5.2 Pre Seattle positions of selected WTO members 
Issue EU  US  Japan Switzerland Australia Egypt India 
Market 
access 
Deeper and 
broader 
commitments 
from all mem-
bers. Close 
the gap be-
tween com-
mitments and 
applied levels 
of liberalisa-
tion. Review of 
MFN ex-
emptions.  
Extend effective 
market access, esp. 
from countries that 
have not yet taken part 
in GATS. Review of 
MFN exemptions. 
Improve services 
classification system. 
Implementation is 
important, but not as 
unmanageable to 
stand in the way of a 
new work programme. 
Deeper and 
broader 
commitments. 
Reduce MFN 
exemptions. 
Consider 
further S&D. 
Elaborate 
rules to 
guarantee 
transparency 
and legal 
security.  
Negotiation of 
specific 
commitments 
should be priority. 
Expand cov-
erage of 
commitments. 
Increase 
transparency. 
Update ser-
vices classifi-
cation list. 
Deal first 
with capacity 
building, 
imple-
mentation is-
sues, S&D 
and 
assessment 
(incl. 
autonomous 
liberalisation 
credits).  
Secretariat 
should study 
participation 
of devel-
oping 
countries in 
services 
trade pre 
and post 
GATS.  
Establish 
autonomous 
liberalisation 
credit mechanism. 
Operationalise Art 
IV and monitor its 
implementation. 
Sectoral 
coverage 
All sectors 
without preju-
dice (esp. 
maritime ser-
vices); reas-
sessment of 
the Annex on 
Air Transport 
Services. 
Exemption for 
audiovisual 
New and improved 
liberalisation com-
mitments in sectors 
such as finance, 
telecommunications, 
distribution, audio-
visual, construction, 
education, health, 
travel and tourism, and 
professional services. 
Distribution, express 
No limitation 
in sectors. 
Make 
maritime 
services a 
priority. 
All sectors should 
be included, but 
prioritise those 
with little 
commitment as of 
yet: air transport, 
environment 
services, distribu-
tion services, en-
ergy services, 
maritime services 
All sectors. 
Particular 
interest in 
sectors with 
limited cover-
age (maritime, 
air transport), 
sectors with 
fast commercial 
change 
(telecom, 
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Issue EU  US  Japan Switzerland Australia Egypt India 
services due 
to cultural 
reasons. 
delivery services, 
private education are 
possible candidates for 
applying a sectoral 
approach. Review 
annex on Air Transport 
Services. Extend 
number of members 
signed up to the 
Financial Services 
Agreement and Basic 
Telecommunication 
Agreement.  
and those sectors 
where recent 
technical/market 
development 
permits easier lib-
eralisation – 
audiovisual and 
air transport. 
financial, 
professional), 
sectors of 
special com-
parative adv. 
for Austr. 
(environm., 
educational, 
distrib.)  
Negotiation 
approach 
Horizontal 
formula. 
Streamline the 
functioning of 
GATS. Do not 
alter GATS 
framework or 
principles. 
Adjust services ne-
gotiations to those in 
goods. Incl. using a 
zero-for-zero approach 
and a formula 
approach155 to fasten 
up services liberali-
sation. Use all avail-
able negotiation 
approaches, request-
offer, horizontal, 
sectoral. Discuss 
autonomous liberali-
sation credits, but 
usually starting point 
should be current 
market access. 
Request-offer 
plus potential 
horizontal ap-
proach/for-
mula ap-
proach. Later 
in the nego-
tiations sec-
toral formulas 
could be de-
veloped.  
Liberalisation for-
mula should be 
developed, incl. 
standardisation of 
definition of 
service products, 
minimum 
liberalisation 
threshold, 
exclusion of 
certain 
restrictions 
across the board. 
Consider consis-
tency of the 
GATS framework 
and classification 
of services, in 
Would consider 
all new options 
without 
prejudice. 
 Further negotia-
tions can only be 
conducted after 
an assessment 
(Art. XIX) has 
been made by the 
CTS in con-
junction with 
UNCTAD. Bene-
fits of service 
liberalisation for 
developing 
countries remain 
unclear before 
this assessment. 
Need to assess 
generally and 
sector-wise. Stick 
                                            
155 In the services negotiations, this could involve a decision to eliminate all barriers to trade in a certain service sector, or agreeing to a formula under 
which these barriers are reduced (IUST 20.08.1999). 
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Issue EU  US  Japan Switzerland Australia Egypt India 
particular new 
services and 
scheduling 
issues. 
to request-offer 
and positive list. 
Modes     Especially 
interested in 
Mode 3. 
Increase 
com-
mitments 
under Mode 
4. 
Make substan-
tially higher 
commitments on 
Mode 4 (e.g. 
transparency, no 
regulatory barriers 
on Mode 4 
movement etc.; at 
least in sectors of 
interest to 
developing 
countries no 
economic needs 
tests (ENTs),156 
easing of VISA 
requirements. 
Establish new 
classification of 
professions.  
Rules 
negotiations 
- subsidies 
- ESM 
Government 
procurement 
Overall: finish 
rules ne-
gotiations, but 
do not set 
target dates 
for early deci-
sions. 
Government 
Aim for agreement for 
transparency on gov-
ernment procurement 
(before Seattle Con-
ference). 
Continue and 
define clearly 
scope etc. of 
an ESM. 
Wants to 
“pursue a 
pragmatic 
approach 
Continue in 
GATS 2000 
negotiations if not 
concluded by 
1999. 
ESM: examine 
to what extent it 
would induce 
greater market 
access com-
mitments 
Subsidies: 
discuss classi-
ESM: yes  
                                            
156 An ENT was introduced by GATS Art. XVI as a means to control access of natural persons to domestic markets under Mode 4. 
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Issue EU  US  Japan Switzerland Australia Egypt India 
procurement: 
yes 
including 
participating 
in discussions 
based on 
hypothetical 
questions”. 
fication and 
those that are 
most trade-
distorting. 
Gov. proc.: yes 
Development  Access to services is 
key for consumers. 
Guidelines should 
include modalities for 
special treatment for 
least-developed 
country Members 
under Article IV:3. 
Particular 
attention 
should be 
given to de-
velopment. 
Guidelines 
should in-
clude flexibil-
ity as in Art 
XIX.  
Developing coun-
tries would esp. 
benefit from com-
prehensive 
negotiations. 
They should have 
benefit from 
increased 
transparency.  
Flexibility for 
developing 
countries is 
important. They 
should use the 
new 
negotiations to 
gain market 
access from 
other WTO 
members and 
review their 
own market 
access and 
regulatory 
systems. 
Central con-
cern. Incl. 
e.g. capacity 
building, im-
plementation 
issues and 
S&D. 
Central concern. 
Operationalise Art 
IV. 
Domestic 
Regulation 
(Art. 6 GATS) 
Strengthen 
GATS regu-
latory rules. 
Promotion of 
pro-competi-
tive regulatory 
principles. 
Creating regulatory 
principles for services 
(on the basis of indus-
try proposals). Regu-
lation should be trans-
parent and not trade-
distortive.  
Promotion of pro-com-
petitive regulatory 
principles. 
Yes, develop 
horizontal 
disciplines. 
Sectoral ap-
proach possi-
bly later. 
On pro-com-
petitive prin-
ciples: slow 
approach, 
study effects.  
Develop further 
disciplines 
pertaining to 
GATS Article VI; 
clarify Art. VI; 
more stringent; 
further disciplines 
on sectoral 
regulation. 
More focus on 
regulatory bar-
riers; high pri-
ority for regula-
tion for profes-
sional services, 
horizontal ap-
proach across 
professions.  
  
Source: IUST 04.06.1999; IUST 11.06.1999; IUST 20.08.1999; WTO WT/GC/W/116, WT/GC/W/115, S/C/W/119, S/C/W/116, S/C/W/103, 
WT/GC/W/262, WT/GC/W/322, WT/GC/W/116, WT/GC/W/216, WT/GC/W/135, WT/GC/W/224  
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5.2.3 The EU position 
This section will consider more closely the position of the EU in the services 
negotiations. From the material on the CTS negotiations, it seems the EU did not 
take a very prominent position in the services negotiations157 and it hardly contributed 
to the information exchange exercise. An EU statement to the CTS on 24 September 
1998 only asked for a higher level of liberalisation and did not give further detailed 
ideas of what the EU would be looking for in the GATS 2000 negotiations (IUST 
25.09.1998).  
Despite the lack of submissions to the CTS in 1998, it seems that the EU had started 
to develop its position with regard to the GATS 2000 negotiations in 1998 on the 
domestic level. In August 1998, Brittan spoke to the US CSI (Coalition of Service 
Industries) and outlined the objectives of the EU for the GATS 2000 negotiations (see 
also Table 5.2):  
• Market access: removal of restrictions and full “national treatment”, 
quantitative and qualitative improvement of market access; this means the EU 
was looking for real and effective market access. 
• Sectors: all service sectors with no a priori exclusions, “new” service sectors 
such as business and courier services, environmental services, and education 
and health services should be considered. Maritime services and air transport 
services also should be included.  
• Attention needs to be given to “regulatory regimes”, they should not be “more 
burdensome than necessary” and “licensing requirements” need to be 
“transparent and reasonable” 
• The round should demonstrate that services liberalisation is good for 
economies (European Commission 1998b, 1998c). 
                                            
157 The same happened in the discussion on services in the cooperation with the USA, which took 
place in parallel: the EU’s outline for the bilateral negotiations with the US did not contain any 
detailed ideas about the services negotiations. 
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Brittan also commented on the ongoing consultation process on services in Geneva, 
which in his point of view  
has confirmed the growing importance of trade in services for the 
economy in general; the need to remove further obstacles to trade in 
services, in particular on establishment conditions and movement of 
skilled service suppliers; and the existence of extensive regulations, 
bureaucracy and lack of transparency (European Commission 
1998b). 
The statements of Brittan on market access clearly show that the EU was looking for 
an ambitious negotiation result in GATS 2000. The EU’s position on services was, 
however, not only offensive: in the run up to the Seattle Ministerial, the EU’s very 
defensive attitude on audiovisual services was clearly visible (FT 14.10.1999).158 
From the discussion above it is also clearly visible that the services negotiations 
would be one area with which the EU would try to counterbalance its defensive 
position in agriculture.  
5.2.4 Rallying domestic support – selling GATS to industry 
Already shortly after the entry into force of the GATS in 1995, the Commission seems 
to have realised the need to promote the GATS among industry in the EU. 
Consequently, in November 1995, they published a guide to the GATS. The 
accompanying press release lauded the benefits of service liberalisation: 
The European Commission has published a comprehensive guide 
to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in order to 
make the benefits of the Uruguay Round more accessible to 
European exporters of tourism, telecoms, distribution, finance, 
construction, transport and other services. Newly opened markets in 
services will affect the lives of everyone, for we are all dependent on 
them. 
Brittan was quoted:  
We can all breathe more freely when military weapons are 
disarmed by agreement. The same applies to the liberalisation of 
services through the WTO. This causes trade wars to recede, curbing 
                                            
158 This was also visible in negotiations with the US about Latvia’s audiovisual services commitments: 
the US had asked Latvia in its WTO entry process to make commitments on audiovisual services. 
The EU argued against this as this would not be compatible with an EU accession of Latvia, given 
that the EU had not committed on audiovisual services in the WTO (IUST 25.09.1998). 
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protectionism and reducing the likelihood of unilateral retaliation. 
Greater competition spurs the search for better products at lower 
prices, stimulating research and technology in the process.  
Already at this early stage, he indicated that further support by the services industry 
would be necessary: 
The vast new world markets for services can only be opened up 
effectively through the definition of clear, aggressive, long-term 
objectives on the part of our services firms. The WTO should be the 
stimulus for a new approach to this (all European Commission 
1995a).  
At this stage, there thus seems to have been a widespread belief that the GATS was 
promoting and delivering market access in services, even though this had not been 
the case in the Uruguay Round. Similarly, Brittan called for business support for the 
WTO in general:  
This is not because there is any lack of ideas in Europe as to what 
needs to be done [in the WTO] […], but it must be a response to the 
needs of businessmen for trade and investment liberalisation 
worldwide. […]We need from our businessmen a strong signal that 
they want continued improvements in market access worldwide and 
clear views as to where those improvements are needed. 
He also identified the interest of business as: “In Europe, the rallying cry from 
business is for greater market access” (European Commission 1995b). 
In 1996, shortly before a negotiation deadline on telecommunications, Brittan met 
with a newly established European Services Coalition (European Commission 
1996g). The new trade policy/market access strategy of the European Commission 
also asked for closer cooperation between the Commission and industry (European 
Commission 1996d). 
The setting up of the group of financial services leaders and the subsequent success 
in the financial services negotiations (see Sect. 6.1) apparently led Brittan to ask for 
further organisation of the services industry. It seems Brittan had also been 
impressed by the US sectoral organisations. In June 1998, the Commission hence 
convened a substantial conference on GATS 2000 in Brussels with 600-700 
participants (interview 31, 35, European Commission 1998b).  
Within the EU we are now considering private sector involvement 
in the process of building up our priorities. The example of the EU-
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USA Financial Leaders Group, involving a Group of business leaders 
to provide high level momentum to the negotiations, has been a 
model for the creation of a new mechanism for Europe. It will be able 
to interact with counterparts in other countries, including the CSI itself 
(European Commission 1998b) 
In a side meeting to the conference, Brittan invited chairmen of major trade 
associations (and/or CEOs of companies), representing the breadth of the European 
services industry. He asked them to organise themselves better to provide him with 
input for the upcoming GATS 2000 negotiations. From autumn 1998, industry started 
to set up the European Services Forum (ESF) (interview 31, European Commission 
2000i).159 Apparently, the Commission held extensive consultations with the industry 
well prior to the start of the GATS negotiations and collected information about trade 
barriers both via industry representations in Brussels and through EU member states 
(interview 35). An important development on the domestic level in the EU was thus 
the Commission’s initiative to build up a domestic network that could provide it with 
information for the upcoming GATS 2000 negotiations. In this way, the Commission 
was increasing its power resources on the domestic level.  
5.2.5 Cooperation in the run up to GATS 2000 
The first set of cooperative activity that was reported with regard to services seems to 
have taken place with the US, which suggests that the EU and the US were laying 
the foundation for the future negotiations. USTR Barshefsky and Brittan met several 
times in the autumn of 1998 to discuss their idea for a Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership. This included ideas regarding “regulatory cooperation, liberalizing 
services trade, and reaching mutual recognition agreements in several areas” (IUST 
25.09.1998). With regard to services, the meetings seemed to have served two 
purposes: first, Brittan explained that cooperation with the US through the 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership should further the advancement of liberalisation 
in the new GATS negotiations (European Commission 1998b). Second, at the same 
time, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership was meant to move forward areas 
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where the EU and the US deemed the GATS as insufficient. This latter aim was soon 
over-shadowed by differences between the EU’s and the US’ interpretation of 
whether their mutual commitments could be exempted from MFN (to prevent free-
riding by other WTO members). Some commentators suggested that the EU was 
using the free-riding issue as a way to circumvent far-reaching liberalisation of 
services trade in the Transatlantic Economic Partnership, in a reflection of certain 
member states’, notably France’s, unwillingness to liberalise services (IUST 
24.07.1998).  
Barshefsky, like Brittan, interpreted the bilateral discussions with regard to trade in 
services as a preparation for the GATS 2000 negotiations (equal statements were 
made later with regard to the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas)). She 
identified several steps the US would have to undertake before it could participate 
successfully in the negotiations (such as identifying regulatory obstacles in other 
countries) and emphasised the need to ensure that the negotiations were not limited 
due to fears by developing countries about new commitments and the need to 
consider whether pro-competitive regulatory disciplines would be needed (as in the 
telecommunication negotiations) to further liberalisation. According to Barshefsky, the 
US was not yet sure whether to approach the services negotiations on a sectoral 
basis, via horizontal issues or with a formula approach. The US did propose two 
alternatives to the request-offer process: sectoral and horizontal approaches (while 
request-offer could be used in combination with these) (IUST 25.09.1998; IUST 
20.08.1999).  
The cooperation between the EU and the US was not constrained to political 
relations. The European Commission used its links to US industry as well: to provide 
input to the General Council, which was supposed to prepare recommendations for 
the Seattle Ministerial, the European Commission sent out questionnaires to 
American and European businesses and industry associations (IUST 11.06.1999). 
                                                                                                                                        
159 The ESF would quickly develop into the most active service industry association in Brussels 
(interview 3). The ESF focuses entirely on international trade and is not concerned with internal 
market issues. The ESF’s members are other sectoral organisations and some companies 
(interview 31). 
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A second area of cooperation in which the EU was involved took place within the 
Quad. The Quad met on 4 June 1999 - this was one meeting in a series of meetings 
in 1999 - to co-ordinate their positions on the services talks. They were discussing a 
move away from the request-offer approach (IUST 04.06.1999). The Quad also 
discussed how to schedule progress in the services talks (IUST 11.06.1999). The 
Quad in July agreed “to explore” a different approach to the services negotiations. 
With this approach commitments would be taken horizontally (in an approach closer 
to a “negative list” where exceptions to liberalisation would have to be specified, thus 
expanding the level of commitments under GATS). A full negative list approach was 
deemed infeasible. The Quad also discussed rules on service subsidies, government 
procurement and the ESM. While the US questioned the technical feasibility of an 
ESM in the GATS, the EU signalled its willingness to agree on an ESM in the new 
round of negotiations, but they also talked about a potential linkage between the 
quality of offers in the GATS 2000 negotiations and an ESM. The US stated that 
nobody had made a clear case for disciplines on subsidies in service trade up to now 
and that government procurement in services should not be treated under the GATS 
but as part of overall government procurement negotiations (IUST 24.07.1998). 
Incoming Trade Commissioner Lamy indicated the EU should support the inclusion of 
maritime services under the GATS despite US resistance, while maintaining that 
there had to be a balance between maintaining cultural diversity and liberalisation 
(referring to the EU MFN exemption in audiovisual services) (IUST 03.09.1999).  
The final draft by the Quad which would be submitted to the Seattle Ministerial 
Conference did not provide decisions on most of the crucial issues (without which a 
successful conclusion of the services talks would not be possible): conflict remained 
as to which negotiation approach would be taken, breadth, timing, venue and target 
dates of the negotiations and the extent to which domestic regulation should be part 
of the negotiations. It seemed that the Quad were divided among themselves with 
regard to these issues: though they all wanted to change the negotiation approach, 
they did not agree as to what would constitute an appropriate mix of the alternative 
negotiation approaches. They failed to reach agreement on these issues at their 
informal meeting on 29-30 September in Tokyo. While the US pushed for an 
approach which would not a priori exclude any sectors, EU negotiators were sure the 
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US wanted to limit the negotiations to certain of its favourite sectors. The EU, while 
apparently fighting an internal battle about its MFN exemption for audiovisual 
services with France, favoured a global approach. The Japanese specifically 
favoured negotiations on maritime services.160 Besides this question, the Quad also 
disagreed as to how to schedule the services talks: the US in a first phase wanted to 
deal with horizontal issues and then proceed to the request-offer process. The EU 
aimed to start with the request-offer process. They also debated whether to hold the 
negotiations in the CTS or to establish a separate negotiation council (IUST 
29.10.1999). 
The Quad also seems to have been involved in “outreach activities” to other WTO 
members, which is reported in one instance: “informed sources” reported to IUST 
that “informal discussions on services involving roughly twenty countries have been 
proceeding in Geneva”. The next step of these consultations would be a meeting in 
Bangkok, organised jointly by the Thai government and the EU on June 17-18. Apart 
from the Quad, Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, India, Pakistan and South Africa were 
invited to the meeting. An exchange of views between senior officials was one aim of 
the meeting (IUST 11.06.1999).  
5.3 Interim Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the EU’s impact on the WTO negotiations overall and with 
regard to the trade in services negotiations in the CTS between the inception of the 
WTO in 1995 and the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999. Little time passed 
between the end of the Uruguay Round and new, intense negotiation activity in the 
WTO. Shortly after the end of the Uruguay Round, the European Commission 
developed its new idea for the trade round and started to promote its idea both 
internationally and domestically. It was the main proponent behind the idea (see also 
Paemen 2000). The Commission’s idea involved significantly extending the range of 
issue areas covered under the WTO’s heading. It appears that at this stage, the EU 
had considerable influence and capacity to shape discussions in the WTO, as it was 
                                            
160 The US has problems taking part in the maritime services negotiations as the “Jones Act” limits the 
5 WTO negotiations 1995-1999: agenda-setting 193 
 
leading and pushing forward its agenda, regardless (or even because?) of the rather 
hesitant position of the US. The EU was hence definitely turning from a rather 
defensive position in the 1980s to one of leadership and a more offensive position in 
the 1990s. At the same time, it can be argued that the EU perceived increased 
opportunities for power usage of the EU in the WTO, which led it to postulate itself as 
a new leader in the WTO.161 The Singapore and Geneva Ministerials seemed to 
positively confirm the EU’s perception of a successful leadership strategy.  
In some ways, the regime played into the hands of the EU (research question 3). The 
services negotiations favoured by the EU were already pre-scheduled by the regime 
and this did not require much attention of the EU in the overall framework 
negotiations. The regime, however, also pre-scheduled agriculture negotiations, 
which presented a threat to at least parts of the domestic constituency of the EU. The 
proposed expansion of the WTO can hence be seen as constituting a way for the EU 
to safeguard its rather defensive position on agriculture by adding more areas of 
offensive interests for later cross-deals. 
The phase of relative success and of apparent leadership for the EU, however, was 
short-lived: already before the Seattle Ministerial, conflicts arose to an extent that the 
EU struggled to exert control over them. The EU’s capacity to lead and to use its 
power became severely contested, especially as the content of the negotiations had 
moved from mere information exchange to formal agenda setting. 
Research questions 4 and 5 postulate agenda-setting and coalition-building in order 
to arrive at a consensus as typical power outcomes. Measuring the EU’s success in 
terms of these two outcomes, the EU seems to have failed rather than succeeded. 
The EU was not able to shape the agenda as much as it wanted to. While it shaped 
the debates significantly, other actors managed to permanently install other issues, 
for example the implementation issue, on the agenda contrary to the EU’s interests 
                                                                                                                                        
maritime services between US ports to US vessels.  
161 It can be speculated that this perception of new power opportunities might have been due to: a) the 
new opportunities the EU found for itself in the new WTO (organisationally-dependent capabilities); 
b) a decline in US power or interest in the international trade regime; and/or c) increases in the 
domestic resources of the EU (extension of competencies, increasing economic integration, 
enlargement in 1995). 
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and despite its initial strong start, the EU’s idea for the new trade round failed at the 
Seattle Ministerial. On coalitions and building consensus, the EU had not managed to 
create successful cooperation, neither with the US, nor within the Quad or the wider 
WTO membership.  
The most significant change visible in Seattle is, however, the rise of certain 
developing countries (notably Brazil, India, South Africa, but also Mexico, Thailand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia and after its accession in 2001 China), a definite sign of the 
power shift mentioned in Sect. 3.2. These actors had by now started to improve their 
strategies of participation in the WTO and of cooperation (see for example Narlikar 
and Tussie 2004). This had crucial effects on the informal decision-making 
mechanisms in the WTO: the complexity of consensus-building had started to 
increase and the mechanisms of decision-making had become more difficult to 
manage. This power shift was apparently already realised by the Commission prior to 
the Seattle Conference. The failure of the Seattle Conference thus brought to into the 
open a whole host of systemic issues which had “smouldered” under the surface for 
a while. In the argument of this thesis, this means that amidst the overt conflicts over 
the substance of the WTO agenda, the power structure underlying the regime was 
changing and this started to impact on the functioning of the regime. In other words, 
the “rules of the game” the EU was playing were altered while it was at the game 
table. This inevitably raises the question as to how this power shift would impact on 
the EU’s capacity to use its resources in the WTO. With regard to research question 
1, the EU had so far attempted to use the new power opportunities for its own good, 
but at Seattle, it became aware of the changing game in the WTO. 
At the same time, first signs of a changing public awareness of the WTO process 
were visible, which culminated in the unprecedented protests in the Seattle 
Ministerial Conference. The European Commission was hence faced with not just 
one, but two major changes in the international trade regime.162  
                                            
162 In terms of EU internal issues, there was some division visible in the run-up to Seattle, but 
compared to the changes happening in the international arena, these do not seem to have had too 
much impact. 
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The services negotiations were hardly relevant in the broad framework-setting 
negotiations, as they were pre-scheduled by the regime. A set of reasons as to why 
services was so uncontroversial has been proposed in this chapter (p. 171). In the 
CTS, however, activity gained in pace towards the Seattle Ministerial and the start of 
the GATS 2000 negotiations. Preparations seemed to proceed largely unaffected by 
the events in the WTO overall. Four key developments can be identified:  
First, in 1998, WTO members started an “information exchange exercise” in 
preparation of the GATS 2000 negotiations. In the first phase of this exercise, the EU 
was remarkably absent from the discussion, while other Quad members submitted 
many papers to the CTS. The EU was not shaping the agenda too actively. 
Developing countries also hardly contributed to the discussion (research question 4). 
In various instances, though, the work of the Secretariat directly played into the 
hands of the EU (for example assessment that services trade liberalisation is positive 
for developing countries). This raises the question whether the Secretariat really is as 
neutral as would have been expected from its role description (research question 3).  
In early 1999, developed country members argued that the CTS could move towards 
establishing negotiation modalities and guidelines, which met resistance by 
developing countries. This means that developed countries wanted to move closer to 
“negotiations about substance”, whereas developing countries wanted to continue 
the “negotiations about negotiations”. WTO members agreed to make the 
assessment exercise an ongoing issue on the CTS agenda (also for technical 
reasons of course!), which means that “negotiations about negotiations” became 
institutionalised in the regime, giving a permanent channel for those opposed to 
“negotiations about substance”. 
Second, in 1999, WTO members started to develop the negotiation modalities and 
guidelines (moving towards “negotiations about substance”). However, the 
unresolved question whether market access negotiations could start before the 
assessment exercise was concluded continued to linger in the negotiations. 
Developing countries also doubted that the CTS was the right place for discussion on 
the modalities – again procedural issues were raised in order to obstruct movement 
to “negotiations about substance”. 
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The third point is on EU strategy. In 1998/1999, the European Commission started to 
develop the EU position on the GATS 2000 negotiations and presented an ambitious 
agenda. The European Commission initiated the organisation of the European 
services industry after it had experienced the positive influence of the industry on the 
financial services negotiations, telecom services negotiations, and accountancy 
sector disciplines. The Commission wanted the European services industry to 
support the Commission prior and during the services negotiations. One can say it 
tried to mobilise or increase its resources (research question 2). Was the EU 
preoccupied with the domestic level and hence did not contribute too actively to the 
CTS?  
In services, the story of the negotiations was hence markedly different from that in 
the general negotiations. While the broad agenda-was pre-set by the regime, the EU 
did initially not seem to contribute too much to the finer details for the negotiation 
framework. Of course, the later announcements of its negotiation objective showed 
the ambition it did have for the negotiations and were an attempt to set the pace in 
the negotiations (research question 4). With regard to cooperation, again there was 
no common agenda between the EU and the USA, and among the Quad,163 despite 
attempts to build one (research question 5). In the services negotiations, there were 
clearly diverging agendas of the broad group of developed countries versus 
developing countries, although there was no direct change in the negotiations visible 
that could be attributed to the power shift (research question 1). Interestingly, the 
changes on the EU’s domestic level (business participation, NGOs) seem to change 
the EU’s resource equipment in the services negotiations, re-opening the issue of the 
EU’s resources raised by research question 2, which had been dealt with in chapter 
3.  
Overall, from a time of short-lived success for the EU in the WTO, the EU’s fortune 
seems to have turned and the opportunities to successfully use its power in the WTO 
seem to have become more limited. This reminds of research question 1: how has 
the EU recognised and adapted to the power shift in the WTO? This question will be 
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revisited during the next chapters. Before that, though, the next chapter will now 
assess the EU’s impact on the issue-specific negotiations on trade in services in the 
WTO from the years 1995-1999 to follow the research questions in these. 
                                                                                                                                        
163 The Friends groups, which according to interviewees had already existed at that stage, are not 
mentioned in the available material. Again, internal divisions in the EU did not matter too much. 
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6 Sectoral services negotiations 1995-1999: 
celebrating WTO successes?  
In parallel to the framework negotiations discussed in the previous chapter, the issue-
area specific negotiations on trade in services (in Table 3.4 also referred to as 
“negotiations about substance”) took place as prescheduled at the end of the 
Uruguay Round. As introduced in Ch. 3, these negotiations happen on the level of 
specialist councils, expert committees and working groups, and focus on the 
substance of the negotiations in all detail. The politicisation of these negotiations 
varies heavily, and expertise and information should be crucial resources at this 
level. 
Negotiations in the following areas took place and are introduced in this chapter: 
financial services, telecommunications services, movement of natural persons, 
maritime services, the accountancy disciplines and a short section on the rules 
negotiations. As we will see in this chapter, the EU had offensive interests in several 
of these areas and the successful financial services and telecommunication services 
negotiations seemed to in turn have inspired the EU to follow a more proactive 
stance overall in the WTO. There was hence a link between the different types of 
negotiations taking place in the WTO. The chapter traces the course of the issue-
area specific negotiations on services and analyses the EU’s involvement in them. 
6.1 The negotiations on financial services 
At the time of the negotiations, the financial services negotiations were portrayed as 
the first point where the WTO could prove the importance of its existence, the 
effectiveness of its procedures and the commitment of its members (European 
Commission 1996h). For the EU, the plurilateral approach was a sea-change after 
the long and arduous negotiations in the Uruguay Round, which had worn down the 
negotiators in DG Trade. Plurilateral sectoral agreements were seen as the way to 
move forward in the WTO (interview 1). 
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The Economist suggests that during the Uruguay Round, a deal on financial services 
failed because of a) the demands of the EU and the USA and b) the reluctance of 
Japan and “some other Asian and Latin American countries”. Negotiations were 
hence scheduled to continue beyond the end of the Uruguay Round (The Economist 
14.01.1995). In the beginning of 1995 an agreement between the USA and Japan 
had been reached and was at the time regarded as breaking the deadlock that had 
existed, as the US was especially discontented with the Japanese reluctance to open 
its financial services market in the Uruguay Round. Other players, the Philippines 
and South Korea showed signs of movement. Trade sources point out the unequal 
interest situation in these negotiations:  
The Americans, with the European Union in support, will now turn 
their attention to the financial markets of fast-growing emerging 
economies, which offer rich picking for the rich world's sophisticated 
financial firms (The Economist 14.01.1995).  
The US in this situation used a protectionist argument to align countries behind its 
position: it threatened to protect its own industry. The Economist pointed out that this 
on the one hand contravened the efforts of the US during the Uruguay Round to 
convince the developing countries that protectionism damages their own economies. 
On the other hand, for the developing countries market access to the US financial 
market was an uninteresting offer (The Economist 14.01.1995).  
The next months saw only slow progress in the financial services negotiations: only 
the US, EU, Japan and Canada submitted offers. The US showed signs of 
disappointment (FT 29.03.1995) and it threatened not to grant equal access to its 
market for WTO members and to “go bilateral”. The EU promised it would not 
activate a controversial clause in its banking directive if a multilateral agreement 
could be reached (FT 29.03.1995). In order to reach compliance with their plans, the 
EU and the US were hence resorting to a “sticks and carrots” method, threatening 
penalties and offering incentives for participation in the negotiations. The US showed 
itself especially dissatisfied with the positions of Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Venezuela. As 
negotiations only proceeded very slowly in May, financial industries expressed their 
concern and the International Chamber of Commerce appealed to governments, 
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while EU member states accused the US of making unrealistic demands (FT 
19.05.1995). This is another encounter with the EU-US divergence of positions as in 
chapter 5. 
One reason why the negotiations were slowed down was the link to the negotiations 
on Mode 4, which were scheduled to end at the same date (30 June 1995) (see Sect. 
6.3). India and the Philippines seemed to have been major actors here, because both 
were important “temporary labour exporters”, and they seemed to have used their 
leverage to stall the financial services negotiations in order to gain greater 
concessions with regard to Mode 4. An EU negotiator stated (quoted by the FT): “The 
trouble is that India is not offering anything on financial services to make us give 
more on the movement of people. […] India’s offer on the movement of people is not 
so very different from ours.” (FT 25.05.1995). India seemed to have given in two days 
later, tabling a new proposal, which was judged as a modest advance (FT 
27.05.1995). 
The US seems to have driven forward the negotiations, taking on a “pushier” stance, 
with the EU in tow: “That would enable the US to limit foreign institutions’ access to 
its financial markets. If Washington took such a step, the EU would be likely to follow 
suit.” (FT 09.06.1995). This raises the question as to why the US took this tougher 
stance and why the EU was simply following. However, shortly afterwards, Brittan 
used the FT to warn that it was “five to twelve” in the financial services liberalisation 
negotiations”. He warned of a potential apathy in the move towards liberalisation and 
linked the negotiations to the question of whether “the world has the courage to 
unclog the financial arteries of the global market”. Failure in his opinion would mean 
that offers would be withdrawn, and the telecommunication negotiations would be 
endangered (FT 19.06.1995). As there does not seem to have been much 
disagreement among EU member states with regard to the financial services 
negotiations, this message by Brittan was clearly directed at non-EU WTO members. 
As at the end of the Uruguay Round, the EU was ready to conclude the agreement 
but it was the US which was blocking progress and finally withdrew from the 
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negotiations, removing a large part of its offer (FT 26.06.1995).164 The US withdrawal 
came as a surprise as the US delegates had unofficially indicated that an agreement 
was within reach. The US’ withdrawal was attributed mainly to Asian countries, 
including India and Indonesia, who refused further market opening. A major 
stumbling block was seen in Malaysia’s refusal to remove its domestic law limiting 
foreign ownership in insurance firms to 49 percent (FT 01.07.1995).  
The EU, fearing the loss of all commitments made so far, came up with an initiative to 
save existing offers and commitments. The negotiation deadline was extended by 
one month until 28 July 1995, and the EU planned for market opening between the 
negotiating countries on a MFN basis. One EU official said: “It is the WTO minus the 
US. It gives a signal to Washington that the rest of the world wants to follow the 
multilateral route.” (FT 01.07.1995; FT 03.07.1995). The US did not block the 
extension of the deadline (FT 03.07.1995). How did this move of the EU come 
about? A former EU official recalled that there had been no particular internal 
reasoning for the EU’s move, but mentioned that it had to do with the interest of 
industry, a personal dislike between Brittan and Barshefsky, and a certain role-
sharing between the EU and the US, with the US exerting pressure for better offers 
by its withdrawal (interview 11). A representative of the EU services industry 
described the EU’s move as a “shock” for the US, as the EU managed to convince 
Malaysia, Mexico and others to follow its approach (interview 31).  
The EU’s approach was welcomed by the press as a sign of EU leadership in the 
WTO: “As well as demonstrating commendable leadership, the EU has turned the 
tables on US obstructionism.” (FT 03.07.1995). The EU managed to keep more than 
30 countries at the negotiation table. Brittan lobbied ambassadors from Japan, South 
Korea, Thailand and India. While trying to keep all WTO members on board, 
Commission officials were concerned that divergences between the EU member 
                                            
164 There was a small conflict surrounding the US offer even before this: although the EU had been 
reassured that its existing subsidiaries would continue to receive the same treatment as before from 
the US, EU member states were wary of this. They were apparently considering to put pressure on 
the EU to retain the right to retaliate unilaterally, should the negotiations fail (FT 26.06.1995). When 
the US withdrew from the negotiations, it pledged to give national treatment to existing companies, 
but it refused to make any commitments with regard to new entrants. It removed the whole banking 
sector part of its offer, which went further than it had previously indicated (FT 01.07.1995).  
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states could undermine the EU negotiation position. The EU pressurised WTO DG 
Ruggiero to support its initiative to reach an agreement by July 21, when the GATS 
Council was supposed to meet (FT 08.07.1995). Brittan visited the US on July 24th 
but failed to persuade Robert Rubin, America’s treasury secretary, to continue the 
financial services negotiations (The Economist 29.07.1995). 
On 26.07.1995, Ruggiero announced that a deal had been reached, even though the 
US did not fully consent to it: 
’This is the first time a global trade agreement has been reached 
without the US and the first time the US has negotiated a deal and 
then walked away from it.’ One senior trade official said yesterday. ‘It 
shows the US doesn’t make the world.’ (FT 27.07.1995) 
Traditionally, it [the US] has taken the lead in multilateral 
negotiations, especially in services; by turning its back on a WTO 
deal, it has forfeited much of the authority that leadership brings (The 
Economist 29.07.1995) 
The EU was praised for taking over leadership from the US: 
It [also] marks an important declaration of support by WTO 
members for the principle of multilateralism and the wresting of 
international trade leadership away from the US to the EU (FT 
27.07.1995) 
This interim agreement would be in place until the end of 1997, when terms should 
be renegotiated (Economist 29.07.1995). The interim agreement was said to mainly 
enshrine existing commitments, but apparently liberalisation was achieved in some 
areas. The offers judged most significant were tabled by some Asian countries, for 
example, Japan and South Korea, which offered to improve access to their insurance 
and securities markets while Thailand improved its offer in banking licences. The US 
did not submit any improved offer and asked for broad MFN exemptions.  
Renegotiation of the interim agreement 
In 1996, there were indications that the EU and US financial industry were starting to 
co-ordinate their strategy with regard to financial services:  
The goal is to develop a consensus [between the U.S. and 
European industries] on what would constitute an acceptable 
agreement," a U.S. industry source said. "If the two sides can send a 
single message to developing nations, it will help the negotiations 
tremendously.  
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A U.S. industry source emphasized that developing countries 
"have had the luxury of watching the U.S. and the EU beat up on 
each other" regarding the level of commitments that would constitute 
an acceptable overall deal (IUST 07.06.1996).  
This new cooperation was confirmed by a representative of the EU services industry: 
“Then during the interim period US and EU industry created the financial leaders 
group” (interview 31). 
This happened because the European Commission and the US treasury had realised 
that industries across the Atlantic did not seem to cooperate and had therefore 
lobbied the EU and the US governments for different approaches in the financial 
services negotiations. In the new financial leaders group it was apparently soon 
discovered that priorities and target markets broadly coincided (interview 30, 31).  
Negotiations in financial services restarted in April 1997 and Bridges indicated that 
the US’ tactic might have played out in forcing developing countries to reconsider 
their offers (Bridges 24.03.1997). In May 1997, APEC ministers pointed out their 
commitment to the financial services negotiations, although it was clear that some 
Latin American countries and less developed countries in APEC were reluctant about 
financial services liberalisation (Bridges 19.05.1997). Shortly afterwards, the Pacific 
Basin Economic Council (PBEC) of international business executives and chief 
executive officers held its 30th annual meeting in Manila. The group was unable to 
reach a common position on the financial services agreement, but in order to rally 
support for the financial services negotiations, WTO DG Ruggiero gave a speech 
describing the possible benefits of financial services liberalisation for the Asian 
economies (Bridges 26.03.1997). The WTO Secretariat was hence supporting the 
proponents of a financial services agreement. 
The EU was the first to table an offer to restart the financial services negotiations in 
1997. According to EU officials, this was part of an EU strategy to give momentum to 
the negotiations. The EU claimed it already provided good market access with regard 
to financial services, but that the offer expanded market access even further. US 
industry considered this move as “welcome, but not critical”. The offer aimed to 
remove twelve existing restrictions in the banking, insurance, and securities sector, 
and to reduce the scope of nine other restrictions the EU retains (IUST 04.07.1997). 
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Brittan outlined the EU goals for the negotiations in a speech given on 24 June 1997 
in Geneva. These included 
• “real” market access and “national treatment” for foreign financial institutions, 
• standstill commitments securing existing practices (so that these are not 
restricted if they are more liberal than negotiated obligations), and 
• a “grandfather” clause to preserve preferential market access for companies 
which have pioneered into a foreign market (IUST 04.07.1997; European 
Commission 1997c). 
Commissioner Monti165 in July 1997 suggested that the EU would be ready to walk 
away from a financial services deal if offers were not substantial enough. At the same 
time a European Commission study pointed out the huge need of developing 
countries for external funds for infrastructure projects – logically, the financial 
services agreement would hence be fostering development by providing access to 
greater financial resources. The Commission also emphasised that the financial 
services agreement would be a win-win situation and used Mexico as an example: 
financial services liberalisation had been speeded up after the peso crisis (European 
Commission 1997a). 
The Quad countries met their objective to demonstrate leadership in the talks by 
submitting offers by their self-imposed deadline of 15 July 1997. Twenty-one 
countries had tabled offers before a 17 July 1997 meeting, among them the US, EU, 
Canada, Japan, Switzerland, Norway, Hong Kong (China), Bahrain, Hungary, 
Turkey, Australia and the Slovak Republic. While a set of countries promised to 
submit offers until the next meeting of the negotiators in September (Egypt, Israel, 
Czech Republic, Macao, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Korea), offers from many 
Latin American, African and Asian countries were not yet in sight. Korea and 
Thailand promised improved offers, despite Thailand’s financial crisis. The EU and 
the US outlined the importance of improved offers from Latin America and Asia: 
                                            
165 In the 1995-1999 Commission, Monti was Commissioner for internal market, financial services and 
financial integration, customs and taxation. 
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The EU last week pointed a finger at Malaysia, saying recent 
moves toward forcing foreign firms in its financial services market to 
disinvest are "exactly the opposite of what we are trying to do ... This 
could be a serious problem if other countries follow suit, and there are 
signs that Malaysia is unfortunately not alone ... that Indonesia, and 
perhaps others, may also be going in that direction (Bridges 
21.07.1997).  
The US’ offer of market access to its market was conditional on a financial services 
agreement being concluded in 1997 (Bridges 21.07.1997). In August, US Treasury 
Secretary Robert Rubin wrote a letter to WTO director General Ruggiero showing the 
eagerness of the US to conclude the financial services agreement and pointing out 
that developing countries should improve their offers. He offered variations in 
implementation periods and phase-in provisions to smooth market opening. US 
officials lobbied in Korea for an improved offer (Bridges 25.08.1997). Some 
observers noted a softening of EU and US rhetoric (for example they offered 
safeguard measures) (Bridges 23.09.1997). 
On 15 September 1997, Brittan gave a speech directed to Asian leaders, stating the 
EU’s hope for its ambitious, “substantially improved” offer to be reciprocated by 
equally ambitious offers by Asian countries. He stated that potential benefits of such 
an agreement could be huge and that  
Recent turbulence on Asian markets is not a reason for hesitancy. 
Such events are not the result of liberalisation. On the contrary, the 
opening of domestic markets, in conjunction with other measures to 
achieve internal and external liberalisation, are part of the solution to 
problems in financial markets (European Commission 1997d). 
He made similar statements in a speech given to the Association of British Insurers in 
London early in October, specifically asking Asian countries to make commitments 
and asserting that the “WTO financial services liberalisation package is too important 
to fail”. He outlined that 
 There is no reason why liberalisation should not be accompanied 
by enhanced prudential supervision. That is the right way forward for 
the countries of S.E. Asia. It will affect more investments and 
strengthen their economies. I hope this will help us pursue a deal 
which will benefit both themselves and the rest of the world 
(European Commission 1997d). 
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In a similar vein, the WTO Secretariat published a study outlining the benefits of 
financial services liberalisation on 23.09.1997: “Opening Markets in Financial 
Services and the Role of the GATS” (IUST 03.10.1997). 
Developed countries within APEC are said to have put pressure on their developing 
country counterparts to submit financial services offers (Bridges 08.09.1997). In view 
of the financial crisis impacting on Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, one negotiator 
asked the EU and the US to lower their expectations, as Asian countries had grown 
more cautious about liberalising their markets (Bridges 23.09.1997). Developing 
countries were using the Asian financial crisis as a way to justify lower commitments 
or even not joining the financial services agreement:  
Perhaps the most dramatic example of developing nations' 
resistance to Western-led liberalization of their financial markets 
came from the much publicized comments by Malaysia's Prime 
Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad: the Prime Minister called currency 
trading "immoral," and blamed recent difficulties in financial markets 
on western speculators. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar 
Ibrahim […] did note that Malaysia would not join the WTO financial 
services agreement unless it provided for protection from 
"unscrupulous speculators” (Bridges 29.09.1997). 
Malaysian Ministry of Finance secretary-general Clifford Herbert 
said last week that " We [Malaysia] told the WTO that 'look, we will 
continue to liberalize, but I think we'll have to bend this more 
carefully, to make really sure that there are safeguard mechanisms in 
place’ (Bridges 27.10.1997). 
During an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in October, fears were 
expressed about the negative effects of opening markets too quickly, but nonetheless 
Ministers signalled their intention to submit offers to the WTO soon. It was assumed 
that Latin American and Asian countries were following a delaying strategy so that it 
would not be possible to put them under too much pressure before the 12 December 
1997 deadline for the financial services negotiations (Bridges 20.10.1997).  
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Ruggiero travelled to a Kuala Lumpur meeting of the G15 leaders166 to promote the 
financial services agreement: "Liberalization of financial services can be positive.” 
(Bridges 03.11.1997). However, others had a different take on this: 
Other G15 members said investment rules being pushed by the 
North are an attempt to gain unlimited market access to developing 
nations at the expense of their sovereignty, or what Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mohamad called the "new imperialism" (Bridges 03.11.1997). 
The meeting revealed the huge differences that existed between developing 
countries with regard to financial services liberalisation and regulation. Nevertheless, 
countries set out to draft rules to restrict currency trading in December 1997, while 
pointing out that developed countries should live up to their responsibility towards 
poorer countries to assure their participation in the global economy and that they 
resisted the “the conditions and restrictions the North is looking to impose as part of 
trade liberalization and globalisation” (Bridges 10.11.1997). 
Discussions and meetings about the financial services negotiations also took place in 
the margins of the annual World Bank – IMF meeting. While major Latin American 
players published a general statement about the importance of free capital flow, IUST 
noted that “[they] gave US officials few indications of what offers they would make in 
WTO negotiations” (IUST 03.10.1997). 
In early November 1997, Commissioner Monti told a “number of leading participants 
in current World Trade Organisation (WTO) financial services negotiations” that 
"Attracting foreign capital through improved market access is essential to tackling 
financial turbulence in emerging market countries". He repeated his threat that the 
EU would not salvage another financial services deal, while stating that the EU’s 
domestic financial services market was “the most open in the world”. The European 
Commission’s case was backed up by a reference to recent World Bank studies, 
which had provided new evidence that growth and financial stability resulted from 
competition and liberalisation of the financial services sector. The EU document also 
offered policy solutions to the potential disadvantages of financial services 
                                            
166 The G15 were countries from developing Latin American, African, Asian and Caribbean nations: 
Malaysia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, 
Senegal, Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Kenya. The group was set up as a counterbalance to the G7. 
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liberalisation that developing countries had voiced during the negotiations (European 
Commission 1997a).  
On 17 November 1997, Bridges reported that 31 countries (incl. the EU) had tabled 
offers. While the US remained rather pessimistic about the outcome of the talks, 
pressing for further and improved commitments, Malaysia seemed to be ready for a 
compromise and to allow 51% foreign ownership of insurance firms (Bridges 
17.11.1997). USTR Barshefsky urged for countries to submit substantial offers before 
the deadline of 12 December, but admitted that the US might have to limit its 
demands as a consequence of the Asian crisis. For example, Brazil and India were 
among the countries which according to the EU and the US had not made 
commitments reaching further than their 1995 commitments (IUST 28.11.1997).  
The US was expected to exert pressure especially on Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia during an APEC meeting. Observers warned the US not to ask for too far-
reaching commitments in the view of the Asian financial crisis, because it would risk 
unravelling the financial services talks altogether (Bridges 24.11.1997). After the 
meeting the common assessment was that the December 12 deadline for the 
financial services negotiations would not be met, with US negotiators insisting on 
improved offers despite the financial crisis (Bridges 01.12.1997). One week before 
the deadline “only 53 of the 97 countries involved in these negotiations have made 
offers; major players such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Brazil are still negotiating.” The 
US did not have much space for compromises as it was constrained by domestic 
regulation (Bridges 08.12.1997). WTO DG Ruggiero emphasised again that the 
financial services deal was a “win-win situation” and would open up much needed 
sources of finance for developing countries (Bridges 15.12.1997). 
A deal was brokered finally in the “early hours of 13 December”. Bridges noted that  
The negotiations were marked by a range of responses and offers 
from developing countries in the face of global pressure to reduce 
barriers to foreign financial services (Bridges 15.12.1997). 
Apparently the deal with Malaysia was done at the last minute on 13 December: 
It was only last minute, at 3 am in the morning […], when Hank 
Greenberg [CEO of the American Insurance Group (AIG)] persuaded 
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the USTR […] to call the Prime Minister of Malaysia to say “listen, you 
really have to give this (interview 30). 
In this way, AIG managed to protect its current investment in Malaysia. A similar 
“deal” seems to have occurred with Japan (interview 30). 
However, Malaysia did not budge completely. It created an exception for AIG, but 
otherwise it stuck to its offer of 51% of ownership for foreign insurance firms. This 
meant that the Malaysian law forcing foreign insurance companies to divest their 
existing holdings remained partially in place and the US in turn refused to open its 
own market to Malaysian insurance firms or those from any other country where 
divesture is enforced. As no Malaysian company was interested in entering the US 
market, the Malaysians were satisfied with the deal, while US representatives 
claimed the MFN exemption would allow them to retaliate against Malaysian 
companies in other sectors as well. Despite the concessions the US had to make, the 
US viewed this improved agreement as a result of its tough negotiation strategy and 
subsequent withdrawal in 1995 (Japan, for example, did multilateralise commitments 
undertaken on the bilateral level). Similar to US officials, Brittan was also hoping for 
improved offers during the ratification process (as had happened in the 
telecommunication negotiations) (Bridges 15.12.1997; IUST 15.12.1997).  
The negotiations for the Financial Services Agreement (FSA) had apparently 
benefited from intense industry pressure: In the final week of the negotiations, 
representatives of the financial services industry had gathered in Geneva. 
Communication between negotiators and CEOs took place and this significant impact 
the industry had on the negotiations apparently was one factor leading Brittan to call 
for greater unification of the European services industry (see Sect. 5.2.4) (interview 
31). The agreement was widely welcomed by the financial services industry, although 
it was assessed as less far reaching in banking and insurance services than in asset 
management and financial information (IUST 15.12.1997; 26.12.1997). Overall, what 
is striking is that the financial services negotiations were held under the conditions of 
a very unbalanced distribution of interests. The EU and the US clearly were the main 
driving forces behind the agreement, with developing countries apparently not seeing 
much to gain in the negotiations, but still participating in the negotiations.  
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6.2 The negotiations on telecommunication services 
While the GATS negotiated in the Uruguay Round contained commitments on so-
called “value-added telecommunication services” (for example voice mail and 
electronic mail), it lacked commitments on basic telecommunications (for example 
basic voice and data transmission, mobile telephony or satellite services) (Niemann 
2004: 390). Further negotiations on these issues were hence scheduled. A key 
feature of these negotiations was that they took place while significant technological 
developments in telecommunications took place. 
“Negotiations on trade in basic telecommunications” started at the end of the 
Uruguay Round, with 34 countries participating. The negotiations were mandated to 
end by April 1996 (The Economist 1995 29.03.1995). In July 1995, optimism 
prevailed in the meeting of the negotiating group on basic telecommunications 
services, as apparently enough countries would be ready to table proposals. Still, the 
US, Canada, the EU, Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand were the few 
countries which promoted these talks (FT 21.07.1995). The US, Japan and 7-8 other 
countries submitted offers in time for a first deadline in September. The EU missed 
the deadline because of internal difficulties (FT 20.09.1995). When it submitted its 
offer in October, the offer was seen as disappointing for among others the US, but 
the EU itself considered its offer as ambitious (FT 04.10.1995).  
Inside the EU, the Commission, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and partially 
Germany were in support of extensive liberalisation through the WTO, and they were 
joined by Sweden and Finland. Spain, Portugal and Greece after the 1995 EU 
enlargement. To a certain extent France, Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg were 
opponents of an extensive liberalisation. Italy and Austria occupied an intermediate 
position (Enser 1998). Niemann analyses that in the initial offer of the EU the liberal 
group within the EU had achieved large parts of their demands, because they argued 
that technological change in telecommunications would inevitably trigger 
liberalisation (Niemann 2004: 396).  
Coordination again happened across different fora (G8, Quad) (Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 1995). US, Japan and EU 
industries pressed for further commitments in the telecom negotiations (IUST 
6 Sectoral services negotiations 1995-1999: celebrating WTO successes? 211 
 
19.01.1996), but only 33 countries had submitted offers by February (IUST 
02.02.1996). The EU and the US showed disappointment. Negotiations continued to 
deal with a host of issues: for example, the EU continued to pursue – apparently on 
its own – a proposal which would mean an annex to the GATS. This annex would 
bind all countries to ensure that liberalised markets are not dominated by former 
monopoly suppliers. The whole area of competitive safeguards167 remained unclear 
(IUST 02.02.1996). In December 1995, Japan submitted a proposal on regulatory 
principles after informal consultations, which shaped the ensuing discussions (IUST 
16.02.1996).  
On 15.03.1996, US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor urged countries to improve 
their offers in telecommunications (IUST 15.03.1996). The EU’s delay in submitting 
an offer held up the negotiations as the EU had problems in arriving at a consensus 
between its member states. Additionally, EU officials warned that if progress in 
Geneva was too sluggish EU member states might not be able to agree on further 
concessions. Other countries waited for the EU’s offer, but the EU claimed it was 
itself waiting for other countries to move first. Several industrial countries had not yet 
tabled new offers and the US threatened to withdraw from the negotiations (IUST 
22.03.1996). WTO DG Ruggiero intervened and pushed for an agreement (IUST 
29.03.1996).  
Even though some offers were submitted, by the end of April the negotiations 
seemed “close to breakdown”. Brittan pointed out that the EU did not envisage a 
similar rescue attempt as in financial services, due to the different nature of the 
sector involved. The EU Foreign Affairs Council agreed on additional flexibility in the 
proposal of the EU. The EU stated it did not share entirely the pessimistic outlook of 
the US, but it would only be able to make further concessions if the US changed its 
position in two areas and if it agreed to abandon its restriction on laying underwater 
cables. One of the disputed issues was whether satellite services would be subject to 
the agreement, the other one was “what special treatment to apply to international 
                                            
167 “In that area, the draft would require countries to prevent monopoly suppliers in one sector from 
subsidizing operations in a liberalized sector and to prevent suppliers of essential services from 
misusing information gathered from competitors, for example” (IUST 02.02.1996). 
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services”. The US did not want to make further concessions as it considered other 
offers as inferior to its own (IUST 30.04.1996).  
The negotiations broke off with no result, at least partially due to the withdrawal of the 
US, but negotiation partners agreed to review the situation early in 1997. Ruggiero’s 
proposal to keep the current negotiation results was accepted by WTO members 
(WTO 2007b). The April negotiation deadline was hence missed and the negotiations 
were extended by 9 ½ months (IUST 03.05.1996). Numerous plurilateral and bilateral 
meetings were held over the course of the next months (IUST 16.08.1996).  
At the beginning of November 1996, the EU promised to table a new offer by the 
middle of the month to re-start the negotiations. Key players resisted EU pressure to 
give up foreign ownership restrictions and phase-in of liberalisation measures (IUST 
01.11.1996). A week later already, the EU had to again renege on its commitment to 
submit a new offer due to internal differences, and it was forced to revert to its 
previous offer. Nonetheless, the US urged for improvements in the EU offer (IUST 
08.11.1996), which the EU responded to with a new offer in mid-November. The US 
also tabled a new offer and proposed a solution to the accountancy rate dispute to 
move the negotiations forward. Over the course of the next weeks, the EU and the 
US found a set of compromises for their many disputes. Despite these compromises 
though, USTR Barshefsky still saw big difficulties in the EU’s offer, and the European 
Commission had to convince its member states to liberalise further (IUST 
06.12.1996; IUST 15.11.1996).  
The Singapore Ministerial was used to ask for further concessions from key countries 
(EU, Japan, Canada and key Asian countries). Informal Quad meetings during the 
Singapore Ministerial were meant to either plan a strategy to get better offers from 
other WTO members or to solve pertaining issues between the Quad (IUST 
06.12.1996). These meetings indeed seem to have brought some momentum to the 
negotiations, with South Africa, Ghana, Jamaica, Bulgaria, Barbados, and Egypt 
promising to submit their first offers (although only South Africa’s offer would be 
significant). A set of other countries announced improvements to their current offers 
(Australia, Canada, Israel, Korea, Hong Kong (China), Poland, Switzerland and 
Singapore). During the Ministerial, the EU tried to gather support for a declaration 
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stating that substantial progress had been made in the negotiations, but the proposal 
was blocked by the US among others (IUST 20.12.1996). The next conflict between 
the EU and the US was also not far off: it concerned the EU’s attempt to exclude 
video services from the agreement (the underlying issue was that the EU wanted to 
exclude broadcasting from the agreement) (IUST 20.12.1996). Thus, in January 
1997, the US proposal on accountancy rates and the EU’s attempt to exclude all 
video services were the two main issues dealt with (IUST 10.01.1997).168 The US 
threatened a few days before the 15 February 1997 deadline to take back 
concessions if others did not extend their offers. This tactic was judged as a 
“classical negotiation tactic” by others (especially Canada, Mexico, Japan and 
Korea), hence they did not seem to believe in it too much (IUST 07.02.1997). A 
solution to the issue of inclusion of video services in the EU offer was found: a 
distinction between the transmission of data and the commercial exploitation of these 
was introduced (IUST 14.02.1997). The “Basic Telecommunication Agreement” was 
reached in time with the deadline on 15 February 1997. 71 offers had been tabled, 
these were from all developed and 40 developing countries (the markets of these 
countries covered 91% of all telecommunication revenues worldwide).  
In contrast to the financial services negotiations, the telecommunication negotiations 
showed no distinct leadership of the EU and very pronounced conflicts among the 
EU member states, arguably limiting the EU’s capacity to lead the negotiations in the 
WTO. In various instances, the EU was prevented from moving forward by internal 
conflicts. Additionally, conflicts between the EU and the US were very pronounced 
and took up substantial negotiation capacities, shifting EU and US attention away 
from getting commitments from the wider WTO membership. At the same time, as in 
the financial services negotiations, the US strategy was again more polarising than 
the EU’s. This reminds us of Tsoukalis hypothesis that the EU’s trade policy can 
never be as aggressive as the US’ because of the EU’s internal structure (chapter 3 
above, Tsoukalis 1997: 234). The extent to which industry was involved in these 
negotiations is not clear: a former EU official described the domestic situation in the 
                                            
168 Another contentious issue was the status of the international treaty organisations Intelsat and 
Inmarsat (IUST 17.01.1997). 
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EU: the telecommunication monopolies in several EU countries were about to be 
privatised, and they were hence seeking new markets outside of Europe (interview 
11). However, Niemann doubts that industry was the driving force behind the 
agreement, as industry remained largely uninvolved (Niemann 2004: 396). 
6.3 The negotiations on the movement of natural persons (Mode 4) 
The third issue up for negotiation after the Uruguay Round was Mode 4. The 
“Negotiating Group on Movement of Natural Persons” was established by the 
Ministers at Marrakesh at the end of the Uruguay Round. The group was meant to 
extend commitments under Mode 4, as these had been mainly limited to only two 
categories:  
intra-company transferees regarded as “essential personnel”, such 
as managers and technical staff linked with a commercial presence in 
the host country; and second, business visitors, who are short-term 
visitors not in general gainfully employed in the host country (Decision 
on Negotiations on Movement of Natural Persons; WTO 2007a). 
The Negotiating Group on Movement of Natural Persons met for the first time on 
04.05.1994 and its work was mandated until 30.06.1995. The first meeting consisted 
mainly of stock-taking and a discussion about the agenda of the negotiation group. 
The negotiations under the Group’s heading were mainly held on a bilateral basis, 
although a few items were discussed inside the Group as a whole (WTO TS/NGNP/1 
10.06.1994; WTO S/L/10 24.07.1995). The negotiation group’s second meeting was 
held in September 1994, when it was noted that no bilateral negotiations had taken 
place since the Marrakesh meeting despite the group’s work officially starting in May 
1994. The Secretariat had prepared an analysis of Mode 4 commitments in member 
schedules and developing countries criticised that in developed country schedules 
Mode 4 was linked to Mode 3 (Commercial Presence). They also complained that the 
criteria for ENTs were too untransparent, while conditions attached to the 
commitments were so unattainable that an actual liberalisation of Mode 4 services 
trade hardly took place (WTO S/NGNP/2 25.10.1994). 
Subsequently, a set of “exploratory” bilateral meetings was held until November 1994 
(WTO S/NGNP/3 22.11.1994). Both in the November 1994 and February 1995 
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meetings, (unnamed) delegations stressed the links of the negotiations on the 
Movement of Natural Persons to those in other areas, notably financial services 
(WTO S/NGNP/4 13.03.1995). In the April 1995 meeting of the negotiation group, 
India expressed its disappointment about the lack of progress in its bilateral 
negotiations and especially with one (unnamed) delegation which had made no 
commitments at all. India outlined that the developed countries should abide to the 
spirit of the GATS which foresaw efforts for greater involvement of developing 
countries into services trade. It threatened it would have to withdraw its financial 
services offer should there not be more progress (see p.200). As an answer to the 
point made by some delegations in the Committee on Trade in Financial Services 
that failure of the financial services negotiations would put into question the credibility 
of the WTO, India used a similar argument for the negotiations on the Movement of 
Natural Persons. Similar points were raised by Egypt, Pakistan and the Philippines. 
The US emphasised that a linkage to the financial services negotiations was 
inappropriate to make as there had been very little progress in financial services. 
With respect to the critique that had been voiced by the Philippines in regard to the 
US’ inability to make further “national treatment” commitments, the US explained that 
“national treatment” was not important in this mode of service supply. The chair 
suggested informal consultations as she still did not have a clear idea of what could 
be achieved before the end of June (WTO S/NGNP/5 08.03.1995).  
During the following meetings, discussions centred around new offers or the lack 
thereof: Canada presented its offer for market access in Mode 4, which entailed 
commitments independent of Mode 3 (commercial presence). Importantly, Canada 
made its offer conditional on improved offers in the financial services negotiations. 
Australia, Switzerland and Norway also submitted improved conditional offers, and 
after a period of (strategic?) hesitation the EU submitted its improved offer as well. 
The US referred to its “very substantive offer in December 1993”, whose 
improvement was dependent on “the broader negotiation”, but finally did not submit 
an improved offer (WTO S/NGNP/6 13.06.1995; WTO S/NGNP/7 12.07.1995169). 
                                            
169 The meeting reports of the meetings on 26, 29 and 30 June give only little information. 
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India proposed to establish a “Committee on Movement of Persons” to monitor the 
implementation of commitments under Mode 4, but the group only agreed to ask the 
CTS to establish a “Committee on Specific Commitments”, which would not only 
monitor Mode 4 commitments, but would have a broader review and monitoring 
capacity (WTO S/NGNP/8 28.07.1995e). The final meeting on 28.06.1995 agreed to 
take the six revised schedules (by Australia, Canada, the EU, India, Norway and 
Switzerland) as the “positive outcome” of the negotiations (WTO S/NGNP/9 
04.08.1995). Most of the commitments were on additional categories of service 
suppliers (for example “independent foreign professionals”) (WTO 2007a).  
The negotiations on the Movement of Natural Persons were negotiations that mostly 
interested and were driven by developing countries. Argentina, India and Brazil acted 
as the main “demandeurs” in the negotiations, and the EU was a key target market. 
The issue linkages mentioned above between the financial services negotiations and 
the telecommunication negotiations were made in this sense. (interview 11). Both the 
EU and the US took a reactive stance, waiting until very late to table new offers (and 
in the end, the US did not table an offer at all). One can speculate that this was 
related to the failure of the financial services negotiations, but it might also be linked 
to domestic reasons. For the EU, the same suggestions can be made: on the one 
hand, the negotiations were concluded around the time when the EU was trying to 
“rescue” the financial services agreement. This suggests that the EU tabled its 
revised offer to gain support for its plan in the financial services negotiations. 
However, a former EU official offered a different explanation for the EU’s low key role 
in the Mode 4 negotiations:  
He recalled that the European Commission had tried to make a better offer on Mode 
4. The European Commission had compiled all the restrictions that existed on Mode 
4. As Mode 4 was a EU member state competence, the EU had 15 different 
schedules, which amounted to around 60 pages. The Commission tried to convince 
the EU member states that they could not negotiate financial services and 
telecommunication services, if there was such a multitude of restrictions on Mode 4 
and if the EU’s offer on Mode 4 could not be improved. However, the EU member 
states did not allow for an improved offer. In the opinion of the former EU official, this 
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did in fact lead to lower commitments in the telecommunication and financial services 
negotiations. The US, in the opinion of the official, had not been such a target for 
Mode 4 demands due to its different immigration regime, but it might also have been 
that the US was benefiting from the EU having “pulled the plug”. The EU hence had 
to take the blame for the meagre negotiation result (interview 11). 
There was little reporting on these negotiations, which suggest that they were either 
seen as of little relevance to any industry in particular or to the public and that Mode 
4 was rather uncontroversial at that point of time. The outcome of the negotiations 
has given rise to little analysis as well, suggesting that there was little substance in it. 
A representative of the EU services industry suggested that India had put itself into 
such a defensive situation overall that it could not make substantial demands on 
Mode 4. Mode 4 was also not a very prominent issue at this stage, and the EU and 
the US apparently saw Mode 4 mostly in conjunction with Mode 3 (interview 30). 
6.4 The negotiations on maritime services  
32 countries had made commitments with regard to maritime services in the Uruguay 
Round and five additional countries did so later on, but a number of (unnamed) key 
players did not. Of particular importance with regard to the maritime services 
negotiations is the US: already in the Uruguay Round, the US faced domestic 
pressure not to liberalise its port and auxiliary services to foreign competition. With 
the offer the US made on maritime services, the EU clearly was not satisfied (IUST 
11.06.1993; WTO 1996a: 127). Consequently, negotiations were scheduled to 
continue after the end of the Uruguay Round on the basis of a mandate given in the 
“Ministerial Decision on Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services” and the “Annex 
on Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services”, which established the so-called 
“Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services”. The aim of the negotiations was 
to improve commitments in international shipping, auxiliary services and access and 
use of port facilities. The group held 16 meetings from April 1994 to June 1996. 42 
WTO members took part in the negotiations (when they were suspended; counting 
the EU as one) and 16 participated as observers. In 1995, negotiators mostly 
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exchanged their views on the issue, while the bilateral request-offer process in 1996 
saw 24 offers being tabled (WTO 1996a: 127). 
The negotiations were supposed to be concluded at the end of June 1996. At the 
beginning of 1996 concerns were already rising among negotiators that if the US 
would not table an offer soon, the talks would have to be prolonged for another year. 
Some indicated that a lack of progress in the maritime services negotiations could 
negatively influence the negotiations in telecommunications. Obviously, this was 
meant to entice the US with its substantial interest in the telecommunication 
negotiations to participate actively in the maritime services negotiations. However, 
US companies continued to urge the US government not to include maritime services 
in the GATS, arguing that the US’ gains in market access would not outweigh the 
losses of the US industry. The US formally remained at the negotiation table, but was 
asking for substantial improvements in the offers of other WTO members in order to 
even reconsider its position. It did not even have a negotiation mandate and had not 
submitted any requests to other countries.  
One argument of the US industry was that a maritime services agreement would limit 
the US’ right to unilateral sanctions in the area of maritime services. The EU and the 
US disagreed as to the scope of the current GATS: 
EU officials have claimed that the U.S. would not be able to use 
unilateral sanctions regardless of the outcome of the maritime 
negotiations because the GATS commitment includes all services 
unless a service is explicitly exempted, like landing rights for aviation 
(IUST 16.02.1996).  
However, the attempts of other WTO members, including as seen above the EU, to 
convince the US to commit on these areas did not bear fruit. Without the contribution 
of the US, the negotiations were bound to falter. On 28 June 1996 the negotiations 
on maritime services were suspended with the “Decision on Maritime Transport 
Services”. Renewed negotiations were scheduled to take place in parallel to the 
GATS 2000 negotiations (WTO 1996b: 127).  
The US had never tabled an offer, which led to a withdrawal of most offers that had 
been tabled so far – only Iceland and Norway decided to unilaterally implement their 
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offers. The European Commission pointed out that important restrictions remained in 
place in the US on  
the use of foreign built vessels in the US coastwise trade and in 
relation to access to certain international cargoes from which non-US 
vessels are excluded (European Commission 1997b). 
Brittan assessed the US’ position in the following way: 
Our failure to achieve any market opening in the field of maritime 
transport was a great disappointment to European negotiators, and I 
am sure to others. That negotiation failed to overcome some deeply 
entrenched traditions which set even the most open and developed 
countries at odds with the WTO principles of non-discrimination. In 
the absence of a deal, maritime transport stands as a reminder of the 
need for comprehensive WTO coverage of services activities. Without 
comprehensive coverage, discrimination will be the norm and trade 
friction will increase as a result (Brittan 1997a). 
Brittan here again links the issue-area specific negotiations to the overall WTO 
framework, using the failure of the negotiations to urge for greater commitments on 
services overall. However, an interviewee for the European services industry also 
questioned to what extent the negotiations on maritime services were even relevant 
to industry. He explained that the maritime service sector is already very open 
(interview 34). This might mean that WTO commitment was not a key priority for the 
EU and other countries and their industries, which might explain the lower profile of 
the negotiations compared to telecommunications and financial services.  
6.5 The negotiations on domestic regulations in the accountancy 
sector 
During the Singapore Ministerial, WTO members agreed to establish disciplines on 
domestic regulation for professional services by the end of 1997 (WTO 1996b). 
When this deadline had passed, efforts were concentrated on the accountancy 
sector, apparently in an effort to make progress at least in one sector. The 
Secretariat put forward an amended draft for the disciplines on 13 January 1998. In 
reaction to this, the CSI in the US asked the USTR to reject the current proposal as 
this would not create effective disciplines for the accountancy sector and have 
negative effects on attempts in other sectors where attempts were made to create 
such disciplines (IUST 06.02.1998).  
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Little is known about the actual process of the negotiations. While meeting reports 
from the WPPS are available, most of the discussion was in fact held in informal 
mode, which is not recorded. Interview partners were, due to the time space between 
the negotiations and the writing of this thesis, not available. From the material that is 
available, we can see that during the course of the negotiations, the negotiation 
subject became substantially reduced (to one sector only) as negotiators became 
more aware of the difficulties involved in setting up disciplines for different sectors. 
In 1998, the CTS agreed on the “Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the 
Accountancy Sector”, on the basis of the work undertaken by the Working Party on 
Professional Services. Box 6.1 gives an overview of the content of the disciplines. 
The disciplines affected all those WTO members which had previously undertaken 
commitments with regard to accountancy services under the GATS. The agreement 
was seen as the “first step in the development of GATS Disciplines on the domestic 
regulation of services” (WTO 1998). The disciplines were meant to come into force 
with other potential disciplines (which were supposed to be elaborated in the Working 
Party) by the end of the GATS 2000 negotiations. The disciplines stayed non-binding 
on the insistence of the USA, which wanted to see them improved later on (in 
potentially horizontal negotiations) (IUST 09.01.1999; interview 30). While the 
agreement was called a “breakthrough” by the US and the EU, the agreement left 
open several areas for future improvement. Its impact on actual services trade was 
also unclear (IUST 09.01.1999). The demand for disciplines in further sectors was 
carried forward into the Doha Round. In this sense these negotiations constituted 
only the start of a broader working programme. For the EU, the disciplines meant 
only a partial achievement of its negotiation objective to have disciplines across 
different sectors of professional services. A representative of the EU services 
industry speculated that the negotiations could not move forward further as the 
launch of the next negotiation round was expected imminently. Additionally, WTO 
members disagreed as to whether one set of disciplines could be set up for all 
sectors or whether each sector had to be treated individually (interview 31).  
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Box 6.1 Provisions in the Disciplines for the Accountancy Sector  
Provisions on the administration of licensing requirements, qualification requirements and 
procedures, and technical standard for the accountancy profession.  
A key provision is the general requirement that measures taken for these purposes should not 
be more trade-restrictive than is necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective. 
Examples of legitimate objectives specified in the Disciplines are the protection of consumers 
(including all users of accounting services and the public generally), ensuring the quality of 
the service, ensuring professional competence, and ensuring the integrity of the profession.  
The disciplines relate to measures taken by governments and to those taken by non-govern-
mental authorities exercising delegated powers: in many countries the accountancy profes-
sion is regulated by professional associations operating under delegated powers.  
Transparency requirements and other general provisions. 
Source: adapted from WTO 1998 
6.6 The negotiations on GATS rules 
The Working Party on GATS Rules (WPGR) was set up by the CTS. It works on the 
basis of GATS Art. X and conducts negotiations on non-discriminatory ESMs for 
services, which were initially supposed to take effect on 01 January 1998. It also 
conducts the negotiations on government procurement, envisaged in GATS Art. XIII 
(with unspecified implementation date). Art. XV requires members to negotiate 
multilateral disciplines on subsidies for services and "the appropriateness of 
countervailing measures.". 
In June 1996, the Quad and developing countries argued whether emergency 
safeguard provisions (to restrain temporarily access to service markets) should be 
put into place and under which conditions. Thailand, on behalf of the ASEAN 
countries, argued in favour of an ESM, and was joined by Egypt, India and Pakistan. 
Pressure from the group does not seem to have been extensive (IUST 28.06.1996). 
This little episode is exemplary for the positioning of countries in this dispute. In 
1997, IUST reported that the working group had spent “roughly 80%” of its meeting 
time trying to determine how to move on in the ESM question. The Quad continued to 
question whether such an ESM would be “feasible and desirable”, while a group of 
developing countries pressed for an ESM. 
Due to this preoccupation of the working group with the ESM, the other two areas the 
group was mandated for received only limited attention. 21 countries (incl. the EU) 
submitted questionnaires on the question of “government procurement in services”, 
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on which “structured consideration of possible negotiations in this area” would be 
based. Little had been happening with regard to subsidies in services (IUST 
26.12.1997). In the early preparations for the GATS 2000 negotiations, the Quad 
discussed the issue of the ESM again and both the US and the EU indicated their 
flexibility to discuss the feasibility of such a mechanism. The EU already then 
indicated that the issue might be carried over to the next round of services 
negotiations and that a trade-off between market access commitments and the ESM 
could occur. From the US’ point of view, nobody in the WTO had actually ever 
spoken out in favour of rules on service subsidies (IUST 24.07.1998). 
The negotiation deadline for all these areas was extended several times and the 
negotiations finally integrated into the Doha Round (see subsequent chapters). While 
the EU and other mostly developed countries were not interested in the rules 
negotiations (except for on government procurement), these issues had entered the 
agenda and could therefore not easily be removed again. 
6.7 Interim Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the progress of the six different issue-area specific 
negotiations on trade in services that were held directly after the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round. The outcomes of these different negotiations were diverse: two 
negotiations apparently succeeded (financial and telecommunication services), two 
succeeded partially or with a minor result (Mode 4 and the negotiations on disciplines 
on domestic regulation in accountancy services), one negotiation failed (maritime 
services) and one was prolonged to continue in parallel to the new negotiation round 
(rules negotiations). 
The first set of observations in this conclusion is on the way in which the EU was 
able to exert power in the six different negotiations and on the outcomes of the 
negotiations. This takes up research question 4 and 6, on the way an actor can 
shape negotiation agendas and whether outcomes reflect an actors’ preferences.  
The financial services negotiations provided a first test of the EU’s ability to use the 
newly created WTO to shape the regime further, which the EU seemed to have 
passed rather well. The EU received extensive acknowledgement for its move to 
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rescue the negotiations from failure and there was speculation whether the EU would 
from now on become the leader in the WTO. The US’ failure to lead here could have 
been a first indication of the power shift in the regime, with the US no longer being an 
uncontested leader.  
Both the financial services negotiations and the telecommunication negotiations were 
mostly in the interest of developed countries. One question could be why, if there 
was relatively little to gain and no apparent cross-deals to make, the developing 
countries remained at the negotiation table, especially as these negotiations were 
plurilateral and not a part of the “single undertaking”. In Krasner’s model, this 
asymmetrical distribution of interests would not even have led to an establishment of 
a regime. An interviewee explained that the developing countries did not leave the 
negotiations formally, but they “left” in the sense that their commitments were very 
meagre.170 The agreements hardly created any new commercially viable market 
access. In the interviewee’s opinion, this caused a sea change in the Commission, 
which subsequently was interested in a broader round again (interview 11). It 
certainly showed the limitations of EU power even in these rather successful 
negotiations. The “plurilateral recipe” had hence not worked out as planned for the 
EU, which might have enticed the EU to look for a more comprehensive trade round 
again. 
On the outside, however, the conclusions of both the financial and 
telecommunication agreements were a clear success for the EU (and the US). Both 
negotiations were driven by these two players and had been concluded despite them 
being on a sectoral basis (rather than being linked to other negotiations) and despite 
interests being largely one-sided. These “para-successes” were used extensively by 
the EU to argue for further services liberalisation and for a new trade round, and to 
sustain the “EU as world trade leader” hypothesis, which was nurtured during 
Brittan’s time as Trade Commissioner (interview 32). While the issue-specific 
negotiations reviewed in this chapter due to their timing and substance proceeded 
                                            
170 The interviewee (a former EU official) talked about month long negotiations with developing 
countries in which they were not ready to commit to liberalisation as the EU was in no position to 
offer anything in return (interview 11).  
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largely unaffected by the changes starting to occur in the WTO Ministerials (see 
chapter 5 above), the linkage between the negotiations was thus a bottom-up 
linkage: the negotiations on the expert level strengthened the EU’s position and 
motivation in the WTO overall.  
Overall, the financial services negotiations were clearly dominated by the EU and the 
US, with the EU taking a leadership position. In telecommunications, there was less 
leadership by the EU, which can be attributed to the internal difficulties the EU 
experienced during the negotiations. This limited the EU’s resources significantly for 
the negotiations and it hence could not exert power as efficiently as in the financial 
services negotiations (research question 2). Additionally, the pronounced conflicts 
between the EU and the US arguably occupied the negotiation capacity of both 
actors, diverting their attention from the broader WTO membership. 
The failed maritime services negotiations did not provide an example for EU 
leadership and again showed the limitation of the EU’s power in the WTO. While the 
EU might have been successful to rescue the negotiations in financial services, it is 
clear from the maritime services negotiations that it cannot “go it alone” in every 
case, as the US market is too important for other trading partners. The EU-US 
dimension is hence emerging as a crucial one in the WTO services negotiations. At 
the same time, the maritime services case gives an indication of the importance of 
interest distribution inside of the services negotiations: with regard to the question of 
maritime services liberalisation the US has been, and continues to be, equally 
defensive as the EU is in respect to the liberalisation of audiovisual services. This 
shows that within the services area itself, all players have differing offensive and 
defensive interests, and each sector therefore displays a different power and interest 
constellation.  
The negotiations on disciplines on domestic regulation on professional services were 
riddled by the complexity of the tasks at hand, so that they were reduced to only one 
sector, accountancy. The nature of the issue area hence made it impossible to 
achieve a greater negotiation result, and the expected new trade round presented a 
good opportunity to postpone the negotiations. The negotiation result so far - 
6 Sectoral services negotiations 1995-1999: celebrating WTO successes? 225 
 
disciplines on regulation in the accountancy sector - can be counted as a further 
developed country success though.  
The negotiations which were favoured mostly by the developing countries had no or 
only minor outcomes. The outcome on Mode 4 was, as discussed above, meagre. 
Although the EU and the US did not prevent issues like the ESM, rules on service 
subsidies or Mode 4 to emerge on the agenda in the Uruguay Round, they prevented 
decisions that would have been unfavourable for them, displaying what might be 
termed the power to prevent outcomes, or “power of non-decision making”. On Mode 
4, the EU and the US might have encountered favourable circumstances though: 
while these negotiations were superficially of major interest to the developing 
countries, apparently both developed and developing countries were reluctant to 
open their own domestic markets to foreign workers (interview 4). 
The second set of observations relates to the way in which the EU tried to achieve 
movement in the negotiations (research question 5):  
Techniques that were used in the negotiations included exerting obvious pressure on 
countries which refused to comply. Negotiators were also trying to shape the 
scientific (or “pseudo-scientific”) discussions around the negotiations (“liberalisation is 
good/bad”) and using the media to promote their message (for example the Asian 
financial crisis was used extensively). Controlling knowledge and the respective 
(scientific or pseudo-scientific) dialogues was an important negotiation strategy, and 
having the resources can be crucial for actors. The first three negotiations also show 
degrees of brinkmanship, avoiding the break-down of the negotiations only narrowly 
at several instances. This might have been a strategy to get commitments from other 
actors, which, however, only worked partially.  
While the WTO secretariat is supposed to be a neutral body, it intervened several 
times in favour of agreements and hence supported the proponents’ case. Again, the 
EU thus benefited from the regime framework in a special way in the negotiations 
(research question 3). 
The role of industry as a resource for actors was ambiguous (research question 2): in 
the financial services there were definite commercial interests behind the agreement. 
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In telecommunication, the information was not unambiguous, but one can expect 
some sort of business involvement to have taken place. In maritime services, there 
might rather have been a lack of business interest. This raises the question as to how 
important business interest really is as a resource for EU’s success in negotiations. 
In the negotiations itself, issue linkages were attempted, but did not always work out 
(research question 5). While apparently the link between the financial services 
negotiations and/or telecommunication negotiations and Mode 4 led to less 
commitments than would have been possible from the point of view of developed 
countries, for developing countries using this link to get better offers on Mode 4 did 
not work out. At the same time, the link between the maritime services and the 
telecommunication negotiations, intended to make the US make an offer on maritime 
services, did not work. Issue linkage was hence a double-edged sword for WTO 
members.  
In terms of coalitions (also research question 5), the EU-US relationship emerged as 
crucial in these negotiations, but again was not always a successful one. In terms of 
cooperation, the former EU official also confirmed that the Quad had been the clear 
leaders in the WTO financial and telecommunication negotiations (interview 11). 
Apart from the developed-developing country division as in the previous chapter, no 
other coalitions were visible.  
The next chapter will now follow the course of the services negotiations between the 
Seattle Ministerial up to the Doha Ministerial (1999-2001). 
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7 From Seattle to Doha 2000-2001: Launching the 
new trade round 
The last two chapters showed that with the Seattle Ministerial the EU’s leadership 
aspirations and ideas for the new trade round had been seriously put into question. 
The EU also had only had partial success in the services negotiations and 
encountered resistance to its plans from developing countries. How would the EU 
adapt its strategy? How would it impact the further development of the WTO agenda? 
Would the EU have to conduct the built-in negotiations on agriculture and services on 
their own? This chapter follows the EU’s attempts at reviving the new round idea 
throughout 2000 and 2001 (first part of the chapter), and it looks at the EU’s 
contribution to the GATS 2000 negotiations (second part of the chapter).  
7.1 Overall framework negotiations: reviving the new round idea 
The Seattle Ministerial had challenged the EU’s previous ideas about the WTO’s 
functioning. If the EU wanted to stick to its idea of a broader trade round, it needed to 
convince especially the broad group of developing countries of the benefits of this 
new round. Lamy hence envisaged a first stage of confidence-building measures, 
which would be followed by the launch of the new trade round in 2000 or in 2001. 
Potential institutional reform, which could theoretically have emerged at this stage as 
the key task of the WTO, was envisaged by the EU as an activity to be conducted in 
parallel with the next round (European Commission 2000a). Conveniently for the EU, 
discussion in the WTO seems to have gone in a similar direction: during discussions 
regarding transparency of the WTO decision-making process, WTO members agreed 
that the failure of Seattle was due to substance rather than to process. Radical 
reform, as it had emerged in proposals after the failure of Seattle (see Sect. 5.1.2), 
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was not deemed necessary. WTO members also decided to stick to the consensus 
approach in decision-making (Bridges 04.04.2000; Pedersen 2006: 112-115).171  
In the meantime, the outcome of the Seattle Ministerial encouraged developing 
countries, among them Brazil, South Africa, South East Asian countries and India, to 
start to further improve cooperation among themselves, with the clear intention to 
shape the WTO agenda to the needs of developing countries (Bridges 01.02.2000). 
Similarly, the ACP decided to set up a representation in Geneva to enhance their 
presence in the negotiations (Bridges 14.03.2000).  
Reflecting on this changing nature of the world trade regime, Pascal Lamy mentioned 
in several speeches in 1999 and 2000 that the times of EU-US leadership in the 
WTO were ending and that developing countries were seeking a new role in the 
WTO (European Commission 1999b, 2000b, 2000c). This is further evidence that 
there was thus an awareness in the EU of a power shift occurring in the WTO. 
However, while Lamy acknowledged this change in the WTO, the demands the EU 
had for the new round did not change in substance,172 although discussion happened 
in the EU as to where the EU should show more flexibility with regard to the agenda 
(Bridges 21.03.2000). Going even further than simply keeping the original idea of a 
broad trade round, Lamy now identified the broader trade agenda as the desirable 
response to the two challenges the world trade regime was facing: globalisation and 
development (European Commission 2000b).  
The EU therefore continued to lobby for a broader round throughout 2000 (for 
example European Commission 2000d, f, g, j, k). A first part of the EU’s lobbying 
activities in 2000 was Pascal Lamy’s high-level talks with ministers from a variety of 
countries, which were conducted throughout the year. Lamy attributed India a key 
position in these visits and made it the first country he visited outside of the Quad as 
                                            
171 The issue of transparency and WTO decision-making did incite further discussion in the following 
years though (see Pedersen 2006). 
172 For the EU’s (unchanged) agenda see for example European Commission 2000d. Flexibility might 
have been envisaged in particular with regard to the labour and the environment issues, which an 
interviewee mentioned: the EU dropped the labour issue and the environment issue, but the EU 
could not change its position substantially as the EU’s internal decision-making process does not 
allow quick and easy changes (interview 10). 
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early as in March 2000.173 In his various speeches throughout 2000, Lamy 
considered it essential not only to convince the developing countries of the new 
round, but also to assure them that their place in the global economy would be 
central in a new trade round (European Commission 2000d, e, f, j). 
The EU’s consensus-building and lobbying activities could, however, not only focus 
on the newly emerging powers in the WTO. Disunity among the Quad and the other 
proponents of the round had importantly stalled progress with regard to the new trade 
round. The European Commission actively sought to build a common agenda with 
the US, who kept on promoting an agenda less extensive than the EU, but more 
extended than the existing negotiations. Consultations also took place within the 
Quad (Bridges 15.02.2000, 14.03.2000).The Commission maintained its alliance with 
the “Friends of the Round”, and Lamy indicated that intensive discussions had been 
taking place within this group, although the “new trade issues” had remained 
contentious in the group (European Commission 2000d, e, f, j).  
Additionally to the consensus-building among themselves, the EU and the US started 
to discuss common measures to re-build the trust of the developing countries. These 
were intended to include assistance for the implementation of the Uruguay Round 
agreements and the extension of duty-free market access to LDC (Bridges 
22.02.2000). In February 2000, proposals were made as to how to increase 
participation of LDC in the trade regime and about market opening for LDC. 
Immediately, there were expectations that there would be trade-offs between these 
new initiatives and the ongoing agriculture and services negotiations (Bridges 
29.02.2000).  
The Quad soon encountered problems with their new initiative for LDC market 
opening, because they could not agree which LDC products to give duty-free market 
access to. While the US struggled with including textiles in the proposal, the EU 
refused to include certain agricultural products (bananas, beef, rice, sugar) (Bridges 
11.04.2000). In April 2000, the Quad offered a first package to increase trade 
                                            
173 While the Indians rejected the idea of negotiations on investment, competition, labour and 
environment, Lamy was confident that the EU would be able to exploit some of the nuances he had 
discovered in the Indian position. 
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participation for LDC, but the LDC rejected the proposal. The proposal also received 
negative comments from WTO DG Mike Moore (Bridges 11.04.2000). The Quad 
“paddled back” and explained that this package was “more of an opening bid” 
(Bridges 18.04.2000). However, the general idea received increasing support in the 
WTO: several countries, among them Korea, Chile and Eastern European countries, 
wanted to join the Quad’s initiative (Bridges 02.05.2000), later on joined by Iceland, 
Norway, New Zealand and Switzerland (Bridges 19.09.2000) 
An early May General Council session was lauded for having made progress on the 
two main pending issues in the relationship between developed and developing 
countries: implementation and the LDC market access package. However, it 
remained unclear what the substance of the agreement on implementation would be 
(Bridges 09.05.2000). Accordingly, the EU and other developed countries 
emphasised in subsequent meetings that substantial movement on the 
implementation issue could only be made in the framework of a trade round (Bridges 
04.07.2000).  
The EU took a crucial step forward with regard to the market access initiatives in 
October 2000, when it launched the EBA (“Everything but arms”) initiative which 
extended market access to all products from LDC (currently 49 countries), except for 
arms and munitions (Bridges 03.10.2000; European Commission 2000g). Mattoo and 
Subramanian interpret the EBA initiative as a sign for the new power and prominence 
that developing countries had attained in the trade regime (2004). Bridges 
commented that many trade analysts saw this as a “meaningful effort to garner 
support for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations”. Bridges also reported 
speculations that this move by the EU might break solidarity among the developing 
countries who had jointly opposed calls for a new trade round (Bridges 03.10.2000; 
European Commission 2000g). With this initiative the EU had created for itself a 
powerful “bargaining chip” with which not only to “woo” the LDC but also to exert 
pressure on its developed country trading partners. The EU had manoeuvred itself 
into the – arguably comfortable - position of a “benefactor”.  
As to the second major change in the international trade regime, the politicisation of 
WTO negotiations with increased media and NGO attention, the EU tried to improve 
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its relations to civil society both inside the EU and in the broader, international realm. 
Internally, the EU established four “issue groups” for a dialogue with civil society. The 
groups were on trade and health issues, services, agriculture, and environment 
(including sustainable development) (Bridges 06.06.2000). The EU also had started 
to conduct a “sustainability impact assessment”, which constituted an innovation in 
terms of trade policy assessment and aimed to assess the social and economic 
effects of new trade policy legislation (Bridges 07.03.2000). In the WTO, the EU 
submitted proposals for more transparency of the WTO and supported the idea of the 
annual public symposium with NGOs and the accreditation of NGOs. Lamy argued 
for WTO reform, increasing transparency and decision-making procedures 
(European Commission 2000b). In October 2000, an EU paper on WTO 
transparency made proposals for an improved decision-making mechanism and 
information flow (Bridges 17.10.2000). Furthermore, Lamy indicated that the high 
level of mobilisation of civil society might have “scared away” the traditional supporter 
of trade negotiations, the business community. Lamy’s assessment was that 
business due to this mobilisation was hesitant to show its support for a new trade 
round and remained on the sidelines (European Commission 2000k).  
As before, the trade round idea was discussed in various international economic 
forums outside the WTO. Thus, OECD members renewed their call for a new trade 
round (Bridges 04.07.2000). The G8 also issued such a call, but Lamy commented 
that it was no longer the appropriate forum, as the leadership of the Quad in the 
WTO was waning (Bridges 25.07.2000). The new trade round was discussed in 
APEC, the United Nations Millennium Summit and an ASEAN meeting (Bridges 
13.06.2000, 12.09.2000, 10.10.2000).  
In parallel to the activities in the overall framework negotiations, the mandated 
negotiations on agriculture and services started in 2000. For the EU, two reasons for 
its participation in the negotiations can be identified: first, stabilisation of the WTO 
regime and second, a pragmatism which assumes that “any negotiation is better than 
none”. However, this strategy certainly carried risks for the EU, especially as the EU 
was faced internally with ongoing division with regard to agriculture (Bridges 
15.02.2000). Sergio Marchi, Canadian head of the Services Council, interpreted the 
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relevance of the current talks: he was convinced of the importance of the 
negotiations as a forerunner for the launch of a broader round and as a possibility for 
the WTO to regain legitimacy and trust (Bridges 28.03.2000). The speed of the issue-
specific level negotiations seems to have been informed by the overall negotiations 
though: despite ongoing discussions and meetings of the services negotiators, WTO 
DG Moore in September declared that it was difficult to progress in services without a 
broader round, as there was a lack of interest of developing countries, although there 
had been a little movement in both agriculture and services (Bridges 19.09.2000).  
For the year 2000, Lamy estimated overall that there had not been much movement 
with regard to the new round, but that “modest progress” had been made with regard 
to implementation related issues and an ‘illusion of progress on procedural issues’ in 
the built-in agenda issues (European Commission 2000h). At the end of 2000, it 
seemed, however, that the EU had “re-“created a valid basis for the promotion of its 
new round idea. 2001 would show whether the EU’s efforts had been sufficient and 
whether its decision to maintain the broad trade agenda would pay off in the end.  
The run-up in 2001 to the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001 was in 
many ways a continuation of the activities the EU had entered into in 2000. This is 
reflected in a January 2001 strategy paper, in which the Commission laid out its plan 
for the launch of the new trade round. The Commission emphasised that the failure 
of Seattle was significantly due to the failure to balance interests in the Seattle draft. 
Hence, the Commission would only be able to achieve its goal of launching the new 
trade round and deepening WTO regulation if the WTO agenda reflected the 
concerns of developing countries. The Commission therefore wanted to use 2001 to 
further rebuild developing countries’ support for its version of the new trade round, 
which the Commission describes as still “perceived as […] excessively ambitious.” by 
some developing countries (European Commission 2001a). 
However, in January 2001 the European Commission received an initial blow to its 
new strategy, when an EU internal study revealed that the EBA initiative might have 
more impact than anticipated on EU farm trade. The European Commission was 
faced with fierce resistance from certain EU agricultural sectors against the EBA 
initiative and had to revise it. This revision included an extension of transitional 
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periods for duty- and quota-free access for bananas, rice and sugar (Bridges 
16.01.2001), and clearly decreased the appeal and value of the EBA initiative to the 
LDC. It is unclear whether the subsequent move of the EU member states to restrain 
the Commission to its pre-Seattle position was linked to the EU internal fight over the 
EBA initiative. In any case, it seems that in early 2001 the EU member states 
tightened the Commission’s space of movement, so that it could only deviate from 
the pre-Seattle position after consultation with the EU member states (Bridges 
30.01.2001).174  
In the WTO, different visions for the agenda of the potential new trade round 
persisted. Many developing countries favoured launching a trade round with a more 
limited agenda, so for this group the Commission saw it as a first key task to promote 
the investment, competition and environment negotiations. The Commission 
considered two approaches: first, to accept negotiations on a limited agenda leaving 
a decision on investment and competition to be taken later on (which in the end was 
the result in the DDA) and a plurilateral approach to investment/competition. It 
considered the plurilateral approach as more beneficial, as it would send the desired 
signal to developed countries and could enhance US support for the approach 
(European Commission 2001a175). Odell identifies this as a key change from prior 
positions of the EU (and also the USA). During the whole year 2001, EU (and US’) 
initiatives showed increasing flexibility and attempts to especially accommodate 
developing countries’ interests, thus showing a move towards more integrative or 
mixed negotiation strategies (Odell 2003: 9, 21-23; see also Pedersen 2006).  
The new flexibility in the EU strategy seems to have had positive effects. Again, the 
EU focused its consensus building initiatives especially on developing countries. 
Lamy was mandated to conduct talks with further developing countries about the 
changed EU negotiation proposal. He for example visited Mercosur countries 
                                            
174 One can speculate that this might have had to do with the Nice Treaty negotiations; the EU 
member states’ might have been re-affirming their authority and control over the European 
Commission. 
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(Bridges 27.02.2001, 17.07.2001). Bridges explicitly reports that ASEAN countries 
were positively surprised by the new flexibility that the EU showed towards their 
problems with implementation of WTO agreements (Bridges 18.09.2001). 
The second key task for the Commission was to deal with the group of countries that 
continued to emphasise the priority of the implementation question. This position, 
held mainly by India, was supported by many LDC and African countries (Bridges 
23.01.2001; European Commission 2001a). These countries argued that they would 
not be able to agree to a new trade round if the implementation question had not 
been dealt with adequately. Their strategy was also to keep the implementation 
question on the agenda of the services and agriculture negotiations. In heads of 
delegations meetings, Brazil, Pakistan and Egypt were reported to having pushed the 
issue. A similar argument was made by the Like-Minded Group (LMG), including 
Pakistan, India, Egypt and Malaysia, in March 2001. However, major concessions 
were not expected from the negotiations (Bridges 06.02.2001, 22.05.2001, 
20.03.2001). In fact, the Quad issued papers both in July and September 2001, 
which were intended to overcome developing countries resistance (Bridges 
25.09.2001) and developed countries indicated that they would be ready to involve 
themselves more substantially in the implementation question. However, the 
seriousness of the developed countries’ initiatives can be doubted, as USTR Zoellick 
indicated the US’ reluctance to concede too much on the implementation issue 
(Bridges 01.05.2001, 22.05.2001). 
Two further issues proved crucial for the European Commission in the run-up to 
Doha, which were the third and fourth key task for the Commission: the third key task 
for the Commission was the renewal of the ACP waiver. As the waiver question could 
not finally be resolved prior to the conference, the question of the ACP waiver proved 
a major stumbling block between the EU/ACP and Latin American 
countries/Philippines/Thailand during the Doha Ministerial. It was assumed that the 
                                                                                                                                        
175 More detailed information on the Commission’s adapted strategy can be found in European 
Commission 2001a. For the trade and labour issue the Commission also showed flexibility and 
suggested to take the issue out of the envisaged Single Undertaking and into a broader framework 
of social development and a multi-institutional setting.  
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issue was brought up in Doha as a pay-off for the ACP’s support of the new trade 
round (Bridges 13.11.2001; Bello 2002; Wolfe 2004b).  
As a fourth task or challenge, the relationship between the TRIPs Agreement and 
public health developed into one of the most difficult issues on the agenda. 
Developing countries wanted this relationship to be clarified in a separate declaration 
to ensure that the TRIPs Agreement would not prevent them from using for example 
compulsory licensing if needed to protect public health (FT 25.10.2001). Developing 
countries here worked in conjunction with North American and European NGOs. A 
declaration on the issue, celebrated as a victory for developing countries, was 
reached at the Doha Ministerial. This meant a main obstacle on the way to a 
negotiation success had been cleared away (FT 27.10.2001; Odell 2003: 29ff; Wolfe 
2004b).  
In terms of coalition-building, for the EU it was crucial in 2001 to clarify the US’ 
position on the new round. While the EU and Japan were both working to ensure the 
launch of the new round, the US’ position remained unclear until the start of 2001, 
especially as “fast track” trade negotiation authority had not yet been granted to 
President Bush (Bridges 30.01.2001176). Even when in the course of 2001, it finally 
became clearer that the US would support the launch of a new round (Bridges 
22.05.2001, 23.10.2001), the EU and the US remained divided on the concrete 
negotiation issues. Among the contentious issues were trade and environment as 
much as trade and investment (Bridges 06.06.2001). However, there seems to have 
been a rapprochement (Bridges 26.06.2001, 24.07.2001; WTA 15.10.2001; FT 
27.10.2001), which was essential to launch the trade round.  
The development towards better cooperation between the developing countries can 
be observed in 2001 as well. The like-minded group organised an unprecedented 
meeting in July 2001 to exchange their views with the media and NGOs (Bridges 
10.07.2001). The LMG in September 2001 developed a proposal for a new WTO 
agenda, which called for negotiations on special and differential treatment, trade and 
                                            
176 For example, Zoellick tried to rally domestic support, when showing his dismissal of the current 
leadership of EU and Japan, and indicated that the US should assume its role of advocating the new 
round (Bridges 30.01.2001). 
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debt, trade and technology transfer and trade and finance. Similarly, LDC formed a 
vocal opposition to the launch of a new trade round, but their position seems to have 
left room for manoeuvre (Bridges 31.07.2001, 18.09.2001). In October 2001, the LDC 
published the Zanzibar Declaration (WT/L/409), outlining LDC’ priorities for the 
Ministerial Conference. This was followed by a common position of the G77177 plus 
China (Bridges 30.10.2001).  
Clearly, the EU’s strategy on its own (and even in conjunction with its Quad partners) 
could not be sufficient to overcome the differences between WTO members. The 
EU’s agenda was indirectly aided by the much improved conference preparation and 
management by the WTO staff. The run-up to the conference was importantly 
shaped by WTO DG Moore and General Council Chair Harbinson. WTO DG Michael 
Moore was well established and experienced in his job, which meant he could devote 
considerable time to confidence-building and compromise-seeking initiatives. Special 
attention was given to spread information widely among WTO members and to keep 
the pre-Conference process transparent (Odell 2003: 24-28; Pedersen 2006: 116-
118; Wolfe 2004b). After a variety of different consultation processes to prepare the 
conference agenda,178 Harbinson in cooperation with WTO DG Mike Moore then took 
a decisive step in the preparation of the conference and distributed a draft 
Declaration and a text on the implementation issue on 26 September 2001.179 
Compared to the Seattle draft Ministerial texts, which failed to achieve progress in 
the negotiations, this text was much shorter and indicated space for compromise 
much more clearly. As was to be expected, at this stage the Draft declaration 
                                            
177 The G77 are a coalition of developing countries set up in 1964 in conjunction with the first 
UNCTAD. It has now more than 130 members (WTO 2003). 
178 The preparation by General Council Chair Harbinson started already in March (Bridges 06.03.2001) 
and by May 2001, Harbinson had managed to get a broad agreement that an agenda would have to 
be set up until July 2001 (Bridges 08.05.2001). Harbinson then set out to hold meetings on the most 
contentious issues. These included competition, investment and environment (Bridges 12.06.2001). 
However, positions had not moved substantially until July 2001 (Bridges 17.07.2001), which led 
Harbinson to call for movement by the Quad in particular. Following this call, the Quad continued 
working towards a compromise that could take developing countries on board (Bridges 18.09.2001). 
In September 2001, Harbinson started a process of plurilateral and bilateral consultations (Bridges 
11.09.2001). 
179 A draft text on special and differential treatment was submitted by Committee on Trade and 
Development (CTD) Chair Ambassador Irumba of Uganda shortly afterwards (Bridges 09.10.2001). 
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received a mixed reception. The EU criticised especially the vague text on trade and 
environment and trade and investment (Bridges 02.10.2001; Odell 2007). Others saw 
this initiative by Harbinson as an undue attempt at agenda-setting, which further 
marginalised less developed countries (Narlikar 2004), but it arguably was a key step 
to facilitating agreement (Odell 2007).  
Harbison´s initiative bore fruit though. Progress was made in a Mini-Ministerial in 
Singapore, in which 22 WTO Ministers participated, when the notion of the “new 
trade round” was dropped and changed into a “new development agenda”, arguably 
to indicate a new “era” and new priorities (Bridges 16.10.2001). In the immediate run-
up to the conference, the EU’s position was challenged especially with regard to its 
intention to clarify and implement environmental rules in the new trade round 
(Bridges 23.10.2001), but it seems that for the EU itself agriculture turned out to be 
the most critical area of the draft declaration.180 Harbinson’s second draft declaration 
was equally contested as the first, but furthermore narrowed down the gaps between 
the WTO members. As the EU had intended, the Singapore issues all were part of 
the Harbinson draft (Bridges 30.10.2001; WTA 15.10.2001; FT 27.10.2001),181 
although it can be argued that they had been “watered down” significantly. 
Two exogenous events seem to have played into the hands of the EU in this run-up 
to the conference: the failure of the Seattle talks can be seen as an important 
impetus for the trade negotiators not to fail again and with this to decrease the 
credibility and legitimacy of the WTO even further. It hence gave rise to a range of 
confidence and consensus-building initatives, as seen in the EU’s strategy prior to 
Doha, which finally made compromise possible. The terrorist attacks on the USA on 
11 September 2001 can be regarded as an exogenous event that increased the 
willingness to compromise. In Odell’s words, these two events raised the cost of a 
renewed failure for the negotiators (2003: 8ff, 34ff; see also Narlikar 2004; Bello 
2002; Pedersen 2006; Wilkinson 2006b). Furthermore, the actual process of 
                                            
180 Arguably, the EU’s promises to compromise in the area of agriculture seemed rather shallow and 
did not incite much credibility (WTA 17.09.2001). 
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conference management during the Doha Ministerial had changed compared to 
Seattle. With Doha providing a relatively isolated conference setting, globalisation 
protests could not hinder the progress of the negotiations and the chairs this time did 
not push forward their own national interests, but took on mediating roles. All this 
worked to facilitate an agreement, which was the EU’s desired outcome. Still, 
developing countries were able to push through their interests in some areas (Odell 
2003: 28-33), and although critics argued that this was too limited (Bello 2002), the 
Conference launched a new trade round with the “Doha Development Agenda” 
(DDA).182 The DDA launched negotiations on the implementation issue, non-
agricultural market access (NAMA), certain aspects of the TRIPs agreement, WTO 
rules, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU, governing the DSB) and trade 
and environment. It integrated the ongoing negotiations on agriculture and services 
into the single undertaking. A decision on the “Singapore issues” would be taken 
during the 5th Ministerial conference and working groups would deal with the issues 
until then. Further issues, such as for example e-commerce, trade, finance and debt, 
trade and technology transfer would be further “examined”. As could have been 
expected, the DDA also emphasised the importance of developing countries interests 
(WTO 2001).  
This Ministerial Declaration was at least in part a convoluted text, still showing the 
attempts to bridge strongly diverging attitudes of WTO members as had been visible 
already in the Harbinson drafts. The DDA did, however, contain some remarkable 
concessions; for example the EU – in a sense – was now committed to phasing out 
export subsidies, albeit without exact time frame and leaving certain loopholes. 
Reference was also made to the possibility for any WTO member to call off the 
negotiations during the next Ministerial Conference (WTA 26.11.2001; Odell 2003: 
31-33; Wolfe 2004b; Kerr 2002).  
                                                                                                                                        
181 The Singapore issues were opposed particularly by the LMG. A further “battle ground” was about 
the Declaration on “TRIPs and Health” (see above). For a more detailed account of the pre-Doha 
positions and the draft for the Ministerial Conference see WTA 15.10.2001. 
182 As not all WTO members could agree on opening a whole new round of trade negotiations, the 
declaration spoke about the “Doha Development Agenda” rather than about the “Doha Round”. 
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The EU had after five years of intensive efforts apparently achieved its goal of 
launching a new, broad trade round. It managed to get the ACP waiver and both the 
issue of trade and environment and the Singapore issues moved onto the WTO 
agenda, although in a less precise form than the EU had sought (Bridges 
15.11.2001). In a briefing paper by Fischler and Lamy to the Commission, the 
Commission acknowledged the DDA as a success for the EU, although of course 
there was awareness that not all EU demands had been met in their entirety 
(European Commission 2001b). An industry representative described Doha as “para-
success”; the European Commission apparently presented Doha as a “genuine” start 
of negotiations on the Singapore issues. The industry representative recalled the 
industry’s questioning of the formula on the paper, but the Commission was adamant 
it had achieved a negotiation success (interview 32).183 
Despite the changes in the preparatory and conference process, which especially 
sought to accommodate developing countries (Pedersen 2006; Kerr 2002), critics 
argued that developing countries had been put under substantial pressure to sign up 
to the DDA. Narlikar criticised that during the Doha Ministerial the style of negotiation 
was set up to systematically disadvantage developing countries; for example contrary 
to customs in previous conferences, ambassadors were banned from speaking 
during the conference. Only ministers could speak for their countries, which created a 
further disadvantage for many already resource-poor developing countries. Narlikar 
also mentioned pressure and blackmailing tactics by Quad members (2004: 422, see 
also Bello 2002; Wolfe 2004b). “Success” at Doha might have been “bought” by this 
pressure but it remained questionable whether there was genuine consensus on the 
new negotiation agenda. Whether the DDA sufficiently took into account the interests 
of developing countries was hence contested. Bello regarded Doha as a failure for 
developing countries, as their main issues such as implementation had got side-
lined. However, despite this failure, he acknowledged a different quality in the 
cooperation between developing countries in the negotiations (2002; see also Wolfe 
                                            
183 A representative from an EU member state commented that the DDA was valued as a success by 
the EU, because it could not consider it as a failure simply because it was a contentious agenda 
(interview 12). 
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2004b). Mattoo and Subramanian’s analysis of the Doha outcome was more positive 
though: they interpreted the EBA initiative, the ACP waiver and the Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health as results of the power of developing countries in the trade 
regime (2004). With these results, it was, according to Kerr, hence obvious that the 
developed countries “no longer control the agenda-making and the negotiation 
process will be broad based” (2002). 
For most of the rest of 2001, delegations further refined their own positions and 
engaged in exploratory talks (Bridges 28.11.2001). Indication of the conflicts left open 
by the DDA was however already visible shortly after the conference, when disputes 
broke out concerning the four Singapore issues and some developing countries 
expressed their concern that they had been “trapped” into negotiating these issues 
(BT 2001). 
Again, in these overall framework negotiations, services do not seem to have played 
a significant role in the 2000/2001 run-up to the Doha Ministerial. In the January 2001 
strategy paper, the EU’s new approach foresaw greater attention to sectors and 
modes of export interests to developing countries, in line with the “development-
alisation” of the EU’s agenda for the Doha Round (European Commission 2001a). In 
the run-up to the Doha Ministerial, there was some discussion in the General Council 
as to what to include into the Doha Declaration on the services issue: it was 
suggested that it should reiterate WTO members’ commitment to the services 
negotiation guidelines and unlike in the agriculture negotiations, most members 
agreed to this. The EU argued for the inclusion of a standstill provision and 
benchmark dates. Developing countries asked for flexibility in all aspects of the 
services negotiations and for due consideration of autonomous liberalisation. Some 
members also pointed out that the negotiations on GATS rules should be completed 
before further market access negotiations. For the ESM, some members recalled the 
importance of the 15 March 2002 deadline (Bridges 19.06.2001). In the end, the DDA 
only contained a recognition of progress that had been made so far on services 
(WTO 2001), but the Commission indicated its satisfaction with the dates set for the 
market access negotiations (European Commission 2001b). This negotiation result at 
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Doha was, of course, preceded by two years of negotiation in the CTS/CTS-SS. 
These and the EU’s impact on them, will be traced in the next section. 
7.2 Issue-area framework negotiations: starting GATS 2000 
negotiations  
In 2000 and 2001, WTO members agreed on the guidelines for the services 
negotiations in the CTS-SS. Other topics were assessment of services trade, credits 
for autonomous liberalisation and the stock-taking exercise. The reason that the 
CTS-SS was discussing all these issues was that while WTO members failed to 
launch a new trade round in Seattle, they were still formally obliged to conduct the 
built-in negotiations of the Uruguay Round. The EU had tried to prevent this from 
happening: having negotiations only in services and agriculture, and while it 
continued to underline the importance of the more extended round, it now agreed to 
support the sectoral negotiations. With respect to services, there was discussion 
about whether to proceed with the built-in negotiations on a sectoral basis or not. The 
US, consistently with the position it had taken before, pushed for sectoral 
negotiations. Falkenberg, head of the European Commission's Trade Negotiations 
Unit, underlined the necessity for a broader round to secure trade offs between the 
different sectors:  
[...] with the agenda being limited to the agriculture and services 
sectors, there is no room for any give and take which is so crucial in 
these negotiations (Bridges 18.01.2000). 
The Japanese delegation argued for a discussion on WTO reform before moving on 
with any sectoral negotiation. It seemed very uncertain whether WTO members 
would be able to continue with the prescheduled built-in negotiations. This was 
expressed by Mike Moore in several press statements (Bridges 25.01.2000). An EU 
official pointed out that there was a clear understanding that the negotiations could 
not proceed without insertion into a broader round, and that the EU’s idea of a 
Millennium Round had therefore not been defeated (interview 9). Given the very real 
opposition that there was with regard to the trade round, the Commission might have 
been rather optimistic about its ability to achieve its goal (which in itself might have 
even provoked further resistance).  
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When the WTO General Council met on 7-8 February to decide how to proceed with 
the built-in negotiations, it agreed to start the mandated negotiations and reviews as 
planned. In fact, the decision seems to have been rather uncontentious (WTO 
WT/GC/M/53 15.03.2000). This can both be interpreted as a general support of WTO 
members for the trade regime and as an indicator that the WTO regime’s inbuilt 
norms compelled WTO members to comply with the required negotiations. 
The services negotiations were scheduled to start on 21 February with a meeting of 
the CTS. The negotiations themselves would be conducted in special sessions of the 
CTS (“CTS-SS”), scheduled alongside the regular meetings of the CTS to facilitate 
participation of non-Geneva based experts.184 An immediate link to the agriculture 
negotiations was created, as the services negotiations would be aligned to those in 
agriculture. Cross-deals were expected. Whereas the decision to start the 
negotiations was heralded as “back to business“ by WTO DG Mike Moore, others 
were not sure that negotiations would actually start in 2000 – rather there would be a 
framing of negotiations in the two areas of services and agriculture (Bridges 
29.02.2000). This means that in the end a proposal prevailed that the US had 
envisaged earlier: sectoral negotiations and a first phase of framing the negotiations. 
For the EU, starting these negotiations clearly was “better than nothing” and at least 
was a way in which the EU (and other WTO members) could express continued 
support for the WTO.  
When the negotiations started, it was decided that in a first phase, negotiations would 
focus on rule-making, with market access commitments following later. Meetings 
would be held every 5-6 weeks and all issues directly related to the negotiations were 
moved to the CTS-SS agenda. Mercosur members called for the services 
negotiations to be linked to those in agriculture and to make progress in both areas 
dependent on each other. Other developing countries outlined that they would make 
progress in the services negotiations dependent on progress in implementation 
issues and they raised the difficulties of negotiating on the basis of the incomplete 
                                            
184 The discussions on the GATS 2000 negotiations in this and the following chapters are therefore 
dealing with the discussions taking place in the special sessions of the CTS (CTS-SS) rather than 
those in the CTS meetings.  
7 From Seattle to Doha 2000-2001: Launching the new trade round 243 
 
trade in services data (Bridges 29.02.2000; WTO Press/167 07.02.2000). The EU 
representative expressed the EU’s interest in an immediate start of the sectoral 
negotiations and argued that rule making discussion should be held in parallel to the 
sectoral negotiations (WTO S/CSS/M/1 12.04.2000). Strikingly, Mercosur members 
submitted a proposal to the CTS outlining a schedule for the negotiations (WTO 
S/CSS/W/2 14.04.2000). It seems that at this early stage of the negotiations even the 
players that were deemed rather defensive played a constructive role in the 
discussion, but naturally their priority was not market access, but shaping the 
guidelines according to their own priorities. 
The preparation of the negotiations continued with the CTS-SS agreeing in April on 
its agenda and working plan for 2000. Four so-called “services weeks” would 
structure the negotiations. A deadline for the submission of proposals about the 
modalities and structure for the negotiations was “more or less” agreed upon 
(expected to be finalised in May 2000) (WTO S/CSS/M/2 09.05.2000). The CTS-SS 
would discuss the following issues in 2000/2001: 
• Modalities 
• Assessment exercise 
• Autonomous liberalisation 
• Sectoral issues: tourism annex, maritime services, financial services, 
environmental services etc.; work of the Committee on Specific Commitments 
(CSC)  
• Horizontal issues: Mode 4, WPDR, WPGR 
In an apparently minor disagreement, certain delegations, among them the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Pakistan, rejected taking the Seattle 
text as a basis for the negotiations and also refused to start negotiations on market 
access before modalities had been established as foreseen in GATS Art. XIX (WTO 
S/CSS/M/2 09.05.2000). A solution was found shortly afterwards: after various 
informal meetings with delegations, the WTO Secretariat had produced a third draft 
version for the negotiation schedule and at the special session on 26 May, WTO 
members agreed on a “roadmap” for services. The roadmap included provisions with 
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regard to the process of the negotiations. Negotiation modalities would be developed 
by March 2001. It was emphasised by developing countries in particular during the 
discussion that the roadmap could not replace negotiation modalities (WTO 
S/CSS/M/3 26/06/2000). The (small) controversies that appeared at this stage were 
raised mainly by the developing countries and all aimed at postponing the launch of 
the market access negotiations. 
7.2.1 Negotiation guidelines and modalities 
Discussions on the modalities continued in June 2000. Proposals for modalities were 
supposed to be submitted by December 2000/March 2001. The EU asked that the 
Seattle text should be taken as a basis, which was rejected by some (developing) 
countries. New proposals were expected from members, while the Secretariat had 
been mandated to compile possible negotiation procedures and guidelines (WTO 
S/CSS/M/3 26/06/2000; Bridges 30.05.2000).  
The US made a strong attempt at shaping the discussion by submitting a paper 
arguing for fast progress in the negotiations until the end of 2002. The proposal 
introduced elements for the guidelines and indicated the US’ priorities for the 
negotiations.185 It argued for a mechanism which would have set standards as to 
which level to liberalise different sectors to and contained the US’ ideas about 
deadlines for the services negotiations, but no agreement was reached on these as 
groups of countries argued for a connection to the agriculture talks or thought the 
plans were too ambitious (Bridges 10.10.2000; WTO S/CSS/M/5 01/12/2000; WTO 
S/CSS/M/5 01/12/2000; WTO S/CSS/W/4 13/07/2000). The US’ ambitious proposal 
was welcomed enthusiastically by US industry. However, an EU representative 
reminded WTO members that progress in the services negotiations was dependent 
on the launch of a broad round. Other WTO members expressed surprise with the 
US’ idea of a deadline in the end of 2002, as this might create tensions with regard to 
                                            
185 As the US’ negotiation objectives, the paper mentioned: increased market access, scheduling 
transparency, broader sectoral coverage, national treatment, MFN treatment, bindings by mode, 
transparent domestic regulation, and progressive implementation according to each country's 
individual circumstances. The proposal emphasised the need for further liberalisation, the expansion 
of existing commitments and sectoral coverage as much as a new service classification system; and 
it called for an assessment of the “needs of developing countries” and S&D for developing countries.  
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launching the round (Bridges 18.07.2000; WTO S/CSS/W/4 13/07/2000). The US’ 
ambivalence with regard to the round was thus reflected in its approach to the 
services negotiations. 
While the discussion reportedly led to greater understanding on some issues, the 
session brought to the front diverging attitudes with regard to the treatment and 
definition of autonomous liberalisation and ESMs.186 Developing countries also 
opposed proposals by developed countries which assumed their status-quo of 
market access as the base level for liberalisation during the current GATS 
negotiations (Bridges 18.07.2000). In July 2001, the EU submitted an informal paper 
on “Negotiating guidelines: Drafting elements”.187 In the CTS-SS meeting, the EU 
representative explained that the paper was based on the discussion that had taken 
place in the CTS in 1999 and on the May-“roadmap”, and it was meant to represent a 
“collective sense” (WTO S/CSS/M/4 18.09.2000). This seems as if the EU was trying 
to keep all interests on board and to broker a compromise. 
In the third services week, the WTO Secretariat had prepared a draft, which 
incorporated both the EU’s proposal and comments made during the discussions of 
the second services week. Both the African Group188 (S/CSS/W/7) and Hong Kong 
(China), (S/CSS/W/6), had submitted further negotiation proposals. While the Hong 
Kong (China) proposal followed broadly the lines of the Seattle text and the May 
“roadmap”, the African Group proposal raised issues related to development 
concerns. In the ensuing discussion, Brazil criticised several points of the EU 
proposal, including the EU’s request for a balancing of commitments during the 
negotiations. Instead, Brazil considered “progressive liberalisation” as key objective 
of the negotiations. Furthermore, the Brazilian representative criticised that the EU’s 
paper indicated that the negotiations should “close the gap between current 
commitments and actual market practices”, which according to Brazil was not 
foreseen in the GATS. To sum up, the Brazilian proposal aimed to weaken the EU’s 
                                            
186 Developing countries continued to argue for ESMs, while industrialised countries still remained 
undecided about the necessity or feasibility of ESMs. 
187 Informal papers are not available to the public. 
188 The African group is a group of all the African WTO members (WTO 2007d). 
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more ambitious stance. Additionally, Brazil reminded other delegates of the link to the 
agriculture negotiations and to the link between the GATS rules negotiations and the 
market access negotiations (WTO S/CSS/M/5 01.12.2000).  
During the fourth services week in 2000, 23 developing countries submitted a 
communication on the guideline issue (S/CSS/W/13189). The proposal underlined, 
among other issues, appropriate flexibility for developing countries, progressive 
liberalisation, increasing participation of developing countries and commitments in 
sectors of interest to developing countries as core elements of negotiations. The EU 
representative welcomed the elements in the proposal (and in the one by Korea) and 
asked for “promotion of regulatory disciplines, pro-competitive principles and that 
liberalization be supportive of policy objectives, including sustainable development”. 
Discussion among members broadly dealt with the question of how much flexibility 
should be incorporated in the guidelines for developing countries and to what degree 
liberalisation should be “prescribed” by the guidelines190 (WTO S/CSS/W/13 
24.11.2000).  
In January 2001, the WTO secretariat distributed a first set of draft guidelines, which 
were close to the proposal made by the 24 developing countries in 2000 (and placing 
greater emphasis on the concerns raised by developing countries than the Seattle 
text; see footnote 189). However, the text did not go far beyond the GATS text, which 
raised doubts as to whether the guidelines would actually be able to give more 
guidance to the negotiations than the original GATS text. There was also still 
disagreement about the preferred mode of services negotiations: while developing 
countries preferred the request-offer approach, the US argued for different methods. 
Again, concerns were voiced that the service negotiations were affected by the 
                                            
189 The countries were Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Uruguay, and the Members of the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru 
and Venezuela). Guatemala joined the statement later on. 
190 The Indian negotiator assessed convergence in many areas, but that disagreement still existed “in 
the negotiations being comprehensive as opposed to there being no a priori exclusion; pro-
competitive disciplines; standstill; sustainable development, social policy and coherence; technical 
review, where he suggested that a list of issues for review might possibly be drawn up; negotiating 
modalities, where there was a consensus that request-offer be the main approach but differences 
existed with respect to supplementary methods and on whether they required a consensus”. 
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overall strategy of developing countries to ask for progress with regard to the 
implementation of existing agreements and by its link to the agriculture negotiations 
(Bridges 30.01.2001; IUST 26.01.2001). 
Developed countries, and particularly the US, found that the draft guidelines proposal 
was catering “too much” to the demands for flexibility by developing countries 
(Bridges 13.02.2001). A second draft of the guidelines was issued, but rejected by 
the group of the 24 developing countries, as they saw “fundamental problems” with 
the formulations in the draft: in the new draft, the “development dimension” had 
according to the group become sidelined (for example the notion of flexibility for 
developing countries and special treatment for least-developed countries). The group 
opposed that ‘developed country text’ had been left unchanged or had been added. 
However, the draft followed the group’s proposal in certain aspects, for example as it 
stated that negotiations could start from bound commitments. The position of the 24 
developing countries was supported by the African Group and CARICOM (Caribbean 
Community and Common Market), whilst India acted as a spokesperson of the 
coalition. Some, though, considered this oppositional move as “tactics” to bridge the 
time until the Doha Ministerial (Bridges 20.02.2001; IUST 02.03.2001). 
Quad members met in March to work out a strategy to overcome the opposition of 
the developing countries, and especially of the group of the 24 developing countries. 
The Quad meeting, however, did not deliver the desired outcome, as Quad members 
could neither agree on how to deal with the developing countries’ demands for S&D 
nor on the broader issue of implementation (IUST 23.03.2001). It was also contested 
how the services negotiations would move forward in 2001: the EU and Japan 
favoured a slower moving approach, in which subsidiary negotiation groups to the 
CTS (which would discuss technical questions and identify market access barriers) 
would only be formed after the Doha Ministerial. This might have reflected a concern 
by the EU and Japan that the resistance of developing countries against the 
guidelines was symbolic of developing countries resistance to the services 
negotiations overall and that actual movement in services could only be achieved 
after the launch of a trade round at the Doha Ministerial. The US did, however, 
support a faster moving approach and had already in 2000 called for the 
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establishment of subsidiary negotiation groups. However, even if negotiations could 
move to a sectoral basis in 2001, a IUST source reported that the challenge for WTO 
members would be to keep momentum in the negotiations at all during the next 
months, because in fact little technical work was needed (except for in energy 
services) (Bridges 06.03.2001; IUST 02.03.2001). IUST commented 
It has been clear for a long time that neither the services nor the 
on-going agriculture talks can move towards negotiations in the 
absence of a larger negotiation (IUST 02.03.2001). 
In the meantime, developing countries organised several meetings among 
themselves to consult about the guidelines. Additionally, Marchi, the Canadian 
ambassador who was now Chair of the CTS, called consultations with 20 delegations 
to seek a compromise. One idea was to restart discussions on the basis of both the 
first and the second draft, but the group of 24 developing countries indicated that 
they would like to submit proposals on the basis of which the chairman could draw up 
a completely new draft or negotiate on the basis of the first draft (Bridges 
13.03.2001). 
After this temporary stalling of the negotiations and the consultation process 
undertaken by Marchi, a new draft for the GATS negotiation modalities was 
distributed on 15 March by the WTO Secretariat, attempting a compromise:  
The new draft reintroduces certain references to development 
issues present in the first draft, such as the objective of increased 
participation of developing countries in trade in services and of 
providing appropriate flexibility for individual developing country 
Members. The new guidelines also contain some bracketed elements 
(i.e., elements on which further guidance from the Council on Trade in 
Services was considered necessary) concerning issues such as 
flexibility for developing countries in relation to negotiations on MFN 
(Most Favoured Nation) exemptions (Bridges 20.03.2001). 
After an informal meeting of the CTS-SS, a fourth draft was compiled by the 
Secretariat. It seemed that members nearly found a consensus on this fourth draft, 
which was welcomed by developing countries as even closer to their concerns than 
the initial first draft. Developing countries’ requests were catered for in the draft as it 
contained provisions to provide flexibility to individual developing country members 
and the objective of increasing the participation of developing countries in the 
services industry. The “standstill provision” was dropped as developing countries had 
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requested, as there was no such provision in agriculture. Furthermore, the provision 
on technical review and a reference to the annex on air transport, advocated by 
developed countries, were dropped (Bridges 27.03.2001).191 
After small further amendments, the negotiation guidelines were agreed upon at the 
end of March 2001, one day after the adoption of the guidelines for the agriculture 
negotiations. The guidelines refer mostly to existing provisions of the GATS. 
Development concerns had been inserted in some sections, for example a reference 
to the size of economies and to small and medium service suppliers.192  
 Reception of the guidelines was mixed: 
While trade sources last week privately acknowledged the services 
guidelines to be of minor substantive significance, they said the 
agreement provided an important signal that WTO Members are 
ready and willing to move ahead in the mandated negotiations even 
in the absence of a new round. WTO Services Division Director David 
Hartridge qualified the agreement on the guidelines as "good news," 
and added "it is seen by everybody as opening the next phase of 
negotiations." […]However, some delegations privately expressed 
dismay at the predominance of developed country proposals 
presented so far, and questioned the ability of developing countries to 
effectively advance areas of interest to them in the current process 
(Bridges 03.04.2001). 
From the EU side, there was little reaction to the guidelines at the time. In an 
interview, an EU official explained that the EU had aimed for a different negotiation 
approach (different from the request-offer approach), but that they had very little 
support for this and that the Quad themselves could not agree on it (see also 
previous chapter). This led to the guidelines being mainly a repetition of the GATS 
provisions (interview 9). The EU and the US also regretted the absence of a 
“standstill provision”, which had been rejected by developing countries because they 
feared it would impede their right to regulate their services sectors. Equally, requests 
would not be based on the status quo of market access but on current WTO 
commitments (usually market access is more liberal than WTO commitments). The 
EU (and US’) favoured cluster approach (see below) also was not taken up by the 
                                            
191 Bridges 27.03.2001 can be consulted for more detail on the contents of the fourth proposal. 
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guidelines. However, the guidelines left it open to WTO members to agree on further 
“bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral negotiations” methods (IUST 30.03.2001). One 
can therefore argue that for the EU, the negotiations on the guidelines brought little 
success. 
The guidelines provided the background for sectoral, technical discussions which 
were expected to last about one year. A first session of sectoral discussions was 
expected in May 2001, among others on the wide sectoral proposals the EU and the 
US had made (IUST 30.03.2001). 
7.2.2 Cluster approach  
In 2000, the CTS-SS also discussed for several months the so-called “cluster 
approach”. The approach was promoted by the EU and Australia, who submitted 
proposals for a “cluster approach” in the first services week in 2000 (S/CSS/W/3; Job 
No. 3194). The cluster approach was meant to make commitments more coherent 
and transparent 
a cluster was a group of sectors or sub-sectors which were related 
and for which negotiators would agree to seek a harmonized and 
coherent set of commitments (WTO S/CSS/M/3 26.06.2000). 
This was hence a further attempt of the EU (and Australia) to ensure a far-reaching 
result in the services negotiations. Discussion on the cluster approach continued in 
the second services week. The EU representative underlined that the cluster 
approach was independent of the ongoing discussion on classification (which had 
been suggested by other delegations) and that the cluster approach did not alter the 
way members would make commitments or the flexibility of GATS (which was feared 
by some other members). It was meant to be a tool to facilitate negotiations. He 
proposed to “experiment” with clusters, which should be followed by a subsequent 
assessment of the results. ASEAN countries and others asked for further clarification 
of the cluster approach (WTO S/CSS/M/4 18.09.2000). However, the cluster 
approach was rejected by developing countries because it might have increased 
                                                                                                                                        
192 For a more detailed description of the adopted set of guidelines see BRIDGES Monthly review, Vol. 
5, No. 1-3, January-April 2001. 
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complexity of the negotiations and might have introduced further services sectors into 
the negotiations (IUST 26.01.2001). The EU’s cluster approach stimulated further 
debate during the third services week, but the US’ paper entitled "Framework for 
negotiations"193 (S/CSS/W/4) was the centre of the discussion (see above) (Bridges 
10.10.2000; WTO S/CSS/M/5 01.12.2000). In the fourth services week, no further 
discussion on the cluster approach took place (WTO S/CSS/M/7 02.03.2001). 
Discussion abated and the proposal seems to have been discarded. This could be an 
example of learning in the negotiations, of failure of an EU proposal or both. 
7.2.3 Assessment194 
As explained in Sect. 5.2.1, the question of an assessment of service trade was 
transformed into a standing item on the CTS-SS agenda. Developing countries 
continued to emphasise that new market access commitments were extremely 
difficult or even dangerous to undertake without reliable trade in services data (WTO 
S/CSS/M/1 12.04.2000). Discussions on the assessment issue in 2000 initially 
centred on how to improve the quality of trade in services data. It was proposed that 
the ESF could provide further statistics, which they did via the EU in the next meeting 
(WTO S/CSS/M/3 26.06.2000). Discussion on services assessment in the second 
services week seems to have been brief. Several developing countries, among them 
Pakistan and India, pointed out that a WTO Secretariat paper had identified 
significant barriers to services trade that developing countries faced, especially in 
Mode 4. Canada, the US and the EU offered to organise a seminar on trade in 
services data (WTO S/CSS/M/4 18.09.2000). This proposal received wide-spread 
support and the seminar was held in October 2000. In the subsequent third services 
week, India emphasised that the seminar had shown that developing countries 
especially suffered from a lack of Mode 4 commitments. Other members shared their 
experiences of assessment of services trade, but again the discussion seems to 
have been short (WTO S/CSS/M/5 01.12.2000). Discussion continued in the fourth 
services week (WTO S/CSS/M/7 02.03.2001), but significant conclusions were not 
                                            
193 A further submission was by Hong Kong (China) (S/CSS/W/6).  
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reached. The US indicated that it felt the assessment exercise had achieved its 
objective and those delegations wanting to discuss further should submit papers as 
soon as possible (WTO S/CSS/W/4 13.07.2000). The assessment exercise hence 
was kept as item on the CTS-SS agenda due to developing countries’ interest in the 
assessment, but it seemed unclear what aim the debate was heading to.  
As assessment was a standing agenda item, the discussion continued in 2001. In the 
first services week, the discussion on assessment was based on two papers by 
Eastern European countries and by Argentina.195 Developing countries argued that 
the available statistics (in the papers) showed an imbalance in services trade, and 
the EU and the US pointed to the different ways in which the statistics could be read. 
Pakistan indicated that the objectives of the discussion needed to be clarified (WTO 
S/CSS/M/8 14.05.2001). In the next services week, Norway presented a research 
paper entitled "Diffusion of Information Technology, SADC [Southern African 
Development Community] and International Production” (JOB(01)/71), which 
analysed the impact of services trade liberalisation on developing countries. Pakistan 
explained that services assessment should have both a quantitative and a qualitative 
dimension, which was supported by the EU. However, apart from these contributions, 
discussion was short and brought no substantially new issues (WTO S/CSS/M/9 
22.06.2001). In subsequent meetings, developing countries continued to underline 
the importance of the assessment exercise as much as the fact that the benefits of 
services trade for developing countries were unclear. Pakistan pointed out that in the 
Uruguay Round, developing countries had conceded to negotiating services despite 
the lack of statistic, and that still now the assessment of the effects of GATS 
remained stalemated. The Secretariat was mandated to sum up statements and 
submissions on services assessment (JOB(01)/160). The EU expressed its support 
for the developing countries’ concerns. However, the US insisted that a sufficient 
assessment exercise had been conducted and was an on-going item on the CTS-SS. 
                                                                                                                                        
194 The assessment exercise was moved to the CTS-SS agenda, alongside with all other issues 
related to the negotiations (WTO S/CSS/M/1 12.04.2000) 
195 S/CSS/W/18 and Corrigendum 1 by Slovenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic; S/CSS/W/44 by Argentina. 
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The EU supported a case study approach to the assessment, which was supported 
by the US and Norway (WTO S/CSS/M/10 21.09.2001; WTO S/CSS/M/12 
28.11.2001). 
In a subsequent meeting, Cuba, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia 
submitted an extensive paper on the possible negative consequences of services 
liberalisation experienced by developing countries (S/CSS/W/132; earlier paper: 
S/CSS/W/114). The debate focused mainly on the latter paper, which was criticised 
by several countries, especially Switzerland, as incoherent. The EU, the US and 
Switzerland set out to critique a statement in the paper that the GATS had negative 
impacts on developing countries – if an assessment of the effects of the GATS was 
still urgently needed as argued so often in the CTS-SS, the effects of the GATS could 
not assumed to be negative from the start. In a reaction seen as too strong by some 
developing countries, developed countries also criticised the from their point of view 
outdated information in the paper (Bridges 04.12.2001; Bridges 12.12.2001). The EU 
furthermore emphasised that the argument that developing countries had been 
marginalised in services trade was not unambiguous. The representative argued that 
domestic policies needed to be adequate to make use of the opportunities created by 
GATS. There was an ongoing “bickering” between the EU, US (and other 
demandeurs) and the developing countries about whether the assessment had 
started and whether market access negotiations could commence before the 
assessment was concluded (WTO S/CSS/M/13 26.02.2002). This was a 
disagreement that the EU/US in a sense had already “won” by making the 
assessment ongoing. However, despite the guidelines, developing countries kept on 
raising this point. While in 2001 several papers were presented that entailed case 
studies or statistical evidence, a large part of the discussion was taken up by this 
“political” dimension of the negotiations. This was a clear sign of the divergence of 
interests within the services negotiations and arguably of the “power of non-decision 
making”.  
7.2.4 Credits for autonomous liberalisation 
Discussions on the establishment of a system of credits for autonomous liberalisation 
were mandated by GATS Art. XIX and started in 2001. Members discussed whether 
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there should be a general or formula based approach to autonomous liberalisation 
and whether autonomous liberalisation credits should be dealt with only bilaterally or 
also multilaterally. The EU delegate suggested that issues to be discussed included 
transparency, credit and the possibility of a review mechanism (WTO S/CSS/M/8 
14.05.2001). CTS Chair Celso Amorim reported afterwards that members thought 
that autonomous liberalisation was not discussed enough (Bridges 22.05.2001). 
Discussion continued on the basis of a Secretariat paper in May (Job (01)/65; 
JOB(01)/141). Contributions by delegations ranged from technical contributions by 
the EU to more general contributions such as Pakistan’s, which reminded negotiators 
that flexibility was essential for developing countries (WTO S/CSS/M/9 22.06.2001). 
The Secretariat’s summary of the discussion (JOB(01)/141) was criticised as 
incomprehensive by several delegations and discussion continued on definitional 
issues (WTO S/CSS/M/12 28.11.2001).  
A further strand of the discussion seems to have been parsimony versus complexity, 
and secondly whether autonomous liberalisation credits should be just for developing 
countries or for the broader WTO membership (WTO S/CSS/M/13 26.02.2002). 
Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay asked for autonomous liberalisation credits to be given 
only to developing countries, because the dominance of the industrialised countries 
in service trade made a “global” autonomous liberalisation credit clause “unfair” 
(Bridges 17.07.2001). However, the question could not be solved easily and 
disagreement continued into autumn 2001. Developing countries argued that 
autonomous liberalisation credits could be a mechanism to operationalise Art. IV 
(increasing participation of developing countries in services trade). Multilateral criteria 
for the treatment of autonomous liberalisation remained to be found though (Bridges 
02.10.2001, 09.10.2001, 16.10.2001). A group mainly consisting of Latin American 
and Asian Members submitted a new paper (S/CSS/W/130) and members requested 
the Secretariat to draft a new report on autonomous liberalisation credits (WTO 
S/CSS/M/13 26.02.2002). Discussion would be continued in 2002. 
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7.2.5 Overall developments196 
Overall, the negotiations in 2000 were accompanied by growing concern in civil 
society about liberalisation of services usually provided by public authorities 
(education, health). Bridges points out that services provided by public authorities are 
exempted from liberalisation under the GATS (Art. I GATS), but that the public feared 
that the GATS would lead to increased privatisation of such sectors. The director of 
the WTO’s Trade in Services Division publicly dismissed these claims and pointed 
out that these services "will not be negotiated, they will not be the subject of market 
access commitments, and they will not be subject to subsidy disciplines". (Bridges 
10.10.2000). Equally, Lamy dismissed the claim that public services were dealt with 
under GATS (European Commission 2000b). As a reaction to increased campaigning 
against the services negotiations, the WTO Secretariat published in early 2001 a 
guide called “GATS – facts and fiction” (Bridges 20.03.01). 
It can be argued that in 2000, a significant change in the public perception of services 
liberalisation became visible. While services was regarded as a “clean industry” 
before, services liberalisation became increasingly a target of NGO campaigning 
amidst fears of uncontrollable liberalisation. This development was reflected on the 
EU level, with first signs of NGO protest against the GATS. At a meeting organized 
by the ESF, Lamy consequently clarified that the EU was not looking to promote 
privatisation or deregulation. A development dimension was inserted in the EU 
objectives for the GATS negotiations.  
Significant in the argumentation of the EU in 2000 is its turn to “sustainable” 
development. This is visible in the proposals in the CTS, for example on tourism 
services. In a speech, Lamy emphasised 
                                            
196 A further item discussed in the CTS-SS was a stock taking exercise. Paragraph 2(g) of the May 
2000 road-map instructs WTO members that "the second phase of these negotiations would begin 
with a stock-taking exercise by the Special Session in March 2001, to consider progress made and 
how to move forward". In the first services week, comments were invited evaluating progress made 
so far and scheduling future work. Most countries assessed progress so far as positive and 
suggested that in the subsequent meetings in 2001, sectoral proposals should be discussed. This 
was also broadly the EU’s standpoint. While countries differed in their emphasis on the different 
areas in the negotiations, due to their diverging interests, the discussion was in general very 
harmonious (WTO S/CSS/M/8 14.05.2001), but no further action was taken. This hence needs not 
to be taken up in more detail here. 
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Trade, environment and social policies must play a mutually 
supportive role in favour of sustainable development (European 
Commission 2000b). 
However, the notion of “sustainable development” or “sustainability” was rejected 
mostly by developing countries, who feared the loss of national sovereignty and 
protectionism under this disguise. 
In terms of business involvement, Lamy acknowledged the ESF’s contribution to the 
EU’s policy on the services negotiations: 
You have united the European service sector, and played an 
active role in shaping our strategy in the service negotiations 
(European Commission 2000b). 
Apart from these issues, services did not figure on the EU’s agenda for the general 
framework negotiations in the WTO,197 much less than agriculture had with its 
prominence in the pre-Doha discussion, apart from the Commission arguing its case 
that services negotiations alone could not succeed. For 2000, Lamy judged that the 
services negotiations had for that reason been very slow (European Commission 
2000b, i). 
7.3 Interim Conclusion 
This chapter traced the EU’s attempts at reviving the new trade round idea after the 
failure of the Seattle Ministerial to the successful Doha Round Ministerial, where the 
DDA was launched. This second period in the negotiations was characterised by high 
activity with regard to the overall negotiation framework. In the GATS 2000 
negotiations, the pace of activity was lower, with first attempts at setting negotiation 
guidelines, but with the negotiations having “starting problems” as many delegations 
were waiting for the launch of a broader trade round. The EU had tried to prevent this 
from happening: having negotiations only in services and agriculture, and while it 
continued to underline the importance of the more extended round, it now agreed to 
support the sectoral negotiations. For the EU, two reasons for its participation in the 
GATS 2000 negotiations can be identified: first, stabilisation of the WTO regime and 
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second, a pragmatism which assumes that “any negotiation is better than none”. 
However, this strategy certainly carried risks for the EU, especially as the EU was 
faced internally with ongoing divisions with regard to agriculture. 
The previous chapters have already indicated a certain recognition of the power shift 
by the European Commission (research question 1). Still, the EU’s agenda for the 
new round remained mainly the same, with only slight changes and some increased 
flexibility in the EU position. However, the Commission’s realisation led to some 
strategic changes (increasing attention towards developing countries, cooperation 
with the US). At this stage, it can hence be said that with regard to research question 
1, the EU chose to make changes in its strategy rather than in the substance of its 
demands. 
The power shift, as observed in previous chapters, caused further effects in the 
WTO: the outcome of the Seattle Ministerial encouraged various developing 
countries, among them Brazil, South Africa, South East Asian countries and India, to 
further improve cooperation among themselves, with the clear intention to shape the 
WTO agenda to the needs of developing countries. The EU would hence have to 
adapt to further changes in the way the negotiations functioned in the WTO. 
The increasing politicisation of the WTO negotiations, as observed in chapter 5 
above, was now affecting the services negotiations directly. There was growing 
concern in civil society about the impact of GATS negotiations on public services and 
“uncontrollable liberalisation”. It can be argued that in 2000, a significant change in 
the public perception of services liberalisation became visible. Similarly to the first 
major change in the trade regime, the increasing prominence of developing countries 
in the WTO, this second factor of the power shift was slowly revealing its full effects 
after the Seattle Ministerial. The EU reacted with attempts to improve its relations to 
civil society both inside the EU and in the broader, international realm. 
In terms of research questions 4 and 5, the chapter has shown plenty of attempts of 
the EU to shape the agenda, to build coalitions and to raise support for its ideas for 
                                                                                                                                        
197 Internally, the Nice Treaty was yet another attempt of the Commission to move from unanimity to 
qualified majority voting (QMV) on services (European Commission 2000b). 
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the WTO agenda: after the failure of the Seattle Ministerial, the EU needed to 
convince especially the broad group of developing countries of the benefits of this 
new round, if it still wanted to see its idea of a broader trade round succeed. Lamy 
hence envisaged a first stage of confidence-building measures. 
The EU hence continued its lobbying for the new, broad trade round. The EU’s 
lobbying efforts concentrated especially on the developing countries: (1) After 
discussions within the Quad, the EU launched the EBA initiative. This might be 
interpreted as the EU trying to break up developing countries’ solidarity. At the same 
time, this means that the EU was moving itself into the position of “benefactor”, using 
the power factor “market access”. With this initiative the EU had created for itself a 
powerful “bargaining chip” with which not only to “woo” the LDC but also to exert 
pressure on its developed country trading partners. (2) “Developmentalisation” of the 
EU’s WTO agenda; and the Commission heavily used the new concept of 
“sustainability” to argue for its trade policy. Closer to the Doha Ministerial, it managed 
to achieve the renewal of the ACP waiver and helped towards a declaration on the 
TRIPs Agreement and public health. These initiatives made an agreement on the 
DDA possible (see also Wolfe 2004b). While its substantive demands did not change 
much, the EU did show some flexibility on the implementation issue, which seemed 
to have had positive effects. This strategy of the EU to raise the importance of 
development issues in the early stages of a trade round has been observed already 
in previous trade rounds (Drahos 2003). 
Division between the EU and the US had previously made agreement impossible. 
The European Commission reacted to this by actively building a common agenda 
with the US, as the idea of the new round could only progress after the US had 
clarified its own position and had started to support the round. These attempts 
arguably were fruitful. Consultations also took place within the Quad, but results were 
not that obvious.  
On negotiation guidelines and modalities, it seems that the EU was trying to keep all 
interests on board and reach for a compromise, but otherwise was mostly concerned 
that the services negotiations would still be integrated in a broader round. Not only 
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the EU tried to use issue linkage though, for example Mercosur members called for 
the services negotiations to be linked to those in agriculture.  
The EU’s agenda was indirectly aided by the much improved conference preparation 
and management by the WTO staff, arguably increasing its organisationally-
dependent capabilities (research question 3). In terms of the EU’s resource power 
(research question 2), the biggest change in this period was the increasing 
opposition to the EU’s plans for services liberalisation expressed by NGOs inside the 
EU, which might have diminished the EU’s resource power. At one stage, the 
European Commission was also challenged over its EBA initiative by the EU member 
states, which arguably also reduced the EU’s resource power.  
Did the EU succeed with its strategy and achieve desirable outcomes (research 
question 6)? At the end of 2000, it seemed that the EU had “re-“created a valid basis 
for the promotion of its new round idea and with the Doha Ministerial in 2001, the EU 
had after six years of intensive efforts apparently achieved its goal of launching a 
new, broad trade round. In this way, the outcome of this negotiation phase strongly 
reflected the EU’s preferences. However, much of the agenda had been watered 
down for the sake of finding a compromise and the success had been “bought” at 
least partially by exerting intense bilateral pressure on various developing countries 
and not by arriving at a real consensus (Narlikar 2004). It was hence not clear 
whether the EU’s success at this stage would lead to a longer lasting new shape of 
the regime or not. “Negotiations about negotiations” would have to continue in the 
WTO to arrive at a clearer direction for the DDA.  
In the services negotiations, the negotiation modalities were agreed upon, but in 
effect had little substantive significance and were hence of much more limited scope 
than the EU had desired. One can therefore argue that for the EU, the negotiations 
on the guidelines were of little success, which again was partially due to the 
divergent preferences of the Quad (research question 5, 6). Another EU (and 
Australian) approach was the cluster approach, which disappeared slowly from the 
negotiation agenda. This could have been an example of learning in the negotiations, 
of a failure of an EU proposal or both. The negotiations on “autonomous liberalisation 
credits” constituted another “negotiation about negotiations”, in which countries tried 
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to shape the regime in a way that they would have to make as little commitments as 
possible. The (small) controversies that appeared at this stage were raised mainly by 
the developing countries and all aimed to postpone the launch of the market access 
negotiations. With the modalities agreed upon before the launch of the Doha Round, 
it remained difficult to retain movement in the negotiations.198 
In the more general framework negotiations, the services negotiations were of minor 
importance in this phase. The negotiations seemed to run more or less smoothly and 
no particular political attention was devoted to the topic. Arguably, however, the 
GATS 2000 discussions constituted negotiations around a lot of “hot air”, as the 
substantial negotiations on market access had not yet started and WTO members 
needed to bridge time until the Doha Ministerial. However, even if these discussions 
were secondary “theatres of war”, they nonetheless show the distributional fight and 
the diverging interests underlying the WTO services negotiations and were used 
frequently to install issue linkages across negotiation levels. 
The Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001 hence did not resolve the internal tensions 
that had emerged inside the WTO, which would become evident soon after the 
launch of the Doha Round. How would the EU deal with this and try to shape the 
DDA negotiations? This will be discussed in the next two chapters. The next chapter 
will take up the period after the Doha Ministerial until the Cancún Ministerial (2002-
2003) 
                                            
198 The CTS-SS held some discussion on technical issues to “bridge” this time. Only little technical 
work was needed though. 
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8 From Doha to Cancún 2002-2003: starting the 
Doha Round 
As described in the previous chapter, the launch of the Doha Round meant that the 
EU’s plan for the WTO’s agenda had succeeded. This, of course, was only the first 
step for the EU to achieve. Now the EU would have to shape the actual negotiations 
in a way that would be conducive towards achieving the EU’s goals of market access 
and also of protecting its defensive interests. The conflicts inside the WTO that would 
shape the negotiations were already visible and could be expected to shape this 
phase of negotiations as well. The first section in this chapter hence deals with the 
first two years of the Doha Round negotiations and with the failed Cancún Ministerial 
in 2003. The second section, as in the previous chapter, follows the GATS 2000 
negotiations through the years 2001-2003, in which the framework negotiations for 
GATS 2000 continued and in which market access negotiations started. 
8.1 Overall framework negotiations: the first stages of the Doha 
Round 
In terms of the overall framework negotiations, 2002 was rather “unexciting”, as with 
the start of the Doha Round the main tasks left were structuring the negotiations and 
other preparatory processes. At the Doha Ministerial, WTO members had decided 
that a “Trade Negotiations Committee” (TNC) would oversee the negotiations. WTO 
members hence started a range of consultations in early 2002 in the TNC about how 
to operationalise the Doha mandate, which led to disagreements between developed 
and developing countries. For example, developing countries and LDC were afraid of 
the Quad enforcing its favoured negotiation approach, because this might have given 
the Quad an advantage over the substance of the negotiations as well. The Quad 
objected to this argument and argued that developing countries were simply trying to 
8 From Doha to Cancún 2002-2003: starting the Doha Round 262 
 
stall the negotiations (Bridges 16.01.2002).199 However, these smaller disagreements 
did not seem to have hindered the negotiation progress substantially and WTO 
members agreed on the structure of the DDA negotiations, establishing seven 
negotiating bodies. These would deal with agriculture, services, non-agricultural 
market access, rules, trade and environment, a multilateral register for geographical 
indications for wines and spirits, and reform of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(WTO 2003: 5). Across the first half of 2002, the work in these various sub-
committees of the TNC consisted of negotiations on procedural issues and 
modalities. Substantial negotiations slowly started afterwards. 
With the start of negotiations on specific issues, the conflicts visible prior to the 
establishment of the Doha Agenda re-emerged in the discussion in the WTO: 
developing countries warned that the negotiations would not move forward 
substantially if their concerns regarding S&D and implementation of Uruguay Round 
agreements were not taken on board. A further contentious area was the extension 
of the geographical indication register beyond its current range of wines and spirits 
(Bridges 24.07.2002; TERI 2003: 5ff). In autumn 2002, two further main issues of 
controversy emerged: TRIPs and public health and agricultural subsidies (see for 
example Bridges 09.10.2002; FT 29.08.2003). The contentious issues were debated 
throughout 2002, but solutions were not found (Bridges 12.12.2002; see also Bridges 
20.12.2002).  
Developed countries continued their initiatives aiming at building support by 
developing countries. In March 2002, developed countries pledged double the 
amount to the “Doha Development Trust Fund” than had been requested by the WTO 
Secretariat in its plan for 2002 (Bridges 12.03.2002). Throughout 2002, Lamy 
continued to emphasise the importance of the development dimension in the trade 
round and how the development dimension should be operationalised (for example 
European Commission 2002d). However, these attempts by the EU did not 
                                            
199 A group of developing countries also feared that their interests would not be represented 
appropriately by WTO DG Mike Moore, if he became chairman of the TNC. A compromise was 
reached, which meant that WTO DG Moore took up the chairmanship but had to follow a set of 
procedures ensuring that all interests were taken on board (Bridges 05.02.2002). 
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necessarily result in EU successes in other negotiation areas. The agreement on 
deadlines for NAMA modalities was regarded as a success for developing countries, 
especially the African Group and India, over the EU’s proposal (Bridges 24.07.2002). 
The EU also failed to align the deadline of the review for S&D with the agriculture and 
services negotiations due to the resistance of LDC and African countries (Bridges 
06.08.2002).200 
Agriculture now quickly moved to become the linchpin and crunch point of the 
negotiations. In early 2003, the negotiations stalled, which Chair Harbinson attributed 
to a lack of flexibility to compromise (Bridges 29.01.2003, 06.02.2003). The TNC 
noted uneven progress in the different negotiation areas, with Services Chair 
Ambassador Jara warning that other negotiation areas should not impede the current 
good progress in the request-offer process in the services area (Bridges 06.02.2003). 
With services now embedded in the broader round, the links between negotiation 
levels and areas clearly became more important.  
From spring 2003 onwards, preparations for the Cancún Ministerial intensified. The 
first Mini-Ministerial that followed took place in Tokyo and 22 trade ministers 
attended. Apparently, the looming US invasion of Iraq hindered progress, especially 
as the EU and the US were at odds over this, a further example where external 
events impacted on the WTO negotiations. Rifts over agriculture and TRIPS and 
health persisted (Bridges 19.02.2003), and no movement was achieved until March 
(Bridges 05.03.2003). The first deadline for the establishment of modalities in the 
agriculture negotiations was missed. This negotiation failure was reflected across 
other negotiation areas: in the CTS-SS, only few offers were submitted in line with 
the end of March deadline (Bridges 04.04.2003). Deadlines on TRIPs and public 
health, implementation issues and S&D were equally missed (Bridges 10.04.2003). 
The OECD and other international institutions (for example G8) urged for progress in 
the Doha Round (see for example Bridges 07.05.2003, 04.06.2003). However, these 
                                            
200 At the same time, the US obtained fast track negotiation authority for the Doha negotiations, which 
raised hopes that the US would be able to play a more active role in the negotiations in the future 
(Bridges 06.08.2002), which might be beneficial to the EU as well. 
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attempts to push forward the Doha negotiations did not translate into actual 
movement in the technical negotiations (Bridges 10.04.2003).  
The EU and the US reacted to this with increasing flexibility on the Singapore issues: 
while the EU had previously indicated that it would like to see the negotiations on the 
Singapore issues reconfirmed in Cancún (Bridges 10.04.2003), the EU and the US 
now indicated that the Singapore issues could be considered on a separate basis 
(Bridges 14.05.2003). To build support for the Cancún Ministerial, the EU also 
continued its strategy of “wooing” especially the LDC. For example, in a speech at 
the 2nd mini-Ministerial Conference, Lamy suggested that by the time of the Cancún 
Ministerial a significant development package should be reached, which should 
include decisions on S&D, market access commitments in sectors of interest to 
developing countries, improved pro-development WTO rules, and technical 
assistance (European Commission 2003g).201  
At the same time, LDC ministers finalised their common strategy for the Cancún 
Ministerial (Bridges 28.05.2003). India and China announced they would strengthen 
their cooperation in the WTO (Bridges 03.07.2003). It also seems that developing 
countries were getting support from a further source now: a US lobbyist pointed to 
the changing strategy of developing countries, which would form alliances with 
Western NGOs (IUST 10.05.2002). Developing countries hence continued to build 
coalitions and expand their capacity to participate in the negotiations. The groups 
they met in were, among others, the ACP, the African Group, the LDCs, the Small 
and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs), and the Like Minded Group (LMG). When 
pressures increased on the developing countries in the run up to Cancún in 2003, 
several new groups formed, among them the G20 dealing with agriculture (see 
below; see also Narlikar and Tussie 2004; Narlikar 2005).202 
                                            
201 Lamy equally emphasised the importance of the development dimension in the Doha negotiations 
at an ASEM meeting shortly before the Cancún Ministerial (European Commission 2003h). 
202 These groups were, among others, the “Core Group” of developing countries, which opposed the 
Singapore issues, a coalition on cotton, and a group dealing with strategic products and special 
safeguard mechanism, and the G20. Narlikar and Tussie describe the work of these coalitions 
(Narlikar and Tussie 2004).  
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Unexpectedly for the EU, a new issue was brought to the negotiation table by 
another new coalition of four African countries. In a June 2003 TNC meeting, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad called for the eradication of cotton subsidies, arguing 
that their economies were damaged substantially by export subsidies of certain 
countries, most of all the USA. The proposal received positive reactions from many 
countries, including the EU. This was logical as the EU does not give cotton 
subsidies (Bridges 12.06.2003; FT 15.09.2003; Narlikar and Tussie 2004). The 
cotton issue would, however, impact the WTO agenda more than the EU probably 
expected at this point of time. 
Disagreement among WTO members persisted, with the next Mini-Ministerial, held in 
Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, not producing a move forward. The EU’s internal problems 
in approving its CAP reform seem to have had a negative impact on the negotiations 
(Bridges 25.06.2003), but the way to a more offensive position of the EU on 
agriculture was cleared with the approval of the CAP reform203 in July 2003. 
However, the European Commission was now also internally faced with resistance 
against the Singapore issues, as NGOs campaigned against a launch of negotiations 
on them (Bridges 03.07.2003, 10.07.2003).  
To drive forward the negotiation process, General Council Chair Perez del Castillo 
submitted a draft Ministerial text in his own responsibility shortly before the WTO 
annual “recess” in August. The draft text contained a broad framework and there 
were no propositions for specific modalities in the various negotiation areas. 
Developing countries complained that the text was one-sidedly biased towards 
developed country issues (Bridges 28.07.2003). A third mini-Ministerial in August put 
increased pressure on the EU and the US to overcome the deadlock in the 
agriculture negotiations (Bridges 21.08.2003). Subsequently, the EU and the USA 
circulated a proposal on agricultural trade, which although criticised by many 
developing countries gave rise to new hopes for a success during the Ministerial and 
for overcoming the deadlock in agricultural negotiations (Bridges 21.08.2003; FT 
19.08.2003). A compromise between the EU and the US, which would then form the 
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basis of a compromise among the broader membership, was common in GATT 
times. This time, however, the paper was heavily criticised exactly for being a deal 
just between the EU and the US. An EU business representative suggested that the 
G20 had formed mainly as an adverse reaction to the EU-US compromise on 
agriculture. In this sense the EU-US attempt to move forward the negotiations 
backfired and even led to the formation of a clearer opposition coalition (interview 32, 
33; see also Narlikar 2005).  
Not much time now remained to bridge the remaining, substantial gaps between 
delegations. General Council Chair Perez del Castillo, in cooperation with WTO DG 
Supachai, issued a further version of the draft Ministerial Declaration.204 As Heads of 
Delegations could not agree on a more refined version of the text, Perez del Castillo 
decided to forward the draft Declaration in his own responsibility to Ministers at 
Cancún (Bridges 28.08.2003). The Cancún Ministerial had been meant to be a mid-
term review of the progress of the DDA negotiations, as foreseen by Paragraph 45 
DDA, and to provide the “necessary political guidance” to enable Geneva based 
negotiators to continue their work (TERI 2003: 4). As negotiations proceeded more 
slowly than foreseen in the DDA, the agenda for the Ministerial was now substantially 
reduced and finally ministers were only meant to agree on a broad negotiation 
framework, with modalities to be added later on in negotiations in Geneva (FT 
15.09.2003; Bridges 10.09.2003). 
8.1.1 The Cancún WTO Ministerial205 
During the first day in Cancún, five working groups were established to deal with  
• agriculture 
                                                                                                                                        
203 According to an interviewee, the CAP reform gave the EU space for a range of concessions on 
agriculture, while the US remained under great pressure domestically (interview 30). 
204 It contained “sections on agriculture, non-agricultural market access, services, rules, trade- related 
aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS), environment, dispute settlement, special and 
differential (S&D) treatment for developing countries, implementation issues, the Singapore issues, 
and some smaller topics”, as much as new sections on a “sectoral initiative on cotton; commodity 
issues; and coherence”. It was accompanied by an “annex outlining a framework for establishing 
modalities in agriculture, a similar annex for non-agricultural market access, an annex on S&D, and 
annexes on the Singapore issues”. 
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• non-agricultural market access (NAMA)206 
• development issues (implementation and S&D) 
• Singapore issues,207 and  
• other issues (which would depend on the preferences of the delegations, for 
example a TRIPS registry for geographical indications for wines and spirits). 
As the services negotiations had been proceeding relatively smoothly, no working 
group was established in this area and it was supposed to be dealt with under “other 
issues”. Apparently, services was not seen as a critical area at this stage. Despite the 
already contested nature of the EU-US draft on agriculture of August 2003, 
agriculture negotiations proceeded on the basis of this draft, as other drafts had not 
gained much support. In regard to the Singapore issues, the DDA requested 
members to take a decision on whether to hold future negotiations on these. The 
decision on the Singapore issues was linked by some developing countries to 
progress in the negotiations on agriculture, implementation issues and review of 
provisions for S&D for developing countries. Developing countries were also 
disappointed with the draft proposal on development issues (Bridges 10.09.2003; see 
also Mkapa 2004).208 Significant divisions on the context of the Ministerial text hence 
persisted. 
Informal “pressure techniques”, as observed in Doha, were in use during the Cancún 
Ministerial (Narlikar 2004): During the first days of the conference, the EU and the US 
apparently tried unsuccessfully to prevent further members from joining the G20. The 
                                                                                                                                        
205 A detailed account of the Cancún Ministerial can be found in TERI 2003 and ICTSD 2003. 
206 In the NAMA negotiations, members disagreed about the level of tariff cuts developing countries 
should commit to; and progress in these negotiations was by many members linked to progress in 
the agriculture negotiations. 
207 African countries and least-developed countries, India, Pakistan, Cuba and others opposed the 
negotiations on the Singapore issues, whereas others, especially the EU and Japan, were major 
proponents. 
208 The discussion surrounding the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) and the WTO agreements was considered as another bargaining chip of the EU. Further 
issues under negotiation were trade rules, TRIPs, dispute settlement, cotton, and the commodity 
crisis (concerning the fact that many developing countries depend on only one or two products for 
their exports). 
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EU seems to have put pressure on the ACP, and the US on Arab countries. 
However, they did not prevent the G20 from taking a strong position on agriculture 
against the developed countries (Bridges 11.09.2003). As could be expected, as 
early as day 2 an agreement on agriculture seemed increasingly unlikely. 
Additionally, the four African countries had managed to “catapult” the cotton subsidy 
issue into the centre of the Conference, which now constituted another stumbling 
block for the conference. At the same time, the EU was still trying to start 
negotiations on the Singapore issues in the face of fierce opposition (Bridges 
12.09.2003). With the last day of the conference arriving, gaps in all negotiation 
areas remained substantial (Bridges 14.09.2003). In a final attempt to arrive at a 
compromise, Chairman Derbez issued a new draft text. He first scheduled 
consultations on the controversial Singapore issues, which were supposed to be 
followed by discussions on agriculture. However, in a very contested move, 
Conference Chair Derbez decided to close the Conference after what he saw as 
irreconcilable positions became visible in the discussion on the Singapore issues 
(Guardian 16.09.2003; see also Odell 2007).  
As a reaction to this abrupt end to the conference, Commissioner Lamy criticised the 
decision-making procedures in the WTO as no longer suitable and created a famous 
quotation by calling the WTO a “medieval” institution (Guardian 16.09.2003). While 
both the EU and the US expressed deep disappointment at this abrupt and 
unsuccessful end to the conference, this sentiment was not shared throughout the 
WTO membership. The G20 was proud at finding its unity and a new 
ACP/LDC/African Union coalition had emerged, complaining that its priorities had 
been sidelined (Bridges 15.09.2003). Developing country representatives used the 
Cancún failure to argue for a true prioritisation of development concerns in the Doha 
negotiations (Mkapa 2004). Quickly, the EU was identified as the scapegoat for the 
failure of the Ministerial Conference, as it was argued that it had not shown enough 
flexibility on the Singapore issues (FT 15.09.2003). The EU refused to accept this 
“blame”, pointing out how much it had moved from its initial position, the 
responsibility of other actors in the system and that procedural problems had existed 
during the conference (European Commission 2003j, 2003k).  
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As had the failure of Seattle, the failure of Cancún led to a substantial debate. Apart 
from the differences on the substance of the Ministerial Declaration, several other 
sets of explanations for the failure of Cancún were discussed.  
It was argued that in terms of conference management, as in Seattle, conference 
preparations started too late, with WTO members spending more time on discussing 
broad issues rather than focusing on achieving goals in specific areas. Pedersen 
argued that the attempt to make the conference process more transparent and 
inclusive had now been taken so far that result-orientated negotiation occurred far 
too late in the Cancún Ministerial (2006: 119-120). As finally a draft proposal was 
circulated by Perez del Castillo, Chair of the General Council, it did not gain the 
support of many WTO members and time was too short for further discussions and 
modifications (TERI 2003: 19). Despite the resistance of developing countries to the 
Chairman’s text and despite its questionable origin as a draft of the Chairman rather 
than the WTO membership, the text was used to form the basis for further 
discussions (Narlikar 2004: 423; see also Narlikar and Wilkinson 2004: 449).  
To Narlikar and Wilkinson, this disregard for developing countries’ is not just an issue 
of conference management, but symptom of a broader systemic neglect of 
developing country interests in the world trade regime, which is favoured by the 
informal procedures with which the WTO negotiations function (2004). Narlikar 
argued that while the agenda had continuously been expanded to include new issues 
that were favoured by developed countries, developing countries’ interests had not 
been sufficiently included (2004: 423; see also Wade 2003). Additionally, resource 
imbalances between developed and developing countries continued to create 
imbalances in the negotiation process (Narlikar and Wilkinson 2004: 452ff).209 This 
systemic disadvantage of developing countries led to their resistance at Cancún and 
was a key factor in the failure of Cancún. The form that this resistance took was, 
                                            
209 “The size of the official US and EU delegations was estimated to be in excess of 800 each. […] 
Japanese officials […] estimated [the size of their delegation] to be between ‘three and four hundred, 
maybe more.’ New Zealand and Australia (with populations of roughly three and 18 million 
respectively) had delegations of 30 and 70. […] The Nigerian delegation, for instance, stood at 12; 
Malawi having ‘learnt’ from previous meetings, took a delegation of 30; the Central African Republic 
contingent numbered three; and Barbados managed eight.” (Narlikar and Wilkinson 2004: 452).  
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according to Narlikar and Wilkinson, by improved cooperation (2004). Hence, 
Wilkinson argued later on that contrary to the Seattle Conference, Cancún had not 
been disrupted by public demonstrations and bad conference management, but that 
the systemic disadvantage of developing countries was the core reason for its failure. 
According to Wilkinson, this systemic disadvantage was likely to persist in the WTO 
as it was inbuilt in the regime (2006b).   
However, others argued that the establishment of the various developing country 
coalitions, including the G20,210 and the active role existing developing countries 
played, hence constituted a new step in the developing countries’ search for better 
representation in the WTO and their improved usage of their resources (Pedersen 
2006: 120; see also Bhagwati 2005b). Narlikar and Tussie speak of “the role that 
developing countries played at Cancún”, which “was unfamiliar and innovative”. The 
innovation in the developing countries’ participation in the negotiations they see in 
their “effective coalition formation”. The qualitatively new feature of these coalitions 
was that they not only exchanged information, but managed to keep up their 
positions throughout the negotiations and that apart from being a blocking coalition, 
they developed their own agenda. This was indicative of the new proactive approach 
taken by the developing countries. Additionally, the G20 was able to withstand 
bilateral pressure by the EU and the US (Narlikar and Tussie 2004, see also Mkapa 
2004; Narlikar 2005; Wolfe 2006). Hurrell and Narlikar compare the initiatives of 
developing countries prior and at Cancún with the activities of developing countries in 
the 1970s. They come to the conclusion that at Cancún, the developing countries´ 
initiatives had a different quality than in the 1970s, which was among other issues 
because developing countries were able to use their knowledge and research 
capacities more efficiently. Learning contributed to this new adaptation to the 
institutional setting of the WTO, and meant for example that coalitions adapted to 
                                            
210 The EU was one of the first to react to the G20 emergence and set up a meeting with the it in order 
to built confidence. This happened at a time when the US was still refusing to even talk to the G20 
as a group. The meeting dealt with agriculture, because when the EU tried to raise NAMA in the 
meeting, the chair Brazil indicated they would no longer be chairing for this topic and every country 
would talk for itself (interview 10). The EU’s attempt at issue linkage here hence failed. Lamy also 
joined a meeting of the G20 in December in Brazil, after which they issued a joint statement (Bridges 
17.12.2003). 
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several different issue areas at different points of time. Rather than being 
competitors, different developing country coalitions now even coordinated between 
themselves (2006; Narlikar 2005).211 The developing country coalitions had also 
learnt that they could use the input and support of developed country NGOs to 
support them during the negotiation (Narlikar 2005). 
Obviously, the emergence and new quality of coalitions had an impact on the way 
negotiations function in the WTO.212 China’s WTO accession in 2001 had also added 
a further factor into the WTO game, and China was now an active member of the 
G20. Overall, this shows that although consensus between the EU and the USA was 
still a necessary condition for the success of negotiations in the WTO, it now was no 
longer a main and at times sufficient criterion. The failure of the EU-US agreement on 
agriculture in August 2003 indicated this (Narlikar and Tussie 2004; Eglin 2004; 
Schott 2004). The WTO was moving from a bipolar institution to a multipolar one. 
Contrary to other commentators, Wolfe and Bhagwati doubted that the failure of 
Cancún was of much significance for the future of the Doha Round negotiation 
(Wolfe 2004b; Bhagwati 2004). Wolfe argued that Cancún did not constitute a big 
turning point for the WTO, but saw Cancún as a further step in a longer process of 
development. As he saw Cancún as part of the broader DDA negotiation process, 
Cancún failed because the negotiations in Geneva had not yet advanced far enough 
and because of the increasing complexity in the negotiations, and process might 
soon after be achieved again (2004b). While Bhagwati had regarded the Seattle 
failure as significant as it failed to launch a new trade negotiation, he already then 
had indicated that failed Ministerial Conferences had been inherent to negotiation 
processes in GATT trade rounds (Bhagwati 2001). Cancún to him clarified a set of 
issues such as the Singapore issues, and also meant a re-balancing of the system 
through the emergence of a stronger representation of the developing countries (see 
                                            
211 In a later work, Hurrell and Narlikar trace the route to power through learning for the actors India 
and Brazil in particular (2007). 
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above; Bhagwati 2005b). To him, the ceasing of civil society protests around the 
WTO meetings was a further sign for the trade regime’s healthiness and functioning. 
He located the reasons for the break-down of Cancún in strategic mistakes by all 
parties and little space for compromise in the position of the G20. As this to him were 
only temporary challenges, he assumed that negotiation in the Doha Round would 
soon progress again, especially as the multilateral system was the only viable option 
to pursue developing and developed country interests (Bhagwati 2004). Hence, he 
continued to advocate trade liberalisation through the WTO mechanism. In a later 
article, he accused Western NGOs for misleading developing countries by 
advocating a range of fallacies about trade policy.213 As important issues for the 
future role of the WTO, he advocated re-introducing the centrality of the principle of 
non-discrimination. This should and could not done by reversing regional trade 
arrangements and S&D, which had undermined the principle, but by taking 
multilateral liberalisation far enough that these exceptions lost their relevance. The 
WTO should also concentrate on its main business, and especially make progress in 
the services negotiations and on agriculture, and not become diverted by issues such 
as trade and labour, or trade and environment, which had been pushed by interest 
groups in developed countries and which are not desired by developing countries 
(Bhagwati 2005a, 2005b).  
8.1.2 Progress of the negotiations after Cancún 
The WTO community was left without a roadmap for further negotiations after the 
abrupt failure of the Cancún Ministerial. The IMF, the World Bank and some business 
organisations called for a quick resumption of the round, but it was not clear how this 
would happen in Geneva. USTR Zoellick emphasised that the US would now 
                                                                                                                                        
212 The G20’s achievement was to pressurise the EU and the USA to reform their agricultural policies. 
Beyond agriculture, the G20 had no common positions. It comprises a very diverse range of 
countries such as China, India, Brazil and Indonesia with equally diverging interests, which 
immediately gave rise to speculations as to whether the coalition could remain stable after the end 
of the conference (see for example Narlikar 2005). 
213 This were for example that further trade liberalisation might harm developing countries’ economic 
development or a misrepresentation of the fact that due to the exemptions from trade liberalisation 
prior to the Uruguay Round and due to S&D, developing countries trade barriers were in fact greater 
than those of developed countries (Bhagwati 2005). 
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concentrate on bilateral and regional initiatives with those countries that had played a 
constructive role in Cancún (Bridges 25.09.2003).214 The US hence quickly 
announced a new focus in its trade policy, which it might already have prepared 
before the Cancún Ministerial though. The EU on the other hand withdrew into a 
reflection period. In the meantime, the G20 underwent some transformations, as both 
Colombia and Peru left the coalition to start FTA negotiations with the US, followed 
by Guatemala, Ecuador and Costa Rica shortly afterwards. Apparently, there was 
continuing pressure from the US on the G20, and the group did adopt a more 
conciliatory position. The US, EU and the G20 blamed each other for the failure of 
the conference. In an article in the Wall Street Journal, Zoellick called on the EU to 
make “aggressive proposals” on the international level on the basis of its CAP reform 
(Bridges 08.10.2003, 15.10.2003; IUST 07.10.2003).215 
Throughout autumn 2003, negotiations remained “in limbo”. October meetings for 
NAMA and agriculture were cancelled, and only services negotiations went ahead as 
planned (see below)216 (Bridges 08.10.2003, 15.10.2003; IUST 07.10.2003). Formal 
and informal consultations continued throughout autumn 2003. The EU and the US 
both indicated that they were not ready to take on leadership to restart the talks 
(Bridges 23.10.2003; see also Wolfe 2004). Discussion based on the Derbez text 
continued (Bridges 30.10.2003).217 However, as the EU’s position on the Singapore 
issues also was not clear, no deal could be reached (Bridges 13.11.2003). The EU 
also indicated that it might not yet be ready for new discussions by 15 December, as 
mandated by Cancún (Bridges 19.11.2003). Still, an interviewee stated that it was the 
                                            
214 Over the next two years, the US entered and concluded a range of new bilateral FTAs. 
215 Zoellick also asked Japan for greater leadership. 
216 A developing country trade diplomat was quoted: "After a nuclear war one thing survives: 
cockroaches, now its the GATS" (Bridges 08.10.2003). 
217 An APEC meeting produced a compromise (among APEC ministers) to use the Derbez text as the 
starting point for further negotiations (Bridges 23.10.2003), but India had continued problems with 
such an approach as the Derbez text foresaw a “Swiss Formula” to reduce tariffs on agriculture 
(Bridges 30.10.2003). Lamy had also indicated that the EU had problems with the Derbez text, and 
the EU position remained unclear (Bridges 30.10.2003). At the end of October 2003, Chair Perez del 
Castillo and WTO DG Supachai held informal "Ambassador plus one" 'green-room' meetings with 
ca. 30 countries. Consultations included agriculture, NAMA, cotton and the 'Singapore Issues'.  
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EU’s intention to support the General Council Chair in this consultation process and 
to keep the round alive: “we wanted the show back on the road” (interview 10).  
It seems that DG Trade had not anticipated the failure of Cancún despite certain 
indicators in the run-up to the conference, as they had considered their offer as 
viable to other delegations and had considered a deal on the Singapore issues as 
feasible (email exchange with interviewee 14). Rather than quickly issuing a new 
trade policy strategy as the US had done, the European Commission started an EU 
internal discussion by circulating an “initial think-piece” on the failed ministerial. The 
document entitled "The Doha Development Agenda After Cancún" contained the idea 
for a WTO I and WTO II (WTO at different paces) and raised a set of questions about 
the future of European trade policy (European Commission 2003i).  
Box 8.1 Defining the post-Cancún EU strategy  
Lamy’s key questions for a post-Cancún EU strategy: 
• “Should the EU retain the same philosophical underpinning to its trade policy -- i.e. that trade 
policy should represent a combination of market access and rules?  
• What is the best forum for pursuing the EU's trade policy agenda?  
• There appear to be selective appetites for progress on both market access and rules within 
the WTO - is there a place for a plurilateral approach?  
• What is the future of trade preferences (given that in some cases preferences may offer 
greater benefits to developing countries than multilateral market opening)?  
• What contribution can the WTO realistically make to development?  
• What scope for WTO reform exists? To what extent is the consensus approach 
effective/useful? Is there a place for a Secretary General's right of initiative?“ 
Source: Bridges 30.10.2003; European Commission 2003i 
Throughout autumn 2003, the EU kept its negotiation position, outlining several times 
that it could not continue to make further concessions without being granted 
concessions in return. Bridges stated that the EU “has taken the approach of 
listening rather than leading with regard to reviving international trade talks” (Bridges 
30.10.2003). This also meant that the EU negotiators remained “conspicuously quiet” 
during informal talks in Geneva. Obviously, the talks could not resume without the 
EU’s active participation and Supachai asked the EU to retake a leadership role. The 
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G20 had already called for a revival of the round and even the US expressed its 
support for revival at APEC (Bridges 30.10.2003).  
Lamy figured that the passiveness of the EU had made other players become more 
active, apparently a result desired by the EU (Bridges 30.10.2003). Due to EU 
member states pressure, the Commission started to be active again in the WTO after 
three months (although apparently there were internal voices that called on it to 
remain inactive for longer) (interview 6). On 26 November, the European 
Commission adopted a post-Cancún strategy, which was up for discussion in the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament on 02 December (Bridges 
26.11.2003).218 While the EU remained clearly devoted to the WTO and the DDA and 
indicated flexibility in some areas, Fischler called on all developed countries to grant 
duty free market access to LDC and reminded WTO negotiators of the potential of 
South-South trade. The EU’s 2002 reforms of the CAP would have to be recognised 
and the G20 should be ready to make concessions as well (Bridges 04.12.2003). 
A second round of informal talks in the WTO ended on 09.12.2003, with members 
not being able to relaunch negotiations at the General Council Meeting on 
15.12.2003. While members had confirmed their commitment to the negotiations and 
the multilateral process, positions had not converged. Some members did not think it 
was useful to restart the negotiations groups in 2004 if no progress had been made, 
while others, for example India, were content to move forward in this way (Bridges 
11.12.2003). Although WTO members did not make decisions on substance until the 
end of 2003, the year ended with the decision to revive all negotiation bodies in 2004 
(Bridges 17.12.2003).  
8.2 Issue-area framework negotiations: making slow progress  
As seen in the last chapter, the services negotiations progressed largely unnoticed 
by the rest of the WTO in the years 2002-2003. The CTS-SS needed to continue the 
                                            
218 The new EU strategy paper was criticised both by the Greens in the European Parliament and civil 
society groups: one critique was that it was a mere tactical repositioning and no new strategy had 
been revised, with the Singapore issues slowly being dismantled (Greens). Another critique was that 
the paper did not provide an answer to the strong rebuke from developing countries, but was still 
focused on how to achieve EU interests (WDM). 
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remaining framing negotiations as required by the GATS agreement (“negotiations 
about negotiations”), but in 2002 discussions on market access negotiations 
(“negotiations about substance”) started. As will be visible in this section, these 
issue-area specific negotiations (“negotiations about substance”) were intermingled 
with the issue-area framework negotiations. 
8.2.1 Credits for autonomous liberalisation  
The first issue under continued negotiation was that of credits for autonomous 
liberalisation. The EU submitted a proposal on 22 February 2002 on the assessment 
and treatment of autonomous liberalisation (S/CSS/W/133). It suggested that 
autonomous liberalisation criteria should be developed multilaterally, but then WTO 
members should negotiate bilaterally, but transparently (Bridges 26.02.2002, 
19.03.2002, 26.03.2002; WTO TN/S/M/1 05.06.2002).219 
In March and June 2002, delegations rejected the Chair’s draft texts for modalities 
(JOB (02)/35). A key stumbling block was the previously raised issue whether all 
trading partners or only developing countries should be able to claim autonomous 
liberalisation credits. The current Chair’s text did not differentiate between the two 
country groupings, but developing countries held that the whole idea of liberalisation 
credits would be led ad absurdum should developed countries be granted credits as 
well (JOB (02)/35/Rev.1) (WTO TN/S/M/1 05.06.2002).  
A further critical issue was whether credits should be restricted to the area of 
services, or whether cross-deals could be undertaken, for example with the goods 
trade negotiations. Additionally, some acceding members asked for their 
commitments during the accession process to be eligible for the credits. This was 
rejected by other delegations, among them the EU, which argued that the credit was 
only applicable to liberalisation “since previous negotiations” (GATS Article XIX:3) 
(Bridges 04.06.2002; WTO TN/S/M/1 05.06.2002). 
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The discussion on autonomous liberalisation was suspended: according to Bridges 
sources, “just too many controversies remained”. The CTS Chair, Chile’s 
Ambassador Alejandro Jara, intended to use consultations in order to reach 
agreement on the outstanding issues (Bridges 04.06.2002). In the subsequent 
discussion in the CTS-SS, Jara identified the key outstanding issues as:  
first, the situation of recently acceded members; second, the scope 
of the modalities, particularly with reference to developing country 
members; third, the possibility of obtaining credit through concessions 
on trade in goods; and, fourth, the relationship between autonomous 
liberalization and bindings (WTO TN/S/M/2 10.07.2002). 
WTO members agreed on an informal consultation process to find a compromise.  
Subsequently, 24 developing country members220 submitted a list of alternative 
modalities as a response to the Chair’s draft modalities. The paper apparently 
indicated that the DDA placed developing countries at its centre and that therefore 
only they should be eligible for autonomous liberalisation credits. In the subsequent 
CTS-SS meeting, Jara indicated that the informal meetings so far had only led to a 
greater understanding of different positions, but not to a compromise. Jara called for 
more realism and flexibility in negotiation positions (Bridges 31.10.2002; WTO 
TN/S/M/3 17.09.2002).  
The informal consultation process continued through autumn 2002 with minor 
movement (WTO TN/S/M/4 11.02.2003). In the CTS-SS meeting, blame-shifting 
between the delegations continued. The US, the EU, Canada, Australia, Japan and 
Poland expressed their regret that agreement had not been reached on the basis of 
the current draft by Jara and urged for flexibility (Job(02)/35/Rev.2). Uruguay, Brazil 
and Malaysia emphasised that developing countries had shown flexibility, but that 
now flexibility had to come from the rest of the WTO membership. Thailand 
                                                                                                                                        
219 The EU paper was supported by Switzerland. Further new proposals were from Hong Kong (China) 
(S/CSS/W/134) and Paraguay (S/CSS/W/140). A formula approach was suggested by Uruguay (and 
previously Korea in S/CSS/W/126). Hong Kong (China) supported a middle ground position between 
the EU’s and Uruguay’s approach: its proposal foresaw the establishment of common modalities 
and criteria, while the actual credit would be determined bilaterally. The purely multilateral approach 
seemed unlikely and the Chair advocated therefore the middle ground approach. 
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complained that no ASEAN member had been called to attend the chair’s informal 
consultations and the recently acceded members Lithuania, China and Jordan re-
iterated their quest for special treatment (WTO TN/S/M/5 21.02.2003). A further 
series of informal meetings followed and the 13 January 2003 CTS-SS meeting 
made progress on the basis of these consultations. Chair Jara circulated a few new 
drafting suggestions, because the group of 24 developing countries could not agree 
with the current draft (JOB (02)/35/Rev.2).221  
The Chair’s new proposal clarified that all developing countries would receive special 
consideration and re-assured the G24 countries that a differentiation between 
different developing countries was not intended. At the same time, the new proposal 
weakened the clause on newly acceded countries. The Chair’s proposal clarified that 
the modalities for the credits did not constitute a legal right to the credits, but that 
they had to be granted on a bilateral basis.222 The Chair’s suggestions seem to have 
been received positively and WTO members apparently committed to finishing the 
autonomous liberalisation modalities negotiations by February 2003. 
However, the treatment of newly acceded WTO members remained contentious until 
the end of the negotiations (Bridges 15.01.2003). When Jara issued a third draft of 
the modalities (JOB (02)/35/Rev3), the draft again was widely accepted, but the 
newly acceded countries Bulgaria, Jordan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Oman still 
voiced critique.223 Bulgaria, Jordan and Oman then agreed to the text, but a debate 
                                                                                                                                        
220 The group of 24 developing countries included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Venezuela and Uruguay. 
221 In their opinion, the issue of developing countries had not been not adequately dealt with in Jara’s 
draft, while newly acceded countries received too much attention. 
222 However, the draft now also foresaw a bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral advancement of the 
application of the modalities, rather than only bilateral. 
223 Bulgaria intervened in the CTS-SS to argue that the value of the autonomous liberalisation credit 
granted would depend entirely on bilateral negotiations, and it accused other delegations of 
purposefully weakening the potential modalities. Bulgaria threatened to not approve of the 
agriculture modalities and to delimit its services offer. 
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still took place with the Kyrgyz Republic224 (Bridges 05.03.2003; WTO TN/S/M/6 
25.04.2003), which finally failed with its request. The CTS approved modalities for 
the treatment of autonomous liberalisation on 06 March 2003.  
Box 8.2 Autonomous liberalisation: negotiation result 
Autonomous liberalisation: definition and value  
The modalities define an “autonomous liberalisation measure (ALM)” and the criteria to define the 
value of an autonomous liberalisation measure (JOB(02)/35/Rev3). An autonomous liberalisation 
measure is  
• “subject to scheduling under Part III (Specific Commitments) of the GATS, and/or leading to 
the termination of a most favoured nation (MFN) exemption;  
• compatible with the principle of most-favoured nation (MFN);  
• undertaken by the liberalising Member unilaterally since previous negotiations, in accordance 
with article XIX of the GATS; and  
• applicable to any or all service sectors.”  
To assess an autonomous liberalisation measure, the following criteria (among others) are applicable: 
• “sectoral coverage; 
• liberalising nature of the measure concerned (for example elimination of measures restricting 
market access; elimination of existing measures that are inconsistent with national treatment 
and/or MFN); 
• date of entry into force and duration of the measure;  
• share of the sector in the total trade of the trading partner;  
• share of the trading partner in the total trade in the sector autonomously liberalised by the 
liberalising Member;  
• importance and impact of the autonomous liberalisation measures on the liberalising Mem-
ber's economy;  
• market potential in the liberalising Member for the trading partner; and  
• opportunities for the expansion of foreign participation in the sector after the introduction of the 
measure.”  
 
                                            
224 The Kyrgyz Republic was asking for a footnote for paragraph 10 to be inserted into the draft. The 
footnote would have acknowledged the commitments made by recently acceded countries. The 
Chair and his supporters held that the inclusion of the footnote would not be legally binding in any 
case. Instead, they recommended that the Kyrgyz Republic could issue a statement after the 
modalities had been agreed upon. 
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Possible types of credit 
• for example a liberalisation measure to be undertaken by a trading partner in sectors of inter-
est to the liberalising Member under the GATS;  
• a decision to refrain from pursuing a request addressed to the liberalising Member; 
• or any other form that the liberalising Member and its trading partner may agree upon. 
Source: Bridges 13.03.2003 
The criteria for the assessment of an autonomous liberalisation measure guide the 
bilateral process in which the credits are established. This means that criteria do not 
establish a right for receiving credits, but that credits have to be negotiated bilaterally 
- under the supervision of the CTS if requested by the negotiating parties. The CTS 
also has an overall supervisory function. While the new modalities apply to all WTO 
members, members are required to take into account the level of development of 
their negotiation partner (Bridges 13.03.2003).  
The agreement on the autonomous liberalisation credits was welcomed as a positive 
sign of movement while other Doha negotiations had slowed down or come to a halt:  
WTO Secretary-General Supachai Panitchpakdi stated that "this 
agreement should inject new dynamism not only in the services 
negotiations but also in other areas of the Doha agenda" (WTO 
TN/S/M/6 25.04.2003). 
An EU official indicated that the EU considered the autonomous liberalisation 
modalities as a necessity, as they were part of the negotiation modalities. However, 
the Commission was also aware that the modalities might not be effective in practice. 
The EU official explained that the autonomous liberalisation credits would be tested 
by Honduras, which had made an offer on telecoms after it already liberalised 
unilaterally and now seemed to intend to use the autonomous liberalisation credit. 
The EU official indicated that from his point of view, this was a tactical mistake and 
that the EU would simply indicate its own unilateral liberalisation rather than granting 
autonomous liberalisation credits (interview 6), made possible as the autonomous 
liberalisation credits were not restricted to developing countries. The autonomous 
liberalisation credit system’s effects might hence turn out to be rather limited in 
practice.  
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8.2.2 Modalities for the special treatment for least-developed countries 
In 2002, the CTS-SS started discussion on the establishment of modalities for special 
treatment for least-developed countries (as mandated by Art. IV(3) and Art. XIX 
GATS). The item was brought to the agenda by Uganda on behalf of other LDC. 
Here was hence yet another group that sought to shape the regime for its specific 
demands in embarking on “negotiations about negotiations”. 
LDC demanded, among a range of other issues, that they “should not be requested 
to make specific commitments in more than four services sectors” and that WTO 
members granted “national treatment” and market access in sectors of export interest 
to the LDC (WTO TN/S/M/1 05.06.2002).225 Although several developed countries 
expressed understanding and support for the concerns of LDC, the US suggested 
that the modalities that were required by the GATS framework were meant to 
increase the effective participation of LDC in the GATS negotiations rather than to 
increase their share in services trade. Similarly, while the EU offered support to the 
LDC for their participation in the services negotiations, it argued that the GATS 
already provided the necessary flexibility to accommodate the concerns of the LDC. 
However, the EU indicated its willingness to discuss all the issues brought to the 
table by the LDC (WTO TN/S/M/2 10.07.2002). Informal consultations took place and 
the LDC submitted a proposal for LDC modalities at the end of 2002 (WTO TN/S/M/4 
11.02.2003; JOB(02)/205).226  
The reactions to the new LDC’s proposal can be grouped in two broad groups: India 
reacted positively to these requests, stating that the needs of LDC should be taken 
into account in requests, but indicated that capacity constraints in services trade 
were a problem not limited to LDC, hence it was also a problem that developing 
countries encountered. China supported India’s statement.  
                                            
225 Details of the LDC requests can be found in WTO TN/S/M/1 05.06.2002. 
226 On the basis of their new proposal (JOB(02)/205), the Zambian representative argued that S&D 
provisions in Art. XIX and Art. IV GATS should be made more suitable for the needs of LDC. LDC 
should also not be requested to commit anything that “went beyond their developmental, economic 
and financial needs”, while full, effective and operational market access, including in Mode 4, should 
be granted to LDC alongside technical assistance. Cuba, Burkina Faso, Benin, Djibouti, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Ghana expressed their support for this position during the meeting (WTO TN/S/M/5 
21.02.2003). 
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Developed countries in general did not want the modalities to be too comprehensive 
and prescriptive: the Japanese negotiator cautioned WTO members not to forestall 
any results of bilateral or multilateral negotiations and argued that in general the LDC 
proposal was too prescriptive; in other words Japan wanted the text to be less 
precise. The EU negotiator said that the EU had already taken into account the 
special needs of LDC in the preparation of its requests. Like Japan, he cautioned that 
some clauses in the LDC proposal were beyond the scope of the modalities. 
Additionally, the modalities were meant to increase participation of LDC in the 
negotiations, whereas the proposed clauses seemed to exclude LDC from certain 
possible negotiations (as they would limit the commitments they would have to 
make). The US supported the statements of the EU and Japan.  
Again it was decided that negotiations should move forward in informal discussions 
(WTO TN/S/M/5 21.02.2003). In May 2003, LDC submitted a second draft for the 
LDC modalities (TN/S/W/13)227 (WTO TN/S/W/13 07.05.2003), which as such was 
welcomed by developed countries, but the substance of which received harsh 
critique from the demandeurs (in this case Japan, Korea, Switzerland, Hong Kong 
(China), US, Poland, Hungary, Singapore and others). The EU criticised the draft’s 
prescriptive character, which it did not see as the purpose of modalities. However, 
rather than holding further discussions in the CTS-SS, the EU asked for a switch to 
informal consultations to proceed on the matter. This idea was supported by a range 
of delegations.  
Developing countries did not present a united position on the proposed LDC 
modalities. The LDC draft was supported by Indonesia, Cuba, Morocco. Pakistan 
asked for further consultation and analysis of the draft. Malaysia indicated that it did 
not think the binding clauses in the draft proposal should be applicable to developing 
countries. Zambia, the representative of the proposal on behalf of the LDC, indicated 
its disappointment with the many reservations raised and hoped that the modalities 
                                            
227 Among other provisions, the draft modalities contained far-reaching demands, as for example it 
asked WTO members to “grant full market access and national treatment to LDC in the sectors and 
modes of supply of export interest to them”, and as it asked for Mode 4 commitments “particularly 
[for] unskilled and semi-skilled persons” (WTO TN/S/W/13 07.05.2003) 
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would not be voided of their substance during the negotiation process (WTO 
TN/S/M/7 30.06.2003; Bridges 21.05.2003). In the next CTS-SS meeting, the 
Secretariat had prepared a new draft, which sought to balance interests better 
(JOB(03)/127, JOB(03)/184/Rev.2).228 In the meantime, the LDC refused to engage 
in the negotiations and make any offers in the negotiations before the modalities 
were agreed upon and in this way pressured for the modalities (IUST 11.07.2003).  
Modalities for LDC were agreed upon on 03 September 2003, arguably in an attempt 
to assure the LDC’ cooperation for the forthcoming WTO Ministerial (WTO TN/S/13 
05.09.2003). The modalities call on WTO members to offer flexibility to LDC and to 
take into account their economic difficulties, but again it is questionable what impact, 
apart from framing expectations and ideas in the negotiations, the modalities would 
have. So while this part of the “negotiations about negotiations” was concluded, the 
result was not worth too much in the end and can be circumvented by using other 
loopholes. 
8.2.3 Assessment of liberalisation of services trade 
As the assessment exercise had been converted into a permanent agenda item, 
discussions continued in 2002, starting with a repetition of positions. Several 
members, including Peru, Pakistan and Cuba, reiterated the position that the 
assessment had to be completed before undertaking new commitments.229 Several 
African countries emphasised that the assessment was a “collective responsibility”.230 
                                            
228 The US also submitted an alternative draft (Job (03)/133). While both the Secretariat and the US 
proposals were based on the Zambian proposal, the WTO Secretariat added information obtained in 
informal consultations. The US proposal incorporated less binding language and was less 
comprehensive (Bridges 10.07.2003). 
229 For them, the main objective of the assessment exercise was to analyse whether GATS objectives, 
and more specifically the objective of increasing participation of developing countries (Art. IV:1), had 
been achieved. 
230 Discussion about the assessment exercise was aided from outside of the CTS-SS: on 14-15 
March, the WTO Secretariat organised a Symposium on Assessment of Trade in Services for WTO 
members (Bridges 19.03.2002). NGOs also held meetings on GATS assessment to brief WTO 
member delegations about the assessment efforts undertaken by several institutions. External 
organisations contributed to the CTS-SS discussion directly at times; for example, in the last 2003 
CTS-SS sessions OECD services experts presented case studies of developing countries’ 
involvement in services trade. Korea encouraged the OECD to carry out more studies of this kind, 
which would show the positive results of services liberalisation to developing countries. Naturally, 
developing countries questioned methodology and findings of the studies.  
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Developing countries thus felt the continued need to show the significance of this 
agenda item.  
The EU and others replied with the “usual” arguments: the assessment of service 
trade was to be conducted on a national level; it should be conducted qualitatively 
rather than quantitatively; and as it was an ongoing item on the CTS-SS agenda, it 
did not have to be concluded before market access negotiations could start. The EU 
representative also indicated that technical assistance would be available from his 
delegation for the national assessment of services trade (Bridges 26.02.2002, 
19.03.2002; WTO TN/S/M/1 05.06.2002).  
The assessment exercise continued to be the place where developing countries tried 
to postpone the market access negotiations, and where developed countries 
continued to repeat their own, opposite position (WTO TN/S/M/2 10.07.2002).231 In 
subsequent CTS-SS meetings, discussions were based on exemplary case studies, 
submitted by various WTO members. The discussion now turned to questions 
relating to what interpretation of the available statistics would be appropriate and 
whether GATS had hindered or furthered the developing countries development in 
services trade. The US pointed out that little liberalisation had been achieved so far 
and the effects of GATS could therefore not be determined. The EU argued for a 
qualitative assessment of services trade flows which in its point of view would give a 
better assessment of the importance of services trade flows for developing countries 
than the statistics that had been submitted by developing countries (WTO TN/S/M/3 
17.09.2002). The debate gained in precision on the basis of the case studies, and the 
EU was trying to dispel and counter-argue the fears of developing countries with 
regard to services liberalisation (WTO TN/S/M/4 11.02.2003; WTO TN/S/M/5 
21.02.2003). The assessment exercise thus developed into a key discussion area in 
the negotiations, knowledge-exchange and build-up of a common or shared 
understanding. The richness of the debate is exemplified by the fact that 145 
                                            
231 For example, in June 2002, a new informal paper was submitted by Pakistan. The Pakistani 
submission was based on a joint submission by Cuba, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (S/CSS/W/131). They advocated an assessment of whether GATS 
had increased the participation of developing countries in the services negotiations (Bridges 
04.06.2005). 
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submissions had been submitted to it since 1998 (Bridges 17.07.2003). However, it 
also seems the discussion lost in prominence and focus at the end of 2002/beginning 
of 2003 because WTO members started to concentrate on the bilateral negotiation 
process. Additionally, developing countries continued to express their disappointment 
with the assessment process, although the EU assessed the process positively 
(WTO TN/S/M/7 30.06.2003).  
8.2.4 Market access negotiations  
At the Doha Ministerial, it had been decided that initial requests should be submitted 
by 30 June 2002, which constituted the start of “negotiations on substance”. For the 
case of the EU, the two relevant fora which warrant observation with regard to the 
market access negotiations are the discussions in the CTS-SS and internally in the 
EU.  
A first question the CTS-SS dealt with was how the sectoral discussions that had 
been running during 2001 would be continued. In the first CTS-SS sessions, the chair 
indicated that the format in which they had been conducted during 2001 had come to 
the end of their usefulness (WTO TN/S/M/1 05.06.2002). Time needed to be 
allocated to bilateral (and plurilateral) meetings to consult on the initial requests.232 
Obviously, a new focus on the request-offer process and a turn to bilateral 
negotiations was not desired by all delegations. The agenda item on sectoral 
discussions hence remained a standing item on the insistence of some delegations, 
but in subsequent meetings discussions became substantially shorter (Bridges 
19.03.2002, 26.03.2002).  
With the end of June 2002 deadline looming, WTO delegations started to prepare 
their initial requests for submission. The European Commission developed its 
requests with industry input, input from EU delegations in other countries, from EU 
                                            
232 This poses a challenge for the assessment of the EU’s influence on the negotiations, as records of 
the bilateral meetings are not available. For this reason, interview material can give an indication of 
WTO members’ perception of the EU’s actorness in bilateral meetings. 
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member states and from their industries.233 The EU’s preparatory process was 
disrupted on 16 April 2002, when draft EU services requests, directed at OECD and 
advanced developing countries (named “Group 1” – “specifically targeted countries”), 
leaked to the public and caused a strong, negative reaction by NGOs. The 
documents were drafts and still being discussed between the Commission and the 
Member States. An interviewee suggested that it was a member state department 
which leaked the requests. For the first time, services negotiations received full public 
attention and for the first time, the internet was used widely for distributing the 
papers. The earlier, apparently mostly positive tone with regard to services 
negotiations had changed. Commission officials were appalled by the leakage, and 
had to defend against allegations that the EU was intending to dismantle public 
services in developing countries, which would lead to privatisation both domestically 
and abroad (interview 31; Bridges 23.04.2002; European Commission 2002a, also 
European Commission 2002f).234  
                                            
233 According to an interviewee, the Commission drafts the position, and then discusses it with the EU 
member states. The EU official also indicated that the Commission would not receive “input” with 
regard to every line of the requests and some sectors get more input than others (for example 
financial services) (interview 9); which means that the European Commission has to develop certain 
areas by itself. 
234 For example, an association of European trade unions asked the EU in a letter to assure them that 
it would not enter any such agreement, and that it would ensure workers’ rights for commitments 
under Mode 4 and development-friendliness of Mode 3 commitments. Lamy answered that while the 
leaked requests were still in a preparatory process and did not reflect an adopted official position of 
the EU, it could be seen from the requests that the EU did not have a “hidden agenda” with regard to 
services and that all publicly stated negotiation objectives were adhered to. The letter clarified that 
the EU did not see GATS as asking for a privatisation of public services and that the EU 
Commission did not intend to do so, because this would constitute a breach of the EU treaties as 
well (European Commission 2002a, also European Commission 2002f). This first leakage of 
services made the Commission realise that they had to be more careful with its communications. For 
example, the Commission started to send different versions of proposals to each EU member state, 
so that they could identify who leaked the request. This created an administrative burden (interview 
6). 
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This leakage of the EU services requests in 2002 gave rise to an unprecedented anti-
GATS campaign, that would only abate somewhat in 2004/2005.235 Compared to the 
campaigns in other negotiation areas (agriculture, NAMA), the campaigns might have 
been less extensive (interview 8, 29), which could have been due to the technicality 
of the services issue making it more difficult for NGOs to follow the negotiations and 
develop them into viable publicity (interview 29).236 Still, a developed country 
representative suggested that the Commission is much more concerned with dealing 
with NGOs than are the US, Korea or Japan and it takes them much more into 
account when presenting its position than other countries (interview 20).  
Increasingly EU civil society undermined the EU’s negotiation power, as they took on 
positions that were represented mostly by developing countries in the WTO. For 
example, in an open letter to Pascal Lamy and the 133 Committee, civil society 
groups asked for more transparency in the GATS request-offer process. They also 
asked for a halting of the negotiations until an assessment of the services 
liberalisation had been made (Bridges 17.05.2002, Mkapa 2004). The European 
Commission had to change its public relation approach to build support for the 
                                            
235 In Geneva, NGOs seem to cooperate and share information among each other. Leaked documents 
are used to prepare the developing countries for the next move of the “demandeurs” (interview 29). 
The South Centre, an intergovernmental organisation with a pro-development focus, gives support 
services to developing countries and provides a meeting platform for their discussions. It seems that 
the South Centre also cooperates extensively with NGOs campaigning on the services issue. NGOs 
campaigning on an international level are: Friends of the Earth (FOE), World Development 
Movement (WDM), Oxfam (starting to work on services), Action Aid (starting to work on services), 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF), International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN), Third World Network 
(TWN), International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTFU) and Public Services International 
(PSI). NGOs from developing countries active in Geneva are: TWN, Focus on the Global South 
(interview 23).  
236 An EU official claimed that the NGOs sometimes are not informed what they are protesting against, 
but are protesting anyway (interview 9). Similarly, a developed country representative argued that 
often he could refute the NGO claims very easily on the basis of his own documentation of the 
negotiations. The management of public relations had become an essential part of his work 
(interview 21). Doubts about the effectiveness of the NGOs’ contribution to the services negotiations 
were also raised by another EU official: although his position directly involved relations to developing 
countries, he did not have any direct contact with NGOs. He suggested that their views were 
collected mostly via the civil society dialogue (interview 3). However, the civil society dialogue does 
not allow any in-depth discussion. Similarly to industry input, it hence seems that the NGOs deliver 
broad ideas rather than specific, targeted input. Another EU official suggested that it was rather the 
European Parliament which was very receptive to NGO messages (interview 3). This could indicate 
that these broad ideas of the NGOs are delivered to the Commission via two channels: civil society 
dialogue and European Parliament.  
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negotiations domestically.237 In May 2002, Lamy spoke to the European Parliament 
to convince them that the EU negotiation proposals did not represent a new or 
revised EU approach to services liberalisation, but were in line with former policies. 
He reassured the European Parliament that public services would be safeguarded 
and emphasised the flexibility of GATS (European Commission 2002e). However, the 
opposition was not so easily calmed. In a statement of 22 October 2002, more than 
70 members of the European Parliament, mostly from left-wing parties, demanded 
that the European Commission should ensure consultation with the European 
Parliament before submitting offers to the 133 Committee and before taking any 
decision about “offers” of service liberalisation. The statement also called for the EU 
to make no demands on developing countries’ public services, for public services to 
remain untouched and no further progress in service liberalisation until a “full and 
independent, economic, social and environmental impact assessment is conducted.” 
(Bridges 31.10.2002). As a further reaction to this heightening internal opposition, the 
European Commission attempted to include civil society into the negotiation process 
by starting a consultation process for the preparation of its first offer (European 
Commission 2002c, 2002g). 
WTO delegations’ reactions to the leak were mixed: delegations were not too 
surprised about the contents of the requests, as the EU had already told them that its 
approach would be ambitious. They had expected though that the requests towards 
weaker developing countries and LDC would be less extensive. Some delegations 
criticised the NGO allegations as built on misconceptions about the nature of 
services liberalisation and deregulation. Other delegations were obviously “positively 
surprised” to now be able to compare the different EU requests, while it also gave 
them a head start before the 30 June deadline and the US requests (Bridges 
23.04.2002).  
                                            
237 There were also reactions from the WTO side to this growing opposition to the services 
negotiations. WTO DG Mike Moore and Chair Jara reacted to NGO criticism with a press release on 
28 June, stating that there was no threat to public services and that initial requests would still be 
changed during the negotiation process. NGOs warned about the lack of definitions in the GATS 
exclusion of public services, and of the differing interpretations that could arise from this lack of 
clarity (Bridges 03.07.2002). 
8 From Doha to Cancún 2002-2003: starting the Doha Round 289 
 
In the CTS-SS, the first round of requests started to trickle in at the beginning of July 
2002. The US submitted its initial requests to 142 countries on 01 July 2002. 
According to the published summary,238 the US requests covered 12 service 
sectors239 and also dealt with several horizontal issues (investment barriers under 
Mode 3 (for example ENTs), Mode 3 restrictions, transparency in domestic 
legislation). Important to note might have been that the US asked the EU to bind its 
current level of liberalisation in audiovisual services. While the EU had tried to 
convince NGOs that the GATS did not lead to privatisation of public services, it 
seemed that the US requests did indeed contain a request to trading partners to 
privatise their telecommunication enterprises. The most extensive requests of the US 
targeted developed countries and a set of key developing countries, such as Brazil, 
India and China. Requests to LDC were of a far less extensive range (2-3 pages) 
(Bridges 03.07.2002; IUST 05.07.2002).240  
Shortly after the US, the EU submitted its initial requests to 109 WTO members. The 
EU stated that it did not submit requests to accession countries and members of the 
European Economic Area (EEA).241 It emphasised in its executive summary that it 
focused on fewer sectors in its requests to developing countries and on even fewer, 
key sectors for LDC. In line with its previous strategy, the EU also sought to dispel 
worries of the NGO community in explaining that its requests did not impede the 
provision of public services and they did not target health and audiovisual services. 
The EU emphasised that its requests on environmental services did not deal with 
access to water resources and would not impede the host governments’ ability to 
                                            
238 The requests remained confidential, but the US published an executive summary. 
239 These were telecommunication; financial services; express delivery services; energy services; 
environmental services; distribution services; education and training services; lodging and other 
tourism services; professional services; computer and related services; advertising services; and 
audiovisual services. 
240 Korea, Switzerland, Norway, Australia, Brazil, China, and Taiwan had submitted requests at this 
state, and requests by the EU and Canada were expected shortly. 
241 The EEA is composed of the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries and the EU 
member states. The Commission had a “gentlemen agreement” with accession candidates not to 
exchange requests and offers during the GATS 2000 negotiations. An interviewee argued that this 
could have “poisoned” the atmosphere, because of conflicts that could arise in the bilaterals. 
Additionally, the candidate countries would take over the acquis communautaire in any case 
(anonymous interviewee). 
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regulate. Lamy commented that the EU’s requests had been formulated in ways both 
to sustain the importance of services trade in the EU and to make it possible for 
developing countries to benefit from increased services trade (European Commission 
2002b; Bridges 10.07.2002).242 
In the CTS-SS, the progress of the market access negotiations started to be 
discussed under “Review of progress in negotiations of participants” at the end of 
October 2002. Brazil emphasised Mercosur’s commitment to the services 
negotiations, but warned that progress in other negotiation areas, especially in 
agriculture, had been sluggish. The Brazilian representative complained that 
economic arguments that were often used in the services negotiations, such as “win-
win scenarios” and “efficient allocation of resources”, were not applied to agriculture. 
The Malaysian negotiator complained that his country had been put under significant 
pressure by other WTO members recently with regard to the services negotiations, 
which was risking domestic support for the negotiations. Malaysia supported Brazil in 
terms of the linkage between services and agriculture, but also the link to S&D. 
Developing countries pointed to their capacity constraints and difficulties emerging 
for them due to the comprehensiveness of requests (WTO TN/S/M/4 11.02.2003). 
Thailand warned that while the market access negotiations in services had moved 
forward, progress was lacking in agriculture, S&D, TRIPs and health-related issues 
and the GATS rules negotiations. The negotiator complained about a lack of 
transparency of the market access negotiations and about an over-emphasis on 
Mode 3 to the detriment of Mode 4 (WTO TN/S/M/5 21.02.2003). In subsequent 
CTS-SS meetings, several developing countries insisted that a systematic review of 
the bilateral negotiations was a mandated task of the CTS-SS (WTO TN/S/M/5 
21.02.2003), which was contested at least partially by the developed countries, who 
seemed to rather want to “get on” with the (bilateral) market access negotiations.  
In general, at this stage the bilateral process seems to have been assessed 
positively – or at least the demandeurs tried to keep a positive atmosphere in the 
                                            
242 Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, China, India, New Zealand, Poland, Norway, Switzerland 
and Taiwan had also circulated their requests at this stage (Bridges 10.07.2002). 
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negotiations (WTO TN/S/M/5 21 February 2003).243 However, additional to the 
various complaints by Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand and others, the Philippine 
representative indicated in spring 2003 that only 40 WTO members had submitted 
requests, although members at this point of time were already required to prepare 
and present initial offers. The link between agriculture and services was emphasised 
heavily at this stage of the negotiations and might be one explanation for the delay in 
the submission of requests (WTO TN/S/M/6 25.04.2003).  
The changing relations to civil society now impacted directly on the CTS-SS (rather 
than before only on the WTO as a whole or on national delegations). In a meeting in 
May 2003, the Chair indicated that he and capital delegations were asked for 
information on the state of the negotiations and he was wondering whether “basic 
information” could be made public, for example with regard to the number of offers. 
Some delegations expressed their concern as to how this information would interfere 
with the negotiation process, for example whether countries could be put under 
pressure by the public to make offers although they are not interested in doing so 
(WTO TN/S/M/7 30.06.2003). The Quad was divided on the issue. Japan and the US 
wanted to keep their offers confidential, whereas the EU and Canada wanted to 
make them available to the public (IUST 28.03.2003). Services liberalisation now was 
a topic for a wide range of NGOs and trade unions.244 The European Commission 
itself continued its internal explanation of GATS. In a public hearing in the European 
Parliament, organised by the Heinrich Boell Foundation, Lamy outlined that the 
Commission’s services agenda was not about pure liberalisation or privatisation, but 
about “market access and rule-making”, and that the GATS framework kept intact the 
regulatory freedom of each government. Lamy outlined that under GATS 
governments are not obliged to open any sector, and he repeated that the EU did not 
                                            
243 Hong Kong (China), as part of the demandeurs, called members to keep up the good pace of work 
in the services negotiations. 
244 The first People's World Water Forum took place in Florence, 21-22 March 2003, and criticised the 
potential water liberalisation under GATS (Bridges 26.03.2003). The charity “Save the children” 
published a report about the potentially disastrous impacts of service liberalisation under the GATS 
(Bridges 10.04.2003a). The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) asked for 
safeguards to prevent “public services or other services of public interest” being submitted to private 
sector competition under GATS (Bridges 10.04.2003). In March 2003, the European Parliament 
adopted a resolution on GATS (European Parliament 2003). 
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make any demands on health, education and audio-visual services (European 
Commission 2003c, e).  
Preparation for the first set of offers started in the EU and as previously with the EU 
draft requests, the draft EU offers leaked in February 2003. On 5 February 2003, 
Pascal Lamy introduced the EU’s draft initial service offers. If accepted in its current 
form, the EU offer would have included further market opening in banking, 
telecommunication, computer, postal, distribution, tourism, transport and 
environmental services, but not in public services or in audiovisual services, as the 
Commission ruled out any commitment in this sector. The EU offer also included 
market opening in Mode 4. Bridges quotes Pascal Lamy:  
This carefully constructed proposal will strengthen the EU's 
position in the Doha negotiations because it addresses the interests 
of others, particularly developing countries. At the same time it 
ensures that services of collective interests in the EU such as 
education and health are preserved. 
NGOs generally approved of the draft offer, but they regretted that the offer included 
postal, retail, environmental and transport services. The Third World Network 
demanded that the EU should withdraw its request for these sectors (Bridges 
06.02.2003). During the preparation of its offer, the European Commission tried to 
make a more extensive offer on Mode 4 and the offer on Mode 4 was considered the 
“most ambitious aspect” of the draft EU offer. Apparently, it would have significantly 
increased the temporary access of professionals to the EU market. It seemed that in 
this way the Commission sought to accommodate for example the demands of India. 
However, in the EU internal consultation process the Commission faced resistance 
by certain EU member states. While some Nordic countries, for example Sweden, 
seem to have been supportive, the resistance against the Commission proposal was 
led by Belgium, various national labour agencies and workers unions. Lamy tried to 
diffuse worries in emphasising the differentiation between changes to immigration 
law and the short term entry of workers, but the proposal still caused security and 
illegal immigration concerns.245 With regard to maritime services, where the 
Commission tried to revive its 1996 offer, the Commission faced resistance by 
8 From Doha to Cancún 2002-2003: starting the Doha Round 293 
 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, who urged for a more cautious negotiation 
strategy. On postal services, the Commission faced resistance from postal worker 
unions. On audiovisual services, the countries that had acceded in 1995 would have 
to take back a commitment. In other areas, it seemed the EU was offering a mere 
binding of actual market access and no new commitments (IUST 21.03.2003). The 
European Commission tried to accommodate the concerns of civil society in an 
(apparently unprecedented) consultation process in the preparation of the offers,246 
which apart from civil society involved industry and the EU institutions (European 
Commission 2003f).  
In the WTO, hopes for significant offers to be presented by the March 30 deadline 
were decreasing, with only 30 offers247 having been tabled by the beginning of 
March. The Head of the Services Division explained that (1) while the services 
negotiations are the most advanced in the Doha Round, lack of progress in other 
areas had decreased members’ motivation to keep up the pace in the services 
negotiations (for example access to essential medicines, S&D, agriculture 
negotiations). (2) Many countries still took time to thoroughly prepare their requests 
to make effective requests. Mainly developed countries, including Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the US, submitted their offers on time for the end of March 2003 
deadline. The Commission’s internal division meant that the EU had not yet agreed 
on its offer and postponed submission. The EU’s internal problems here caused a 
definite drawback for the EU and the US seems to have had a more effective impact 
on the negotiations. According to Bridges, some saw the US offer as a kind of 
benchmark for the other offers, because it showed a clear intent to move forward 
                                                                                                                                        
245 ENTs were a further crunching point. 
246 The offer needed to go through the Council and the European Parliament for consideration, before 
being forwarded to other WTO members. 
247 In the discussion surrounding the WTO services negotiations, the number of submitted offers and 
requests became a proxy to the progress made in the negotiations. However, it should be noted that 
the number of offers on its own can be misleading and does not express the actual impact of the 
offers on world services trade. An interviewee gave an example: in May 2005 there were 52 offers 
on the table, covering 95% of services trade. Five crucial countries were missing to cover nearly all 
services trade: South Africa, Philippines, Pakistan, Venezuela and Morocco (interview 30). 
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even despite other areas stalling. However, developing countries had not yet 
submitted any offers (and only 30 had submitted requests) (Bridges 02.04.2003).248  
Taking a closer look at the US offer, however, puts into question how far the US 
would be an effective leader in the negotiations. IUST comments that the US offer did 
not go beyond existing US law and hence just bound commitments that had already 
been made unilaterally. The US had only added two new sectors to its commitments: 
express delivery and energy services, again offering to bind existing market access. 
The US did not offer to liberalise the provision of water services and other public 
monopolies such as postal delivery, as had been requested by the EU, because the 
Bush administration expected these requests to be retracted by the EU. This can be 
seen as a direct result of the civil society campaigning in the EU. The US offer 
remained cautious on Mode 4 as well (IUST 28.03.2003, 04.04.2003) and an 
interviewee assessed that the US was much more restrained in the services 
negotiations than the EU overall (interview 30). 
The EU finally submitted its initial services offer on 29 April and made it conditional 
on offers of similar depth from other members. The content of the EU offer is 
summarised in Box 8.3.  
Box 8.3 Content of the EU offer 
Sectors: business services, computer and related services, research and development services, real 
estate services, rental/leasing services without operators, rental services with operators, other busi-
ness services, communication services, construction and related engineering services, distribution 
services, privately funded educational services, environmental services (incl. distribution of water, but 
no cross-border transportation), financial services, tourism and tourism-related services, recreational, 
cultural and sporting services, transport services, other services.  
Various sensitive services sectors are excluded from the offer, among others education, health, social 
services, and audiovisuals; reflecting civil society concerns and interests of some regional authorities 
in the EU. Public utilities: no change to current limitations.  
Modes: the offer of the EU with regard to Mode 4 was regarded as “superficial”. Bridges pointed to the 
following potential EU commitments:  
Corporate managers and specialists will be allowed to stay for an ex-
tended period of three years. Graduate corporate trainees will be allowed to 
stay a maximum period of 12 months. In either case, an economic needs 
test will not be required.  
                                            
248 By April 2003, the EU had received 35 requests, 27 were from developing countries (European 
Commission 2003f). 
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Foreign companies with a contract to provide services to a client in the 
EU will be allowed to send highly skilled corporate employees to the EU for a 
maximum period of six months (within a period of 12 months). This period 
was previously limited to three months. The offer does not, however, apply 
to important services sectors such as research and development, construc-
tion, higher education and entertainment. 
A new category of contractual services is offered. Self-employed, highly 
skilled people will be allowed to enter the EU for up to six moths. This ap-
plies only to architectural, engineering and integrated engineering services, 
computer, management consulting and translation services. The entry of in-
dividual service suppliers is subject to a numerical ceiling, for which the mo-
dalities and level are still to be determined.  
Scope: the EU offer includes some modification to the EU regime on investment. Subsidies in the 
services sector remain unchanged.  
Source: Bridges 07.05.2003; European Commission 2003b 
Commentators pointed out that as the EU offer was maintaining all services 
subsidies, it was of limited benefit to developing countries’ service suppliers. The 
proposed commitments on Mode 4249 were criticised by GATS Watch: 
 The EU offer on mode four appears to be very poor. The 
possibility of concessions in mode four has been used by the EU and 
by businesses to sell the GATS negotiations to developing countries. 
The current EU offer shows that this is for the most part an empty 
promise.  
The EU’s offers on the water sector were also criticised by civil society groups 
(Friends of the Earth, World Development Movement (WDM), Centre for International 
Environmental Law), although the European Commission emphasised that its 
liberalisation proposals in the water service sector only concerned the distribution of 
water “through ‘mains’” (Bridges 07.05.2003). 
In the WTO, the offers by developed countries were sharply criticised by developing 
countries. They accused the US of making unjustified demands on developing 
countries while offering very little in return. Both the EU and US offer were criticised 
for their offers on Mode 4. The US justified itself by pointing to its significant 
commitments in the Uruguay Round and to its unilateral liberalisation. The ESM 
proved another critical point, with the EU, US and Canada insisting that the GATS 
                                            
249 The offer excluded less-skilled labour and “GATS-type” visas, proposed by various developing 
countries, as it was feared that this could undermine normal visa procedures. 
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just mandated the discussion of whether such a mechanism would be desirable, 
while Brazil, Malaysia and other developing countries considered the mechanism as 
essential for further progress in the negotiations (IUST 30.05.2003) – arguments that 
had been made in the GATS discussions since 2005. Some members, including the 
EU and Japan, criticised some other WTO members’ offers for having very little 
substance. This was rejected by developing countries with a reference to agriculture 
negotiations. Issue-linkages were hence now made between all different negotiation 
items and between services and other negotiation areas. At the same time, 
developing countries also opposed the proposal that the Secretariat should prepare a 
paper summarising which country had submitted an offer, sectoral coverage and 
other issues, which could have increased transparency in the negotiations, which 
obviously was not desired by them (Bridges 28.05.2003). 
The submission of the first offers in the WTO hence changed the tone of the 
discussions in the CTS-SS. So far, the services negotiations had been left relatively 
unnoticed by the WTO negotiations overall and seemed to run smoothly: “Countries 
were sailing along.” (interview 28). While the number of requests had already 
remained behind expectations, the submission of the first offers created a first crisis 
in the services negotiations, because of a perceived lack of quality in the offers and 
the slow pace of submissions. In this first round of offers, only some 30 offers had 
been submitted by the summer of 2003 (IUST 11.07.2003,250 15.08.2003251). These 
included offers from Mercosur countries, but more than 10 of the offers came from 
developed countries. Tunisia explained on behalf of the African Group that the lack of 
                                            
250 In July 2003, 27 countries had submitted services offers. These countries were the US, EU, Japan, 
Canada, Australia, Mexico, New Zealand, Korea, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Uruguay, Taiwan, 
Paraguay, Norway, Iceland, Bahrain, Liechtenstein, Panama, Argentina, Switzerland, Senegal, 
Israel, Hong Kong (China), Poland, Macao, China and Saint Kitts and Nevis (IUST 11.07.2003). 
251 In August 2003, 30 WTO members had submitted services offers. The countries were the US, the 
European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Korea, Uruguay, Taiwan, Canada, Paraguay, 
Norway, Bahrain, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Panama, Argentina, Switzerland, Senegal, Israel, Hong 
Kong (China), Poland, Saint Kitts and Nevis, the Czech Republic, Macao, Mexico, Fiji, Slovenia, the 
Slovak Republic, Singapore and Chile (IUST 15.08.2003). 
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requests and offers from African countries was due to resource constraints.252 Japan 
regretted that some of the key developing countries, who had also been very active 
in the CTS-SS, had not yet submitted their offers.  
At the same time, the Tunisian representative complained that offers received by 
African countries so far had not taken account of their concerns, and Uruguay 
assessed the quality of offers as below expectations. Of course, countries were trying 
to “advertise” their own offers as “ambitious”: Mexico introduced its own offer as 
“ambitious” and regretted the lack of positive responses to it. Again, the link to other 
negotiation areas was emphasised: developing countries reminded other WTO 
members of the sluggish progress in the rules negotiations and the link to agriculture 
as much as the lack of offers on Mode 4 (WTO TN/S/M/7 30.06.2003; WTO 
TN/S/M/8 29.09.2003). In July 2003, 14 developing countries warned that the offers 
on Mode 4 had been too limited. Apparently, the issue became more difficult to deal 
with for the US and EU, as India had become a leader on the Mode 4 issue and had 
rallied the support of many developing countries, among them China (IUST 
11.07.2003).253 LDC continued to hold back submission of their requests and offers 
until LDC S&D modalities were agreed upon (Bridges 17.07.2003).  
Developing countries thought to further shape the agenda of the CTS-SS in insisting 
on the implementation of Paragraph 15 of the Negotiation Guidelines (“review of the 
progress in the negotiations regarding the effective implementation of the objectives 
of Articles IV and XIX:2”) by discussing the item in a sub-heading to the “review of 
negotiations” agenda point. Various delegations254 suggested in a proposal to assess 
the negotiations by answering a set of questions, aiming to facilitate the assessment 
                                            
252 Tunisia explained that this not only meant countries could not effectively participate in the 
negotiations, but also that they could not support their domestic industries to increase their 
competitiveness. As the bilateral process constituted a further burden on their scarce resource, the 
representative called for a “multilateralisation” of negotiations on Mode 4 and tourism services as a 
solution to this problem.  
253 Countries that supported the paper on Mode 4 were India, China, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines and 
Thailand. 
254 These delegations were Peru, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, China, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Dominican Republic, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.  
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of the offers by individual members. Discussion ensued as to whether the WTO 
Secretariat could undertake part of the work or whether members should undertake 
the assessment completely on their own. The US, Canada and Japan showed their 
disapproval for mandating the Secretariat for a qualitative assessment task (WTO 
TN/S/M/8 29.09.2003). However, in 2003 no further work was undertaken in this 
respect, as WTO members thought that more offers should be submitted first (WTO 
TN/S/M/9 05.02.2004). 
8.2.5 Preparation of the Cancún Ministerial in the CTS/CTS-SS  
In the middle of 2003, the preparations for the Cancún Ministerial started in the 
CTS/CTS-SS. Jara presented a report to the TNC on 14 July, which was supposed to 
form the basis for the service text during the Cancún Ministerial (Bridges 
17.07.2003). In line with previous discussions, the draft on services was criticised by 
various developing countries for over-emphasising market access, while neglecting 
horizontal and rule-making issues. They also complained that the offers of developed 
countries contained little new commitments, especially on Mode 4. Hence, a group of 
developing countries proposed a revision of the draft Ministerial text in early 
August.255 Their new proposal "urged participants to intensify [...] their efforts and 
improve the quality of their offers, particularly in sectors and modes of supply of 
export interest to developing countries especially Mode 4" and the text re-
emphasised the importance of the various deadlines in the rule-making negotiations 
(esp. ESM). Some of the changes were inserted into the pre-Cancún draft ministerial 
text (Bridges 28.08.2003, IUST 15.08.2003), but the US did not approve of the 
developing country draft text and presented its own draft proposal on August 20. Jara 
tried to broker a compromise (IUST 22.08.2003) and as there was also not yet an 
agreement on modalities for the treatment of LDC, Chair Jara also continued 
consultations on this issue in order to reach agreement before the Cancún Ministerial 
(Bridges 28.08.2003; IUST 15.08.2003), as this constituted a crucial area to sustain 
LDC cooperation during the Cancún Ministerial.  
                                            
255 The group included Bolivia, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
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Finally, during the Cancún Ministerial, services played a very minor role. It was not 
negotiated in a separate negotiation group, but added into the “miscellaneous 
group’s” agenda. As it was not seen as major concern of WTO members, the 
miscellaneous group did not negotiate services and members were advised to 
negotiate bilaterally (Bridges 12.09.2003). As the Cancún Ministerial remained 
without outcome, new directions for the services negotiations were not given.  
However, as discussed above, despite the cancellation of all other negotiation 
bodies, the CTS and its subsidiary bodies met from 29 September to 6 October as 
planned, which apparently surprised several delegations. Member states’ positions 
had not changed significantly and the future of the negotiations remained unclear: 
while some suggested the CTS should wait for movement in other committees, 
theoretically the CTS could move forward without further political guidance due to the 
nature of the request-offer process. CTS-SS meetings took place on 06. and 09. 
October 2003, but seemed to have lacked enthusiasm and mostly dealt with “routine” 
issues, with negotiators being mostly concerned as to how negotiations overall would 
move forward.256 A subsequent Heads of Delegations (HoD) meeting confirmed that 
the CTS would also meet as scheduled in December, but the Heads of Delegations 
meeting mostly concentrated on agriculture and did not issue a new schedule for the 
services negotiations (Bridges 08.10.2003, 15.10.2003; WTO TN/S/M/9 05.02.2004). 
An interviewee confirmed that despite the formal continuation of the services 
negotiations, there was hardly any progress in the negotiations, and that activity 
levels would only start to increase again after the July 2004 framework (interview 6).  
In October 2003, India announced it would soon submit its initial offer. One 
commentator considered the Indian move as strategic to diffuse suggestions that 
India as part of the G20 was not ready to compromise in Cancún (Bridges 
08.10.2003, 15.10.2003). In December 2003, the CTS meetings and its subsidiary 
bodies apparently made some progress despite the still stalled Doha Round 
                                            
256 A proposal on Mode 4 by India and 13 other developing countries (including Argentina, China, 
South Africa) from May 2003 was discussed. 
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negotiations. The number of requests and offers continued to increase.257 There was 
hence still movement in the different places in which the services negotiations took 
place.258 Accordingly, one commentator pointed out that services was still an area of 
interest to many WTO members and now showed most dynamism in the Doha 
Round (Bridges 11.12.2003).  
8.3 Interim Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the impact of the EU on the WTO negotiations overall and 
on trade in services from the launch of the Doha Round to the failed Cancún 
Ministerial Conference and its initial aftermath. This third phase in the negotiations 
under consideration in this dissertation is initially characterised by low activity: little 
movement occurred in 2002 as the DDA had just been established and preparatory 
work was ongoing in all sub-committees. In 2003, negotiations gained in prominence 
in the run-up to the Cancún Ministerial and agriculture became the major stumbling 
block on the agenda. After the failure of Cancún, negotiations were interrupted, with 
only the services negotiations continuing, although they arguably were also hindered 
from making any substantial progress.  
In the trade in services negotiations, activity also initially remained low, albeit with 
ongoing “skirmishes” between developed and developing countries taking place. The 
first focus of these was the assessment exercise, which developed into a key area for 
knowledge-exchange in GATS 2000. The second focus was the market access 
negotiations. While already the number of requests had remained below 
expectations, the submission of the first offers created a first crisis in the services 
negotiations, because of a perceived lack of quality in the offers and the slow pace of 
                                            
257 62 mainly developed or larger developing countries had now submitted requests; more than 40 
offers were submitted in 2003. New offers were received by (inter alia): Bahrain, Bulgaria, Colombia, 
Chile, Czech Republic, Fiji, Guatemala, Hong Kong (China), Korea, Macao, China, Paraguay, 
Peoples Republic of China, Peru, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, St Christopher and Nevis, 
Thailand and Turkey. 
258 For example, the Japanese representative indicated that the bilaterals Japan had held during this 
special session had been less intensive than before, but activity still had been visible in the 
multilateral meetings, in the Friends groups and in the subsidiary bodies. 
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submissions. Two agreements on the framework for the GATS 2000 negotiations are 
found: the agreement on autonomous liberalisation credits and the LDC modalities.  
In order to build consensus in the WTO (research question 5), the EU continued to 
emphasise the importance of development in the WTO. It tried to build support from 
the LDC especially, by suggesting a development package for Cancún. At the same 
time, issue linkage gained in importance at this stage of the negotiation: with services 
now embedded in the broader round and with agriculture becoming the key stumbling 
block in the negotiations, the EU’s offensive interest services was increasingly held 
back by this. With the market access negotiations starting in the middle of 2002, new 
linkages between the market access negotiations and the rules negotiations and 
S&D were established, which were used by other actors to defend against the EU’s 
offensive interest in the market access negotiations. The issue linkage desired by the 
EU for tactical reasons thus developed into a double-edged sword.  
A further attempt by the EU to build consensus was co-leadership with the US: the 
EU and the US tried to assume leadership in the negotiations and to resolve the 
deadlock in the negotiations by proposing a deal on agriculture. This attempt failed 
and was interpreted as the end of EU-US co-leadership of the WTO. The power shift 
was hence further changing the way the WTO functioned. The EU also tried offering 
flexibility in its negotiation position by suggesting that the Singapore issues could be 
“de-bundled”, but this was not followed through by the EU. In the end, after the failure 
of Cancún, the EU’s strategy was to stay committed to the regime (while the US 
quickly announced a new focus in its trade policy) and in this way arguably try to 
keep the negotiations going.  
In the services negotiations, the EU used the assessment exercise to further the 
case for services liberalisation, especially with regard to developing countries 
(research question 5). Little happened in these negotiations though: the assessment 
exercise continued to be a place where developing countries tried to postpone the 
market access negotiations, and developed countries repeated their well-known 
counter-positions. On the autonomous liberalisation credits, the Commission made 
sure the agreement had not too much impact, and it seems it had a similar approach 
on LDC modalities (research question 6). For both negotiation outcomes, it is 
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questionable what impact they will have, apart from framing expectations and ideas 
in the negotiations. The modalities were negotiated because the regime in form of the 
GATS required WTO members to do so, and because certain WTO members had 
obvious interests in establishing such a mechanism, but they might constitute a void 
mechanism. They might have been a mere “negotiation about negotiations”, without 
any real impact on “negotiations about substance”.  
In terms of EU strategy for consensus building (research question 5), at this stage we 
can thus see the use of offering “rewards” in the form of integrating development 
concerns into the negotiations at various stages, issue-linkage, co-leadership with 
the US, shaping the debates (on services liberalisation) assessment, suggesting (but 
not following through) more flexibility on its negotiation position, ensuring that 
adversarial outcomes (on autonomous liberalisation credits and LDC modalities) do 
not have a too far-reaching impact. 
Did outcomes at this stage reflect the EU’s preferences (research question 6)? As 
mentioned above, the EU-US co-leadership did not have the desired outcome, 
arguably because of the power shift happening in the WTO. Overall, this shows that 
although consensus between the EU and the USA are still necessary conditions for a 
success of negotiations in the WTO, it now was no longer a main and at times 
sufficient criteria. It can be argued that the failure of the Cancún Ministerial, following 
the shifts in negotiation dynamics in Seattle and Doha, was a further expression and 
institutionalisation of this shift in power in the WTO. This was also expressed in the 
emergence of a new level of cooperation between developing countries, as despite 
their differences in interests and needs they managed to draw up a more or less 
coherent agenda. The establishment of the G20, and finally the ACP/LDC/African 
Union coalition at the end of the Ministerial (later on referred to as G90, see also 
Narlikar 2005; Wolfe 2006), constituted new steps in the developing countries’ search 
for better representation in the WTO and their improved usage of their resources. 
However, the failure of Cancún can also be seen as indicating the failure of the major 
players (EU, US) in the regime to accommodate the new situation (research question 
1). Four small African countries also managed to re-shape the WTO agenda, 
indicating the limits of the EU’s ability to control it. 
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On the results in the services negotiations, LDC modalities and autonomous 
liberalisation credits, the EU neither showed great support nor clear rejection of the 
proposal, but again the negotiation results were not particularly far-reaching, 
arguably reflecting the EU’s power to prevent adverse outcomes (research question 
6). On market access negotiations, services negotiators realised in 2003 that far too 
few requests had been submitted. The subsequent first round of offers also delivered 
few offers. A first sense of crisis occurred in the services negotiations. Additional to 
this unsatisfying result for the EU, the EU came under increased pressure due to new 
prominence of the Mode 4 issue.259  
The services negotiations also reveal a further point on the resources of the EU 
(research question 2). The leakage of the EU draft requests meant that the 
Commission now had to react to a new “game” in terms of its relations to EU member 
states and civil society. The Commission started a strategy of “heavy lobbying” 
(towards NGOs, the European Parliament, etc.) at the domestic level.260 The services 
negotiations now had become highly politicised. Increasingly EU civil society 
undermined the EU’s negotiation power, as they took on positions that were 
represented mostly by developing countries in the WTO (see also Narlikar 2005: 9). 
The European Commission had to change its public relation approach to build 
support for the negotiations domestically.  
The Commission’s internal division meant that the EU had not yet agreed on its offer 
and postponed submission. The EU’s internal problems here caused a definite 
                                            
259 Apparently, the issue became more difficult to deal with for the US and EU, as India had become a 
leader on the Mode 4 issue and had rallied the support of many developing countries, among them 
China. 
260 For non-EU WTO members, the importance that European NGOs now have in the negotiation 
process can be bewildering (interview 20). The (frequent) leakage of documents creates a certain 
mistrust, but by now seems an established element of the “game”. Several interviewees indicated 
that NGOs frequently receive internal EU documents. For example at the Hong Kong Ministerial, the 
members of the European Parliament in the EU delegation leaked a strategic document. Another 
interviewee indicated that documents leaked to IGOs or NGOs, which redistributed them to 
developing countries (anonymous interviewees). A developing country interviewee indicated that this 
kind of leakage would frequently happen in his home country as well, and was not too special, and 
was an expression of certain societal parts feeling under pressure from the proposals in the 
documents (interview 25, 29). It might also be that this document leakage has already become “part 
of the game”, and that the Commission is well aware that its counterparts might have read internal 
papers (interview 29). 
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drawback for the EU and the US seems to have had a more effective impact on the 
negotiations. 
The EU’s attempts at driving the negotiations forward had at this stage mostly been 
unsuccessful. In the WTO, the shifting negotiation dynamic made it hard to control 
the outcomes, while at the same time, the EU’s domestic resources proved shaky. 
The next chapter will now follow the EU’s attempts to revive the Doha Round 
between 2003-2005. 
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9 From Cancún to Hong Kong 2004-2005: Lowering 
expectations 
After the Doha Round had slowly started in 2002, it had come to a sudden halt in 
2003 with the failure of the Cancún Ministerial. The services negotiations were also 
slowed down. Negotiations had been formally restarted, but it did not yet seem that 
any progress on the substance of the issues had been made. How would the EU try 
to push the negotiations forward now that positions had become so very clear in the 
Doha Round? The next two years would be years of high activity and tense 
negotiations throughout, as WTO members delved deeper into the issues at stake. 
The first section in this chapter deals with the attempts to find a compromise on the 
Doha Round that could appease all WTO members. The second section follows the 
services negotiations with the intensifying market access negotiations. 
9.1 Overall framework negotiations: admitting defeat? 
9.1.1 Towards the July 2004 framework 
The year 2004 started with concerns in the European Commission, as it feared that 
negotiations would remain without results because of the US elections. Throughout 
the year, the Commission hence made special efforts to ensure that the talks moved 
forward (European Commission 2004g). However, despite the Commission’s fears, 
the US in fact took an unexpected initiative in January 2004 to revive the stalled trade 
negotiations (although it was at the same time involved in a multitude of bilateral 
trade talks). The US brought back its idea of a narrow trade round, proposing a 
slimmed down version of the Doha round with an initial negotiation framework to be 
established by mid-2004.261 Apart from this new agenda, the US also diverted from 
the EU-US common position from August 2003 on agriculture and again demanded 
the end to export subsidies. While the EU indicated officially that it welcomed the US’ 
                                            
261 Apparently this round would have dealt with the areas NAMA, agriculture, services and S&D. 
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activism as such, it clearly pursued a different agenda (Bridges 14.01.2004; IUST 
13.02.2004).  
In speeches, Lamy indicated areas in which the EU position had changed as a result 
of the Cancún Ministerial. The EU had moved to a more flexible position on the 
Singapore issues and on the extension of the geographical indication register. On 
agriculture, the EU offered to negotiate a list of products on which it would end export 
subsidies. On the Singapore issues, the EU agreed on a “de-bundling” and on 
prioritising trade facilitation and transparency in government procurement. While the 
US was already engaged in a set of bilateral negotiations, the Commission had 
decided to prioritise the WTO negotiations (European Commission 2004a, 2004b). 
As in previous years, the Commission attempted to reach out to the various groups of 
developing countries, especially the new G20 and G90 (European Commission 
2004a, 2004b).262  
In Geneva, despite these attempts at leadership by increasing flexibility by first the 
US, and afterwards the EU, compromise was not yet within reach. A 12-13 February 
meeting between the EU and the G20 did not achieve any breakthrough (Bridges 
19.02.2004).263 While the US seemed to have moved towards a more proactive 
position in agriculture, and towards the round as a whole, the EU’s initiatives seem 
not to have been enough to lift it out of the new defensive position it found itself in 
(Bridges 26.02.2004). 
                                            
262 The G90 was a joint coalition of the African Union, ACPs and LDC with ca. 64 members (WTO 
2007d). On the new coalitions, Lamy had held consultations with the G90 and the G20 in December 
2003 already, and met representatives of various countries in January/February 2003 (India, 
Indonesia, Bangladesh) (European Commission 2004b, 2004c). The EU apparently fostered links to 
domestic ministries as well: for example, in two ASEAN countries the EU has made regular contact 
and visits with the ministry domestically (interview 15, 16). Domestically, as after the Seattle 
Ministerial, ideas for WTO reform were discussed in the EU as well. In a discussion with the 
“Kangaroo” group (a group promoting further advancement of the single market) in the European 
Parliament, Lamy discussed various ideas for WTO reform. These included improvements to 
conference management, an expanded WTO Secretariat and better public access to the WTO 
(Bridges 04.02.2004; European Commission 2004e). Again these ideas seemed to have remained 
without result. 
263 In various capitals, high level meetings had been taking place to revive the trade talks. An informal 
meeting on trade issues was held from 18-19 February 2004 in Mombasa, Kenya. Before the 
meeting, Zoellick had met Asian and African trade ministers in their capitals (Bridges 19.02.2004). 
The lack of progress in the Doha Round negotiations was also discussed at the World Economic 
Forum at Davos (Bridges 28.01.2004).  
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In attempts to further focus and drive forward the negotiations, Supachai, the US and 
the EU suggested the summer of 2004 as the new target date for a framework for the 
negotiations (Bridges 04.03.2004). While negotiations gained in pace in April 2004, 
progress was still highly dependent on movement in agriculture. The future of the 
Singapore issues remained uncertain, with the EU’s exact position remaining 
somewhat unclear (Bridges 08.04.2004). The search for solutions for the stalled 
negotiations hence moved to “micro-Ministerials” (Bridges 05.05.2004; see also 
Wolfe 2004).264 With the pressure for a deal increased by the looming change in the 
European Commission and US presidential elections (Bridges 05.05.2004), Lamy 
and Fischler then offered to end all export subsidies and to give more lenient 
treatment for weaker developing countries – a concept that was called the “round for 
free”. The “round for free” meant that LDC and other weaker developing countries 
would not be asked to undertake any new commitments ,apart from binding certain 
tariffs and participating in the trade facilitation negotiations. The Commission had 
realised that these countries did not have the negotiation capacity to participate 
properly in the DDA and also would not be in a position to implement the results of 
complex negotiations in any case. This recognition was a significant strategic change 
for the EU. Lamy and Fischler also called for a significant step forward in services 
liberalisation, marking a shift in attention of the EU to the services negotiations 
(Bridges 13.05.2004; IUST 09.05.2004; European Commission 2004f, g). In the 
WTO, the reactions to this new EU initiative went from positive (USA) to negative by 
some developing countries, which feared the EU’s “round for free” idea was intended 
to split developing country solidarity (Bridges 13.05.2004; IUST 09.05.2004; 
European Commission 2004m).265 It is significant though that when the Commission 
had already announced the new initiative, it was still contested by some of the EU 
member states: France, Ireland, Belgium and Hungary doubted the Commission had 
the mandate to end export subsidies. Germany, the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Finland 
                                            
264 Zoellick convened such a meeting on 01 May 2004 with Lamy and representatives of Kenya and 
South Africa. 
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and the Netherlands supported the proposal (Bridges 13.05.2004; IUST 09.05.2004; 
European Commission 2004f, g). The European Commission apparently had taken 
the EU member states by surprise by stretching its mandate in order to arrive at a 
compromise at the international level.266 The EU’s new initiative seems to have been 
fruitful in the short-term: the Paris Mini-Ministerial ended with renewed optimism and 
Lamy was quoted with “the (trade) volcano is smoking again”. The General Council 
now agreed to the idea promoted by Supachai, the US and EU of a negotiation 
framework to be established by July 2004 (Bridges 19.05.2004).  
At about the same time, the new coalition of the “FIPs” (five interested parties267) 
emerged in the agriculture negotiations and replaced the EU-US co-leadership in this 
area (Bridges 23.06.2004; see also Wolfe 2004). Similarly, the new Quad268 emerged 
in the negotiations overall (see also Wolfe 2006). Interviewees attributed this was to 
the power shift in the WTO (interview 17); this meant that developing countries 
moved into the centre of decision-making and that these new coalitions signified a 
strategic adaptation of the EU and the US to the new power structure in the WTO 
(interview 35; see also Wilkinson 2006a).269  
                                                                                                                                        
265 Outside the WTO, the EU initiative was also not uncontested: a NGO representative criticised that 
the proposal would be (partially?) made meaningless by the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) negotiations with the ACP, which requested market opening from the same vulnerable 
economies that were protected by the “round for free” approach (interview 35). 
266 The “G90” initiative hence was a surprise move by Lamy, which the Council of course could not 
publicly renounce. Apparently, another tactic the Commission uses to overcome the limitation the 
Council sets for it is by overloading the Council with proposals and expertise in often very short time, 
so that the Council cannot thoroughly examine all the proposals (interview 32). 
267 The FIPs were the EU, US, Australia, Brazil and India. 
268 The “new Quad” (also “G4”) consisted of the EU, the US, India and Brazil. However, both the FIPs 
and the new Quad seemed to have come together in different formats. The WTO describes on its 
website that the EU, US, India, Brazil, Japan and Australia have met as the Quint, the G6, or in the 
formation of the new Quad, the FIPs, or the four interested parties (WTO 2007). Prior to this, in the 
overall framework negotiations, the Quad had lost in importance significantly. While the EU still 
coordinated with Japan and Canada, dialogue with India and Brazil was now paramount (interview 
10, 12). A discussion on why it was Brazil and India, and not other developing countries, that 
acceded to the centre of decision-making in the WTO see Hurrell and Narlikar (2007). 
269 The G90 established their own “steering committee” for the WTO negotiations, further enhancing 
the coordination of their negotiation strategies. LDC continued to coordinate their positions as well 
(Bridges 09.06.2004, 13.05.2004). 
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In June 2004, the initial draft version for the July framework was discussed during a 
Heads of Delegations meeting (Bridges 09.06.2004, 16.06.2004).270 Intense 
negotiations subsequently took place (Bridges 07.07.2004).271 A FIPs meeting in 
early July did not result in convergence on the July framework, but Lamy indicated 
that a good discussion had taken place. The G90 met again, accompanied by sharp 
warnings from Supachai, Lamy and Zoellick to move towards compromise (Bridges 
14.07.2004). The G90 had by now emerged as a viable negotiation partner and was 
recognised as such by the European Commission (European Commission 2004g, 
h).272 
Efforts to reach agreement continued, but while there were specialised meetings on 
NAMA and agriculture, there were none on services. For the draft text, the EU and 
the US hence asked for a better balance between the negotiation areas and a whole 
group of countries was reported to have called for more attention to services in the 
draft framework (Bridges 21.07.2004). For a short while, it seemed that agreement 
again would not be possible, as there seemed to be little willingness to compromise 
(IUST 23.07.2004),273 but the July framework was finally successfully agreed upon.  
The framework extended the deadline of the Doha negotiations unlimitedly and it 
indicated five negotiation areas which needed to progress: agriculture, non-
agricultural market access (NAMA), development issues, trade facilitation and 
services. With regard to other areas of the Doha mandate, the framework restated 
the need for further negotiations. The agriculture text was seen as the most important 
part of the agreement, as it apparently struck an improved balance between the 
                                            
270 Calls by APEC Ministers and the G8 for movement in the negotiations followed (Bridges 
09.06.2004, 16.06.2004). 
271 The FIPs and the G90 held (separate) Ministerial level meetings. However, there might have been 
a “gap” between events on the Ministerial level and the technical negotiations in Geneva: in the 
TNC, Jara reported limited progress in the negotiations (Bridges 07.07.2004). The African Group 
continued to request that the Singapore issues were dropped completely from the WTO agenda, if 
the negotiations on trade facilitation were to go ahead (IUST 11.06.2004). 
272 In Lamy’s speeches, and in a speech by Commissioner Hübner at a meeting of the G90, the EU 
recognised the emergence of the G90 as negotiation partner (European Commission 2004g, h). 
273 Critical issues were agriculture, S&D and trade facilitation. 
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different negotiation areas compared to previous texts.274 On services, the text 
foresaw a new deadline of May 2005 for the submission of revised offers. Zoellick 
counted it as a US success that services was now again a third area equal in value to 
agriculture and NAMA with a separate paragraph on services in the declaration and 
not, as had been originally foreseen, included into a paragraph with other negotiation 
areas (Bridges 03.08.2004; IUST 06.08.2004).  
While IUST analysts judged that the text on NAMA and services showed a lack of 
progress since the Cancún Ministerial, the main WTO players greeted the framework 
as a milestone and expressed content with the agreement reached. Celso Amorin of 
Brazil received “praise” by both the EU and US for his role as broker for the deal 
(Bridges 03.08.2004; IUST 06.08.2004).275 The EU welcomed the July framework, 
and Fischler estimated that the EU May 2005 letter had made movement possible 
(European Commission 2004i). 
9.1.2 The run-up to the Hong Kong Ministerial 
After the July framework had been agreed upon, technical discussions continued in 
Geneva (Bridges 24.11.2004, 01.12.2004), but though the July framework meant 
certain progress, it had not yet provided a full solution to the issues under negotiation 
and conflicts hence re-emerged quickly (Wilkinson 2006a).276 In December 2004, 
Commissioner Mandelson outlined that “detailed modalities” would have to be agreed 
upon in the planned 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial (IUST 26.11.2004).277 In an end of 
January 2005 Mini-Ministerial, held on the sides of the Davos meeting, Ministers from 
                                            
274 Apparently, the new coalition of the FIPs played a strong role in reaching consensus in agriculture. 
The new influence of the FIPs was criticised by the G10 (group of net food importers; members are 
Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway, Switzerland and Chinese Taipei 
(WTO 2007d)) and the G33 fighting for the place in the decision-making process. The G33, under 
the leadership of Indonesia, was focusing on proposals for special and differential treatment and 
special products (Campolina Soares 2005). 
275 Civil society organisations criticised the deal and the WTO in general. The critics included the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) which criticised the deal for not 
addressing the threat to public services (Bridges 03.08.2004; IUST 06.08.2004). 
276 Apart from this, several groups, including APEC and the African group, restated their support for 
the Doha Round (Bridges 24.11.2004, 01.12.2004). 
9 From Cancún to Hong Kong 2004-2005: Lowering expectations 311 
 
25 WTO members called for increased movement in the Doha negotiations. They 
would concentrate on five negotiation areas; in the case of services, they were 
asking for the submission of more offers. However, of course disagreement prevailed 
as to how progress in the negotiations should be achieved: the EU reminded WTO 
members that it had already agreed to end export subsidies, which was a “big 
concession”, and it asked developing countries to move with respect of NAMA and 
the liberalisation of South-South trade. The Indians replied by reminding the EU that 
movement was needed in the services negotiations with regard to Mode 4 (Bridges 
02.02.2005).  
In a February 2005 TNC meeting, Supachai explained that if members wanted to 
conclude the round by December 2005 in the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial, they 
would have to agree on modalities by July 2005, before the summer break (Bridges 
16.02.2005). During a second Mini-Ministerial in March 2005,278 the EU and the US 
asked for initial movement in NAMA and services, whereas Brazil and Australia 
wanted to see movement on agriculture subsidies first (Bridges 09.03.2005).279 When 
the agriculture negotiations were suspended in April 2005,280 this caused deadlock in 
the other negotiation areas (Bridges 20.04.2005).  
The third Mini-Ministerial, held in May 2005 in Paris, seemed to have revived 
optimism, especially as the agriculture dispute (on the “ad valorem” equivalent 
conversion rate, see footnote 280) was resolved in the beginning of May 2005. This 
can be seen as part of a range of smaller compromises found in the run-up to Hong 
Kong (see for example Wilkinson 2006a). At the Mini-Ministerial, agriculture was 
                                                                                                                                        
277 Mandelson became the new trade commissioner in November 2004. His first speeches show a 
continuation of approach (as to be expected), but he clearly urged trading partners to make 
concessions (European Commission 2004j, k, l). 
278 30 Ministers took part in the Mini-Ministerial, which was held in Kenya in March 2005, with a larger 
than usual African participation in the meeting. 
279 At this stage of the Doha Round, WTO DG Supachai kept on reminding negotiators that they had to 
move fast in the negotiations in order to achieve the end of year target (Bridges 23.03.2005). 
280 This suspension was due to disagreement over the so-called 'ad valorem' equivalents (AVEs). 
“Specific” agricultural tariffs based on imported quantities need to be converted into 'ad valorem' 
equivalents, which are tariffs based upon the price of the product. Before a tariff reduction formula 
can be agreed upon in the agriculture negotiations, “ad valorem” equivalents need to be established 
(Bridges 23.05.2005). 
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once more the main subject of the meeting, with NAMA and services discussed as 
secondary items. On services, Ministers called for high quality offers, and, as a new 
development, were envisaging a mechanism to assess services offers (Bridges 
11.05.2005). Due to persistent disagreements, Supachai lessened expectations for 
the July approximations (Bridges 18.05.2005). 
The African Union met to coordinate its position on the Doha negotiations, and 
Mandelson urged for greater involvement of African countries in the negotiations 
(Bridges 15.06.2005).281 The LDC also coordinated their position, and were 
especially critical of the EU’s proposed changes to its sugar market regime (Bridges 
29.06.2005). At various times, some WTO members, especially developing countries, 
expressed their scepticism about the Mini-Ministerial process: while they agreed that 
the process moved the negotiations forward, they thought it should not be 
institutionalised and they complained about intransparency (Bridges 18.05.2005, 
20.07.2005, 27.07.2005; Pedersen 2006).282 
During the Dalian Mini-Ministerial in July 2005, it seemed that some movement 
occurred in the agriculture negotiations, but none in NAMA and services. While 
Mandelson spoke of a softening of positions, the EU and the US were criticised for 
not agreeing to the G20 proposal on agriculture (Bridges 13.07.2005; European 
Commission 2005f). The link of different negotiation areas to agriculture “appear[ed] 
to be posing serious barriers to the talks” (Bridges 20.07.2005).  
Despite all attempts, the talks failed to achieve the expected July approximations and 
were interrupted for the WTO summer break, with agriculture apparently blocking the 
other negotiation areas. Mandelson urged for a compromise which could unlock 
several negotiation areas at the same time (Bridges 03.08.2005).283 LDC complained 
                                            
281 APEC members expressed concern over a lack of progress in services (Bridges 18.05.2005). The 
OECD and APEC called for movement on the Doha negotiations (Bridges 15.06.2005). The G8 
agreed on debt relief and promised greater market opening for developing countries, and pushed for 
the movement in the round (Bridges 13.07.2005). 
282 Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand called for transparency in the Mini-Ministerial process.  
283 High level meetings between the EU and the US took place during agriculture week (Bridges 
21.09.2005). Six major business groups from the US, the EU, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Australia 
stated in a 6 September warning that the Doha Round talks were "on the verge of collapse”. They 
argued for sectoral approaches in NAMA and services (Bridges 07.09.2005).  
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that they struggled to keep up with progress in the trade negotiations, for example 
with drafting submission on S&D and with the extensive meetings on agriculture and 
on services (Bridges 05.10.2005).  
The EU continued to strongly link progress in agriculture to ambitious tariff cuts in 
NAMA, and Commission President Barroso asked Brazil to move with respect to 
services. The EU also upheld its proposal for a differentiation beyond developing 
countries and LDC, which had always been highly contested in the WTO (Bridges 
12.10.2005, 19.10.2005). During these tense negotiations in the WTO, the European 
Commission faced strong opposition inside the EU. France accused the Commission 
of overstepping its negotiation mandate and called for a special expert committee to 
review EU WTO concessions. The French position was not uncontested inside of the 
EU, and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was quoted saying: 
No negotiations are possible if you have to negotiate with people 
in the room and at the same time negotiate with your own side... that 
would make the negotiating team powerless.  
Mandelson expressed his dismay at the idea: such a committee would "stop the 
world trade talks in their tracks” (Bridges 19.10.2005).  
WTO DG Lamy284 set out a new roadmap for the way towards the Hong Kong 
Ministerial and indicated that “modalities” would have to be achieved by mid-October. 
It was evident by then that the round would not be concluded at the Hong Kong 
Ministerial, but Lamy still promoted an ambitious 2006 conclusion of the trade round, 
in the light of the 01 July 2007 expiry of the US President’s Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA) (Bridges 19.10.2005).285 After the US had made a new offer in the 
agriculture negotiations, the FIPs consultations broke up at the end of October 
without agreement on agriculture, giving rise to fears about a failure at the Hong 
                                            
284 Lamy started his term as new WTO DG in the beginning of September 2005. In the beginning of 
2005, the search for the new WTO director had started. In a move to improve civil society relations, 
the candidates even met with representatives of civil society (Bridges 26.01.2005). In June 2005, 
Pascal Lamy was confirmed as new WTO DG. The selection process had run smoothly and had not 
impacted negatively on the negotiation process like in 1999. Lamy still had sufficient time to prepare 
for the Hong Kong Ministerial as well (Bridges 01.06.2005). 
285 The Trade Promotion Authority allows the US President to present a negotiated trade agreement 
as a whole to Congress, which can then either agree or disagree with the agreement, but cannot 
amend the agreement. Trade Promotion Authority was up to 2000 called “fast track”. 
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Kong Ministerial. The EU slid into a “scapegoat position” and was pressured to make 
an improved agriculture offer. However, it emphasised it needed concessions in other 
areas first. For example, for services, Mandelson called again for mandatory, 
quantitative benchmarks (Bridges 26.10.2005; European Commission 2005g). It 
seems that the EU failed to resist the pressure of its negotiation partners: in view of 
its fruitless attempts to achieve movement in other negotiation areas, the EU made a 
new offer on agriculture at the end of October 2005. The offer was made conditional 
on movement in other areas, for example the EU was still demanding mandatory 
qualitative and quantitative targets (“benchmarks”) for services liberalisation, the 
extension of the geographical indication register and seemed to assume 
differentiation between different categories of developing countries.286 Despite the 
new agricultural offer, developing countries complained about the asymmetry in the 
EU’s offers and demands across negotiation areas (Bridges 02.11.2005, European 
Commission 2005h). 
For the now prominent services negotiations, the EU proposed that developed 
countries would have to bind 139 (out of 163) subsectors, against 93 sectors for 
developing countries. LDC and “small and vulnerable” economies would be 
exempted. The EU also asked for binding of existing market access, better sectoral 
and Mode 1, 3 and 4 commitments. Some observers feared that the insistence of the 
EU on the benchmarks could be “counterproductive” and indicated that developing 
countries were afraid of an erosion of their flexibilities under GATS (Bridges 
02.11.2005, European Commission 2005h).287  
                                            
286 Apparently some members of the “core group” (an agriculture coalition) were surprised about the 
conditionality in the EU’s offer. 
287 The EU also kept pushing for an extension of the geographical indication register (to products other 
than spirits and wines); here the negotiations also were blocked (Bridges 02.11.2005). On the 
development issue, the EU was advocating: (1) duty and quota-free access for all LDC’ products by 
all developed countries; (2) an outcome to the cotton dispute; (3) adoption of the S&D treatment 
package for LDC; and (4) a credible aid for trade package. (European Commission 2005j). The 
Commission also wanted to introduce a further differentiation besides LDC and developing countries 
and asked for an extension of the LDC treatment to small and vulnerable economies. How these 
would be identified was still unclear, but the EU proposed certain economic and geographic 
indicators. The EU hence differentiated between LDC, small and vulnerable economies, and 
advanced developing countries (European Commission 2005k). 
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The EU’s new agriculture offer, however, failed to restart the talks. Brazil accused the 
EU of still offering too little on agriculture and making unreasonably ambitious 
demands on services. A group of developing countries issued a statement on what 
they considered as a crucial outcome for development in the Doha Round, rejecting 
any approach in services other than the bilateral request-offer approach, and asking 
for further movement in areas of interest to developing countries (Mode 4 etc.) 
(Bridges 02.11.2005).288  
The increasing tensions and deadlock in the negotiations led to a further lowering of 
expectations for the Hong Kong Ministerial, arguably a step that prevented the Hong 
Kong Ministerial from failing because of too high expectations (Wilkinson 2006a).289 
Blame-shifting continued (Bridges 09.11.2005).290 Towards the end of November 
2005, WTO DG Lamy released a draft Ministerial text to WTO members and informal 
consultations among 25-30 key WTO members ensued (Bridges 30.11.2005). In the 
final run up to the conference, the services text was especially contentious, as some 
developing countries disapproved of the sense of urgency that the services chair had 
inserted in the text (Bridges 07.12.2005). 
The WTO General Council adopted a revised version of Lamy’s text as a basis for 
the Hong Kong Ministerial. The draft text did not leave too many areas open for 
actual debate and discussion during the Hong Kong Ministerial.291 However, attached 
                                            
288 The countries were Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. Similarly, in October, civil society organisations published the “Dhaka Declaration on 
LDC interests in the Doha Round”, which rejected benchmark proposals and asked for more 
commitments on Mode 4 (Bridges 19.10.2005). 
289 In a Ministerial meeting between the EU, the US, Brazil, India, and Japan, Ministers coined the idea 
to hold a further Ministerial meeting in 2006 to agree on modalities (Bridges 23.11.2005). 
290 Again, the EU was blamed for the lack of progress due to its stance on agriculture. The EU itself 
blamed for example India and Brazil for not moving forward on NAMA and services despite the new 
EU offer. 
291 The areas still open for discussion included a new date for agreeing on negotiation modalities for 
agriculture and NAMA. WTO DG Pascal Lamy and General Council Chair Ambassador Amina 
Mohamed (Kenya) tried to move issues beyond this decision by sending sets of questions about 
what could constitute these modalities. 
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to the draft Ministerial declaration were the reports from the various negotiation areas 
with many contentious areas (Bridges 07.12.2005, 13.12.2005).292  
9.1.3 The WTO Hong Kong Ministerial 
During the first day of the conference, Mandelson called for other developed 
countries to adopt the EU’s duty and quota free access offer for LDC. Japan had 
already announced the adoption of the measure and the EU was now mostly 
interested that the US and other developed countries joined this initiative (European 
Commission 2005i). The EU was hence using the positive position of benefactor it 
had brought itself into.  
At the same time, in a notable attempt to build support from developing countries, 
Japan, the EU and the US announced an expansion of their “aid for trade” spending 
(EU: from 400 Million p.a. to 2 Billion). This new aid package came with the warning 
by USTR Portman that a development package could be lost if no overall Doha deal 
was reached. These announcements were called “bribes” by some NGOs, which 
argued that they were supposed to hide that there was no real change in Western 
trade policies (Bridges 14.12.2005, 15.12.2005; European Commission 2005j; see 
also Wilkinson 2006a). 
With regard to conference proceedings, it was decided to first focus on agriculture, 
NAMA and a “development package” for LDC, as these were areas where progress 
was most needed. Notably, despite its new prominence and contentiousness, 
services had been scheduled to be negotiated only after agreement in the three 
previous areas had been reached (Bridges 14.12.2005, 15.12.2005; European 
Commission 2005j).  
                                            
292 Draft annexes concerned negotiations on agriculture, NAMA, services, rules, trade facilitation and 
S&D treatment for least-developed countries. Only the text on trade facilitation had already been 
agreed upon in Geneva. The other texts had been submitted at the Chairs’ own responsibility. The 
services text was seen as much more precise than other texts, but it contained heavily contested 
areas such as the introduction of qualitative targets for members – albeit non-binding ones – and 
plurilateral negotiations. The clause on the plurilateral negotiations foresaw that WTO members 
would have to enter plurilateral negotiations if this was requested by another group of countries. 
Some WTO members feared that this could bring them under considerable pressure to commit 
services sectors under GATS (Bridges 07.12.2005, 13.12.2005).  
9 From Cancún to Hong Kong 2004-2005: Lowering expectations 317 
 
On day two, the cotton issue emerged again as key area on the conference agenda, 
followed by critique of the EU’s new banana tariff regime.293 On domestic support, 
the EU and Switzerland now were the only countries disagreeing with a proposed 
2010 end date for export subsidies, and it looked as if the EU would have to concede 
in this area. On services, the discussion about the annex continued. India and Brazil 
seemed to want to preserve the annex in its current form, but the ACP, the African 
Group and Malaysia were contemplating submitting a new version of the text. The 
EU still intended to achieve a more ambitious annex, but in different ways than the 
US (Bridges 15.12.2005).294  
On the third day of the conference, new texts on agriculture, NAMA and S&D were 
debated in the “Green Room”. The G90 had floated a new draft text for services as 
well, which was based on an earlier text drafted by ASEAN.295 Developing countries 
alleged the EU, US and Lamy of “blackmailing” them. It was speculated that the EU 
would use services as a bargaining chip so that it would not have to commit any 
further on agriculture (Bridges 16.12.2005). In the press conference, Mandelson 
complained that too much focus was on export subsidies, and threatened that the EU 
would not sign up to a declaration that would not offer movement in other areas 
(European Commission 2005e). 
On the fourth day, WTO members redrafted the text of the Ministerial Declaration.296 
The EU was clearly disappointed by a reference to its proposal on the liberalisation of 
government procurement in services being dropped from the Ministerial Declaration. 
                                            
293 The US refused an “early harvest” (“WTO speech” for a negotiation result agreed upon before the 
whole DDA negotiations have been concluded) on cotton, arguing that its cotton subsidies did not 
substantially distort world cotton prices. Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali decided to increase the 
urgency of their appeal. Similarly, Honduras, Colombia and Ecuador used the publicity available in 
the conference to voice their continued disagreement about the EU’s new banana tariff regime and 
urged for a solution by the end of the Ministerial (Bridges 16.12.2005). This initiative was later on 
contravened by the ACP, which said they would block any declaration if their preferential market 
access to the EU was not protected beyond 2006 (Bridges 17.12.2005).  
294 On development, the EU continued to lobby for an extension of its EBA initiative by other countries. 
The US seemed to have lobbied LDC to accept the exclusion of certain sensitive products. 
295 The G90 text in general weakened the original draft text and completely dropped the notion of 
targets or benchmarks.  
296 In the services negotiations, a 15-member committee (US, the EU, Malawi, Rwanda, Hong Kong 
(China), Chile and others) was mandated to redraft Annex C.  
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The G-20, the G-33, the ACP, the LDC Group, the African Group and Small 
Economies held a joint press conference, in which they lauded the cooperation 
meetings between all developing country members of the WTO as unprecedented 
(Bridges 17.12.2005, 18.12.2005). 
As expected, no concrete figures or modalities were agreed upon in the final 
Ministerial Declaration. However, the EU had to accept a 2013 end date for phasing 
out export subsidies, which apparently had made agreement possible on the last day 
of the conference (Bridges 19.12.2005; WTO 2005d; see also Wilkinson 2006a). 
Although the text thus contained some clarification about the future agriculture 
negotiations, in large parts the text constituted a road map for further negotiations 
rather than clarifying the content of the various negotiations.297 In the NAMA 
negotiations, the picture was similar, although agreement existed on the kind of 
formula that would be used for tariff cuttings. The duty- and quota free access to 
developed countries markets would be granted to LDC by 2008.298 On services, the 
Annex C of the declaration had been significantly weakened compared to the original 
version. Although a plurilateral negotiation approach had been introduced, there was 
no longer an obligation to participate in the process (due to the insistence of the G90 
and some ASEAN countries).299 The benchmarking proposal had been dismissed 
completely, only non-binding targets were agreed upon. The EU and Japan were 
clearly disappointed by this text, but they nonetheless agreed to it (Bridges 
19.12.2005; WTO 2005d; see also Wilkinson 2006a).300 In the final press conference, 
Mandelson called the Ministerial “a week of disappointment”, but he said that the 
                                            
297 Remarkably, the four African countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, who had been pushing 
the cotton issue since 2003 achieved parts of their goals: cotton subsidies would be ended by 2006; 
and duty- and quota-free market access would be granted for cotton from LDC. However, it was 
suggested that this was of limited usefulness for them, as they did not usually export cotton to 
developed countries, and as domestic subsidies would still hold down the price of US cotton in other 
markets.  
298 However, developed countries would be able to under certain circumstances “carve-out” 3% of 
product lines. This could make the new agreement non-efficient, as LDC usually export only a few 
products (see for example Wilkinson 2006a). 
299 A first deadline for the submission of plurilateral requests was set for 28 February. 
300 On bananas, no solution was found, but it also did not develop into a major issue. Other areas 
which were discussed were trade and environment, TRIPs and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD). 
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week had at least not been a failure (European Commission 2005c). Now there were 
only three main pillars left on the DDA: agriculture, NAMA and services, but services 
was the sidelined issue of the three (Wolfe 2007b).  
While Hong Kong thus did not produce a break through for the round, according to 
Wilkinson its most significant achievement is providing a clearer shape of how the 
outcome of the Doha Round negotiations might look like. In his analysis of the pre-
Hong Kong process, Wilkinson finds that it was shaped by “[a] willingness to keep 
moving forward with negotiations despite the persistence of significant differences”, 
visible for example in the solution to the ad valorem conflict, and the various 
agricultural offers that were made in the run up to the Ministerial. Failure had also 
been avoided by the fact that members scaled back expectations early enough 
during the process. In terms of conference management, Ministers could this time 
negotiate from a pre-negotiated text (Wilkinson 2006a). Wilkinson hence also argued 
that the previous failure of Ministerial conferences had promoted later agreement and 
hence also the agreement at Hong Kong (Wilkinson 2006b).  
As at previous Ministerial Conferences, other commentators relate the negotiations 
surrounding and at the Hong Kong Ministerial to the broader changes the WTO was 
experiencing, such as the power shift, ideas shaping the trade regime and the status 
of the GPE. At the time of the Hong Kong Ministerial, Bergsten pointed out that the 
Doha Round was suffering from near deadlock or very limited progress, whose 
origins were due to the increased complexity in the WTO because of the increases in 
membership and issue areas, and the wider economic and ideational climate in 
which the DDA negotiations are taking place (2005; see also Hills 2005): 
The massive current account imbalances and currency 
misalignments pushing trade politics in dangerously protectionist 
directions in both the United States and Europe; [and] the strong and 
growing antiglobalization sentiments that stalemate virtually every 
trade debate on both sides of the Atlantic and elsewhere; and the 
absence of a compelling reason for the political leaders of the chief 
holdout countries to make the necessary concessions to reach an 
agreement (2005). 
Bergsten hence argues for a political move to overcome the economic limitations 
underlying the Doha sluggishness. However, single countries alone cannot make the 
necessary changes, but the issues need to be addressed both by key developed and 
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developing countries. Threats to the interests from powerful players, for example 
from bilateral or regional integration, could also ensure progress in the multilateral 
negotiations (2005).  
Bhagwati continued to express his widely positive assessment of progress in the 
Doha Round. He argued that with civil society protests have subsided since the 
Seattle Ministerial, the challenges facing the DDA negotiations was mostly 
disagreement among WTO members. Since WTO members had at or after Cancún 
settled some difficult issues such as the question of the Singapore issues, Bhagwati 
was hence optimistic that the Doha Round would conclude successfully in 2007 
(Bhagwati 2005b; FT 15.11.2005).  
While the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial hence did not constitute a further widely 
publicised breakdown of the negotiations, it meant a continuation and deepening of 
the changes that the WTO was experiencing. The next section analyses the services 
negotiations, which have taken place in parallel, and sheds light on the EU’s attempts 
to increase the importance of the services negotiations between the Cancún and 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conferences.  
9.2 Issue-area framework negotiations: much ado about very little? 
After modalities on autonomous liberalisation and the LDC modalities had been 
agreed upon, the issues that remained in the issue-area framework negotiations 
were the ongoing assessment exercise and the actual market access negotiations. 
As with the overall negotiations, the services negotiations gained in pace and 
intensity. 
9.2.1 Assessment exercise 
On the assessment issue, the years 2004 and 2005 constituted a continuation of 
further discussion: talks continued on the basis of case studies301 (WTO TN/S/M/10 
                                            
301 For example, Rwanda presented a paper on “Assessment of Trade in Services in LDC: The Case 
of Rwanda” to highlight the difficulties that LDC encountered in services trade (WTO TN/S/M/16 
28.10.2005). 
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18.05.2004) and on the basis of presentations by various external organisations.302 
Discussion centred extensively around Mode 4. UNCTAD presented its 2004 World 
Investment Report on the shift to FDI, which the EU used to argue for more extensive 
Mode 3 commitments (WTO TN/S/M/13 28.01.2005). Members continued to discuss 
examples from various countries, for example on how an appropriate regulatory 
framework could be established, the benefits of liberalisation etc. (WTO TN/S/M/14 
26.04.2005; WTO TN/S/M/15 15.09.2005). A further topic was the relationship 
between Mode 4 commitments and migration. Delegations emphasised the 
importance of a dialogue between the migration policy and trade policy community on 
the issue of Mode 4 (WTO TN/S/M/16 28.10.2005). The assessment exercise had 
hence become an institutionalised knowledge exchange, but as it did not have a 
clear objective, it remained repetitive. An attempt by certain developed countries (the 
EU and the US were named in this case) to drive forward the services negotiations 
by building up knowledge of the services sector were funding International Trade 
Centre (ITC) programmes303 which helped countries’ services assessment. Countries 
funded included Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya and Rwanda (WTO TN/S/M/12 
09.11.2004). Overall, an interviewee from a developing country suggested that the 
EU was not interested in furthering the assessment exercise because it could reveal 
negative outcomes of services liberalisation and therefore would undermine the case 
the EU had made (interview 27). 
9.2.2 Market access negotiations  
Negotiations on market access proceeded with India submitting its initial offer 
(TN/S/I/IND).304 The offer was welcomed by other developing countries, while 
developed countries, including the EU, showed disappointment due to the perceived 
low level of commitments in the offer (Bridges 21.01.2004). On 1 March 2004, the 
                                            
302 In September/October 2004, UNCTAD, the OECD, the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) and the World Bank gave presentations in the CTS-SS. UNCTAD presented its 2004 World 
Investment Report on the shift to FDI. The EU used this report to argue for more extensive Mode 3 
commitments (WTO TN/S/M/13 28.01.2005). 
303 The ITC is a joint technical support centre by the WTO and UNCTAD.  
304 The offer concentrated mostly on Mode 1 and 2. The EU asked India to improve its offer, especially 
in the area of telecom, distribution, or environmental services sectors 
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CTS met to take stock of the offers submitted so far. It found that in general the level 
of ambitions in the offers was relatively low, and constituted a locking-in of current 
levels of service liberalisation rather than a movement towards greater liberalisation. 
Jara, new chair of the CTS, pointed out that this would not provide new opportunities 
for business. Bridges reported: 
Although trade in services has been considered one of the main 
engines of the Doha round of negotiations, trade sources stress that 
most of the offers have proven to be very cautious, containing only a 
low level of commitments. This phenomenon applies to the offers of 
both developed and developing countries. The US, for example, did 
not offer anything new on mode 4, which is of critical interest to 
developing countries, and India, in its recent offer, maintained a 
number of development buffers (Bridges 03.03.2004).  
After an informal meeting with various countries,305 Chair Jara held informal 
“confessionals” in order to establish why many delegations had been so hesitant to 
submit services offers (IUST 02.04.2004, 30.04.2004; Bridges 24.03.2004)). WTO 
members voiced their complaints about the offers presented so far:306 while most 
developed countries complained about the lack of offers from many countries, 
developing countries criticised the lack of quality and depth in the offers. The usual 
complaints about Mode 4 were voiced: developing countries criticised that Mode 4 
offers were often linked to Mode 3 and that there were restrictions for different levels 
of skills.307 The EU representative defended the EU position indicating that it had 
extended de-linked Mode 4 offers (from Mode 3 commitments) and explained that 
South-South liberalisation was very important in Mode 4. The representative added 
that Mode 4 was therefore not a developed-developing countries issue. The EU 
representative also argued for better quality in offers (IUST 02.04.2004).  
In preparation for the July framework, the Chair assembled a draft on the basis of 
informal consultations between the US, European Union, Brazil and India 
                                            
305 US, European Union, Japan, Switzerland, Australia, Switzerland, the Philippines, Brazil, India, 
Hong Kong (China), Argentina and Chile. 
306 42 countries had so far presented their offers, with (key agriculture exporters) Brazil, South Africa, 
the Philippines and Egypt still missing. 
307 Other complaints were about restrictions on Mode 4 (such as ENT) and the attached visa and work 
permit requirements; and the lack of coherence between different offers (for example due to different 
services classifications). 
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(JOB(04)/86). However, for other developing countries, language on Mode 4 was too 
weak (IUST 02.07.2004). Discussion was held in informal mode, and a revised text 
was edited (JOB(04)/86/Rev.1). The discussion held in the CTS-SS was a repetition 
of previous arguments: the EU was disappointed by the poor quality in offers, Brazil 
pointed to the sluggish agriculture negotiations, and Thailand (on behalf of ASEAN) 
to the link with the rules negotiations (WTO TN/S/M/11 08.09.2004). In the General 
Council, African countries and other developing countries continued to argue for 
stronger language on Mode 4 and a separate paragraph on services, which was 
rejected by the EU and the US (IUST 11.06.2004).  
Brazil’s subsequent submission of its initial offer was interpreted by observers as a 
strategic move to show that despite the lack of movement in agriculture, Brazil 
contributed constructively to the Doha negotiations. Apparently, the Brazilian offer in 
fact did not include new liberalisation in the services sector and it was linked not only 
to the agriculture negotiations, but also to the GATS rules negotiations 
(JOB(04)/86/Rev.1) (Bridges 07.07.2004).308 
In the beginning of July 2004, the CTS-SS agreed on a set of recommendations, 
which were to be integrated into the July Framework. The recommendations for 
example called for a better quality in offers (Bridges 07.07.2004). The chair 
presented the results of the “confessionals” (informal bilateral meetings), which he 
had held with those delegations resident in Geneva and non-LDC who had not yet 
submitted offers. The chair argued this had increased his understanding of these 
countries’ technical and political difficulties. At this stage, 44 offers representing 65 
WTO members had been received. Not taking into account the LDC, 52 offers were 
still missing. The quality of offers was generally considered as “modest” (WTO 
                                            
308 The Brazilian service offer was made public in late September 2004 (TN/S/O/BRA). Most 
commitments were in Mode 3 (qualitatively seen); other than that new commitments were offered 
only under veterinary services, Mode 1 and 2. Brazil emphasised that the offer in no way should 
impede on its right to regulate and on its public services (Bridges 29.09.2004). 
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TN/S/M/11 08.09.2004).309 As May 2005 had already been set as benchmark for 
revised offers, progress was now urgently needed. 
In the CTS-SS at the end of September/beginning of October 2004, the 
demandeurs310 hence urged for more and better offers. Chile, Hong Kong (China) 
and the EU identified an intensification of the negotiations and expected this to 
become visible on all levels (for example also in the Friends groups). Japan 
dismissed the idea of an issue linkage between the rules negotiations and the market 
access negotiations. Extensive discussions on Mode 4 also took place.311 The US 
encouraged developing countries to focus not only on Mode 4, but on other areas 
such as tourism which they had identified as their interests earlier. Brazil rebuked this 
idea and emphasised that each country had the right to choose on what to focus in 
the services negotiations (WTO TN/S/M/12 09.11.2004).312 
The year 2004 ended with a stark warning by various demandeur countries that WTO 
members would have to refocus the services negotiations on market access, 
because otherwise they might risk a failure at the Hong Kong Ministerial (IUST 
                                            
309 Apart from this, discussion in the June/July CTS-SS centred around proposals on logistics 
(TN/S/W/20) by Australia, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Switzerland, Chinese 
Taipei and Hong Kong (China), as well as Mode 1 (JOB(04)/87) by Chile, India and Mexico. Mode 4 
was also discussed as it had been raised again by India. 
310 The proponents of the services negotiations are referred to as the “demandeurs”. For more 
information on the demandeurs see Annex 4 (Sect. 12.4).  
311 The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), UNCTAD and the OECD provided input for the 
discussion. 
312 A group of countries submitted a paper on GATS Art. IV implementation and on progress in the 
negotiations in general. The sponsors of the paper pointed out that the paper also answered the US’ 
criticism that developing countries were too focused on Mode 4. The paper analysed initial offers 
and also tourism services (TN/S/W/23). The tourism issue hence re-emerged on the CTS-SS 
agenda after two years of silence. The paper was by Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, India, Indonesia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand and co-sponsor Peru. In the same 
meeting, Switzerland presented two papers, one on the “Importance of Improving the Scheduling of 
GATS Commitments” (TN/S/W/21) and one on ‘E-Work Permits in Switzerland’ (TN/S/W/22). Both 
submissions incited extensive discussion and showed how much WTO members can shape 
discussions by timely submissions. The scheduling debate raised a whole host of issues, which had 
previously been dealt with in the Committee on Specific Commitments (CSC). 
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10.12.2004; Bridges 01.12.2004).313 The demandeurs, including the EU, warned of a 
delay in the negotiations, due to the different, regulatory nature of the services 
negotiations. To arrive at a successful outcome through the bilateral request-offer 
process would take extensive preparation and several rounds of requests and offers. 
If sudden movement occurred in the other negotiation areas, the services 
negotiations would not be able to catch up easily (IUST 10.12.2004; Bridges 
01.12.2004; WTO TN/S/M/13 28.01.2005). Some negotiators argued that the 
demandeurs now started to push so strongly for a re-concentration on market access 
that in the Hong Kong Declaration most attention would be devoted to market access 
and not to other areas in the services negotiations (IUST 10.12.2004; Bridges 
01.12.2004). In the subsequent November/December 2004 CTS-SS, the 
demandeurs’ renewed emphasis on the market access negotiations led Brazil to 
remind them of the rules negotiations, which had also been mentioned in the July 
framework. Japan countered that the linkage between market access and rules 
negotiations should not be overemphasised, so that no “negative linkages” would be 
created. The EU representative expressed the EU’s concern about the lagging of the 
services negotiations behind other negotiation areas. He reminded other WTO 
members of the EU’s efforts on Mode 4 and asked developing countries to 
reconsider the South-South dimension of Mode 4. Developing countries added to 
their usual arguments the issue of incoherent classification systems, which in their 
opinion obstructed the negotiations further (WTO TN/S/M/13 28.01.2005; IUST 
10.12.2004).314 The lack of new offers led to fewer bilaterals being held during the 
CTS-SS (IUST 10.12.2004). 
                                            
313 A paper on this was distributed at the end of November and discussed in the November/December 
CTS-SS. The US, the EU, Japan, Canada, Australia, Chile, Hong Kong (China), Iceland, India, 
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, and Taiwan were the sponsors of 
the paper. By now, 47 offers representing 71 Members had been submitted, with 45 offers still 
missing. Countries that had not yet tabled offers were South East Asian countries such as Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Indonesia, and for example Pakistan, South Africa and Egypt. 
314 Mode 4 was once again on the agenda of the CTS-SS. Australia started the discussion with a 
presentation of Australian Mode 4 entrance requirements. Equally, Chile held a presentation on 
Mode 4. Under the heading “Proposals Relating to the Negotiations under Article XIX of the GATS”, 
WTO members now consulted on increasingly detailed issues (WTO TN/S/M/13 28.01.2005; IUST 
10.12.2004). 
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After this last CTS-SS in 2004, the “crisis mood” in the services negotiations was 
spreading, as engagement of many countries was lacking. Mamdouh, the head of the 
WTO Secretariat's services division, did not see any progress in the negotiations 
after the two week negotiations. Only Chair Jara assessed the situation more 
positively (Bridges 08.12.2004).315  
Twice in early 2004, sources report intervention by the services industry, which had 
not been that obvious before in Geneva. First, in April industry representatives from 
the US, the EU, Australia, Hong Kong (China) and Japan visited Geneva, and 
expressed concern about the lack of movement in the negotiations (IUST 
02.04.2004, 30.04.2004; Bridges 24.03.2004). Second, services coalitions from the 
US, EU, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong (China), India, Japan, Chile and Singapore 
sent a letter on 25 June 2004 to WTO DG Supachai to urge progress in the 
negotiations (IUST 02.07.2004; Bridges 07.07.2004).316 This raises the question as 
to how much lobbying the European services industry was conducting both in the EU 
and in Geneva. Box 9.1 presents results from the interviews. 
Box 9.1 The services industry and the GATS 2000 negotiations – interview results 
How far does the ESF and European industry in general lobby alongside the Commission in Geneva 
or domestically?  
Clearly, the ESF has established itself as the key interlocutor for the services unit at DG Trade. It is 
the most active services industry association in Brussels (interview 3). In Brussels, industry 
associations activities’ would usually include presenting their position papers and/or arranging 
meetings with the Commission (interview 6). An interviewee indicated that services industry 
associations have become very successful in identifying services as a tool for economic development 
                                            
315 Jara stated that there was political will in the services negotiations and that they had advanced to a 
similar state than the NAMA and agriculture negotiations. At this stage, 37 non-LDC countries, incl. 
Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, Morocco, and Venezuela had not yet submitted offers. 
Malaysia submitted its offer on 03.12.2004 and Egypt announced its offer for shortly after the CTS. 
316 Other stakeholders trying to impact the services negotiations were the World Consumer Rights 
Day, which highlighted that water and sewage services should not be liberalised under GATS 
(Bridges 18.03.2004). Representatives from the international trade and migration communities 
convened in Geneva on 4-5 October for the conference “Managing the movement of people: what 
can be learned for Mode 4 of the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)" (follow-up 
to a similar conference held in November 2003; organised jointly by the International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM), the World Bank and the WTO) (Bridges 06.10.2004). The UN Millennium 
Development Goals argued for Mode 4 liberalisation (Bridges 19.01.2005). 
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and are thus indicating a “win-win set” in the negotiations (interview 13).  
However, apart from the ESF, only a few other sectoral associations are conducting lobbying on the 
services issue in Brussels; the associations mostly seem to rely on the ESF.317 Asked as to why only 
so few associations take an interest in the services negotiations, two EU officials speculated that most 
of them would conduct lobbying via the EU member states (interview 3, also interview 9). For 
example, while the services unit only had few contact with the financial services industry, national 
ministries of finance seem to receive more input, esp. in the UK. Groups active in the UK are the Lotus 
group, the legal, financial, shipping and telecommunication services associations (interview 3, similarly 
in interview 13). EU officials hence assumed that the Commission would be informed of business 
interests via the Council of Ministers. Alternatively, the level of activity of an association can depend 
on the person that is employed there (interview 6). Another official saw the reason more inside the 
structure of the industry associations: the official commented that the “organisation of industry [at the 
EU level] is ineffective in major sectors, financial, telecoms, express, maritime, for example”. The 
different positions within services sectors mean that the industries either hardly manage to build a 
common position, and if they do their position is very general (interview 5). However, another official 
indicated that while the industry positions are often rather general, sectoral organisations have at 
times provided the Commission with more detailed information. For example, when the EU services 
requests were prepared, some associations identified target markets and sometimes even trade 
barriers (interview 6). The lack of input from business could also be a result of the structure of service 
sectors and from the different paces in which business operates compared to international 
negotiations. Rather than trying to influence the international framework and waiting for the result of 
lengthy processes of international negotiations, business might overcome hurdles to its entry into 
markets by alternative strategies, for example setting up a joint venture. It is particularly difficult for 
government representatives and for the associations to get access to the information of these 
stakeholders, as they can be reluctant to reveal internal information (interview 14). This leaves the 
impact on trade policy rules to a few big players who can afford to directly influence the negotiations in 
Brussels. And indeed, single companies do at times contact the services unit (interview 3). However, 
this does not seem frequent.  
Interviewees from non-EU countries reported that in terms of European industry, they had been 
approached nearly exclusively by the ESF (other lobbying organisations active were the CSI, and at 
times the Australian services organisation). The ESF would set up meetings with staff from Geneva 
delegations and it would arrive with ca. 10 sectoral CEOs or other high level business representatives. 
One interviewee reported that they would not receive the ESF delegation with an equally high ranking 
counterpart, so that the ambassadors would hardly participate in such meetings (interview 15, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 21, 26). The ESF also sets up information meetings for its delegations with the services 
                                                                                                                                        
317 The association dealing with maritime transport services, the “European Community Shipowner’s 
Association” (ECSA), was named as a further active association. Apparently, it had even provided 
the Commission and hence the “Friends of Maritime services” with a list of target countries, which 
with slight alterations was accepted by the Friends groups. In the case of professional services, the 
Commission seems to have good contacts with some of the more active associations, for example 
lawyers and architects. While the veterinary sector and nurses have a range of associations, they 
are not playing an active role. The European Banking Federation (FBE) seems to have been active 
in earlier years, but it is not clear what their influence is today. The engineering association was 
active in the early 2000s, but activity has ceased since then. The accountancy services industry is 
also not active, and the interviewee suggested that this was due to the substantial influence the “big 
five” in the industry have anyway on any rules concerning them (interview 6, 34). An interviewee 
from a sectoral organisation criticised that on certain issues, for example professional services, 
there was a “British dominance” in the ESF. He also emphasised that the ESF could only assume 
statements on horizontal issues, as his organisation would not accept if the ESF took on a position 
on a sectoral matter. On computer services, IBM Europe seems to have a crucial influence on the 
direction of the ESF (interview 34). This is indicative of various conflicts existing inside of the ESF. 
318 The interviewees felt that the CSI had similar problems, but its lobbying “routes” were better 
established. 
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division at the WTO (interview 28). However, not all countries seem to have been targeted by the ESF 
(interview 23). The only other activities of European services industry in Geneva were by the British 
financial services industry, and apparently a visit from logistics and telecoms associations. An 
interviewee mentioned that the British industry is “quite present” (interview 18, 24). However, the 
organised receptions and briefings do not necessarily have obvious effects on the negotiations 
(interview 24).  
Two interviewees wondered whether the industry was really interested in market access via the 
GATS, as it seemed that the industry’s issues where so different from what the Commission was 
pursuing. An interviewee therefore questioned the EU’s motivation behind its position in and support of 
the services negotiations (interview 15, 16, similar interview 17). Other interviewees suggested that for 
parts of the industry the negotiations were already irrelevant and hence the pressure was low 
(interview 21, 28). Interviewees also questioned the effectiveness of the ESF and the services 
industries in general, because it did not seem able to influence the Commission position. Importantly, 
it seemed to them that the European services industry has failed to positively influence the domestic 
debate318 (interview 17, 21, 26).  
Source: Interviews 
The interview results apparently confirm the picture obtained in earlier chapters, 
namely that business interest on trade in services is ambiguous and might be limiting 
the EU’s negotiation capacity. 
In the WTO, in line with remarks of the demandeurs, the EU attempted to raise the 
priority of the services negotiations in the WTO. The Commission indicated that 
advancing services would be a core EU objective at the Hong Kong Ministerial. It 
considered it as a problem that several developed countries (probably referring to the 
US) were not yet ready to make better offers on Mode 4. The Commission regarded 
this as crucial for a negotiation success on services (European Commission 2004m). 
In another instance, Lamy had indicated the potential that lay in the EU’s offer on 
Mode 4 for developing countries, although he also referred to EU internal 
disagreements on Mode 4 (European Commission 2004d). 
In a further attempt to raise the stakes of the services negotiations, the EU tabled its 
revised requests to WTO members on 25.01.2005. The submission of the request 
was judged as an important attempt at moving the negotiations forward and in 
clarifying what trading partners should include in the revised offers. According to an 
EU official, the Commission launched new services requests in early 2005:  
specifically to get the debate going […} and to encourage others to 
also put forward revised requests. 
But this strategy would not be very successful: 
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in the event, not many others did, but I think it gave us something 
to discuss in bilateral meetings […] we could explain them [the new 
requests], we could remind people of our initial requests, which by 
then they had probably forgotten about (interview 3). 
The EU constrained its request from LDC even further.319 Aware of civil society 
attention to the services negotiations, the EU emphasised that it had consulted with 
civil society representatives about the requests, that the requests did not restrain 
domestic regulation and that they took into account the policy objectives of 
developing countries (Bridges 02.02.2005; IUST 28.01.2005; European Commission 
2005c, d).320 It seems that in its internal reflection, the Commission had realised that 
with regard to the LDC and other low income countries, it would not achieve any 
market access. In the subsequent negotiations with LDC and the African Group, the 
Commission had apparently realised that while these countries realised the 
development dimension of the sectors, they were concerned about a lack of 
regulatory environment. The Commission hence found itself torn between 
acknowledging that regulatory systems are indeed difficult to install and being wary 
that countries might use this argument as an excuse for not liberalising. The 
Commission increasingly realised the difficulties experienced by this group of 
countries and finally agreed not to ask anything of them unless they were interested 
in committing themselves. At the same time, this apparent concession was paying 
tribute to the fact that the Commission received no or hardly any offers from the LDC 
(interview 3).  
                                            
319 For LDC, the EU asked for the opening of only 2-5 sectors out of five proposed sectors: 
telecommunications, financial, transport, construction and/or environmental services. The 
Commission thought to target sectors as they had an explicit development dimension (i.e. key 
infrastructure services) (interview 3). LDC were not obliged to make any offers, but the EU stated it 
believed in the benefit of services sector opening for development. While the internal discussion in 
the Commission led it to this new approach towards the LDC/low income group and while it had 
envisaged making substantial changes to the requests for developing countries, after internal 
discussion the Commission decided to leave the requests to developing countries broadly 
unchanged. The Commission hence sought to fulfil the new requests for a development dimension 
by altering the requests to low income economies/LDC. It seems that the development dimension of 
the GATS was something the Commission had to newly integrate into its vision with regard to the 
GATS. An interviewee even described a move from where the Commission thought that 
LDC/developing countries did not participate for tactical reasons to a situation today where the 
Commission is much more aware of the capacity constraints experienced by the LDC (interview 3). 
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While the new approach towards the LDC/low income countries failed to persuade 
them to a greater participation in the services negotiations, it did influence the 
Commission’s ideas for the benchmarking proposal and the increased understanding 
of LDC/low income countries problems apparently led the Commission to install 
technical assistance programs in the services areas. The communication between 
the Services unit and DG Development intensified and DG Trade gave a grant to the 
ITC for programmes helping mainly the LDC to assess their services interests 
(interview 3). 
As in previous years, the WTO Secretariat tried to facilitate negotiations and hence 
played into the hands of the EU.321 However, again the EU and the US apparently 
contradicted each other: Deputy USTR Allgeier stated that issue linkages should not 
be made but negotiations needed to move bit by bit, while the EU re-emphasised the 
importance of issue linkages (Bridges 16.02.2005). While the request-offer process 
did not see big changes, the intensity of the talks is reported to have increased. 
Different proposals (on more than 15 sectoral issues) were discussed (Bridges 
23.02.2005; WTO TN/S/M/14 26.04.2005).322 While hence part of the WTO 
membership held detailed discussions on the issues involved in the services 
negotiations, others claimed to being held back purely by capacity constraints: the 
African group complained it was not able to participate in the discussion, as 
                                                                                                                                        
320 It was unclear whether the US would also submit a revised request; and it was speculated that the 
US would rather indicate its priorities for revised offers in informal bilateral meetings. Revised 
requests were not expected from WTO members. 
321 Supachai repeatedly stated that a “critical mass of service offers” would be needed by Hong Kong 
(China) in order to conclude the round by 2006 (Bridges 16.02.2005). He urged African countries to 
be more active in the negotiations and to submit more service offers (Bridges 26.01.2005). In May 
2005, he again warned that movement was lacking in the service trade negotiations and urged 
especially developing countries to submit offers (Bridges 04.05.2005). 
322 Indonesia submitted its initial offer. There were two different proposals for the classification under 
Mode 4: Proposal (TN/S/W/31) by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay proposed classifying professionals as “intra-
corporate transferees”, “business visitors”, “contractual service suppliers”, and “independent 
professionals”, plus a further, flexible category. ENTs and other links to market access would be 
abolished. The second proposal supported a similar system, but wanted simply the categories and 
no link to market access (TN/S/W/32, by Bulgaria, Canada, the EU, and Romania). During the 
meeting, Brazil, Colombia, and the Philippines presented an informal document proposing 
disciplines on domestic regulation; and the US submitted a proposal on transparency in domestic 
regulation. 
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translations of documents had not been provided to them. They complained that this 
had become a “frequent occurrence”.323 The discussion on progress in the 
negotiations was a repetition of arguments: while the discussions had intensified, 
WTO members expressed their disappointment with the sluggish progress in the 
services negotiations. Some delegations called for guidance from the overall 
negotiation on how the services negotiations should progress (WTO TN/S/M/14 
26.04.2005). In spring 2005, the Chair of the CTS-SS conducted a range of informal 
consultations, among others with the African Group and the LDC with regard to S&D 
provisions (WTO TN/S/M/14/Suppl.1 30.05.2005), a further attempt to build 
consensus among WTO members.  
In discussions throughout 2004/2005 the question as to how to assess the quality of 
offers was important. At this stage (May 2005), the EU representative said that such 
an assessment was not necessary, as the quality of offers clearly was poor. An idea 
of “benchmarks” to assess the offers had been raised in the informal consultations 
the Chair had held, and in the meeting the Brazilian representative rebuked the idea 
as there were no benchmarks in other negotiation areas. Rwanda reminded fellow 
negotiators about the benchmarks contained in the LDC modalities, which in its 
opinion had not been adhered to (WTO TN/S/M/14/Suppl.1 30.05.2005).  
When the three weeks CTS-SS in February 2005 concluded, the chief of the WTO 
Secretariat’s service division Mamdouh complained that increased activity in the 
negotiations had not led to proportional results in the negotiations, which could have 
a negative effect on the whole round. Delegates of some countries emphasised that 
countries needed to bring services more to the fore back in capitals, and hence 
increase its importance during the Mini-Ministerials and other meetings in the overall 
negotiations. Thus, in 2005’s 2nd Mini-Ministerial, held in Kenya, the EU and others 
tried to get services back on the main agenda (together with other negotiation group 
chairs and other delegations) (Bridges 02.03.2005). Naturally, Brazil apparently 
complained that agriculture was neglected and that too much focus was given to 
developed country issues such as services (Bridges 09.03.2005).  
                                            
323 The chair blamed delegations for not submitting papers on time for translations to be made. 
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In the informal document, which was the outcome of the next mini-Ministerial in Paris, 
members agreed that a sufficient number of “high quality offers/revised offers” 
needed to be submitted before the end of July. They also agreed to find practical 
measures to asses the quality of services offers (Bridges 04.05.2005, 11.05.2005; 
IUST 18.03.2005), as the realisation was spreading that the request-offer process 
was not delivering the desired results (Bridges 18.05.2005).324 The benchmarking 
proposal was subsequently brought forward by the US, the EU, Australia, Bahrain, 
Canada, Japan, Norway, Oman, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland and Taiwan 
(Bridges 15.06.2005). In EU-hosted senior level talks with the US, Brazil, Canada, 
Hong Kong (China), India, Japan and Kenya, officials apparently agreed to support 
the recent benchmarking proposal (Bridges 22.06.2005), but this harmony among 
some of the key players was short-lived and already in the June/July 2005 CTS-SS, 
developing countries again asked for more focus on the rules negotiations than on 
market access (Bridges 22.06.2005).325  
The CTS-SS chair made a quantitative assessment of the offers and indicated that 
most offers did not extend commitments into the requested areas.326 He raised the 
question whether WTO members had difficulties in taking on further commitments 
due to the nature of GATS. The reaction of delegations was mixed, ranging from 
Brazil criticising the chair for having prepared the assessment in his own 
responsibility to India offering a different assessment of the offers.327 The EU 
representative expressed the EU’s “serious” disappointment with the quality of the 
current offers. Even the revised offers had in the EU’s opinion not led to better 
                                            
324 The US started to “float” proposals for improvements with other WTO members. Deputy USTR 
Allgeier proposed to supplement the request-offer approach by further liberalisation in “core critical 
areas”. 
325 They complained that only little progress had been made in the rules negotiations, despite the last 
two services clusters being focused on them.  
326 The chairman’s assessment was quantitative, as a qualitative assessment was too difficult to do. At 
the same time, the Secretariat was mandated to provide a review tool for every sector, which 
clarified which commitments had been undertaken. 24 initial offers were still outstanding (excluding 
LDC offers) at this stage, out of which 18 were of acceding members or African countries. 21 revised 
offers had been submitted so far. 
327 Brazil also criticised that his opinion did not reflect the opinions of members. An alternative 
assessment of offers on Mode 4 was proposed by a group of countries, led by India (Job(05)/131). 
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commitments, which was, according to the EU, due to the reliance on the request-
offer method.328 The EU representative therefore suggested a re-consideration of the 
negotiation method.329 The EU’s ideas were contested in the CTS-SS, with other 
WTO members trying to prioritise their own negotiation concerns: Brazil and 
Argentina even doubted that there was a “crisis” in the services negotiations and 
suggested the crisis was “created” by some WTO members.330 Japan and Taiwan 
supported a benchmark proposal. The US did not express support for the benchmark 
proposal, but it expressed support for the exploration of additional negotiation 
approaches as foreseen in the modalities (WTO TN/S/M/15 15.09.2005).331  
The EU submitted its revised offer at the beginning of June 2005 (European 
Commission 2005d).332 In August 2005, service negotiators from the EU, the US, 
Japan, Canada, Hong Kong (China), Chile, Mexico, India, and Australia (in total 
apparently 14 countries) met informally to set up a work programme for the lead up to 
the Hong Kong Ministerial in the autumn 2005. It can be speculated that these 
meetings were installed as a reaction to the development of the July 2004 framework 
when services was side-lined until the end (WTO TN/S/20 11.07.2005; Bridges 
03.08.2005).333 
                                            
328 Hong Kong (China) offered another explication of the low quality of the services offers: the 
representative indicated that a vicious circle had occurred in which one meagre offer was followed 
by another; and it indicated that its domestic constituencies had therefore questioned the authorities 
as to what the reward for a more ambitious offer would be.  
329 The EU suggested to complement the bilateral negotiation approach with further multilateral or 
plurilateral approaches. First elements of the new “services package” should be included in the July 
approximations and further elaborated until the Hong Kong Ministerial. 
330 Brazil argued that political attention was needed for the agriculture rather than for the services 
negotiations, and that the difficulties in the services negotiations could be overcome within the CTS-
SS and hence without attention by the overall negotiations. It also doubted the assessment 
undertaken by the Secretariat and questioned why LDC had not submitted offers. He thought that 
this was mostly due to a lack of understanding of the LDC that they had something to gain from the 
services negotiations. Overall, Argentina and Brazil doubted there was a “crisis” in the services 
negotiations; the “crisis” was “created” by some WTO members.  
331 Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Peru, Philippines and Thailand.  
332 The offer was 408 pages long, reflecting the non-integrated state of the EU’s domestic services 
market. 
333 They scheduled weekly informal consultations. The consultations were supposed to focus on 
issues raised in the last report to the TNC. 
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In September 2005, the demandeur countries Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, 
Taiwan, and the EU put forward a proposal for “benchmarks” in the GATS. The 
proposals were distributed as “non-papers” during the informal consultations held by 
Jara. All the proponents of the benchmarking approach submitted different 
proposals,334 and with the Hong Kong Ministerial to be held three months later, the 
submission of the benchmarking proposals actually came quite late.  
The EU and Japan were the most outspoken proponents of the benchmark; the EU 
thought that services benchmarks could bring the two services negotiations in line 
with agriculture negotiations. However, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and other developing countries were strongly opposed to the 
benchmarking and the plurilateral approach (Bridges 21.09.2005). With regard to the 
benchmarking proposal, developing countries’ opposition can be grouped into four 
areas: first, some countries thought that benchmarks would be incompatible with the 
GATS structure;335 second, they doubted it was suitable to promote development in 
developing countries;336 third, they thought it might put further strain on developing 
                                            
334 Japan proposed that target levels for each country should be agreed. The EU proposed a formula-
based approach ensuring both quantitative as well as qualitative commitments. The EU’s 
benchmarks would mean a strong link between Mode 3 and 4 and the proposal did not establish 
independent benchmarks for Mode 4. The aim of the proposal was common baselines for all WTO 
members. Australia’s proposal aimed to agree a number of subsectors which would have to be 
liberalised and hence to establish clear, mandatory goals for the negotiations. Korea suggested the 
use of a multilaterally determined percentage of sectors/subsectors, which would have to be 
liberalised. The request offer approach would be used to determine (sub)sectors for commitment in 
each specific case. New Zealand’s proposal aimed to quantify levels of commitment. Each member 
would rank itself according to its sub-sectoral, sectoral, and modal coverage, with penalties for 
limitations on market access and national treatment. A target score would be used for further 
liberalisation. The Swiss proposal followed the one of New Zealand. Taiwan wanted to de-link Mode 
3 and 4 and introduce a measurement for full and partial commitments in Mode 1-3. The proposals 
were said to also contain calls for a plurilateral approach. 
335 Brazil doubted that the benchmarking proposals could be brought in harmony with the GATS 
structure and provisions in general, and proposed to rather concentrate on having more balanced 
commitment across modes of supply and unifying the classification system. The African Group 
supported the Brazilian intervention. The Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand complained 
that the proposals would galvanise the request-offer process. LDC expressed their concern that the 
proposed complementary approaches could “overturn” the nature of GATS.  
336 The Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand complained there was a lack of a development 
dimension in the proposals. They were worried markets might be opened abruptly and policy space 
would be reduced significantly. LDC asked the other WTO members not to demand commitments 
from the LDC which went beyond their capacity. The LDC explained that their priorities for the Hong 
Kong Ministerial were preferential market access for LDC’s limited services exports, and effective 
technical assistance and capacity-building. 
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countries’ scarce negotiation resources in the WTO337 and fourth, they argued 
benchmarks might lead to disproportionate commitments by developing countries.338 
With regard to the plurilateral approach, developing countries were concerned that it 
would constitute a very untransparent and difficult to follow negotiation approach.339 
Several developing countries complained about the low level in offers by the 
demandeurs themselves.  
The demandeurs defended their proposals: they argued that they wanted to raise the 
level of ambition in the services negotiations multilaterally,340 that benchmarking 
would make the services negotiations more assessable and comparable to the 
agriculture negotiations. The EU reminded fellow negotiators that among the 
objectives of the DDA was to create new commercially meaningful market access, 
and a balance between the negotiation areas. The EU delegation felt that this 
balance had not been achieved due to the low level of ambition in the services 
negotiations even after five years of negotiations and two rounds of requests-offers. 
While the EU delegate promised the EU would carefully reflect on the concerns 
raised with regard to the benchmarking approach, he argued that flexibility of the 
GATS was maintained under the new approach. He promoted the EU’s approach in 
outlining that it accommodated targets that had been formulated by other delegations 
with regard to Mode 4, cross-border supply of services and Mode 3. He indicated that 
the EU was also supporting a plurilateral approach.  
                                            
337 The Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand indicated that the demandeurs in the 
negotiations had a much better resource equipment, which allowed them to send experts to all 
meetings and to capitals, and which gave them lobbying power the developing countries did not 
have. 
338 It was argued that benchmarks would burden developing countries disproportionally as developed 
countries had already made further reaching liberalisation commitments (and would hence not have 
to commit much further to fulfil the benchmarks). 
339 The plurilateral approach was also rejected by some developing countries, because they 
considered it as a way of negotiation as intransparent as the Friends groups, which they found very 
difficult to follow due to their limited resources. 
340 Korea and New Zealand explained that they intended to raise the level of ambition multilaterally. 
Australia argued that if a significant number of WTO members was not willing to liberalise services 
as they had committed to under GATS, then services would no longer be at par with agriculture and 
NAMA, which Australia could clearly not support. 
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The US delegate did emphasise the importance of raising the targets for the services 
negotiations, but again the delegate did not clearly support the benchmarking 
proposals.341 The US intended to work towards a package on domestic regulation 
and GATS rules, and for a statement on LDC in the Hong Kong Declaration (WTO 
TN/S/M/16 28.10.2005).342  
In September 2005 as well, a new services coalition was established by the “new” 
Quad. The group was to be chaired by the US and India and its aim was to advance 
the service talks and to assess benchmark proposals (Bridges 28.09.2005).343 An EU 
official indicated that they viewed this new Indian activism, including the leadership in 
this new group, in the services negotiations as positive and that the group was meant 
to facilitate the run-up to the Hong Kong Ministerial (interview 8). This intended 
impact seems to have been achieved: according to an interviewee, the group did 
have an impact on annex E (interview 26).344 Apparently, the group was meant to do 
for services what the FIPs did for agriculture, but it did not have much success. 
However, an interviewee interpreted the chairmanship of the new group as indicative 
of the changing interests in services (interview 18). 
Over the course of the 2004-2005 services negotiations, WTO members expressed 
increasing concern about the lack of participation of LDC in the services negotiations. 
The LDC distributed a paper on the implementation of the LDC modalities 
(JOB(05)/114), which was subsequently discussed. The EU delegate argued that the 
EU’s extensive commitments in Mode 1 and 4 would create new business 
opportunities for LDC; however he also clarified that lower skilled workers were not 
covered under GATS in the EU’s opinion, as this was a case of seeking access to the 
domestic employment markets. The LDC contested the EU’s interpretation that non-
                                            
341 Instead, he emphasised the need for flexibility and maintaining the original structure of GATS. The 
US supported a “general qualitative multilateral guideline” to move forward the services negotiations, 
and a potential plurilateral approach. 
342 The benchmarking proposals were formally debated in the September 2005 CTS-SS.  
343 Apparently, the members were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, the EU, 
India, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. 
344 However, after the Hong Kong Ministerial, the coalition seems to have vanished: another 
interviewee described the group as very informal and as inactive since the Hong Kong Ministerial 
(interview 8). 
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skilled labour was always seeking access to the labour market and that it was not 
covered under GATS (TN/S/W/54) (WTO TN/S/M/15 15.09.2005; WTO TN/S/M/16 
28.10.2005). 
In 2005, lobbying by some industry representatives was also obvious. EU, Japanese 
and US financial services representatives held a meeting on the benefits of financial 
services for developing countries (Bridges 09.02.2005). The US and EU services 
industry stated that offers were especially needed by South Africa, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, the Philippines and Venezuela, and that the services offers then available 
would already cover 95% of services trade worldwide (Bridges 04.05.2005, 
11.05.2005; IUST 18.03.2005). Alongside the June CTS-SS meeting, services 
representatives from the EU, US, Chile, Singapore, Hong Kong (China), Canada etc. 
were meeting – an interviewee saw this as evidence that the cooperation of the 
services industries was increasingly strong (interview 30). 
9.2.3 The EU and services at the Hong Kong Ministerial  
As mentioned above, at the Hong Kong Ministerial, it was decided to first discuss 
NAMA and agriculture, and services was scheduled for the third day, when progress 
was expected to have occurred in the two first areas (interview 19). The danger of 
this strategy was, of course, that the very contentious services annex would only be 
debated at a later stage of the conference, but it might indicate a general 
prioritisation of agenda issues on the Doha agenda. 
During the Hong Kong Ministerial, there was a strong conflict surrounding Annex E, 
including the benchmarking proposal. According to interviewees, it was the ACP, 
some ASEAN countries and the African Union (coordinator Egypt) which made it fail. 
However, these are countries that were mostly not affected by the proposal, and the 
proposal apparently even contained positive provisions for them (interview 15, 20, 
27):  
those countries are not even requested, but talk about domestic 
regulation or the schedule for the plurilaterals (interview 20). 
This clearly shows an unexpected and undesired effect of the WTO expansion, 
namely that parties that are not (yet) concerned by a WTO regulation now can 
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influence and veto regulation. It is worth remarking that in the subsequent 
plurilaterals, requests were concentrated on the “critical mass countries”, i.e. the 
target markets of the demandeurs.345 This means that some countries that at the 
Hong Kong Ministerial could decide how to move forward in the services negotiations 
were not affected by their own decisions (interview 15). For the EU, seeing especially 
the ACP working so strongly and successfully against the EU’s proposal seems to 
have been a new situation (interview 8). Around and after the Hong Kong Ministerial 
the EU hence made steps to improve its cooperation with the ACP, because of a set 
of “misunderstandings” in the run up to the Hong Kong Ministerial (interview 3, 27).346 
With regard to the GATS rules negotiations, the EU pushed for a text on government 
procurement in services equally ambitious as the ESM and rules on service 
subsidies. However, interviewees from developing countries suggested that the item 
is both “dead” as too many WTO members dislike it and also not a real priority for the 
EU, as the EU for example had not updated its position on government procurement 
since 2003. Still, other WTO members agreed to a text putting government 
procurement on a similar level – and an interviewee clearly emphasised that for 
them, after all a mandate as such did not mean commitment anyway. The 
interviewee speculated that government procurement might be a bargaining chip 
versus the ESM, as the Commission was fully aware that government procurement 
would not move forward, but did keep it on the agenda (interview 15). 
The kind of “games” that were employed in the “last minute” policy-making in the 
Hong Kong negotiations are exemplified by the following example: the services 
facilitator at the Hong Kong Ministerial apparently used “blackmailing” against some 
developing countries (putting strong pressure on these countries), which the 
                                            
345 For more information on the “critical mass” countries see Annex 4 (Sect. 12.4). 
346 It can be assumed that this had to do with the rejection of the benchmarking proposal, but the EU 
changed its strategy too late in order for it to have any effects. The EU understood its new role as to 
explain to the ACP “what actually was going on” in the services negotiations (interview 3). In the 
overall negotiations, there have been attempts to include an ACP representative in the Mini-
Ministerials (interview 27). It is also interesting to note that the ACP Secretariat in Geneva receives 
financial support from the EU. Despite this and other EU efforts to facilitate the ACP’s representation 
in the negotiation process and to accommodate their needs, the ACP often oppose the EU in the 
negotiations, which an interviewee suggesting that this was an ACP attempt to be granted more 
financial assistance (interview 33). 
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defensive countries leaked to the NGO community and the press. An interviewee told 
the anecdote that subsequently the NGOs were “running around” the conference 
centre with “anti-GATS” stickers, which means that the strategy of the defensive 
countries clearly was working (anonymous interviewee).  
With regard to the failed benchmarking approach, two things can be noticed: despite 
the earlier linkage between the EU’s new agriculture offer and the benchmarking 
approach, the EU kept its agriculture offer despite the failure of the agriculture 
negotiations. An interviewee explained it would not have been politically feasible to 
withdraw the agriculture offer and it was the EU’s commitment to the round which 
made it pay in disproportionate terms (interview 8). This shows again how little the 
EU can control this negotiation and this EU linkage clearly was ineffective.  
9.3 Interim Conclusion 
This chapter followed the DDA negotiations after the Cancún Ministerial to the Hong 
Kong Ministerial. This last section of the DDA negotiations under consideration in this 
thesis here shows a heightening of activity on all negotiation levels, both in the 
overall and in the services negotiations. Agriculture turned out to be continuously the 
most critical issue on the DDA agenda. The EU had serious difficulties in maintaining 
its negotiation position and found itself cornered several times. Even after the EU 
offered to end export subsidies, pressure mounted on the EU and it had to make 
more concessions. The services negotiations re-gained in importance, and in 2005 
especially, the EU tried to push services on the overall negotiation agenda, but failed. 
At the Hong Kong Ministerial, parity was established between agriculture and NAMA, 
and services was further sidelined (see also Wolfe 2007b). 
In terms of EU resources (research question 2), the results presented in this chapter 
apparently confirm the picture obtained in earlier chapters, namely that business 
interest on trade in services is ambiguous. In the time period covered in this chapter, 
there were lobbying efforts of business associations, but there was no extensive 
reporting about this – either the actions of business were simply not covered by the 
sources used for this research, or their lobbying efforts were insignificant and did not 
create a lot of “noise”. It seems that overall, the civil society campaigns died down in 
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this phase of the negotiations. However, a developing country interviewee suggested 
that because the Singapore issues were dropped after Cancún, the NGOs could 
concentrate on services (interview 19), which implies that pressure might have 
continued in this area of the negotiations. 
Again, the relationship between the Commission and the EU member states proved a 
double-edged sword for the EU. With regard to the Round for free initiative, the 
Commission seems to have taken the EU member states by surprise by stretching its 
mandate in order to arrive at a compromise at the international level. An interviewee 
observed that the Commission overall became “very aggressive” on services in 2005, 
which led people to wonder if the EU wanted to create an overall crisis in the round, 
but the interviewee suggested that the EU’s activism mostly had to do with EU-
internal pressure, especially by France (interview 26). Managing its domestic 
“resources” hence continued to take up part of the EU’s negotiation capacity, but the 
public resistance of certain EU member states against too far-reaching commitment 
might also have helped the European Commission to sustain its case in the WTO. 
The chapter also provides an interesting case for empowerment through the regime 
(research question 3). As indicated in Sect. 3.1.2, the WTO consensus system de 
facto attributes similar voting power to all WTO members. A practical result of this 
was visible with regard to the decision on plurilateral services negotiations. WTO 
members that did not even (yet) have a stake in world services trade or would not 
take part in the plurilateral process could influence and veto this idea. Of course, this 
problem does not only exist with regard to the plurilateral approach, but was also 
visible with regard to the benchmarking proposal. It can be argued that here in 
particular the regime was disadvantageous for the EU, as it attributed significant 
organisationally-dependent capabilities to actors pursuing agendas adverse to the 
EU’s interests although they would not be affected by the regime change anyway. In 
more general terms, this raises questions as to who should shape the rules in the 
WTO. 
As in the previous chapters, this chapter also gives a range of examples for the EU’s 
attempts at agenda-shaping (research question 4) and coalition- and consensus-
building (research question 5). In 2005, the European Commission invested heavily 
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in promoting the benchmarking proposal, but it did not succeed (research question 
6). Why did this significant investment of power fail? The interviewed Commission 
officials recognised that their own approach was sketchy, as of course it did not take 
into account the relative importance of a sectoral commitment. While the services 
unit officials were aware that a quantitative approach to services would be difficult, 
the benchmarking proposal was meant to give orientation to the discussion: 
we saw that the offers were very limited in substance and very 
often we saw that some of the countries were not really playing the 
game (interview 8).  
Apparently, the Commission wanted to use benchmarking as a tool to expose the low 
level of commitment in services by other members and as a counterbalance to 
agriculture (interview 8, see also Wolfe 2007b). A point of criticism was that the EU’s 
approach would have exempted the EU from making major new commitments, which 
had to do with the generally higher level of binding by the EU and the very different 
level of commitments that existed among WTO members (interview 5). Interviewees 
from (non-EU) WTO members also pointed out that the benchmarking proposal was 
a “void” proposal. It was clear to all the negotiators that even if there had been some 
quantitative or qualitative targets for each WTO member these would in practice not 
have been effective and would also not make the offers more comparable (interview 
18, 20, 21, 23). It is hence evident that the substance of the proposal itself could be a 
reason for the failure of the proposal. 
In terms of consensus-building for the benchmarking-proposal, a Commission official 
evaluated their efforts of convincing the WTO membership that the bilateral request-
offer process was not working as reasonably successful (research question 5). 
However, the Commission found further consensus-building much more difficult. The 
Commission tried to build consensus among the demandeurs, but even this was 
problematic and the EU official estimated that the biggest hurdle was that the 
Commission failed to convince the US of the benchmarking idea. The opposition to 
the benchmarking proposal was led by Brazil, and the official estimated that the 
opposition’s task was an easy one given the absence of US support for the proposal 
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(interview 9). A second reason for the failure of the benchmarking proposal was 
hence a failure by the EU to built consensus and support for the idea.347 
Clearly, there have not only been attempts to introduce new initiatives to induce 
movement into the round. Important new coalitions emerged in the 2003-2005 period: 
the “FIPs” were set up in the agriculture negotiations and replaced the EU-US co-
leadership in this area (Bridges 23.06.2004). Similarly, the new Quad emerged in the 
negotiations overall. Interviewees indicated that this was due to the power shift in the 
WTO (interview 17); this meant that developing countries moved into the centre of 
decision-making and these new coalitions signified strategic adaptations of the EU 
and the US to the new power structure in the WTO (interview 35; research question 
1).  
Similarly, in the services negotiations, a US-India led group was set up in the run-up 
to the Hong Kong Ministerial as a “FIPs-equivalent” in services, but this informal 
coalition soon became meaningless. This seems to be in line with the formerly 
observed absence of negotiation coalitions in the services negotiations. However, 
interviewees described a situation where cooperation does take place in various 
forms. In services, coalitions apparently are more informal than in other negotiation 
areas and can vary across issue areas (see Annex 4 (Sect.12.4)).348 As to the Quad, 
while it was mentioned regularly in earlier chapters as an acting coalition in the 
services negotiations, it seemed to have disappeared here. Interviewees explained 
that while coordination in the Quad had been key in the services negotiations in the 
                                            
347 The EU’s heavy support for the failed benchmarking approach might have had unintended strategic 
costs for the EU. Interviewees from (non-EU) WTO members questioned that the EU’s approach for 
the benchmarking proposal had been a good strategic decision, arguing that it led to distrust and 
created divisions rather than consensus. For them, the benchmarking proposal looked like a 
leverage for agriculture (interview 17, 19). In the eyes of the interviewees, the EU clearly lost 
credibility because of this attempt to push the benchmarks, and the way they did it. They added that 
in 2006 it seems the Commission was playing a similar “game” with the stocktaking exercise, casting 
doubts on the EU’s seriousness about the services negotiations: while the EU was perceived as 
consistently emphasising services in the Doha negotiations, it did not show convincing activism in 
the services negotiations (interview 18, 20, 21, 23). In the eyes of (non-EU) WTO members, the 
Commission also lost credibility, because it pushed for benchmarks for various months in 2005 but 
only submitted a proposal in October (interview 21).  
348 For example, Switzerland and Mexico are both neighbours to big markets, so they push for similar 
issues in the domestic standards negotiations, and India supported the benchmarking proposal, 
deviating from the usual G77 line (interview 24).  
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Uruguay Round and in the late 1990s, the Quad today seems to have a limited 
impact. The power shift now seems to have started to impact on the coalitions that 
are steering the WTO negotiations on the different levels.  
With regard to the outcomes of the services negotiations, the EU was increasingly 
worried about the results of the services negotiations (see also Bergsten 2005). It 
realised that offers submitted to it were far below its expectations. While it had 
postulated “effective market access” as one of its negotiation goals, this seemed 
increasingly unachievable:349 Commission officials did not estimate that there would 
be any new “commercially viable market access” market access in the sectors they 
were dealing with (interview 3; 5).350 Interviewees from (non-EU) WTO members 
confirmed the assessment that there would be no or hardly any commercially viable 
market access as a result of the round (interview 17, 18, 19, 21, 26).351 A sense of 
“crisis” hence built up among the demandeurs in the services negotiations. As in the 
overall negotiations, the European Commission now lowered its demands: it reacted 
by introducing a distinction between different developing country groups and lowering 
its requests to each group.352 The European Commission was apparently 
increasingly aware that there were real and substantial capacity problems in LDC 
and developing countries and that they were not simply using capacity problems as a 
strategic blockage of the negotiations. The Commission had realised that these 
                                            
349 Assessing the quality of the offers is, however, highly individual, as WTO members have not yet 
allowed the WTO Secretariat to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the offers (however, even 
if the Secretariat would be mandated to do so, it might struggle to find the capacity to undertake a 
comprehensive assessment). Hence, no official assessment exists. 
350 The Commission had on the one hand to realise other players’ reservations, and on the other hand, 
realised that pushing harder on services or restraining the offers on agriculture further might have 
created further conflicts in the negotiations (interview 10). The Commission officials are clearly 
dissatisfied with the current negotiation result (interview 5). At the same time, Commission officials 
were aware that in many countries services liberalisation was much further advanced than what had 
been committed in the WTO, even in those countries that hardly participated in the negotiations 
(interview 3). Apparently for the Commission, it had been a gradual realisation during the 
negotiations that market access was getting “thinner and thinner” (interview 10) 
351 The gains through the negotiations would still be legal certainty and a possibility to overcome 
domestic interests, although this was not what the Commission intended initially. Many countries 
would first liberalise services domestically, anticipate the effects and then make a commitment at the 
WTO (interview 21). 
352 A NGO representative alleged that the EU’s attempt to create different developing countries’ 
subgroups was part of a strategy to break the unity of developing countries though (interview 35). 
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countries did not have the negotiation capacity to participate properly in the DDA and 
also would not be in a position to implement the results of complex negotiations in 
any case. This recognition was a significant strategic change for the EU. Hence, the 
European Commission increased cooperation with LDC (also to “sell” its ideas for the 
services negotiations), and technical assistance. So far though, the new approach 
towards the LDC/low income countries failed to persuade them to a greater 
participation in the services negotiations. The EU also tried to help the ACP in their 
participation in the services negotiations, but arguably efforts came too late to 
salvage the benchmarking proposal. 
The EU and the US continued to pursue different agendas with regard to the WTO. 
After the Cancún Ministerial, the US had quickly turned to a new strategy of bilateral 
agreements, whereas the EU continued its unambiguous support for the regime. The 
contribution of the US to the revival of the round after the Cancún Ministerial seems 
significant, starting with its early 2004 surprise initiative to revive the Doha 
negotiations. However, there does not seem to have been much cooperation 
between the two, as the US in part undermined the EU’s position.  
As in previous chapters, the links between different negotiation areas were used by 
different actors. Arguably, the Commission used government procurement as a 
bargaining chip inside the services negotiations. The services negotiations continued 
to be pinned against the agriculture negotiations.353  
While the EU has been successful in keeping the round going until the Hong Kong 
2005 Ministerial and not letting a WTO Ministerial fail a further time, it had to make a 
set of substantial concessions. Flexibility in the EU position has increased.354 This in 
particular seems to have contributed to the interim success of the July 2004 
framework. However, the EU’s benchmarking proposal failed. At a first glance, the 
plurilateral approach initiated by the Hong Kong Ministerial looks like a revival of the 
                                            
353 A developed country representative suggested, however, that the importance of the services 
negotiations had gone up and that the EU had tried to be more proactive, and that the benchmarking 
proposal was an indication of the EU that the importance of services had gone up (interview 20). 
354 The EU was forced to become more flexible and dropped the Singapore issues. It also increased 
its flexibility on the geographic indication issue. 
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plurilateral approaches that have taken place in the mid-1990s and which the EU 
found to be relatively successful, but this view did not last long into 2006.355 Despite 
all the efforts of the EU, compromise seems still not in reach and the impact of the 
EU on negotiation outcomes seems rather limited (research question 6).  
How has the EU’s approach changed because of the power shift (research question 
1)? As in previous chapters, the EU has tried to increase cooperation with certain 
actors and it took part in a set of new coalitions. However, apart from these strategic 
changes, the important observation in this chapter is the changes in its substantial 
demands that the EU made. The major change was dropping the Singapore issues 
and there was a decision by the EU whether to stay with the WTO or to move to a 
different forum (interview 5, 6), with the EU deciding to continue focusing on the 
WTO (as opposed to the US). The Commission also made concession in agriculture. 
In the services negotiations, the Commission realised that it had been too ambitious 
in the WTO and lowered its expectations for the services negotiations (interview 8). 
The EU hence moved from making strategic adaptations to the power shift to making 
changes in its demands in the negotiations.  
The last two years under observation in this thesis hence did not prove entirely 
successful for the EU, as it had to make substantial concessions to prevent the WTO 
negotiations from breaking down and as it failed to establish the services 
negotiations as on equal level with the NAMA and agriculture negotiations. Having 
with this last case study chapter now completed the consideration and analysis of the 
EU’s contribution to the WTO negotiations between 1995-2005, the subsequent 
                                            
355 While the plurilaterals held in spring 2006 were seen as successful by an EU official, and while the 
official suggested that in the Uruguay Round the best results were achieved in the plurilateral 
negotiations (interview 5), enthusiasm for the plurilaterals waned quickly in 2006, as it brought with 
itself the same problems as previously, namely that there was no obligation to take part in it. The 
advantage of the process was increased transparency in the negotiations, and it allowed the EU to 
focus on its target markets (interview 8). However, another EU official admitted that the Commission 
had concluded that the plurilaterals were so “successful” because they did not mean real 
commitment for anyone (interview 8). A representative from a developing country suggested that the 
plurilaterals were the first time that the demandeurs were forced to cooperate among themselves. 
This led to a lowering of ambitions, welcomed by the opponents. However, the discussion raised by 
the plurilaterals soon faded away in spring 2006 (interview 19). Developing countries which were not 
requested through the plurilateral process also quickly started to complain that they were excluded 
from the discussion (interview 28). 
9 From Cancún to Hong Kong 2004-2005: Lowering expectations 346 
 
conclusion in the next chapter will sum up the results of this investigation and revisit 
the propositions put forward in chapter 2 above and the research questions set out in 
chapter 3 above to provide a complete picture of the EU’s impact on the WTO 
negotiations.  
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10 Conclusion 
This thesis has assessed the EU’s impact on the international trade regime by 
analysing the WTO negotiations between 1995-2005 based on an actor-centered 
power concept. Initially it was argued that the WTO as a “make-or-break” forum 
provided a core place for the EU to establish its identity as an international actor, as 
the EU is equipped with far-reaching capacities for action due to its resource 
equipment in trade policy and due to its organisationally-dependent capabilities. It 
was then asked how the EU would try to use its resources to shape the WTO 
negotiations and hence the international trade regime. The thesis was based on two 
core assumptions set out in the Introduction: first, the assumption that power matters 
in regimes, and that an actor-centered power approach could crucially contribute to 
our understanding of outcomes of negotiation processes in the international trade 
regime; and second, that a power shift has occurred in the WTO, with consequent 
effects for the EU’s capacity to respond and to achieve policy effectiveness.. 
Chapter 2 above set out the theoretical framework used in this thesis. It reviewed the 
concept of the “international regime” and “power” in political theory and IPE theory, 
and then argued for a broad-based analysis of actor power in international regimes, 
for which it put forward five propositions. These can be re-presented here as the 
initial baseline for overall conclusions to the thesis:  
• First, that analysis of actor power in international regimes depends initially on 
specification of the international regime, its qualities and the issue-area(s) it 
relates to. 
• Second, that analysis of actor power in international regimes depends on an 
assessment of the resources and capacities that the actor brings to the regime 
(in other words, of ‘power to’ existing independent of the regime – in Keohane 
and Nye’s terms, ‘underlying capabilities’). 
• Third, that analysis of actor power in international regimes must take account 
of the actor’s ‘organisationally dependent capabilities’ and thus of resources 
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derived from involvement in the regime itself (what might be defined as ‘power 
from’ the regime – in Barnett and Duvall’s terms, ‘institutional power’). 
• Fourth, that analysis of actor power in international regimes can profitably 
focus on formal negotiation and bargaining processes in which the actor is 
involved (and thus on what might be termed ‘power in’ negotiations), with 
particular reference to processes of agenda setting and coalition building. 
• Finally, that analysis of actor power in international regimes must include an 
assessment of outcomes in relation to actor preferences (and thus what can 
be seen as ‘power over’ in the regime setting – in Barnett and Duvall’s terms 
‘compulsory power’). 
Chapter 3 above introduced the regime under consideration in this thesis, the world 
trade regime with its key organisation the WTO, and the issue area chosen for this 
investigation, trade in services. It also introduced the way in which the WTO’s 
institutional framework might influence the organisationally-dependent capabilities of 
the actors involved in the WTO and argued that a power shift was taking place in the 
WTO in the time of observation. In this chapter, six research questions were 
developed based on the discussion of the international trade regime and the five 
propositions for an actor-centered power approach:  
1. How has the EU recognised and adapted to the power shift in the WTO? 
2. What resources for action does the EU have in the WTO? 
3. Which organisationally-dependent capabilities exist for the EU in the framework of 
the WTO? 
4. To what extent is the EU capable or not capable of influencing the processes 
leading to the WTO’s negotiation agendas? Are there differences between the 
different types of negotiations in the WTO? 
5. To what extent does the EU have the capacity to build and lead coalitions within 
the WTO and in which other ways does it acquire support for its positions? 
6. Do outcomes of WTO negotiations reflect preferences of the EU? Why or why not? 
These research questions guided the investigation in this thesis and through the case 
study. Chapter 4 assessed the EU’s resources and organisationally-dependent 
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capabilities for action in the WTO, thus dealing with the context for consideration of 
research questions 2 and 3. Chapters 5-9 contained the case study on the WTO 
negotiations in general and in trade in services, thus dealing in particular with 
research questions 4-6. This last chapter gathers and evaluates the results of the 
investigation and revisits the research questions. It will do so by dealing with 
questions 2-6 as they are illuminated by the case study, and then by returning to the 
broader consideration of research question 1 in light of the evidence. 
10.1   Results of the investigation 
With regard to the resources brought by the EU to the WTO (research question 2), 
chapter 3 established that the EU’s resource equipment for shaping the world trade 
regime is, as expected, unique and extensive. Its power in the WTO is founded on its 
economic resources and the attractiveness of its internal market, both overall and 
specifically in services. The growing competencies of the EU in trade policy form the 
basis of its political power, and the EU disposes of significant institutional resources. 
While the distribution of competencies between the EU and the EU member states is 
mixed in the area of the “new trade issues”, carrying the risk of potential frictional 
losses, the effect of this competence distribution remains unclear. EU business and 
civil society were identified as further potential factors of the EU’s domestic 
resources. The EU’s vast network of formal and informal relations with its trading 
partners provides the EU with further resources for its impact on WTO negotiations.  
The EU also benefits from a range of organisationally-dependent capabilities in the 
WTO (research question 3). It acts on the basis of a long established actorness and 
of a special legal status. The EU has a disproportionate influence on the decision-
making in the WTO, and on the DSB. It is in a position to shape the structure of the 
WTO and the negotiations. In many instances, the WTO framework, and the WTO 
Secretariat in particular, play into the hands of the EU. Theoretically, therefore, the 
EU should be able to establish leadership and live up to its “superpower image” in 
the WTO. 
In chapter 2, it was postulated that in order to observe actor power in a regime, it was 
important to look not only at resources, but also at the negotiation process and at 
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outcomes of a process of regime change. This request was taken up by three 
research questions (research questions 4-6). They drew special attention to the EU’s 
ability to shape the WTO’s agenda, to build coalitions and more generally attract 
support to its proposals, and to what extent the outcomes in the WTO reflected the 
EU’s preferences.  
Research question 4 dealt with the agenda-setting capacity of the EU. As shown in 
the case study, a first aim of the EU was obviously to shape the WTO’s agenda. With 
regard to the overall agenda-setting in the WTO, the first phase observed in this 
thesis showed a very definite impact of the EU. It came up with the idea for the new 
trade round and arguably took over leadership from the US at stages. The EU was 
hence definitely turning from a rather defensive position during the GATT years to 
one of leadership and a more offensive position in the 1990s. At the same time, it can 
be argued that the EU perceived increased opportunities for power usage in the 
WTO, which led it to position itself as a new leader in the organisation. The interim 
failure at Seattle was overcome by the EU with increased investment in consensus-
building (research question 5). The launch of the Doha trade round can hence be 
counted as a considerable success of the EU in agenda-setting.  
However, this success was on the one hand not a complete or long-lasting one, as 
the EU’s agenda had been significantly watered down for the sake of finding a 
compromise. It was thus not clear whether the EU’s success at this stage would lead 
to a longer lasting reshaping of the regime or not. On the other hand, even before the 
Seattle Ministerial, conflicts arose to such an extent that the EU struggled to exert 
control over them.  
In the services negotiations, the EU was active in the negotiations continuing after 
the Uruguay Round and displayed the ability to shape and lead the negotiations to a 
certain extent. In the preparations for the GATS 2000 negotiations, there first seemed 
not to have been too much impact of the EU, although the EU seemed to have built 
support at the domestic level and clarified its own position. It became evident that the 
EU wanted an ambitious outcome from the services negotiations and it pushed for 
this for the next five years. Ways in which it tried to shape the services negotiations 
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included (research question 5), among others, providing substance to the 
assessment exercise, providing technical assistance, and issue linkage. 
In chapter 9, it was evident that the EU attempted to raise the importance of services 
on the WTO agenda.356 The EU constantly countered the linkage made by the 
developing countries between agriculture and services with requests for movement 
on services.357 However, in the end a negative linkage between services and 
agriculture seems to have prevailed. Services became “the odd nr. 3”, with the link 
between agriculture and NAMA being institutionalised at the Hong Kong Ministerial 
(Art. 24 Hong Kong Declaration).358 The EU’s attempt at raising the services issue 
had therefore not been successful. Clearly, by 2005 the single undertaking once 
desired by the EU had become a “double edged sword” for the EU and issue 
linkages were not working out for it. WTO members attempted linkages inside the 
services negotiations (ESM versus market access, Mode 4 versus market access) 
and across issue areas (services versus agriculture), and with agriculture becoming 
the key stumbling block in the negotiations, the EU’s offensive interest in services 
was increasingly held back by this.  
The EU clearly exerted pressure on members and the process, which was visible in 
the case study, and it played a major role in the negotiations, but did outcomes 
reflect its preferences (as asked by research question 6)?359  
As discussed in chapter 9, it became evident to the negotiators during the services 
negotiations that offers were rather limited. The EU had initially postulated “effective 
market access” as a negotiation goal, but this now seemed unachievable. The 
                                            
356 In 2006 it tried to have a “services Mini Ministerial” alongside the planned NAMA Ministerial, but 
this idea was rejected by the WTO members (interview 15, 19). 
357 This was confirmed by interviews 19 and 20. An interviewee suggested that this might be a very 
difficult strategy, because it would be rather difficult to think that a movement in services would 
appease European farmers. It also remained completely unclear what kind of concession would 
have made a movement in agriculture possible (interview 20).  
358 This was mentioned in interview 24 and 21, and similarly in interview 26. There is no fourth 
negotiation area which could be a balance to services. TRIPs and S&D do not have enough weight 
to be this (interview 24). 
359 All the results that are discussed here are, of course, temporary. With the current slow movement 
of the trade round looks as if the Doha Round will carry on after 2007. 
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European Commission hence had to significantly lower its ambitions in the services 
negotiations, and the GATS negotiations would then only serve to provide a certain 
level of legal security for WTO members (interview 8).360  
In other areas of the services negotiations it also seems that the EU did not achieve 
its preferred outcomes: with regard to government procurement, the EU had clearly 
shown an offensive interest, but many developing countries were reluctant or 
completely opposed. It seems that at the Hong Kong Ministerial, the EU had 
managed an interim success on the issue (see section 9.2.3), but it remains unclear 
whether an agreement can be reached.361 Similarly, at the beginning of the GATS 
negotiations, a new classification system was an objective for several WTO 
members.362 Although all Friends groups promoted new classification systems, 
nothing had been agreed upon and movement could not be expected (interview 9). 
Disagreement between the EU and the US prevailed here as well (interview 19).363 
With the accountancy disciplines having been successfully agreed upon, the EU had 
intended to push for similar disciplines for domestic regulation in other sectors, but 
there were differences among WTO members about which approach to take. 
Because a very ambitious proposal could have had unpredictable ramifications, the 
negotiations became reduced to transparency on domestic disciplines (interview 30), 
and no results have been achieved. The other example for a failed EU initiative, the 
benchmarking proposal, was discussed in detail in Section 9.3. Other interim 
                                            
360 This was a disappointment for certain parts of the EU industry: as the services negotiations were in 
crisis, many industry representatives seemed to have (further?) lost confidence in GATS: it was 
sobering for those who viewed GATS as very important and had great expectations in it (interview 
32). 
361 This was confirmed by interviews 3 and 19. An interviewee suggested that the EU was losing 
credibility because it continued to push the government procurement issue in the working group, 
although it knew the negotiations would eventually fail (interview 23). 
362 An EU official described it as a key problem of the GATS that there was no agreed classification 
system, which meant that everyone used different ones. 
363 A member of the WTO Secretariat explained that the Secretariat had built a classification on the 
basis of the CPC UN classification system, but that countries use any classification they think fit. 
This makes commitments even less comparable, as countries can create carve outs that undermine 
what they seem to be committing to (interview 28). A developing country interviewee suggested that 
disagreement between the EU and US on the classification issue meant that in order to comply with 
the requests of both the EU and the US on telecommunications his country would have to use two 
different schedules of commitment (interview 19). 
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decisions were either preparatory (framework), or irrelevant for the EU (for example 
LDC modalities). It seems that in terms of working towards or achieving its offensive 
interest the EU was not very successful. 
It appears that the EU was more successful with regard to safeguarding its defensive 
interests in the negotiations. Although the EU (and the US) did not prevent issues like 
the ESM, rules on service subsidies or Mode 4 from emerging on the agenda, they 
prevented decisions that would have been unfavourable for them. On other 
outcomes, it is evident that the EU tried to not let them be too far-reaching (Mode 4, 
autonomous liberalisation modalities, LDC modalities). For the ESM and the services 
subsidies question, the EU took a “wait and see” attitude,364 and, as the EU had 
preferred it, results were not achieved (by 2007). Equally on its sensitive sectors 
(especially audiovisual, health and education services), the EU managed to prevent 
the negotiations from going anywhere (which was of course criticised by (non-EU) 
WTO members).365 
10.1.1 Reasons for the EU’s failure to use its resources effectively 
What were the reasons for the EU’s failure to transform its resources reliably into 
outcomes? The case study has suggested a range of answers to this general 
question, which relate back to the research questions. The first set of answers relates 
to the EU’s resources, the second to the nature of the regime and the EU’s 
organisationally-dependent capabilities, the third to the EU’s ability to build 
consensus and coalitions, and the fourth to the power shift and the EU’s adaptation 
to it. 
                                            
364 The discussion on the ESM had become more technical in the last years, but the question of 
feasibility (technical) and desirability (political) had not yet been resolved (interview 23). An EU 
official said that from the EU’s perspective, there was a lack of concrete proposals by the 
proponents of the ESM and disciplines on services subsidies (interview 3). An interviewee described 
his country’s attempt to find a watertight definition for the ESM (interview 15). Often, negotiators 
from developed countries will “take apart” the proposals made by developing countries. This is part 
of the game, of course – a legally “watertight” definition needs to be found, although this is much 
harder to deliver for those countries with less analytical capacity (interview 15, 35). Main proponents 
of the ESM remained ASEAN countries (interview 35). 
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EU underlying resources 
The first set of reasons is related to the EU’s underlying resources, which brings us 
back to research question 2:  
First, the relationship between the EU and the EU member states at times 
contravened or undermined the Commission’s strategy in the WTO, especially when 
it came to concessions on agriculture (Bergsten 2005).366 Although this was not 
always the case, at times the EU’s relationship with its member states proved a 
stumbling block for the EU in the negotiations. Second, the EU’s relationship with 
business does not seem to provide an unambiguous source of resources. With 
regard to trade in services, after the apparent sectoral industry impact on services 
negotiations in the second half of the 1990s, there was hardly any indication of 
business involvement in the analysis of chapters 7–9. This raises the question as to 
how far European industry actually influences the services negotiations today and 
how far they even have an interest in the negotiations. Overall, it has been claimed 
that, in contrast to the Uruguay Round, business support in the developed countries 
was low for the Doha Round (see also Odell 2003: 8; TERI 2003: 25ff), which 
coincides with the findings in this research. 
Third, a major change in terms of the EU’s resources was the changing attitude of 
civil society towards trade policy in general and towards services liberalisation in 
                                                                                                                                        
365 This was confirmed by interview 18. According to an interviewee, the EU landed a successful 
“coup” with the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions of 2005, which might enable it to continue to protect audiovisual services from 
liberalisation (interview 19).  
366 This was supported by interviewees: despite its resources, the EU is regarded also as a more slow-
moving or less outspoken negotiation partner, due to its internal constraints (interview 14, 18, 23). 
The “more refined position”, that an EU official lauded, was experienced by (non-EU) WTO 
members as a tactical obstacle, e.g. the US could take a very ambitious proposal and then negotiate 
downwards from this basis, whereas the EU was rather inflexible with its position (interview 15). An 
interviewee observed that the EU negotiators were often more vague in the negotiations; “leaving a 
window open” as it had to check with the 25 member states. The US’ negotiation style was 
described as more direct and straightforward (interview 19, similarly 20). The Commission 
negotiators seemed more restrained by their mandate. An interviewee described “Of course we [all] 
follow instructions from the capital. But if the discussion goes somewhere unexpectedly, I only have 
to keep in mind my colleagues in [my capital] and whether I can sell this to them […].So I can step 
out of my mandate if I think fit.” (interview 20, similar in interview 21). While the Commission 
negotiators seem very though negotiating inside their mandate, they do not have the same freedom 
as other WTO members, and they often remain silent or reserve their right to speak for later if the 
discussion departs from the foreseen (interview 20).  
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particular. Similarly to the other major change in the trade regime, the increasing 
prominence of developing countries in the WTO, this change slowly revealed its full 
effects after the Seattle Ministerial. The EU reacted with attempts to improve its 
relations to civil society both inside the EU and in the broader, international realm. 
At the EU level, civil society’s emerging interest in the services issue has changed 
the EU’s position and strategy on services. Civil society interaction has added a 
fourth partner to the Commission-Council-industry game. An evident example of the 
effects of NGO involvement is the EU dropping all requests on education and health 
services (see chapter 8).367 The EU’s approach to services liberalisation has hence 
been shaped by the NGO and media campaigns since 2001. One can also say that 
the EU’s resources were diminished as EU civil society took on positions that were 
represented most directly by developing countries in the WTO.  
Clearly, the perception of the WTO overall has changed since the 1990s. “WTO” 
became synonymous for “globalisation”, understood negatively (interview 32). The 
2005 Bolkestein directive discussion could be regarded as a further discussion 
undermining the EU’s bargaining power in the WTO. It reveals the sensitivities on the 
EU level – so the Commission faces two crucial and demanding settings in the 
services negotiations: internally with civil society and outside (in the WTO) with the 
developing countries. Of course, all other WTO members are aware of the EU’s 
internal discussion and it has weakened the EU’s position in the services 
negotiations.368  
Fourth, it might have been problematic for the EU to fully utilise its resources. It is 
interesting to note that some of the resources which the EU could use seem not to 
have been fully utilised: for example, the EU seemed to hardly use the EU 
                                            
367 An EU official indicated that this move by the Commission importantly undermined the anti-GATS 
campaign, while it meant giving up only a minor EU interest. Therefore, he considered this as a 
successful EU strategy (interview 6). 
368 This was confirmed by interview 23. 
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delegations abroad for lobbying.369 The EU offered technical assistance to 
developing country WTO members rather than engaging with authorities in national 
capitals (interview 23). This could be an important point especially for specialised 
negotiations such as the services negotiations: another interviewee suggested that 
the services negotiations are “won” in the capital, because this is where the Geneva 
based negotiators receive their instructions from (interview 17), but the EU did not 
seem to use this channel so often.  
Fifth, it can be asked whether the EU used its resources wisely. It has been 
mentioned several times that the EU quantitatively and qualitatively has much more 
expertise than other WTO members, which in itself can be overpowering for 
negotiation partners. The technical expertise of the EU negotiators, and the fact that 
the EU can make more extensive use of its capital based experts, also means that 
the services negotiations often take place between EU technocrats and (trade) 
diplomats from its trading partners. At times, this seems to have led to a clash of 
different approaches.370 It can be suspected that cultural differences also play into 
negotiation approaches being perceived differently.  
                                            
369 Interviewees verified this for the case of the Philippines, Israel, India, Hong Kong (China), Colombia 
and Brazil. The US seems to have done this very strongly: the US delegations seemed involved in 
the negotiations and supported the work of the US administration (interview 14, 18, 15, 17, 19, 24, 
13). It seemed that in certain countries, not only the US, but also Japan, Australia, and Canada were 
actively lobbying the domestic capital with regard to the WTO negotiations. 
370 The interviewed diplomats seemed to feel that they had a distinctively different identity from 
“technocrats”. According to an interviewee, some EU negotiators seemed to lack the “international 
exposure” to understand the Geneva “game”, and they seem to underestimate the difference 
between “Brussels and Geneva”. While they were “brilliant technically”, they could not play the 
political game in Geneva (interview 21). An (Asian) interviewee suggested that there was 
“something” about the public relations strategy of the EU towards other delegations: other countries, 
e.g. Asian countries, were much more open, but negotiators from the Quad were more restraint. He 
indicated that it might be both cultural (because he felt that e.g. Spanish negotiators were much 
more engaging than other Europeans) or because of the above mentioned technocrat versus 
diplomat rift (interview 23). Another (Asian) interviewee suggested that the EU’s way of asking for 
commitments was “demanding them as a right”, whereas in his culture they would look for a 
realisable compromise rather (interview 16), which might have to do with either the diplomat versus 
the technocrat rift, or also was a cultural issue, or both. The technocrat versus diplomat rift seems to 
occur in other countries as well, though: an interviewee commented on the problems that occur 
when the Commission flies in experts that are not always based in Geneva. He indicated that the 
same problem occurs with negotiators from his own capital: “[they] can come up with incredible 
things, because they don’t know what’s possible here. […] I afterwards repair the damage here.” 
(interview 21). 
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The regime’s nature and the EU’s organisationally-dependent capabilities 
A second set of reasons for the EU’s failure to transform its power into outcomes is 
related to the nature of the regime and the issue area, and hence leads back to the 
question of organisationally-dependent capabilities that the EU derives from the 
international trade regime (research question 3).  
First of all, the services issue is to a large extent regulatory in nature. In the WTO, 
however, it has become embedded in a tariff-style negotiation. The difficulty in 
applying the concept of reciprocity to such an area was evident in section 3.3 and the 
case study. The insertion of the various negotiation areas into one framework means 
that negotiations with very different paces are conducted in parallel, which can lead 
to sub-optimal negotiation outcomes.371  
Second, services liberalisation is a new and highly complex negotiation area 
(exemplified by the problems experienced with services liberalisation at the EU’s 
domestic level) and this apparently brings a lot of insecurity to the negotiations. It 
means that during the negotiations, processes of policy learning and experimenting 
are ongoing, which was evident in the assessment exercise. This situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that even nationally, in many countries experiments with 
services liberalisation have only been conducted recently, for example in many 
developing countries only in the late 1980s (interview 17). The lack of reliable trade in 
services data and scientific assessment as to what services liberalisation entails has 
been mentioned throughout the case study chapters. This means that many WTO 
members are unsure about the effects of liberalisation, which makes them reluctant 
to commit multilaterally. Even if the EU had invested more political capital into the 
services negotiations, results so far might not have been different.372  
Third, the complex nature of the services negotiations and the resulting hesitant 
attitude towards multilateral commitment is reflected in the flexibility inherent in the 
                                            
371 For example, Ministerial Conferences are pre-scheduled by the regime. This means that Ministerial 
Conferences are scheduled at times when the “negotiation machinery” in Geneva has not yet 
advanced far enough (interview 10). For a similar argument see Narlikar 2004.  
372 An interviewee indicated that in this special situation, the EU (or the “demandeurs” as a group) 
might not have been able to achieve a better result even if they had conducted more intensive 
lobbying, (interview 24).  
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GATS framework. This flexibility of the GATS agreement gives a lot of room of 
manoeuvre to the negotiators and makes the negotiations particularly un-
transparent.373 This is exacerbated by the fact that market access negotiations take 
place bilaterally. This makes it hard for any country, regardless of its resources, to 
lead or significantly influence the outcome of the negotiations. 
Fourth, the technicality and lack of assessment mechanisms of the services area 
create a gap between the specialised services negotiators and the politicised, 
hierarchically higher levels in the WTO negotiations.374 This might be the reason for 
the unconnectedness of the services negotiations to the overall negotiations for 
extended periods, which has been observed in this dissertation. It could also be that 
services negotiations are “unattractive” for senior ministers – political capital cannot 
easily be extracted from these complex negotiations, which are hard to “sell” 
                                            
373 An interviewee explained this on the basis of the development provisions in GATS: the GATS 
agreement could be the most development friendly but it depends on the negotiators’ discretion and 
their goodwill, because what exactly development friendly would mean is open to interpretation 
(interview 3). The complexity of the services negotiations make them also very hard to observe from 
the outside. An example for this is the debate surrounding the “positive list/negative list” approach. It 
is often assumed that a “positive list” gives more choice and flexibility to the trading partners. The 
EU has favoured a “positive list” approach in bilaterals, while the US’ negative list is seen as 
liberalising services further and more aggressively. EU officials feel they cannot push for it as 
politically unacceptable (interview 3), not in the developing countries’ interest and that it is simply not 
the EU’s approach (interview 3, 6). An EU official also explained that the US’ negative list approach 
is a “farce” as the US exempts from its negative list all the regulations on the sub-federal level 
(interview 6).  
374 The senior level of trade negotiator has usually negotiated NAMA during their career and are hence 
not familiar with this new area (interview 18). An interviewee reported this from a Green Room 
meeting at the Hong Kong Ministerial, where despite previous briefings he was astonished by the 
lack of knowledge among senior officials (anonymous interviewee). Services negotiators are 
generally junior staff, which is different from negotiators in the agriculture and NAMA negotiations. 
An interviewee mentioned informally that this created a good atmosphere, with lots of “fun” among 
the services negotiators (interview 15). “Socialising” seems to be an important dimension of the 
negotiations, and even after exchanging harsh tones in the negotiation room, they will later on 
socialise with everyone (interview 21). The junior staff in the services negotiations, in the opinion of 
another negotiator, leads to them not being able to handle the political dimension of the negotiations 
well. Many of them apparently come from trade ministries, have a very technical outlook, and are 
less able to play the “alliance building” game and other political games (interview 19). Another 
interviewee suggested that Quad negotiators spent time “socialising”, but would use this relaxed 
atmosphere to still push their own agenda on other countries (interview 29). Narlikar observers an 
expert-senior level gap for other areas under negotiation in the WTO as well (2004). 
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domestically.375 The EU’s organisationally-dependent capabilities are hence 
especially restrained by the nature of the issue area of trade in services, a problem 
which became increasingly evident during the research. 
The EU’s ability to build consensus and coalitions 
A third set of reasons for the EU’s failure to achieve its preferred outcomes is related 
to the EU’s ability to build consensus and coalitions (research question 5).  
The first dimension with regard to consensus- and coalition-building is the EU-US 
relationship. Across the case study and in all different types of negotiations, the EU-
US dimension emerged as crucial. It was evident from the sectoral services 
negotiations in the late 1990s that although the EU might at times be able to take 
over leadership from the US, an agreement without the US would be impossible or at 
least very unattractive for WTO members. With regard to the DDA, the EU’s more 
ambitious agenda finally was down-sized during the negotiations to something much 
more like the initial US agenda. Additionally, throughout the negotiations, support by 
the US was crucial for the progress of the EU’s ideas in the negotiations. Competition 
of ideas, but also convergence was visible. For example, with regard to the 
benchmarking proposal, a key reason why it failed was the hesitant US position. 
Although EU-US leadership might no longer have the effectiveness it used to have 
(see the failed EU-US deal on agriculture in 2003), it is still indispensable (see also 
Wolfe 2007b; Odell 2006). Interviewees confirmed this for the services negotiations 
(interview 10, 14, 33).376 Across the case study, it was also evident that the EU and 
the US disagreed about how to proceed in a lot of instances. Failure to agree on a 
                                            
375 Another interviewee suggested that Ministers had to be very cautious as the services negotiations 
touched upon competencies of various domestic ministries and could easily lead to competence 
fights. It required lots of coordination beforehand (anonymous interviewee), and it was also often not 
clear to Ministers what gains they could actually claim to have won when they were returning home 
(due to the complexity of the negotiations) (interview 30). 
376 As was visible prior to Cancún in the agriculture negotiations, it can be risky for the EU-US to try to 
push forward a solution on their own (interview 33). Another interviewee suggested that there was a 
strong competitiveness going on between the EU and the US. This competitiveness could be 
strategically deployed by other WTO members (interview 21). 
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common agenda between the EU and the US can be seen as one reason for the 
failure of the EU.377  
The second dimension with regard to coalitions is the Quad. Quad coordination 
emerged as crucial in the sectoral services negotiations in the late 1990s and 
disagreement among the Quad in the run-up to the Seattle Ministerial meant that it 
could not give any ambitious guidance to the negotiations. This lack of coordination 
among the Quad continued to be a major stumbling block in the services 
negotiations, for example with regard to the services modalities and benchmarking. 
Failure to create a common agenda among the Quad is hence a further reason for 
the failure of the EU’s agenda.  
Inside the services negotiations, this lack of coordination around the EU’s agenda 
seems to also be visible with regard to the “demandeurs”. An interviewee indicated 
that the “demandeurs” did not show as much solidarity among themselves as did the 
opponents of services liberalisation (interview 9, similarly in 17).378 Overall, an 
interviewee identified a lack of leadership: “In services, those who were supposed to 
lead the negotiations were confused” and did not exert the leadership they should 
have (interview 19).379 
A lack of cooperation hence seems to prevail among the proponents of the 
negotiations on various levels,380 and makes it harder for the EU to implement its 
agenda.  
                                            
377 For more information on the position of the USA, and arguments on why it had difficulties to 
participate actively in the current trade round, see Annex 5 (Sect. 12.5) and Bergsten 2005. 
378 As seen before, it is a key feature of the services negotiations that each country has both defensive 
and offensive areas. This leads to a situation which requires a delicate balancing for the negotiators. 
A negotiator from a developing country indicated his astonishment as to how far the “demandeurs” 
in these negotiations let their negotiation strategies be driven by their defensive interests: both the 
EU and the US would spend much more time defending their defensive areas than pursuing their 
offensive areas (interview 18). 
379 As an example, the interviewee mentioned the benchmarking proposal. The “demandeurs” could 
not agree among themselves and came up with 7 different proposals for the benchmarks. This 
incoherent approach apparently could easily be dismanteled by the opposing countries (interview 
19). 
380 The “Friends” groups also seem to have failed to reach out and build consensus in the services 
negotiations (see Annex 4 (Annex 12.4). 
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The power shift and the EU’s adaptation to it 
The last set of reasons for the EU’s lack of success in affecting outcomes evolves 
around the power shift and the ways in which the EU has recognised and adapted to 
it (research question 1).  
As argued in section 4.3 on the organisationally-dependent capabilities of the EU in 
the WTO, the WTO seemed to be a regime which was favourably tilted towards the 
EU. It seemed to provide the EU with an excellent place for power usage. This 
analysis seemed confirmed by the early years (1995-1998) in the case study: the EU 
seemed to be able to shape the agenda (the new round idea), provide leadership in 
the negotiations (financial services negotiations) and arrive at (at least superficially) 
desired outcomes (financial services agreement, telecommunication agreement, 
accountancy disciplines). The analysis so far suggests that the regime then started to 
change in a way which decreased the EU’s power in the WTO.  
This power shift in the WTO was caused primarily by the growing membership of the 
WTO, mostly developing countries, and the new economic impact of many 
developing countries (see section 3.2; Bergsten 2005). Throughout the case study, it 
was visible that developing countries were seeking better representation in the WTO. 
The establishment of the G20 and the ACP/LDC/African Union coalition were 
expressions of this search and of the improved usage of the developing countries’ 
resources. Another example is that in the services negotiations, Brazil emerged as a 
developing country leader (see chapter 9 and Annex 5 (Sect. 12.5)), and India was 
involved in the leadership of a pro-services coalition.381 This increased “presence” of 
developing countries in the WTO negotiations is reflected in the reporting about 
developing countries’ participation in the negotiations, which rose significantly after 
the Seattle Ministerial. A further component of the power shift might be the US’ 
“fuzzy” position and lack of support for the WTO, which could be attributed to a 
relative decline of US resources.382 
                                            
381 It was an important change compared to the end of the Uruguay Round that some developing 
countries were part of the “demandeurs” in the service negotiations (see Annex 4 (Sect. 12.4)). 
382 The US’ lack of activity can also be due to a lack of interest. An hypothesis is that the USA had 
achieved in general what it wanted in the Uruguay Round and so is not a driving force in the Doha 
negotiations (TERI 2003: 4). 
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From the EU’s realisation of the power shift around the 1999 Seattle Ministerial, it 
took several steps in an attempt to adapt to the power shift (mainly research question 
1, but also research question 5). A first step in this adaptation to the power shift was 
the increased outreach towards developing countries, which included various 
initiatives such as the EBA initiative and the “round for free” idea. The EU clearly 
moved the “development issue” into the core of its communication strategy with 
developing countries and into the centre of the WTO agenda. The EU hence made 
strategic changes at first to adapt to the power shift.  
After this strategic adaptation did not deliver the desired outcomes in the regime, the 
EU started to display greater flexibility in its position. Before the Cancún Ministerial, it 
had only quietly dropped the trade and labour issue. After the Cancún Ministerial, the 
EU made far-reaching concessions to arrive at a consensus. This included un-
bundling and mostly abandoning the Singapore issues, various concessions on 
agriculture and importantly lowering its ambitions in the services negotiations. The 
second step in the EU’s adaptation was thus changing the substance of its WTO 
agenda.  
A third step, occurring in parallel to the dismantling of the EU’s agenda in the WTO, 
was participation in new coalitions. These were in particular the FIPs and the new 
Quad, which were active in the agriculture and the overall negotiations. However, the 
new Quad does not seem to exist as a formation in the services negotiations itself 
and the EU tended to coordinate bilaterally.383 But an interviewee observed that the 
EU’s informal cooperation with other WTO members has changed as well: the EU 
apparently now consults India before it turns to other Quad members in the services 
negotiations (interview 20). The EU was also involved in the US-Indian led informal 
coalition in the run-up to the Hong Kong Ministerial, which can be seen as an attempt 
to adapt to the changed power situation in the WTO. Though this attempt was not 
entirely successful, it shows that relationships between WTO members have started 
to change. The power shift hence has impacted on the relationships the EU has 
within the WTO.  
                                            
383 This was confirmed by interviews 8 and 25. 
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Whether the adaptations the EU has made so far to the power shift have been 
sufficient to arrive at agreements desirable to the EU remains to be seen.384 The 
adaptations the EU has made will take longer to take their full effect, as will 
knowledge-shaping initiatives such as technical assistance and capacity-building. At 
a later stage, when other forces might play more into the hands of the EU (for 
example if more developing countries have positive experiences with services 
liberalisation), the EU might again find more favourable conditions for achieving its 
agenda in the WTO.385 
Despite its outstanding resource equipment, the WTO negotiations have become too 
complex for the EU to decisively influence them. The resources of the EU are not 
extensive enough to set the regime’s rules. Due to the special nature of the issue 
area, the services negotiations are particularly unmanageable and do not seem to 
present the EU with a setting for achieving its preferences. In the services 
negotiations, the lack of cooperation among the various members of the 
“demandeurs”, including the EU-US dimension, and the Quad, has made progress in 
the negotiations very hard to achieve for the EU. This lack of cooperation is 
replicated in the overall DDA negotiations. At the same time, the erosion of the EU’s 
resources by the shifting attitude in civil society towards the services negotiations 
and towards trade policy in general has increased the task for the European 
Commission, which is now faced with a civil society “management task” on top of the 
WTO negotiations.  
The power-based analysis of the EU’s impact on the trade regime has hence 
revealed a range of opportunities for action and power usage that the EU encounters 
in the trade regime on the basis of its resources, and which it exploited more or less 
successfully over the time period under observation, 1995-2005. However, it has also 
                                            
384 For example, an interviewee criticised the “demandeurs” for not creating sufficient new coalitions to 
steer the services negotiations. He hence suggested that the reaction of the “demandeurs” to the 
new situation in the WTO had been completely insufficient; as the lack of coalitions meant that 
differences between WTO members had not been bridged as it had happened in agriculture and 
NAMA (interview 19).  
385 From the point of view of a 133 Committee member, the Commission’s efforts at addressing 
capacity building issues and providing technical assistance for LDC are very useful, but have not yet 
been acknowledged (interview 13). 
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clearly shown the limitations, and the increase in limitations, that the EU has 
experienced in shaping the international trade regime.  
10.2   Revisiting international regimes and actor power 
What does this tell us about the actor-centered power approach and international 
regimes? The middle ground definition of a regime adopted in section 2.1.1 has 
provided a useful “lens” to focus attention on both the formal aspects of the 
international regime, and the informal aspects predominant in negotiation processes, 
which have a key influence on regime change in the WTO.  
Extending the conventional interest-based focus of regime theory to a power-based 
regime analysis has drawn our attention to a range of interesting and significant 
factors in the case study that otherwise have been neglected. 
The research confirmed that the power status of an actor in a regime is not static, for 
two key reasons: first, resources are not static. The EU’s resources underwent 
substantial shifts during the phase of the case study. This confirmed the suggestions 
by Keohane, Nye and Habeeb introduced in section 2.3. Second, the regime itself is 
not static, as there are constant shifts in the nature of the regime and in the power 
distribution underlying it. 
A factor that stood out in the case study was the variation in contents, pace and 
nature of the negotiations overall and the issue-area specific negotiations. Though 
the negotiations were inextricably linked under the heading of the WTO, they 
proceeded at different paces and had different power and interest constellations. This 
created tensions in and between the different negotiations. The differentiation 
between different levels of negotiation proved hence to be crucial, and it is clear that 
in an analysis of power in international regimes, generalisations across issue areas 
should not easily be made. The case study approach, taking into account the power 
constellations in a specific issue area, proved a useful tool in order not to over-
simplify the impact of an actor’s power by only looking at the overall power 
constellation.  
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As predicted by Keohane and Nye, resources alone do not mean an actor actually 
can shape a regime. The international trade regime did show a “life of its own” and it 
shaped the organisationally-dependent capabilities actors have in them (including the 
support of the WTO Secretariat for certain policy proposals). An actor’s capacity to 
shape the regime is hence limited importantly by the structure of the regime, which in 
itself is a result of the nature of the issue areas covered by the regime. In this way, 
this power-based regime analysis can contribute to debates on the relationship 
between agent and structure. In contrast to what might have been found if a 
negotiation theory approach had been used, the regime analysis drew the attention 
to the multiple factors shaping international negotiations, delivering a “thick” 
description both of the regime, the actor, the process of negotiation and hence 
regime change, and the interaction between agent and structure. 
As argued in Krasner’s work, the shift in the power distribution underlying the regime 
resulted in pressure on the regime to shift, too, but the regime proved static for a 
while. Nonetheless, there was increasing pressure on the regime to adapt to the new 
underlying power distribution, and this adaptation would evidently be to the detriment 
of the previously powerful actors in the regime. Additionally, even an actor as rich in 
underlying resources and organisationally-dependent capabilities as the EU 
encountered difficulties in directing the regime changes analysed in this thesis into 
directions it desired. It might be concluded that international regimes, once 
established, remain largely uncontrollable even for powerful actors. 
With regard to the different aspects of power as described in sections 2.2 and 2.3, 
normative factors such as knowledge and the control of it emerged as crucial power 
resources in the negotiation process in the trade in services issue area: first, actors 
negotiated with imperfect knowledge; second, the lack of knowledge significantly 
impeded the progress of the negotiations and the input of various actors in the 
regime; third, input of knowledge had the potential to “unlock” the deadlock in the 
negotiations; fourth, knowledge “production” and learning occurred in parallel with the 
negotiation process (the EU negotiators apparently learnt both about the issue area 
and the new power constellation, which made it impossible for the EU to pursue its 
original objective of obtaining “commercially significant market access” in trade in 
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services). The comparison between the overall negotiations and the nature of the 
trade in services negotiations also give an indication that in technical negotiations 
such as trade in services the possession of the power factor “knowledge” is crucial, 
whereas in the more politicised, general negotiations other power factors (issue-
linkage, overall economic power, relations to other actors) are more important.  
With regard to whether normative considerations would prevent the EU from fully 
using its resources in the bargaining process (Sect. 2.3.3), it was not clear for the 
case under investigation that there might have been normative considerations within 
the EU restricting its ability to fully use its resources in the negotiations. Some 
negotiators from other WTO countries raised doubts about the depth of the 
“proclaimed interest” of the EU in the services negotiations and in the WTO overall, 
but there was no further evidence to support this. Thus, while it is important to keep 
in mind that an actor might not fully use its resources in the bargaining process due 
to tactical or normative considerations for an analysis of actor power, for this 
investigation there is no evidence that this has significantly skewed the results (and 
the previous analysis of resources was intended to minimise this potential problem). 
On the other hand, it seems that resources and interests can be strongly correlated; 
it seems logical that the Commission would “invest” more resources in areas it has 
stronger interests in and it might be that the European services industry would be 
better equipped and organised if its interest in international trade was more 
extensive.  
What does this tell us about the validity of our initial five propositions? One thing it 
tells us is that they are good ways of generating targeted questions and that they 
seem to provide a logical framework for the evaluation of the evidence. More 
specifically, we can say the following: 
1. The evidence in the thesis clearly points to the importance of specifying the 
regime, its qualities and the issue areas it relates to. Much of the preceding argument 
in these conclusions shows that the changing nature of the regime and in particular 
the characteristics of the services area was a potent factor in conditioning the ability 
of the EU to fulfil its potential and pursue its preferences. 
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2. There is clearly a role for the analysis and evaluation of the resources and 
capabilities an actor brings to the regime, but the case of the EU and services shows 
that the context and the ways in which these resources are deployed are crucial to 
their effective use. 
3. Organisationally dependent capabilities matter, but crucially they are mediated and 
modified by the changing power context and by the demands of specific sets of 
negotiations, which can produce a set of “moving targets” competing for policy-
makers’ attention. There is no straight line between organisationally dependent 
capabilities and actors’ success. 
4. The negotiation process itself – the ways in which it is organised, and the context 
within which it takes place – can significantly modify the capacity of actors to shape 
agendas and to build coalitions. The EU was successful in doing both of these things 
at some stages and on some issues, but ultimately could not transfer those limited 
successes into broad-ranging “victories” within an increasingly intractable negotiating 
environment. 
5. Finally, and as suggested above, the EU found it increasingly difficult to transform 
its underlying and organisationally dependent capabilities into power over the regime 
and achievement of its stated preferences in the area of services trade, and had to 
adapt its objectives and strategies to this realisation. Whilst it could defend its 
established positions effectively on key issues, it could not make progress on its 
offensive agenda for a variety of reasons, many of them outlined above. 
This brings the argument back to more general considerations of “regime” and 
“power”, as raised in chapter 2. Whilst we cannot revisit all of the issues raised there, 
it is appropriate here to note especially the questions raised by Barnett and Duvall in 
their treatment of power, and those noted by Keohane and Nye in their treatments of 
international regimes. In respect of the latter, it seems clear that an actor-centred 
power perspective can add both to competing approaches based on interests or on 
knowledge and to power approaches that emphasise a more structural and 
aggregate approach. It is also clear from what has been argued here that we are not 
talking about actors as insulated from their environments; in fact, it is precisely the 
interaction of actors, environments, issues and institutions that makes the approach 
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appealing and appropriate. In respect of power more generally, the evidence and the 
conclusions we have drawn from it seem clearly to support the more differentiated 
approach adopted by Barnett and Duvall, in contrast to those approaches that 
privilege structural or relational power alone. We have seen considerable evidence to 
support the validity of ideas of “compulsory power”, but also evidence that shows the 
limitations of these ideas. Likewise, we have seen evidence to support the notion of 
“institutional power”, but also evidence of the ways in which this power can be 
mediated and contained or constrained. We have not focused specifically on notions 
of “structural power” or that of “productive power” as advanced by Barnett and Duvall, 
and this was not the intention of the thesis, but there are ways in which one might 
pursue these as a further avenue for the investigation of WTO negotiations. 
10.3   Revisiting methodology 
A few words seem necessary about the methodology used in this thesis. In using 
process-tracing within the case study approach, the thesis addressed a critique of 
regime theory, namely that it is too encompassing and structural to produce credible 
results (Checkel 2005: 4). The combination of the case study approach and process-
tracing provided a valuable insight into the mechanisms at work inside the world 
trade regime and proved useful for generating a range of explanations about the 
causes for the EU’s failure to convert its resources into outcomes. A particular 
strength of these methods was their firm rooting in “real life”. However, assuming the 
process-tracing method in combination with the case study approach also meant that 
a huge quantity of documents had to be reviewed in order to arrive at comprehensive 
and accurate results. Various data sources were triangulated (specialist press, 
newspapers, official documents, interviews) to verify the results. Evidently, as 
Checkel has already argued, this choice of method proved highly time-intensive 
(Checkel 2005).  
The three types of negotiations indicated in Table 3.4 are interdependent and 
occurred in parallel. For example the sectoral, “issue-area specific” negotiations in 
the GATS 2000 negotiations mostly took place in bilateral negotiations (not 
documented) or inside the CTS-SS alongside the issue-area framework setting 
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negotiations and the differentiation between the different types of negotiations 
required distinct care and attention. There were interlinkages not only between 
different negotiation types, but also between issue areas and different stages in the 
negotiation process. Agenda setting turned out to be a process that did not end with 
the establishment of a formal agenda, but continued while negotiations already 
started. The complexity of the negotiations thus had to be taken into account in the 
analysis in this dissertation. To follow the coalitions in the WTO proved another 
challenge: often coalitions were highly informal and only partially reported about at 
best; so that interview data needed to be generated to arrive at an account of the 
coalitions’ development.  
Interviews delivered a practical, first-hand insight into the negotiations, but due to job 
rotation, interviewees covered time periods and different negotiations to varying 
extents. When using expert interviewing as in this thesis, this job rotation in 
institutions obviously poses an obstacle. Nonetheless, the interviews proved 
extremely useful to obtain an insight into the crucial, informal side of the negotiations 
in the WTO. The detailed information on coalitions in the services negotiations, set 
out in detail in Annex 4 (Sect. 12.4), would otherwise not have been available. The 
interviews also delivered evaluations on the different events in the negotiations, both 
from an EU and a non-EU point of view, and explanations on the technical issues in 
the services trade negotiations. EU officials commented on the internal motivations 
behind the EU’s moves, which greatly supported the analysis in the case study. 
Interviewees brought my attention especially to the nature of the regime and its 
impact on the negotiations as a further dimension in the EU’s difficulties in using its 
resources effectively in the WTO. 
The time period 1995-2005, chosen for this thesis, allowed us to observe the 
functioning of the WTO in the first ten years of its existence, the agenda-setting 
process preceding the Doha Round and the decisive first four years of the Doha 
Round negotiations. Within this time period, crucial developments in terms of the 
EU’s power impact on the WTO occurred and were integrated into the EU’s approach 
to the WTO. The time period chosen hence gave us the opportunity to analyse the 
EU’s role during an important time of change in the international trade regime. 
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10.4   Outlook 
The actor-centred power approach developed and utilised in this thesis could be 
carried further into a range of interesting and challenging directions: the research 
could be expanded to other issue areas in the WTO, to other time periods in the 
WTO or to other regimes the EU is involved in. This could greatly further our 
understanding of the EU’s impact in the GPE. Alternatively, the concept could be 
applied to other actors in the GPE, hence furthering our understanding of the role of 
different actors in international regimes. With regard to EU trade policy, it could be 
especially interesting to investigate the (diffuse) factors that shape the EU trade 
policy domestically, such as businesses and NGOs. There is also surprisingly little 
literature on the national processes in the EU member states, which feed into the 
development of the EU trade policy. The EU’s trade policy, though long established 
and prominent, is thus an area requiring and deserving further academic attention. 
What does the analysis in this thesis suggest for the future of EU trade policy 
making? With Lamy’s departure as trade commissioner and the round falling further 
into limbo in 2006, the EU’s firm commitment to “multilateralism” seems to have 
started to become less strong and the EU has entered negotiations for a new 
generation of bilateral trade agreements. This move was not only initiated by the EU 
though; in fact it seems that some of the EU’s trading partners had urged the EU to 
negotiate new bilateral or interregional trade agreements with them. This movement 
towards bilateralism was also not limited to the EU; other WTO members had also 
turned to negotiating bilateral agreements.386 The increasing complexity in the WTO 
negotiations might hence induce a rise in EU and worldwide bilateralism. Although 
bilateralism is of course not a new form of managing the international trade regime, 
the current move to bilateralism might prove qualitatively different from former 
bilateralism, because of the effects of the power shift on the multilateral trade regime. 
                                            
386 Apparently, the Andean Community, ASEAN and Central American countries had asked the EU for 
bilateral agreements, but the EU had kept them waiting (interview 35). Two interviewees indicated 
that due to the meagre results in the services negotiations their domestic colleagues were already 
heavily involved in bilateral negotiations (interview 16, 21). It seems that bilaterally, trading partners 
show greater flexibility with regard to the special needs of their negotiation partner (interview 23). A 
former EU official also observed a higher commitment by the ACP in the interregional Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the EU than in the WTO process (interview 3).  
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The difficulties arising from negotiating a regulatory issue like services, which is 
qualitatively so different from the “traditional” areas of trade policy, multilaterally does 
indeed raise the question whether in the case of regulatory issues a comprehensive 
institution like the WTO is the way forward. Specialised regimes might provide a 
more tailored approach to the difficulties of regulatory cooperation and liberalisation. 
A move towards bilateral regulatory cooperation in certain of the EU’s trade relations 
was already visible prior to 2006 (see for example IUST 12.03.2004 and IUST 
18.02.2005). Additionally, specialised regimes or bilateral agreements could contain 
the complexity of the negotiations. The obvious disadvantage of bilateralism for the 
EU is the heavy burden it puts on the Commission’s resources. Even the European 
Commission would encounter resource constraints in managing bilateral trade 
relations at some stage.  
What would this all mean for the WTO? An EU official suggested that the WTO would 
have to be kept in place, as a “symbol” (interview 4), rather than as primary place for 
shaping the international trade regime. What we have seen in this thesis is that the 
WTO might be suffering from its own success: it was such a successful regime that it 
became overcrowded both in terms of members and in terms of issue areas under its 
heading. It might hence be losing its greatest advantage, which was to produce 
effective, commercially relevant results for its members.  
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12 Appendices 
12.1   Annex 1: The three main paradigms in regime theory in 
comparison 
Table 12.1 The three main paradigms in regime theory in comparison  
 Realism Liberalism Cognitivism 
Regime formation Positive gains out of 
cooperation under 
anarchy; facilitated by 
hegemon. 
Bipolar or bimodal 
distribution of power is 
necessary for the 
success of regime 
formation. 
The greater the degree 
of symmetry in the 
distribution of power, 
the more likely is a 
success in regime 
formation. 
The existence of a 
small group of great 
powers (i.e. a direc-
torate) enhances 
prospects for regime 
formation. 
States cooperate to 
achieve joint gains and 
to increase certainty 
and transparency in 
international politics 
Necessary conditions 
for regime formation: 
joint gains/contract 
zone of agreement. 
Success depending on 
the process of bar-
gaining: conditions for 
that are integrative 
bargaining and a veil of 
uncertainty; equity of 
options; availability of 
salient solutions; ex-
ogenous shocks or 
crises; policy priority of 
the issue; or a low pri-
ority for all participants; 
concentration on 
scientific rather than 
political issues; the 
greater the role of 
negotiators with sci-
entific or technical 
considerations/com-
petence; participation 
of all relevant parties; 
availability of compli-
ance mechanisms; 
emergence of indi-
vidual leadership. 
Concentrate on im-
portance of the 
structure for the later 
regime characteristics 
Shared beliefs and 
assumptions con-
cerning the issue area 
create converging 
expectations, beliefs 
about causal effects. 
Impact of epistemic 
communities on the 
decision making 
process, especially 
when levels of uncer-
tainty increase. 
The coordinating 
function of ideas 
influences the content 
of the regime. 
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Persistence   Emphasise the role of 
epistemic communities 
as defenders of the 
regime. 
Change or mainte-
nance 
 Regimes incorporate 
“sunk costs”, states 
also “consider” their 
reputation and thus 
rather comply. 
Due to change in 
underlying ideas and 
norms. 
Norms can “survive” in 
a regime. 
Demise/destruction of 
a regime 
Decline of hegemon. 
Change in the distri-
bution of capabilities. 
Change in interests. E.g. by disagreement in 
the epistemic 
community which sup-
ported the regime 
(Haas 1993: 189). 
Rational actor Yes, maximise relative 
and absolute gains. 
Rational egoists; goal: 
maximise absolute 
gains. 
No 
Role of the state Primacy of the state Impact of the structure 
on regime rather than 
state power 
 
Role of international 
institutions 
Minimal in the main-
stream, post-classicals 
assume that institutions 
are structured by and 
reflect the distribution 
of power in interna-
tional society 
  
Role of non-state 
actors 
Only as background 
variables 
Generally state-ori-
ented, sometimes 
incorporation of IGOs 
and epistemic com-
munities; firms and 
non-profit NGOs hardly 
considered. 
Epistemic communi-
ties/advocacy or-
ganisation influence 
regime (creation, 
sometimes even state 
interests). 
Source: Adaptation from Young and Osherenko 1993: 248-251; Arts 2000; Hasenclever et al. 1996 
and 2000 
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12.2   Annex 2: Provisions on Commercial Policy in the EC Treaty 
Box 12.1 Article 133 of the EC Treaty 
Article 133 
1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to 
changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in 
measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in 
the event of dumping or subsidies. 
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common commercial 
policy. 
3. Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need to be negotiated, 
the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to 
open the necessary negotiations. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring 
that the agreements negotiated are compatible with internal Community policies and rules. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed 
by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the 
Council may issue to it. The Commission shall report regularly to the special committee on the pro-
gress of negotiations. 
 
The relevant provisions of Article 300 shall apply. 
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act by a qualified major-
ity. 
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall also apply to the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of 
trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, in so far as those agreements 
are not covered by the said paragraphs and without prejudice to paragraph 6. By way of derogation 
from paragraph 4, the Council shall act unanimously when negotiating and concluding an agreement 
in one of the fields referred to in the first subparagraph, where that agreement includes provisions for 
which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules or where it relates to a field in which the 
Community has not yet exercised the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty by adopting internal 
rules. 
The Council shall act unanimously with respect to the negotiation and conclusion of a horizontal 
agreement insofar as it also concerns the preceding subparagraph or the second subparagraph of 
paragraph 6. 
This paragraph shall not affect the right of the Member States to maintain and conclude agreements 
with third countries or international organisations in so far as such agreements comply with Commu-
nity law and other relevant international agreements. 
6. An agreement may not be concluded by the Council if it includes provisions which would go beyond 
the Community's internal powers, in particular by leading to harmonisation of the laws or regulations of 
the Member States in an area for which this Treaty rules out such harmonisation. In this regard, by 
way of derogation from the first subparagraph of paragraph 5, agreements relating to trade in cultural 
and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services, shall fall within 
the shared competence of the Community and its Member States. Consequently, in addition to a 
Community decision taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 300, the negotiation of 
such agreements shall require the common accord of the Member States. Agreements thus negoti-
ated shall be concluded jointly by the Community and the Member States.  
The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport shall continue to be 
governed by the provisions of Title V and Article 300.  
7. Without prejudice to the first subparagraph of paragraph 6, the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may extend the applica-
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tion of paragraphs 1 to 4 to international negotiations and agreements on intellectual property in so far 
as they are not covered by paragraph 5. 
Source: European Union 2001 
12.3  Annex 3: EU-25 trade with its main partners in services 
Table 12.2 EU-25 trade with its main partners, total services (in million EUR) 
  2004 2005 
Rank* Trading partner Export Import Balance Export Import Balance 
1 Switzerland 45734 34407 11326 49565 36677 12888 
2 Japan 18712 10665 8047 19969 11871 8098 
3 USA 119979 109780 10200 122872 115967 6905 
4 Norway 13172 9396 3776 15117 9668 5450 
5 Russia 9094 6800 2294 11444 8125 3320 
6 Singapore 7483 5047 2435 8264 5521 2743 
7 Hong Kong 
(China) 
7209 5259 1950 8181 5645 2537 
8 Nigeria 2970 859 2111 3371 964 2408 
9 South Korea 5553 3281 2272 5725 3424 2300 
10 China 9121 7183 1939 11109 8848 2261 
11 Australia 7034 5198 1836 8054 5860 2194 
12 Taiwan 3130 2055 1075 3267 1978 1289 
13 Canada 8083 7122 961 8474 7642 832 
14 South Africa 4311 3966 345 4833 4031 802 
15 Mexico 3592 2741 851 3416 2653 763 
16 Chile 1278 815 463 1650 957 692 
17 Venezuela 937 474 463 1175 588 587 
18 Israel 3047 1997 1050 2829 2249 580 
19 India 3759 3962 -203 5261 4688 573 
20 Brazil 3725 3452 273 4460 3939 522 
21 Malaysia 1911 1507 404 1943 1518 425 
22 New Zealand 1499 1161 339 1638 1318 319 
23 Iceland 536 629 -93 768 628 140 
24 Uruguay 252 207 45 318 203 115 
25 Indonesia 1073 1051 22 1157 1047 110 
26 Philippines 824 731 93 912 857 55 
27 Argentina 1210 1201 8 1472 1417 54 
28 Romania 2379 2296 84 2871 3058 -187 
29 Liechtenstein 399 492 -94 407 611 -204 
30 Bulgaria 1089 1661 -571 1144 2044 -900 
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31 Morocco 1499 2970 -1471 1403 3018 -1614 
32 Thailand 1717 3357 -1640 1821 3736 -1915 
33 Croatia 1725 3748 -2022 1722 4423 -2701 
34 Egypt 1819 4164 -2345 2226 4933 -2708 
35 Turkey 3920 9669 -5749 4456 10636 -6180 
*ordered according to EU25 net in 2005 
Source: Eurostat 2007a 
12.4   Annex 4: Coalitions and cooperation in the services 
negotiations  
As mentioned in the chapters above, much cooperation in the services negotiations 
does not happen in formal coalitions (as for example the “Cairns Group” in the 
agriculture negotiations). Cooperation often seems to occur informally. Negotiators 
that are “close” to the EU negotiators can have very frequent contacts with the EU, 
frequent phone calls are made and lunch appointments (interview 21). This can at 
least partially be attributed to the fact that the services negotiations are of regulatory 
nature and comprise a range of vastly different sectors so that interests are often too 
diverging to form formal coalitions. Still, informal coalitions do exist in the services 
negotiations.  
In “Geneva speech”, the proponents of the services negotiations are referred to as 
the “demandeurs”. As the “demandeurs” are no formal coalition, there is no official 
list of who the “demandeurs” are. Interviewees indicated that looking at the sponsors 
of the plurilateral requests could give an indication: 
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Table 12.3 Identifying the “demandeurs” in the services negotiations387  
Sponsors of the plurilateral requests  
Australia (Air, Ar, Comp, Cons, Edu, En, Env, Fin, Leg, Log, Mar, Tel) 
Canada (Ar, Comp, Cons, En, Env, Leg, Log, Mar, Tel) 
Chile (Air, Ar, Comp, Cross, Log) 
Djibouti (Log) 
Ecuador (Fin) 
EU (Air, Ar, Comp, Cons, En, Env, Fin, Leg, Log, Mar, Pos, Tel) 
Hong Kong (China) (Audio, Comp, Cross, Fin, Log, Mar, Tel) 
Iceland (Log, Mar) 
India (Comp, Cross) 
Japan (Ar, Audio, Comp, Cons, En, Env, Fin, Leg, Log, Mar, Pos, Tel) 
Korea (Ar, Comp, Cons, En, Env, Fin, Log, Mar, Tel) 
Liechtenstein (Log) 
Malaysia (Cons, Edu) 
Mauritius (Log) 
Mexico (Ar, Audio, Comp, Cons, Cross, Mar) 
New Zealand (Air, Ar, Comp, Cons, Cross, Leg, Log, Mar, Pos) 
Nicaragua (Log) 
Norway (Air, Ar, Comp, Cons, En, Env, Fin, Leg, Log, Mar, Tel) 
Pakistan (Comp, Cross) 
Panama (Log, Mar) 
Peru (Comp, Log) 
                                            
387 Air = air transport services; Ar = Architectural, Engineering and Integrated Engineering Services; 
Audio = audiovisual services; Comp = computer and related services; Cons = Construction services; 
Cross = cross border supply of services (Mode 1); Edu = private education services; En = Energy 
services; Env = Environmental services; Fin = financial services; Leg = legal services; Log = 
logistics services; Mar = maritime transport services; Pos = Postal and courier services (incl. 
express delivery); Tel = Telecommunication services. Countries that can definitely be counted as a 
“demandeur” are marked in bold. Others have rather sectoral interests only. The Mode 4 request 
and the request on distribution services were not available. An interviewee indicated as the 
demandeurs or the members of the “very good Friends” the US, EU, Japan, Canada, Hong Kong 
(China), China, Mexico, Chile, Switzerland, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Australia (or roughly the 
OECD plus Chile, Mexico, Hong Kong (China), Singapore, India) (interview 19). Obviously, as the 
“very good Friends” are an informal coalition, this is an approximation of its membership rather than 
“hard facts”. Within the “demandeurs”, the most “natural” allies for the EU are the countries 
surrounding the EU geographically: Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Norway and Switzerland. The 
Norwegians have aligned their position completely to the EU, not so the Swiss (interview 21). Before 
the 2004 enlargement, the 10 2004 accession countries plus Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia 
coordinated their positions with the EU. After the 2004 enlargement, this coordination seems to have 
come to a halt. Clearly, however, candidate countries would try to align themselves as much as 
possible with the EU position, because they do not want to risk causing any friction with the EU 
(anonymous interviewee). At times, it seems that the Anglo-Saxon countries, the US, UK, New 
Zealand, Australia have a common position, which might be due to their similar regulatory system 
(interview 24). 
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Saudi-Arabia (En) 
Singapore (Audio, Cons, Cross, En, Log, Tel) 
Switzerland (Air, Ar, Cross, Env, Log, Mar 
Taiwan (Audio, Comp, Cons, Cross, Edu, En, Env, Fin, Log, Mar, Tel) 
Turkey (Cons) 
USA (Ar, Audio, Comp, Cons, Edu, En, Env, Fin, Leg, Log, Pos, Tel) 
Source: plurilateral requests (available from http://www.esf.be) 
The “demandeurs” convene in the – allegedly very - informal coalition of “the very 
good Friends of services”. Many of the “very good Friends” countries are the 
coordinators of the different Friends groups. The group discusses the objectives of 
the sectoral Friends groups (interview 9, interview 19).  
An important part of technical discussions in the services negotiations seems to take 
place in the so-called “Friends groups”. The “Friends groups” are sectoral coalitions 
of the “demandeurs”.388 Friends groups involve the most active countries in the 
services negotiations, mostly developed countries. The Friends groups are 
technocratic discussion forums for expert negotiators, which concentrate entirely on 
technical issues like classifications and the discussion of positions (i.e. this is 
completely different from the political forum “Green Room”).389 The effect of the 
Friends groups on the negotiation process is contested. Clearly, they were places for 
                                            
388 The Friends are entirely informal; and their cooperation can be very intense or rather loose. There 
is no public record of Friends group activity, as the “beauty” of these groups is their informality. 
Formalising the groups would apparently destroy the Friends group, as they are made for open and 
informal debate. The Commission has records of the Friends group meetings in the form of notes of 
the participating negotiators. These notes are not publicly available and have also not leaked to the 
internet. 
389 Some Friends groups have some developing country members. Access to the Friends groups is by 
invitation of the existing members; and the Friends’ activities include consultation and the 
development of papers and proposals. For the EU, only the Commission negotiators take part in 
Friends group meetings (interview 2, 3). The way that the Commission presented its involvement in 
the Friends groups is, according to a NGO representative, that it was much more active than the US 
(interview 35). An EU official suggested that the EU had an especially strong role in those Friends 
groups that it chaired: energy and environment. Japan is said not to be very active in the Friends 
groups and Canada seemed constrained by its narrow interests (interview 9, 17). 
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consultation and technical experiments,390 but it is questionable to what extent they 
would actually lead countries to make market access commitments (interview 6). An 
EU official lamented that the Friends groups had wasted most of the time with 
discussion among themselves, but had failed to communicate their ideas to the rest 
of the WTO members. When the Friends groups - after long discussions - sent 
communications to other WTO members, these would often not give much attention 
to the ideas presented in those communications. Only with the plurilateral 
approaches the Friends had turned more to the outside (interview 9). An interviewee 
from a developing country had a similar assessment of the situation: the Friends in 
his point of view had for a long time focused on technical discussions among 
themselves, rather than reaching out to the broader membership (interview 19). 
Equally, the Friends groups’ work might have been impeded by their exclusiveness 
(interview 9). Being mostly composed of developed countries, they also encountered 
problems understanding the concerns of the broader WTO membership. The 
interviewee said that the Friends group negotiators seemed to lack an understanding 
of the political sensitivities involved in the services negotiations for many countries 
and therefore had failed to make proposals searching and exploiting a common 
ground. In this way, they had been discussing on the grounds of an OECD type of 
regulatory framework, which then was very difficult to “sell” to the broader WTO 
membership (interview 19). After the plurilateral requests had been presented in 
February/March 2006, the Friends groups did not meet again, as discussion had 
shifted to this new forum. However, with the ceasing of the plurilateral process they 
might regain importance (interview 17). 
                                            
390 Compared to the Uruguay Round, they seem to have lost in importance (interview 28). An EU 
official gave an example: Australia invited all its “target markets” to a first meeting for the “Friends of 
legal services”, among these Hong Kong (China), Brazil, Thailand, Malaysia. Many countries did not 
have an interest in the group, and therefore never again participated in meetings of the group after 
this first time. The remaining Friends group moved on to discuss the classification issue in legal 
services. The EU played a very active role and the official estimated that this constituted a “real 
success story”, because the Friends developed a proposal for a new classification. The paper that 
was subsequently developed was co-signed by several developing countries (TN/S/W/37). However, 
despite this interim success for the EU, the paper had been developed without a linkage to market 
access, and when the discussion turned to market access issues, a range of “not so liberal” 
countries left the Friends group (interview 6).  
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Due to the informal and undocumented way in which the Friends groups function, 
there is no record of who participates in these groups. The sponsors of the 2006 
plurilateral requests can be taken as an indication of who is associated with which 
sectoral Friends group.  
Table 12.4 Presumed members of the Friends groups 
Group presumed members 
Air transport Australia, Chile, the European Communities, New Zealand, Norway 
and Switzerland  
Architectural, Engineering 
and Integrated 
Engineering Services 
Australia, Canada, Chile, the European Communities, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States 
Audiovisual services  Hong Kong (China), Japan, Mexico, Singapore, the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and the United States 
Computer and related 
services  
Australia, Canada, Chile, the European Communities, Hong Kong 
(China), India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and the United States 
Construction services Australia, Canada, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu, the European Communities, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Turkey, 
and the United States of America 
Cross border supply of 
services (Mode 1) 
Chile, Hong Kong (China), India, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Switzerland, Singapore, The Separate customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu  
Distribution services n/a 
Education (private) 
services 
Australia, Chinese Taipei, Malaysia and the United States  
Energy services Australia, Canada, the European Communities, Japan, Norway, The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Republic of Korea, Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Singapore, the United 
States 
Environmental services  Australia, Canada, the European Communities, Japan, Korea, Norway, 
Switzerland, The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu, and the United States 
Financial services  Australia, Canada, the European Communities, Ecuador, Hong Kong 
(China), Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and the United States 
Legal services  Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and the USA  
Logistics services  Australia, Canada, Chile, Djibouti, the European Communities, Hong 
Kong (China), Iceland, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Singapore, Switzerland, 
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and 
Matsu, and the United States 
Maritime services  Australia, Canada, the European Communities and its Member States, 
Hong Kong (China), Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Switzerland, the Separate Customs 
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Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu 
Postal and courier 
services, incl. express 
delivery 
EU, Japan, New Zealand, US 
Telecommunication 
services  
Australia, Canada, the European Communities, Hong Kong (China), 
Japan, Republic of Korea, Norway, Singapore, the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and the United States 
of America. 
 
Source: based on the 2006 plurilateral requests (available from http://www.esf.be) 
With regard to the (mostly) defensive countries, as for the “demandeurs” there is no 
formal coalition of the defensive players in the services negotiations. However, there 
is informal coordination among the various groupings that can be understood to be 
part of the defensive side of the negotiations. Membership in the various groupings 
can overlap. 
As has been mentioned before, the core of the negotiations takes place between the 
“demandeurs” and a range of emerging economies. These main target countries for 
requests are called (in “Geneva speech”) the “critical mass” countries. These are 
the countries whose markets are key targets for the “demandeurs”. Again, it is not 
entirely clear which countries belong to the “critical mass” countries, and they might 
differ across sectors, but it seems that up to 30 countries can be counted to this 
group. It appears that Brazil, Argentina, China, India, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Egypt, Morocco, South Africa and Nigeria are “critical 
mass countries”, as they have been identified as core recipients for plurilateral 
requests.391 As seen in chapter 9 above, these countries experience a special 
pressure to enter commitments, especially after LDC and other vulnerable 
economies have been exempted from commitments in this trade round.  
Of course, there are more defensive players in the services negotiations than the 
“critical mass” countries. As the developed countries try to coordinate among 
                                            
391 While the plurilateral requests leaked to the internet and an identification of the sponsors is 
possible, the recipients of the requests have been kept secret. TWN has identified a range of core 
recipients for the requests, which are used here as a first indication of who the “critical mass 
countries” are (TWN 2006). 
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themselves, the developing countries aim to “keep a common front”.392 Brazil’s 
influence on the defensive players seems crucial. According to an interviewee, 
Brazil’s new capacity to coordinate the opponents of service liberalisation (compared 
to the Uruguay Round) has created a very effective opposition. Brazil is clearly 
viewed as the leader of the opponents (interview 9).393  
The LDC’s also aim to coordinate among themselves. As discussed in the earlier 
chapters, they have improved their representation in the negotiations in various 
ways.394 Comparable to this is the coordination between the ACP (WTO 2005).395 
Apart from the groupings discussed here, ASEAN, the African Group and Mercosur 
also play a role in the services negotiations. 
12.5   Annex 5: The position of key WTO members in the services 
negotiations  
While countries can be identified as generally offensive or defensive in the 
negotiations, interests are not as coherently distributed as in other negotiation areas. 
All actors have both offensive and defensive sectors and interests in the services 
area, which is one of the particularities and the uniqueness of the services 
                                            
392 An example of informal coordination of the defensive countries was prior and at the Hong Kong 
Ministerial, where they refused the benchmarks. In the plurilateral negotiations, they decided to 
block Mode 1 and 2 commitments, and commitments under Art. 18 GATS. They also coordinated 
their (defensive) approach against transparency in government procurement (interview 19). 
393 For example, Brazil apparently worked to prevent the G20 from co-signing proposals with 
developed countries (interview 6). This could indicate that while the G20 do not have a position on 
services, their positions might still end up aligned to each other due to informal channels of 
communication and cooperation. 
394 After realising that part of their exclusion in the negotiations was due to a lack of manpower, LDC 
established focal points and appointed a spokesperson (interview 27). They have an overall 
representative (in 2006: Zambia) and focal points for each negotiation area. For services it was 
Rwanda, and in 2006 Uganda. 32 LDC are currently WTO members. Often, 1-2 persons in national 
delegations are conducting the whole of the WTO negotiations, so that the focal points take over 
crucial work for them. As discussed before, the LDC are exempted from committing in the Doha 
Round, but have identified a set of priorities for themselves. The LDC demand a) an 
operationalisation of special treatment; b) movement on mode 4 (see paper in May 2006); and c) 
that the situation of LDC should be recognised in the domestic regulation negotiations. While the 
LDC are no longer being requested, commitments will be extended to them via MFN (interview 22).  
395 Apart from the groupings discussed here, ASEAN, the African Group and Mercosur also play a role 
in the services negotiations. 
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negotiations (interview 17). This section introduces how the positions of some of the 
key players in the negotiations were perceived by interviewees. 
Brazil: Brazil is perceived as extremely defensive in the services negotiations. 
Consequently, it has started to act as leader of the defensive developing countries 
(interview 9, 16). Brazil is rather interested in designing “good safeguards” than 
achieving good new market access (interview 25). Brazil’s defensive position is 
certainly partially strategic (interview 23), however, it might find itself in a defensive 
position in its region and in Mercosur as well (interview 18). For the EU, “negotiations 
with them have been a bit difficult” (interview 3).  
India: India has shifted its position in the services negotiations from a hesitant one to 
a more active one. It has taken on a (partial?) demandeur position, and has made an 
extensive offer which gave it leverage in the negotiations. Its co-leadership of the 
informal group in the run-up to the Hong Kong Ministerial can be seen as a sign of 
this changed position. India has offensive interests in Mode 4, including on skilled 
persons. In line with its chairmanship of the Friends groups, India now seems to push 
strongly for movement on Mode 4 and cross-border supply of services. However, 
even India, a major trade power, has only one (part-time) services expert in its 
Geneva delegation plus 1-2 experts domestically. (interview 15, 17, 18, 31). India 
also seems to be switching from its main interest being on Mode 4 to developing 
broader interests in the services negotiations, for example on Mode 3 (interview 30, 
31). 
USA: While the US was the explicit sponsor of the services negotiations in the 
Uruguay Round, it now seems to play a less prominent role (interview 28). However, 
it is unclear to what extent the US’ position on services has changed, and whether 
this was driven by a loss of US power, interest or whether the US’ position is simply 
strategic. An EU official gave an example: he described the US as rather hesitant in 
the services negotiations; it had tried to avoid having too many meetings in Geneva. 
If the developing countries had questions in the meetings, the US would rather try to 
answer them bilaterally than in the plenum. However, the official attributed this to a 
different strategy rather than a disinterest, because in his point of view the US had 
clear interests in the services negotiations (interview 7). The US also did not submit 
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an ambitious offer, which could have put it in a leadership position in the negotiations 
(interview 21), which could indicate a lack of interest though. Two non-EU WTO 
interviewees criticised the US negotiators in Geneva for spending too much time on 
its defensive areas (mode 4 and maritime services), where the US did not move at all 
- while its domestic Ministries tried to pursue the offensive interests (interview 18, 
21). The two apparent defensive areas of the US are maritime services and Mode 4. 
An EU official felt that the US does not want to impede an outcome on maritime 
services, but does not want to make commitments either (interview 5). However, as 
other WTO members considered commitment by the US crucial, the maritime 
services negotiations turned into a game of “everyone against the US” (interview 6). 
An EU official also blamed the US for being a major stumbling block in the services 
negotiations due to its inability to move on Mode 4, which due to its linkage to market 
access can hold up further progress. The EU was therefore working to make the US 
move forward (interview 6). An EU industry representative indicated that there has 
been a change in the perception of the US by DG Trade. Rather than transparency 
and trust, a certain distrust has become enrooted in the transatlantic relationship 
(interview 32). 
China: China is seen as still very “low key” in the negotiations. China seems to still 
define its position. While it could have offensive interests, it might not pursue them as 
they might run counter the interests of other developing countries (interview 16). 
ASEAN: The eight ASEAN countries which are members of the WTO (Brunei, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore (though rather 
a demandeur!) and Thailand) are key target markets for the demandeurs. Still, the 
ASEANs seem to have dropped in importance as target market due to the 
emergence of China. They assume a rather protectionist stance in the negotiations 
due to domestic disinterest in the services negotiations. Interviewees indicated the 
discrepancy between their own agenda versus the agendas of their capital based 
experts. The Geneva based negotiators said they were more open to liberalisation 
than their capital counterparts or than domestic industries (interview 15, 16). This 
defensiveness, for example, leads them to be the major sponsors behind the ESM 
negotiations. The capacity of the ASEANs to analyse their own situation in service 
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trade is much advanced compared to other developing countries. Still, the lack of 
resources is evident. The example was given of a delegation with one junior official 
working on the services issue (although this is common across delegations), where 
the capital had not updated the position for months. Consequently, the delegation 
could not contribute anything new to the meetings. However, negotiators also 
suggested that in this case resources might be especially scarce due to a shift in 
priorities towards bilateral FTAs (anonymous interviewees). 
Other developing countries: For many other developing countries, it is even hard to 
identify their priorities for the negotiations (interview 3, 12). They also lack 
understanding of the negotiation process. This problem concerns for example many 
African countries, the Central Americans and Middle East countries (who do not even 
attend meetings) (anonymous interviewee). The LDC suffer from the same problem, 
but have used their group to identify a few general priorities (see above). Often 
though, they concentrate on the GATS framework rather than on specific 
commitments. They were for example holding others responsible for not 
implementing Art. 4 and 19, or they would concentrate on their interest on Mode 4, 
but fail to define their interests in terms of sectors (interview 3). While the resource 
constraints are evident, an interviewee suggested that this also has to do with a 
“traditionalist” mindset, a “we play defensive so why should we care”-attitude. Some 
would argue that in this way they are also losing out opportunities for gains 
(anonymous interviewee). 
An EU official doubted this assessed lack of interest in the services issue: 
over the last year or so I have been encouraged when talking to 
the LDC and ACPs, to see that they do see that trade in services 
offers a lot of potential in terms of development. […] they do feel they 
need more time. They don’t understand the issues enough; they don’t 
have the capacity to negotiate […]. 
While realising that these countries need more time, the Commission had to weigh 
this against what it thought could be a hugely beneficial agreement in the services 
sector and hence pressed for this. The result of the Hong Kong Ministerial (no 
commitment for LDC on services) was a result of the EU realising that the LDC were 
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not ready for services liberalisation. This signifies a see change in the Commission 
(interview 3). 
South and Central American countries (except for Costa Rica) assume in general 
defensive positions (interview 28). 
12.6  Annex 6: List of interviews396 
European Commission  
1. Former member of the European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 
30.05.2005 
2. Administrator, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 17.05.2005 
3. Former member of the European Commission, DG Trade, London, 12.04.2006  
4. Administrator, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 24.04.2006 
5. Administrator, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 25.04.2006 
6. Administrator, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 27.04.2006 
7. Administrator, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 27.04.2006 
8. Administrator, European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 28.04.2006 
9. Administrator, European Commission Permanent Delegation to the 
International Organisations in Geneva, Geneva, 12.06.2006 
10. Representative, European Commission Permanent Delegation to the 
International Organisations in Geneva, Geneva, 12.06.2006 
11. Former member of the European Commission, DG Trade, Geneva, 
16.06.2006 
Council of Ministers 
12. Advisor, [an EU member state] representation at the EU, Brussels, 28.05.2005 
                                            
396 Due to the strict confidentiality required by many interviewees, all interviews have been made 
anonymous (a list with full details about the interviewees has been provided separately to the 
external and internal examiner). 
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13. Advisor, [a national ministry], London, 26.05.2006  
Non-EU WTO members 
14. Former Director for International Organisations and European Union, Ministry 
of Finance, [a developed country WTO member], Leuven, 30.04.2005 
15. Counsellor, Permanent Mission of [a developing country WTO member] to the 
WTO, Geneva, 13.06.2006 
16. Minister and Counsellor, Permanent Mission of [a developing country WTO 
member] to the WTO, Geneva, 13.06.2006 
17. Counsellor, Permanent Mission of [a developing country WTO member] to the 
WTO, Geneva, 14.06.2006 
18. Deputy Representative of [a developed country WTO member] to the WTO, 
Geneva, 14.06.2006 
19. Counsellor, Permanent Mission of [a developing country WTO member] to the 
UN Office and other International Organisations in Geneva, Geneva, 
15.06.2006 
20. Counsellor, Permanent Mission of [a developed country WTO member], 
Geneva, 15.06.2006 
21. Counsellor, Permanent Mission of [a developed country WTO member] to the 
WTO, Geneva, 16.06.2006 
22. Economic Minister, Permanent Mission of [a developing country WTO 
member], Geneva, 19.06.2006 
23. Counsellor, Mission [of a developing country WTO member] to the WTO, 
Geneva, 20.06.2006 
24. Counsellor, Permanent Mission of [a developed country WTO member] to the 
WTO, Geneva, 20.06.2006 
25. Counsellor, Permanent Mission of [a developing country WTO member] to the 
WTO, Geneva, 21.06.2006 
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26. First secretary at the Permanent Mission of [a developing country WTO 
member] to the UN and International Organisations in Geneva, Geneva, 
21.06.2006 
International and Intergovernmental Organisations 
27. Expert, ACP Secretariat, Brussels, 28.03.2006 
28. Counsellor, WTO, Geneva, 13.06.2006 
29. Representative, South Centre, Geneva, 21.06.2006 
Industry 
30. Representative, European Services Forum, Brussels, 10.05.2005 
31. Representative, European Services Forum, Brussels, 27.03.2006 (follow-up 
interview) 
32. Advisor, Federation of German Industries (BDI), Brussels, 17.05.2005 
33. Advisor, Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe 
(UNICE), Brussels, 23.05.2005 
34. Representative, European Community Shipowner’s Association (ECSA), 
Brussels, 25.05.2006 
NGOs 
35. Representative, 11.11.11., Platform of the Vlaamse Nord-Zuidbeweging 
(Flamish North South Movement), Brussels, 17.05.2005 
12.7   Annex 7: Sample interview schedules  
For the type of expert interview conducted for this thesis, it proved useful to adapt the 
questionnaires to the organisational background, position and specialisation of each 
interviewee. This annex shows two sample questionnaires used in the interviews. 
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Box 12.2 Sample interview schedule for European Commission member 
Interview on “The EU in the WTO services negotiations” 
 
Process of the GATS 2000 negotiations 
1. Many analysts regard the Cancún Ministerial as marking the end of EU-US bipolarity in the 
WTO system. Can this be observed in the services negotiations as well? What effect has the 
emergence of the “new Quad” in the WTO had in the services negotiations? 
2. After the Cancún Ministerial, the EU had a phase of strategic repositioning. In your point of 
view, did the outcome of the Cancún Ministerial change your approach to the negotiations on 
services? If yes, what kind of changes did you make (Strategy? Demands? New coalitions?) 
3. What role did the new US-India led grouping play in the run-up to the Hong Kong Ministerial? 
Was it a successful coalition? Why was it led by the US and India?  
4. How did you try to build consensus for the benchmark proposal? Why did it fail? Why did the 
plurilateral approach succeed?  
5. In October, the EU made its new agriculture offer dependent on, among other issues, 
agreement on quantitative and qualitative benchmarks in the services negotiations. The 
benchmark proposal was rejected – why did the EU keep up its agriculture offer? 
6. Two apparent interim results in the GATS negotiations were the “Modalities for the treatment 
of autonomous liberalisation” (06 March 2003) and the “Modalities for the special treatment for 
LDCs”. Both reflect developing country interests. Are there interim results in the GATS 
negotiations that you would call an EU (or OECD/developed country) success? 
7. What effects has the Anti-GATS campaign in the early 2000s had on the EU’s strategy with 
regard to service? 
8. Do you estimate that you can achieve a higher level of commitments to services liberalisation 
and further rules setting in the current bilateral and interregional negotiations on services? 
Why has the Commission not yet adopted a negative list approach like the US? 
 
Further Information 
Can you recommend any other persons whose views would be useful in answering the questions 
raised by this research? 
 
Thank you for your time! 
Box 12.3 Sample interview schedule for a non-EU WTO member country 
Interview on “The EU in the WTO services negotiations” 
 
Assessment of the GATS 2000 negotiations 
1. If the current services offers were implemented, would there be new commercially viable 
market access for service providers from your country in foreign markets? How do you view 
this result? 
2. Would you say your country is more interested or less interested in multilateral services 
liberalisation via the GATS compared to the situation 10 years ago? Why? 
3. Do you think the negotiation dynamics in the services negotiations have changed since 2000? 
For instance, what effect has the emergence of the “new Quad” or G4 had on the services 
negotiations? 
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The EU in the services negotiations 
4. After the Cancún Ministerial, the EU had a phase of strategic repositioning. In your point of 
view, did the outcome of the Cancún Ministerial change the EU’s approach to the negotiations 
on services?  
5. In your experience, which resources and strategy does the EU use to communicate its 
position in the services negotiations to you? 
6. To what extent do you think the EU member states support the European Commission’s 
position in the WTO services negotiations? Have you observed diverging positions between 
the European Commission and its member states? 
7. In how far do you think the EU is successful in the services negotiations (e.g. in agenda-
setting, promoting or hindering outcomes, or in comparison to other actors)? Why is it 
successful or not successful? 
8. What, if any, is your experience with the European industry in support of the services 
negotiations?  
 
Further Information 
Can you recommend any other persons whose views would be useful in answering the questions 
raised by this research? 
 
Thank you for your time! 
  
